Attempting to determine solutions for unethical practices in the field, this research was designed to assess the effectiveness of public relations firms’ ethics statements in decreasing the incidence of malpractice. This study revealed an encouraging finding that practitioners working in firms with ethical parameters were significantly more likely to engage in ethical practices. Moreover, educating public relations practitioners about the content of ethics statement could positively influence their ethical practices. At the same time, this study’s findings suggest further questions for (...) consideration in future scholarship and in the application of ethics statements to practice within the field. (shrink)

v.1. Yuhak ŭi parwŏn kwa wansŏng -- v. 2. Chungguk Yuhak ŭi chŏn'gae -- v. 3. Han'guk ŭi Yuhak (sang) -- v. 4. Han'guk ŭi Yuhak (ha) -- v. 5. Ilbon kwa Pet'ŭnam ŭi Yuhak.

The paper examines consensual contractarianism John Rawls proposed in his A Theory of Justice, and develops the following criticism. The veil of ignorance device requires but cannot secure the neutrality of the primary goods. In the Rawlsian ‘original position’ of contract, the only relevant information the hypothetical choosers are allowed to have is that they all prefer to have some ‘primary goods’ rather than not to have any, and that they prefer to have more rather than less of the primary (...) goods. This stipulation entails that the ‘primary goods’ are neutral with regard to the diverging preferences of the choosers. In other words, for the Rawlsian contract to yield acceptable results, neutrality of the primary goods must hold. It cannot, however. Hence Rawls’ account of a consensual contract is untenable. The paper suggests that the difficulty is not rooted in the particular features of the Rawlsian theory but in the very idea of a consensual contract. (shrink)

Hindi interpretation of Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 387 vs. "objective" is all no doubt rather imprecise, but points toward an important truth. In fact, in the contrast between them, we can see, I believe, not merely a clash of methods, standards or styles in writing history, but, more deeply still, an instance of the general antithesis between a "formalist" and a "sympathetic" sensibility, one encountered over and over in humanistic studies.6 PLATO New in (...) this section is an essay on "Some Controversial Points of Plato Interpretation Reconsidered" (pp. 183-209). Its first two parts combat the view that Plato ever gave up the metaphysics of his "middle period," but they do so only by rehearsing familiar theses about the Idea of the Good and the "two worlds" theory. These pages afford nothing new (apart from an extremely unfortunate appeal [p. 185 and again on p. 230] to an Homeric usage of the genitive to settle a problem at Rep. 518C9). The third part (pp. 194209 ) expands upon some views about later Plato for which Mme. de Vogel is already widely known, and these are very useful indeed. They offer a welcome expansion and defense of her view that in order to "do justice" (196-197, cf. 228) to the famous phrase,o) 7r,,v,e)~r ~v,t at Soph. 248E7, we must concede that Plato came to assign "the motion of a thinking mind" (208-209) to the very being of the Ideas, i.e., came to regard "the intelligibleworld as a vo~r (p. 194). Two interesting objections to her reading are confronted at some length (pp. 200-206) and several others are more briefly dealt with, thus affording her a good chance to explain her view. Valuable as these pages are, however, their upshot is rather unsatisfactory: just what Plato's view would, on her reading of it, really come to, remains mightily obscure--an obscurity she tends to concede but to explain away as Plato's "seeming peculiar to a modern mind" though we can get some grip upon his views if we but "take the trouble to follow his lead" (pp. 201, 198; cf. pp. 228-230, etc.). Such reminders of the genuine strangeness of Plato's view can no doubt be healthy in themselves, but can also be stultifying when reiterated in the face of genuine dissatisfaction with the sense that she makes of his meaning. This situation is not helped by the fact that, at crucial junctures in her argument, she buttresses her case about Plato's meaning by appeals to Aristotle's report at de Anima 1.2, 404b18-27 (see pp. 193-194, 199-200, 208, 277-281, 384-385). As she rightly reports (pp. 280, 385), Prof. Harold Cherniss has vigorously opposed the view that Aristotle is there giving Plato's view at all; yet--despite the fact that she has dedicated this volume to Cherniss--she never makes any reference to his most extended and most powerful defense of his position on this text, and much less does she attempt to answer his argument. (See Cherniss' review of H. D. Saffrey's book--a book to which de Vogel does refer, and repeatedly--in Gnomon 31 [1959], 36-51.) This matter is crucial, not merely as a bibliographical nicety, but because she tends to argue ]rom this text, maintaining that, however peculiar and isolated the sense of Soph. 248-249 and of certain phrases in the Timaeus may, on her reading of them, seem, this text proves that Plato must be read in her way. If it is not about Plato's view at all, it of course proves no such thing. The full weight of her argument will thus be borne by her view of how best to "do justice" to the text of Soph. 248E. Though she makes a clear and reasonable case 6 See Leo Steinberg's comments on this contrast as encountered in current art criticism: Other Criteria (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), Essay 3 (especially pp. 63-68). His remarks about the prescriptive or "interdictory stance" of formalism also fit an important aspect of Burkert's book--an aspect which, though not articulated by her, accounts (I suspect... (shrink)

