In today's world, the problems of culture have become world problems, as are those of the protection of the environment, the rational use of natural resources, the demographic situation, international disarmament and the prevention of war. We speak of a “cultural explosion” with regard to the very lively interest that culture arouses today and the increasing needs in this area. We can expect this development to continue, but what is the social significance of the process? What is its origin? To (...) what is it connected? (shrink)

Among all the possible choices of “objects” for collection, that of works of art is the richest in meaning. In this paper we propose to discover if this ages-old activity may be understood as a historical phenomenon or only interpreted as one of the expressions man may give of his relationship with the universe of artistic works.

The presence of the past is of prime importance in today's Mexican society. According to José Fuentes Mares, among the “peoples of the world the Mexican is the one who lives history the most”. With regard to the unsatisfactory relations between Mexico and North America, the journalist Alan Riding asks himself: “How can a people who relish the past to the point of intoxication understand another that looks constantly to the future?” In the Republic of Mexico, according to him, “the (...) entire past of the country throws a dense shadow over the present”. Conforming to a universal custom, every country divides its present past into four groups (survival, residues, memories and history), but in few nations are the four groups as copious as in this one. Although Mexico is rapidly shedding many old customs and is selling residual objects to foreign collectors on the sly, its historical treasure is still enormous, perhaps the largest in the world. (shrink)

For some time it has been fashionable in literary circles to reject what is called scornfully the biographical method. It was inevitable. No mode lasts forever. Sooner or later, there is a change. This method was the law for too long. It had no rival. Under its tutelage the motto for teaching literature was “the man, his work”. It was by its authority that students were taught that La Fontaine was in charge of waterways and forests and master of the (...) hunt before writing his Fables, that they had to learn by heart; or that Beaumarchais had been a clockmaker, musician, secret agent and business man before inventing the character of Figaro, proposed for their admiration. There has been a reaction. Our irreverent and contentious age has put an end to that absolute sovereignty. For a good quarter of a century this practice and the assumptions on which it rests has been on trial, in the name of the various and at times even contradictory conceptions and theories about the nature of literature. These have in common, however, the belief in the independence of literature with regard to the human being who was the instrument of its creation, as well as the anathema cast by this fact on what is commonly accepted as “referential illusion”. (shrink)

There is a tendency today to substitute the affirmation of the absolute value of peace for an earlier, fully-formulated ideal of universal peace. This formula, if I am not mistaken, bears the mark of a new exigency: how to maintain the philosophical task, that is, give a basis to the idea of peace that does not arise solely from circumstantial considerations—however imperious they may be, since they come from the knowledge of the danger that a new world war would bring (...) to entire populations—without again falling under Utopian illusions that have fed the projects of perpetual peace. However, some of the difficulties with which the present consideration will deal give a glimpse of the definition of peace as an absolute value. I think it would be wise to examine this definition briefly in order to clear a way for myself. (shrink)

“Biography” is a sober, precise and modern word. Like other words formed from a Greek root, it has a competent and knowing air. It makes a good appearance in the summary of reviews, on the platform at conferences, between “biology” and “bibliography,” between “necrology” and “radiography,” in that scientific elite of the lexicon that travels in “business” class from one language to another, always at home in the time belts, hotel lobbies, conference rooms or amphitheaters. Compared with this prosperity, the (...) word “Life” is old-fashioned, a poor relative doomed to retirement homes. In the period between the two wars it disappeared from bookstore windows and book jackets. The hesitations of André Maurois, the author of Aspects de la biographie (1928), are characteristic of a transition: he wavered between La Vie de Disraeli (1927), Ariel ou la vie de Shelley (1923), Prométhée ou la vie de Balzac (1965) and Byron (1930). We sense that the title Vie was on the way out or had to yield to a proper name or an allegorical figure. However, it was a word in good standing, nobly Latin in origin, as great a signore in its class as those Massimi or Colonna who claimed their ancestors were mentioned by Titus Livy. Its genealogy is still more ancient, if we recall that its metonymic and literary meaning in Latin is a translation of the Greek word Bios, which the Hellenes, inventors of the genre and who had a more pedantic use of their language than we do, were content to use up until the end. “Biography,” according to Liddell-Scott, is not found in Antiquity except in a very late neo-Platonian, Damaskios, who put this humorless escogriffe into circulation when twilight was descending on the Roman Empire, between the 5th and 6th centuries A.D., at the dawn of the Middle Ages. It made its entrance into modern languages in the last quarter of the 17th century, when the humanism of the Renaissance was coming to an end, and the Enlightenment was beginning its rise. This late and ill-boding word began a slow ascension, long delayed: it did not come into usage outside the circles of antiquarians until the 19th century. The old word “Life” proudly kept its importance until the ‘20s of our era in the particularly conservative language of titles of works. Its definitive effacement to the profit of “biography” brought that of the word “memoirs” or the word “confessions,” which yielded to “autobiography,” while “hagiography” without being able to impose itself so well in usage, took much gravity and credibility away from the “Lives of the Saints.”. (shrink)