I have spent 20 years preparing for the translation of Heidegger’s Being and Time. In these 20 years, I spent 10 years in Germany writing the master and doctoral thesis on Heidegger in order to understand Heidegger’s thoughts properly. Later on I spent other 10 years teaching Heidegger’s philosophy at university while translating Being and Time into Korean. At that time, there were already 4 different translations of Being and Time in Korean. But because these translations were based on Japanese (...) translations, many concepts and terms were ungraspable by ordinary Korean people. Impressed with Heidegger’s use of the ordinary words as important philosophical concepts, I also did my best to translate Being and Time using ordinary Korean words. (shrink)

In ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, Berlin wavered between two readings of the concept of positive liberty. In the first one, ‘positive liberty’ is a distinct concept, different from that of ‘negative liberty’. Those who advocate liberty in the negative sense and those who advocate it in the positive sense do not disagree on which interpretation of the same thing – ‘liberty’ – is the correct one; they speak about different things. Both defend valid ideals, although those ideals may not be (...) simultaneously achievable. In the second reading, negative and positive liberty are competing interpretations of the same concept, the defenders of negative liberty being involved in a substantive disagreement with the advocates of positive liberty on what the same term – ‘liberty’ – really means. On this understanding, negative and positive liberty cannot both be valid ideals: one of them (negative liberty) is a genuine value, the other (positive liberty) being nothing but the perversion of it. My article aims to uncover the roots of this ambiguity in unresolved difficulties in Berlin’s account of the history of the ideas of negative and positive liberty and, more importantly, in his conception of value pluralism. (shrink)

The association of emotions as kinds of affections is not unusual. This essay, however, considers whether the tight association between affections and emotions is conceptually satisfactory and advantageous. Does an emphasis on the boundedness of affections and emotions inadvertently mask their distinctive natures? In turning to Gustafson, Aquinas, and, ultimately, Edwards, I propose that, while affections are not emotionless, noticing their differences can reveal the limitations of the emotions for moral deliberation and draw greater attention to the moral significance of (...) the affections. (shrink)

In this dissertation, a logical analysis of points of view is presented. It is based on the concept of determinable presented by Johnson in his book Logic. A point of view is a set of Determinables. Determinables generate a many-dimensional conceptual space. Concepts are subsets of this space, and their relations form a lattice. A logical system to present points of view is introduced and proved to be complete. Some applications of this logic are demonstrated (relative identity, scientific change, inductive (...) logic etc.). (shrink)

This essay provides an interpretation of Jonathan Edwards's moral thought that calls attention to the motif of perception in his conception of true virtue. The aim is to illumine the extent to which Edwards's virtue ethics can be included in and contribute to prevailing approaches to virtue in contemporary theological ethics. To advance this proposal, this essay attends to the question of moral agency that Edwards's reflections on charity, the new spiritual sense, and religious affections raise. This procedure offers an (...) acute sense of the significance of perception for Edwards's virtue ethics, which in turn allows for a constructive Edwardsean entry into current theological discussions on the narrative character of virtue. (shrink)