Certain lives are transcribed like musical scores that compose themselves in a transparent register and whose traces—memories and written works—remain present, long-lasting or eternal. In a way, biography consists in deciphering them, then recomposing them through some process—condensation, for example—in modifying chronological time into writing-reading time or in shifting, regrouping certain facts or certain parameters. In some cases we discover that they give a dynamic and structure homologous or very near to those of narratives, epics or marvelous tales. The life (...) of Lou Andreas-Salomé belongs to these cycles that are, in some respects, exceptional. (shrink)

Nation and liberty: two ideas that in spite of the innumerable works that have been devoted to them are still open to new approaches, indeed, to new definitions. They pose a problem whose essence is to remain without a definitive answer, to be always actual, because it concerns man of all times, all countries and all conditions. This apparently-simple remark raises a question: is it possible to put nation and liberty on the same level? It is permissible to consider liberty (...) and nation as a pair forming a new concept, or do we simply have a relationship located in a precise time at a given place? (shrink)

To pose the question of myth and truth is to pose three complementary questions: that of myth, that of truth and that of their relationship. It is also to pose a still more fundamental question: that of knowing if the question of myth and truth is not badly put. a pseudo-problem. In other words, is there not a “myth” of the “myth” and, perhaps, of truth? More precisely, is there a philosophical problem of the myth that is not at the (...) same time a problem of language, of its usage and its claim to truth? The myth-philosophy-science hierarchization is not perhaps itself a “supermyth”? Is not myth always a certain philosophy? And science, is it not always an undertaking of testing concepts suffused in a non-scientific context, i.e., philosophical, religious or mythical? (shrink)

The subject to consider briefly here is certainly complex and difficult but especially abundant in epistemological misunderstanding and hermeneutic complications. To try to avoid all those pitfalls it is necessary to set up some rudimentary limits and recall some truisms of sociological analysis.

The extremely pernicious and paganly immoral principles stated by the Florentine secretary run counter to all national thought and have incontestably exercised a corrupting influence on it.F. SchlegelWe must be grateful to Machiavelli and other writers who like him have openly and without dissimulation shown not how men ought to act, but how they do normally act.F. BaconThe interpretation of Machiavelli's philosophy of history encounters specific difficulties. His contribution to the history of thought is unique and yet rooted in the (...) culture that was typical of the Renaissance; it constitutes—something rarely found among the creative spirits of the High Renaissance—the logical-historical limit of that culture, the critical point at which the contradictions that characterize it tragically come to light. (shrink)

At a time when there is general speculation about civilization, or civilizations, as well as on what the relationships are between Western and other civilizations, it is logical to try to define precisely what the men of ancient Greece thought about the question, since Western civilization owes so much to them.It may be that they did not think about it at all, or at least they thought nothing that could be expressed in modern terms. The fact is that ancient Greece (...) did not have a word for civilization: the French and English words come from Latin, not from Greek, while the first examples given in French and English dictionaries are the privileged example of Greece, “the civilization of Greece.” Did the Greeks use a paraphrase? Or a different word? If we consult a English-Greek dictionary we are surprised to see that the word given for “civilized” is hèmeros) that is, “docile,” “tamed.”. (shrink)

The productions of goods and the laws governing their exchange are no longer enough to account for the economic reality with regard to which the idea of crisis is generally invoked. The psychological, intellectual and moral motivations that support the activity of production are seen today as more and more decisive factors but ones that are evasive. Thus the stakes that would govern economic crises (but are they not something else?) must be sought on new ground, around mental incitements, ethical (...) references, networks of obligations that take the question of crisis beyond the economic domain, that would pose it in terms of civilizations. (shrink)

The word “legitimacy” and its derivations (legitimate, legitimation, etc.) are widely employed in scientific language as they also are in current usage. In fact, we find them in several areas, from that of reasoning (“this conclusion is legitimate”) to that of law (“judgment of legitimacy”, “legitimate family”) and politics (“legitimate sovereign”). It is particularly in this latter domain, however, that they have their normal use as qualifications for power, and it is this particular aspect that I shall consider in this (...) paper. In accredited political language “legitimacy” designates a principle, or criterion, of justification for power (acting and commanding) and, correlatively, of the obedience that is its due. (shrink)

Thanks to the particularly penetrating analysis of André Martinet, we now know that the complementary existence of two levels of different articulation is one of the most remarkable specific characteristics of language. To the first level belong all facts concerning significant units, the meaning and inflection of words, syntactic groupings and the composition of a discourse; the second articulation is that of non-significant elements that we call phonemes. In other words, it is at the second level that we pronounce articulate (...) sounds, while to the first we owe the possibility of formulating groups with meaning. The first articulation could be visualized as the molecular and cellular level in which the simplest elements, having a very limited autonomy, are organized according to affinities having the force of law; the second articulation would thus represent the atomic level, that of elementary particles identified by their role in groups. (shrink)

Today, the linguistic approach offers us an irreplaceable method for the direct study of the constitutive processes of social phenomena (A. Delobelle, 1981). In fact, each social phenomenon is basically inhabited or interpreted by language. It is language processes that give its ramifications to the social and form disstinct sub-groups in it. This is why, when these processes are observed in their formal dynamics, outside their vehiculated “contents,” it is as though we find ourselves faced with the very functioning of (...) the social: as though we have in it a typically experimental terrain for the direct study of social phenomena. (shrink)

Inspired by Columbus, Spaniards set out on an adventurous voyage of the circumnavigation of the globe and, to their surprise, encountered a new continent.This is the essential fact. There were no preliminaries, no previous knowledge, but an abrupt and unexpected meeting between a handful of men who represented the mentality of Spain at the end of the 15th century and an immense geographical panorama that slowly and continuously unfolded, populated by beings for whom there was not even a name and (...) who represented native cultures in different stages of devopment with no previous contact with Europeans, almost diametrically opposed in values, concepts and mentalities to what the transatlantic navigators represented and brought with them. (shrink)

Aleksandr Pushkin (1799-1837) occupies a special place in the development of Russian culture. He was at the same time a great poet, the reformer of Russian literary language, a historian and a political thinker. In the enormous mass of work devoted to Pushkin, a certain number of articles are concerned with his ideas on economics and the reflection of socio-economic problems in his writing. Until now, however, this theme has been studied in only a fragmentary way and less from the (...) point of view of the professional economist than from that of a literary historian. In an attempt to enlarge and complete the idea we may have of Pushkin's economic views, I propose also to show the importance the politico-economic thought of Western Europe had for his work. One person comes to the fore when we study the subject from this angle: Nikolai Turgenev, a Decembrist, one of the “masters” of the poet's youth, who played an important role in the rapprochement of Russian and Western European cultures. (shrink)

When we think about our way of seeing, appreciating and understanding the different forms and manifestations of the life of the mind in human civilization, we become aware of a rather surprising fact. We are ready and spontaneously inclined to place them in a historical perspective and consequently to judge them according to a “historical consciousness”, with practically only one exception, that of science. No one finds it difficult to admit that the poetry of Homer, Virgil, Dante, Goethe or Baudelaire (...) has always been an authentic poetry, attaining the heights of absolute value and even at times being incomparable, all the while recognizing that to understand this poetry, to appreciate its nobility and penetrate its meaning the effort must be made to put it within its historical context (and ideally to put oneself within that context) rather than to judge it according to the modes and forms of the poetry of our own day. What we have just said regarding poetry also applies to music, the fine arts, philosophy, law, social and political institutions, ethical concepts, religions and customs. In the case of science, on the other hand, such a historical consciousness is almost entirely lacking, even among cultivated people: the history of the sciences is not normally a part of the store of knowledge of these people, but this situation, far from being the cause of such a lack of historical consciousness, is rather the consequence. This is because we are unconsciously persuaded that science is not properly speaking a historical phenomenon; we have the impression that it has not had a real history. (shrink)

It seems at least daring to speak of truth on the subject of art, when Plato, in the Sophiste, 234c, likens art to sophistry, in other words, to falsity and deformation. To be sure, this comparison is based on an exaggeration, because elsewhere Plato insists on the necessity of artistic reality: in the same Sophiste, 299e, he states that “life would be unlivable without art.” The importance thus given to art becomes obvious when we think that this same expression is (...) already used in the Apologie, 38a, with regard to philosophy, the activity that for a man conscious of his own existence is one of scrupulously examining his own life. This similarity in expression testifies to the conceptual and axiological similarity of two (but distinct) activities of the mind effected by Plato who, on a different level, as we have just seen, unhesitatingly condemns one of them, at least apparently; apparently, because basically Plato does not inveigh against art in general but against the art of his contemporaries, whom he openly accuses of accepting the postulate of verisimilitude by using artifice and acrobatics, with the sole end of pleasing the crowds by flattery. In other words, they substitute for the scarch for authenticity that of dexterity in creations conceived only for that effect, which means identifying this type of substitution of values with a prostitution of the artist himself with regard to his public. (shrink)