A nation is not a creation of the brain but a collective experience. It does not equal the sum of the individuals that compose it but transcends that sum like a global personality that is not only juridical (although there once was a “League of Nations”) but also moral in the highest sense of the word.We may ask ourselves if liberty is indetermination, nonalienation and autonomy in its accomplishment; if it is congenial in the genetic code of the nation for (...) its entire existence or, on the contrary, if there is not a sort of dialectic, that is, historic, aleatory and problematic relationship between these two realities. In fact, there is danger in the desire to find a similarity, even by analogy, between the life of nations and a biological process. The nation is a historical phenomenon appearing through a chain of circumstances in 19th-century Europe, theorized by Europe and often born elsewhere as a reaction to European imperialism. The Nation is largely a bourgeois idea and reality. (shrink)

There is an embarrassing polarization of opinions about the status of economics as an academic discipline, as reflected in epithets such as the Dismal Science and the Queen of the Social Sciences. This collection brings together some of the leading figures in the methodology and philosophy of economics to provide a thoughtful and balanced overview of the current state of debate about the nature and limits of economic knowledge. Authors with partly rival and partly complementary perspectives examine how abstract models (...) work and how they might connect with the real world, they look at the special nature of the facts about the economy, and they direct attention towards the academic institutions themselves and how they shape economic research. These issues are thus analysed from the point of view of methodology, semantics, ontology, rhetoric, sociology, and economics of science. (shrink)

This study formulates a conception of knowledge in interactive practice disciplines such as education and health care and clarifies different types of knowledge in these disciplines. Focus is on the relationship between practical and theoretical knowledge. Four theses are discussed: (1) the role of knowledge in an interactive practice is to guide practice; (2) different types of knowledge in an interactive practice consist of value-knowledge, factual knowledge and procedural knowledge, parts of which are unarticulated, parts articulated; (3) science is a (...) way of articulating and creating knowledge that can be used as internal action determinants in the practice concerned; and (4) theories in an interactive practice can have both a theoretical and a practical purpose but the theoretical purpose is also indirectly linked to the practical. (Author/JD). (shrink)

This essay focuses on the growing disconnect between the diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) commitments of universities and their enrollment practices and considers the economic concerns buttressing this divergence. In response, this essay encourages universities—both administration and faculty—to reexamine the kinds of sacrifices necessary to recruit and support a student body that aligns with their DEI commitments.

Sustained reflection on multiple expressions of Asian American experience directs us to the coercive logic of racial identities. Noticing this logic is critical to identifying the limitations of several strategies to resist and transcend racial injustice, including the demand for racial recognition. Rereading the Parable of the Good Samaritan as one about the perils of racial identity and then taking cues from the nonviolent practice of truth force provide a blueprint that reimagines the liberative role racial identities can play.

THIS ESSAY CONSIDERS THE COLOR-BLIND MORALITY OF POSTRACIAL discourse, whether racial identity is to be considered suspect or simply "forgotten," or whether it can play a constructive role in public life. I pursue this question by turning to two accounts of racial identity, a liberal-multicultural conception and a social perspective conception of racial identity. The latter, I argue, better meets the primary objections to the former and offers an advantageous framework within which to evaluate postracial assumptions. Racial difference does not (...) need to be considered a threat to political community but can be envisioned in a way that supports the kind of political and moral deliberation necessary to support and advance a society committed to justice. (shrink)

THIS ESSAY PROPOSES A CONCEPTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN art and ethics that moves away from popular causative understandings. Turning to select themes treated in the work of the literary theorist Elaine Scarry, the moral and aesthetical theology of Jonathan Edwards, and finally the philosophical reflections of Marcia Muelder Eaton, a more positive theoretical account of the moral relevance of art and various aesthetic experiences emerge. Central to this account is the observation that art objects, specifically those objects that can (...) be judged as beautiful, provoke a number of deliberative practices. These practices range from the solitary to the relational. Special emphasis on the latter practices provide the conceptual space to reflect more imaginatively about the significance of art for the building of political community and the task of Christian ethics more generally. (shrink)