Behind every Utopia there is always a territory, but a territory that “is not here”, a territory removed from immediate reality in space or in time. In time, when the Utopia invokes the past of an Age of Gold or a Paradise Lost “illo tempore,” but also when there is a gamble with the hope of a better world to be organized in the future. These are “ideal times” or “longed-for times,” past or future of which philosophers, writers or political (...) men speak. (shrink)

The advent of science brought about a radical division between the means of expression it made possible and the one it disavowed: in the centuries preceding its establishment such a break was not possible, even though it was often desired.Medical treatises of the Renaissance that analyze the plague and melancholy used categories that were not different from those used by theologians (and sometimes doctors) as far as their reference to the Devil was concerned. Since it is no less a question (...) of the imagination in one case than in the other, we can try to associate these three “objects”-three figures of misfortune-and treat them as though they belonged to the same level of expression. Such a decision is not at all arbitrary; it proceeds, completely a posteriori, from the observation of a noticeable proximity between them, aside from their diversity: it is as though they offered variations on a certain number of themes, variations requested by a logic of the imaginary that we shall try to elucidate here by showing the several categories that serve as a point of departure for the functioning of that logic. (shrink)

Rapid developments in science, technology and means of communication offer man possibilities for dialogue that up until now have been undreamed-of. It must be undeniably admitted, however, that we live in a world dominated by fear of the other, fanaticism, racism and every kind of conflict. This is why we have thought it useful to reactualize the Goethian conceptions of universal literature and otherness, conceptions that, coming from the generosity of a humanist and appreciator of the other, could help us (...) contribute to the discussion on the problems of interculturality that give rise to more and more animated controversies. (shrink)

Can we think without words? At first, the question is surprising, and the answer is most often, “No.”This response is quite understandable. Words and thought are so closely connected in our mental activity that they appear almost indissociable, since if we follow an introspective process, it is not possible for us to analyze our reasoning and our feelings without having recourse to words. Moreover, man's verbal expression is not only a means of communication; it is also an instrument of progress (...) for the mind, without which the mind would not be able to attain the very high levels of abstract and conceptual thought that are proper to it. No one would dream of minimizing the important influence of words on thought. It is more correct to magnify it as Paul Valéry did: “The honor of man, blessed speech.”. (shrink)

Magic and religion are at the origin of the concept of money as a unit for measuring value. Actually, they determined the first forms money took: precious objects, engraved stones, amulets and talismans which conferred a special power, within a social group, on the one who possessed them. In time, this power came to include the power of acquisition in commercial terms, but its original ties with magic were never lost. Aristotle clearly saw the relationship between a certain concept of (...) money (in Politica) and a new ethical concept as a corrective for the imbalances within a social community (in Ethica Nicomachea). If we look closely, we see that this ethical concept is not in opposition to the former but emphasizes the double aspect of the idea of money in antiquity, an idea which has survived, with some modifications, in Christianity and the modern era. (shrink)

The flames of Alexandria continue to rage. After twenty centuries, they still dazzle us, as though the Mouseion were the only massacred library. One would believe that Julius Caesar, Theophilus of Antioch and Omar (the three pyromaniacs, the pagan, the Christian and the Moslem) had had no predecessors or imitators. But the race of incendiaries is as numerous as the waves of the sea. It is monotonous, it is indestructible, it is equal to that of the ants. It was born (...) at the same time as the first Babylonian tablets. In 1988, it continues its work. All over the world and in all times, the incendiaries were there with their torches. They burned parchments, wood or clay tablets, leather manuscripts, papyrus or folios. The same warriors who profaned temples set fire to incunabula. The same ones who slaughtered the Aztecs threw their firebrands into the collection of codices. What is it, this unleashed fury of prince and priest, judge and soldier against these small monuments of clay or paper, against these sepulchres in which the dead say that they have lived and loved, suffered and hoped? (shrink)

Our thinking is still the captive of the dichotomy “national/ international.” The reaction to nationalism takes the form of an abstract internationalism, and reaction to internationalism leads to the rebirth of nationalism. However, this dichotomy was only true (and that relatively) in 19th century Europe, or at the latest, at the beginning of the twentieth century, when subnational cultures seemed on the way to disappearing, and everything European was considered “universal” (two hypotheses that the facts prove to be untrue). As (...) H. Frey observes, “Today, the decline or decadence of the West is part of the contemporary view of the world, like the electron or the dinosaur.” The linear outline of progress, with Europe at the head, did not withstand the test of the First World War. The year 1918 marked the beginning of the end of Europeanism. Since then, we have begun to speak of “areas of civilization” (Splengler), “civilizations” (Toynbee), “cultural coalitions” (Lévi-Strauss). The existence of “areas of civilization” (regions) is commonly admitted today; it has entered journalistic language and even the structure of regional commissions and agencies of the United Nations (Europe, Near East, Southern Asia, South-east Asia, and the Far East). New communities have inserted themselves between nations and humanity. What do they represent? Are they something unique, or are they divided into a certain number of types in opposition to each other because of some characteristic? And in what way have they modified our view of universal history? (shrink)

The subject of values presents certain dangers. Why not the moral philosophy of Islam or even the ethics of Islam? The term “moral” seems traditional, if not antiquated: it connotes the ideas of good and evil, a long list of commandments and interdictions; it evokes a restraint of the individual, something limiting and narrow. The word “ethics” is more acceptable; it is closer to the idea of a system of values, a global vision of the moral life, but it may (...) also express a normative process. Max Weber speaks of Islam and other religions as being ethical religions, that is. “a complex of commandments and bans whose transgression is sin,” and he imputes this particularity to prophecy that “produces a centralization of ethics.” The term “values” is often used today, and it corresponds better to modern sensitivity preoccupied with the search for dispersed or connected values on which to base its behavior and its image. We know that the “theory of values” began with Western moralist philosophers as a substitute for the old morality, experienced as submission, and to introduce the idea of a personal morality, the essential being to conform to freely-chosen values. However, we may also speak of collective values or even of values attached to a particular line of conduct that they establish, for example, “martial values.” “tribal values” or “fundamental values.” A value may be isolated, like a Platonic idea, put into a package or even a system. It remains none the less abstract, since it is itself the product of an abstraction and rarely a creation. To look for the values of a culture, a religion or a society is to devote oneself to an operation of extraction from a multitude of data. It is truly a quest, one that allows for personal interpretation in selection from the lime that one becomes sensitive to one line of values rather than to another. Thus is presented the problem of the divergence of values within a single ethical system, especially if it is as vast as that of Islam. My purpose here is not selective. It is to go in search of the values of Islam in their variety while trying to find a guideline and also locating them at various levels of comprehension. (shrink)

In various parts of the world—of which Mexico is one example— archaeology has been not only an academic discipline but has followed other motivations and goals, some valid and others more disputable: formation of a nationality, a need to know ancient roots, importance of a distinct art for understanding past societies or simply the promotion of tourism by attracting people to visit recently-excavated monuments or those that are already famous. In this paper, I intend to present the case of Mexico.

In the past few years, anthropological research concerned with the ethnographic aspects of ritual practices has renewed its interest in the meaning of ritual symbolism. This research has been possible because of a methodological inversion, namely, starting with a descriptive study of the rites rather than analyzing religious beliefs, contrarily to what was the moraine frontale of traditional history of religion.

Lately, the issues of “transfer of technology” seem to have become fashionable. However, they cannot be considered at length until those of DEVELOPMENT are clarified: transfer of technology is a means, development is an end, and, if we are not careful, we risk—in all good faith—being carried away by the example of the development and techniques of the “Northern countries,” while the needs and possibilities of the “South” may be quite different.

It is not easy to understand the history and origin of the different peoples of today's world inasmuch as scientific data are partial and seemingly contradictory. These roughly fall into three categories:-prehistoric data are remains of cultures and human skeletons. They allow us to affirm that such and such a region was inhabited in such and such an epoch. Their absence, however, means nothing, and they hardly permit the attribution of a biological origin to the peoples of the past because (...) of the rapid evolution of the forms and dimensions of the skeletons during the course of time;-present genetic data give an interesting picture of the biological relationship of peoples and of the way they diverged throughout history. Their interpretation is delicate, however, especially when it concerns small populations;-“biometric” data involve the measurement of pigmentation, dimensions and proportions of the body and organs. They are susceptible to very rapid variations during the course of history and mainly give an indication of the adaptation of the people to a certain kind of environment: tropical, temperate, cold or arctic, plain or altitude, forest, savannah, prairie, steppe or desert. (shrink)

“Frontier” is included in the general category of “limit” (limes: a road bordering a field). But what is at the origin of limit, frontier? An authority, a power that can exercise “the social function of ritual and social significance of the line, the limit whose ritual legitimizes passage, transgression” (Bourdieu, 1982, p. 121). The limit, a traced line, sets up an order that is not only spatial but temporal, since it not only separates a “this side” from a “that side” (...) but also a “before” and an “after”. This dual nature of the limit is at work in the myth of the founding of Rome. Any limit, any frontier, is intentional: it proceeds from a will; it is never arbitrary. Its legitimacy was originally established by a religious ritual and later, by a political procedure. (shrink)

For several decades, molecular genetics have given rise to a new order of phenomena, profoundly disturbing the classic ideas that men have of their identity and their place in the universe. What becomes of the classic figure of man when hybridizations permit the systematic crossing of the frontiers between species? What do the possibilities opened by cloning and especially the grafting of foreign genes in mammals mean to us? What happens to the classic structures of relationship when the introduction of (...) foreign genes into the cells of embryos allows us to obtain individuals that are heirs of the genetic patrimony of eight or twelve different parents? The list of all these strange phenomena would be long, and the disquieting nature of the results thus obtained gives spectacular effects that, for the scientific mind, are not satisfactory. It is thus in a different perspective that we must reflect on the rapid irruption of this new order of phenomenality brought about through the genetic approach. (shrink)

Since 1973 the experts of O.C.D.E. have been presenting the development of systems born of computer science and telecommunication as a “ second industrial revolution.” A year earlier the Japan Computer Usage Development Institute announced for the year 2000 the advent of a “society of information.”.

One of the most intriguing and painful anomalies of the modern world—so diffused that it has almost become a universal culture— is the incredible number of individuals and groups who kill, torture, burn, kidnap, imprison or merely outrage other people with a clear conscience when a political motive may be alleged. Added to them is the much larger number of people and institutions that tolerate, approve, encourage, praise and even bless that type of behavior when it occurs within a political (...) context. Included in this generic political violence is „the kind of behavior that is much more serious and that we may call terrorist, the behavior of those who seek to impose their will through the commission of atrocities that sow a generalized terror or a panic fear, and then to manipulate the reactions these atrocities provoke. Here “private” terrorists, as well as “semi-state” and “state” terrorists commit acts that would not be tolerated in normal, non-political life, and the public that approves this conduct would never accept it if it occurred in everyday life. (shrink)

Today there is a great deal of discussion about human rights. We speak of them in reference to totalitarian regimes but also in reference to Western democracies, which is a sign, it seems, of a reconsideration of the legitimacy of the power of the State and the conception of law on which this legitimacy rests. However, we had thought this question had been settled for a long time, at least in democratic countries: a legitimate government is one elected by the (...) people, whose sovereign will it expresses through elected representatives, retained or replaced periodically, who make the laws. In other words, the people are sovereign, and the exercise of this sovereignty is governed by a constitution, according to laws that permit the legitimacy of the State (Rechtsstaat) to be expressed concretely. The doubts that arise concerning human rights in many areas of the world would thus be signs of either a rupture between the sovereign people and the executive or legislative power, to which the people delegate the care of their interests and will, or of a resignation of the popular will, reduced to the condition of a sort of do-nothing king, doubting his own legitimacy and handing his power over to his clerks. In both cases, there is a crisis of confidence and perhaps more: a fundamental skepticism toward the very notion of legitimacy as it is usually presented, that is, as the expression of the will of the people: a capricious will, sometimes docile and sometimes rebellious, of an amorphous sovereign (rex otiosus) that it is difficult to identify in the features of its representatives, (congress, parliament or national assembly) or in the form of a ballot. In any case, the citizen, holder of a small particle of popular sovereignty, feels alienated from the State and its institutions, contrary to what we find in texts before the 18th century, when institutions were surrounded by an apparent, if not always sincere, respect and when the social hierarchy was accepted as a matter of fact. (shrink)

Since the end of the 19th century, Brazilian researchers have speculated about the phenomenon of ethnic coexistence they have witnessed in their country. How may the mixed culture that is its obvious result be explained? Should it be attributed to some sociocultural syncretism, to an interpenetration of civilizations or, quite simply, to a synthesis? Whatever the case, it is certain that cultural elements of very different origins became united in Brazil and that they have remained closely associated there in spite (...) of their disparity. The best example of this “cultural conglomerate,” if we may call it that, is without a doubt that of the Afro-Brazilian religious cults and, although numerous studies have already been devoted to them, they have a richness of content and meaning, plus a capacity for renewal, that is far from being exhaustively investigated. (shrink)

The theory of beauty has always rested on the representation of the infinite, understood in its finite expression and perceptible through the senses. The relationship of beauty to truth, of art to science, is inevitably modified with the new way of treating the infinite in the modern conception of the world. Non-classical science works with the notions of “infinitely large” and “infinitely small,” modifying their meanings in terms of experimental observations. We put these words in quotation marks because the Whole (...) may be considered as finite or infinite according to the angle from which it is viewed: the “infinitely small” only becomes so in determined circumstances, for example, when we consider the extended and discrete elements of space and time in a macroscopic approximation, as infinitely small elements of perpetual motion. Modern science studies these two poles of being—the Whole and its parts—in their interaction, admitting the dependence of macroscopic and even cosmic processes with regard to the processes being created in infinitely small spheres (or, according to another interpretation, finite but extremely small). However, as characteristic of our time as these concepts are—most often hypothetical—they nonetheless express a very old historical tradition that contemporary retrospection, turned toward classical science and the past of science in general, allows us to discern very clearly. All the culture of the past was dominated by the principle of the authority of the Whole over its parts. In peripatetic cosmology and physics, individual processes depended on the cosmic harmony of the center and frontiers of the universe, on the spheres and places toward which bodies tend. This authority of the general law, of universal harmony, of the system hinging on individual processes, is confirmed in Aristotle's Physics, but not only there: we find it in almost all the thinkers of antiquity. On the plane of general logic, it received expression in the Hegelian concept of the true infinite, a concept constituting to a high degree the philosophical equivalent of classical science. In Hegel's time, this last was already drawing away somewhat from the idea of an absolute and strict subordination of elementary processes to integrating systems and general laws, laws being realized through the probability of microprocesses, thus statistical laws, and whose exact application ignored individual acts, for example, the mechanism of molecules in thermodynamics. The statistical theory of heat has rendered continual a discrete microcosm—for the movement of individual molecules it substituted the average speed of the molecules—and continual laws became supreme points determining macroscopic processes. These laws had a differential nature. In other words, they prescribed the defined relationships between the infinitely small increases in size. Also, the schema of the classic law consisted in defining infinitely small processes by an infinitely large integral legality because of the number of processes. The infinitely true of Hegel is the actual infinite being realized in each of its finite elements; it is the subjection of the finite element to the infinite. (shrink)

The social sciences are again talking about time. They venture to do so, because the crisis of meaning in which modem society is involved shows the narrow limits of the solutions to this problem of being that phenomenology has reinvented. Since meaning only exists in duration of time, the crisis becomes a crisis of time and a crisis of the representation of man in time.

Today, esthetic thought takes pride in the fact that it no longer scorns familiar objects nor any form of everyday culture. Refusing to limit its domain to Fine Arts, it analyzes the products of artisans and industry, urban environment, costumes and customs, tattooing and graffiti. It thus confirms a tendency of contemporary creativity that rejects the separated status of art and defies the regulations of good taste.

A nation is not a creation of the brain but a collective experience. It does not equal the sum of the individuals that compose it but transcends that sum like a global personality that is not only juridical (although there once was a “League of Nations”) but also moral in the highest sense of the word.We may ask ourselves if liberty is indetermination, nonalienation and autonomy in its accomplishment; if it is congenial in the genetic code of the nation for (...) its entire existence or, on the contrary, if there is not a sort of dialectic, that is, historic, aleatory and problematic relationship between these two realities. In fact, there is danger in the desire to find a similarity, even by analogy, between the life of nations and a biological process. The nation is a historical phenomenon appearing through a chain of circumstances in 19th-century Europe, theorized by Europe and often born elsewhere as a reaction to European imperialism. The Nation is largely a bourgeois idea and reality. (shrink)

Today's industrial society is having an encounter with ecology: in April, 1976 the French government presented the National Assembly with documents on the dumping and burning of waste in the sea, as well as on the protection of nature. Electoral campaigns, discussions and demonstrations are centered about the theme of pollution and environment. In the last century the accumulation of waste had already become a problem : “ One of the most important duties of industry is to find a useful (...) employment for waste,” wrote P. L. Simmons in 1875. The advice was heeded if we may believe what J. Gottmann wrote on the matter nearly a century later: “ If our era is to be defined by its most important raw material and one that is truly proper to it, as is done for the Bronze Age or the Iron Age, we may no longer speak of a Steel or Petroleum Age, nor of an Atomic Age (which may come in the future) but of the Garbage Age.” The extraordinary demographic expansion of humanity that has gone from a population of five million in the Paleolithic Age to four billion today gives rise to a monstrous abundance of refuse resulting as much from the natural mechanisms of living as from industrial activity (factory waste) or from the present attitude haunted by the idea of obsolescence (the throw-away society of Alvin Toffler). The outline of a universe submerged in waste matter appears, similar to that evoked by Italo Calvino in Città Invisibili apropos of the town of Leonia: “The refuse of Leonia would gradually invade the world if the interminable garbage heaps were not pressed upon, beyond the last crest, by the refuse of other towns that also push mountains of refuse far away from themselves. Perhaps the entire world beyond the borders of Leonia is covered with craters of trash, each with a continually erupting metropolis in its center. The borders between foreign or enemy towns are thus contaminated bastions in which the detritus of the one and the other serves as mutual support, menacing and mixing together.” The world of Metamorphosis is approaching in which man, transformed into an insect, covered with dust and remains of food, gnaws on the cores and parings of half-rotten vegetables. Science fiction invents a remedy to fit the problem : a planet specialized in storing all the garbage unloaded by an entire galaxy. (shrink)

Because of the widespread feminine priority that makes it the receptacle of śakti, India is definitely “one of the last bastions of the Mother,” as is pointed out in a recent book. If in fact there is a “maternalistic” culture it is certainly that of India, in spite of the legal regime, in which the element of affectionate magic characterizing all life and all organic intimacy is affirmed through the warm symbiosis of mother-child love. A miracle of that absolute love (...) incarnated with a natural serenity by millions of mothers dispensing a felicitous affectionate security, instilled in the Indian soul throughout its entire life. The traits of the Hindu personality and the principle content of its culture are organized and ordered around this center, characterized by an extraordinary coherence. Since its construction begins with this “dual unity” the Hindu personality has necessarily the popolarity of fusion-separation as a pivot. This is the central theme of S. Kakar, who, basing his conclusions on results of clinical psychoanalyses of Hindu individuals as well as on contributions from the collective imagination (folklore and myths) claims to discern the ontogenetic source of the supreme ideal of deliverance (mokṣa) in early childhood and, more specifically, in the strong unconscious desire to find again the benevolent presence of the “good mother”. (shrink)

To speak of lateral specialization is to take up the old question found in myths and religions from the.dawn of humanity. Gastaut has remarked that the prehistoric skulls he collected and examined presented a larger number of trepannings on the left than on the right. At the very begining, man's. cranium was treated asymmetrically by the trepanners.

All specialists who question the diverse components of the medieval universe stress that the ecclesiastical institution occupied a choice place within the sociocultural structure of that world. This is true because of the solidity of its implantation in the century and particularly because of the efficacity of its doctrinal function. In the cultural domain, the production and transmission of knowledge (in addition to the practice of indoctrination that it supposes), the Church was completely sovereign. The ecclesiastical institutions (from simple parish (...) churches to cathedrals and episcopal sees, as well as convents and monasteries) were responsible for the foundation and rise of medieval schools, universities, the centers where books were produced—or more precisely, manuscripts—and the organization of libraries. (shrink)

It is said that reality is stronger than any description we can make of it, and we must admit that atrocities, when we see them, go beyond any idea we may have had of them. On the other hand, when it is a question of values and beliefs, the contrary is true: reality is much less than its representation and the ideas it professes. This loss of energy is called indifference. Madame Bovary believed that in Naples happiness was as firmly (...) rooted as the orange trees and as strong as stone. The wisdom of nations knows that that is not the case: “We hope for Paradise but as late as possible,” affirms a Christian proverb. This indifference poses a problem or an entire series of problems (Georg Simmel's work could be considered from that point of view) unless it arises from all our errors, spontaneous or scientific, concerning man and society. I do not know where I read, or dreamed, the story of a young ethnologist who went to study a tribe that was said to believe that the world would come to an end if the priests let the sacred fire go out. He assumed that the priests were as anxious as though they controlled the detonator of an atomic bomb. Admitted into the temple of the fire, he saw the peaceful religious going about routine tasks. Reality is rarely emphatic. Rites and customs, for example, reflect the beliefs of a society. Paintings and sculptures show what the society believes or serve to make it believe what it sees. Sculpture in cathedrals were the bible of the illiterate. Is that really certain? We notice that most often people perform the rites without believing in their significance and, in any case, without interest in them, because the liturgy is not a means of communication giving information. They do not look at the images. (How many Parisians have looked at the Napoleonic bas-reliefs on the Vendôme column?) and if they tried to do so, they would not be able to decipher their iconography or even see them: placed too high, the images are often undecipherable. So it is necessary to sketch out a sociology of art in which the art work, far from conveying an iconography and an ideology, is a decor that we do not even look at, that we can hardly see and that is however very important. The study of all these insufficiencies would be a vast program. Here we will confine ourselves to art. (shrink)

The philosopher has always been engrossed with the notion of death. Schopenhauer understood this and elevated the idea to the rank of the Muses:“Death is the true inspiring genius and the musagete of philosophy. This is why Socrates defined it as θανἑτoν μɛλέτη” (Plato, Phaedra, 81a).This notion has been presented to us by turns in its various aspects, at times as a metaphysical concept, at other times as an ethnological or religious reality.

It is a truism that the relationships between literature and visual entertainment are multiple, complex and variable, especially if we consider literature in the broad sense and keep in mind the enormous variety in the forms of spectacle. Actually, several dangers lie in wait for the one who, on the comparative level, deals with the problem of the relationships between a literary work and a work intended to be viewed as visual entertainment.

One of the great problems of our time is how to behave toward a society that is different from our own. Rather than deal with this question in the abstract, I should like to present a particular case, truly exemplary: that of the first encounter between Europeans and Americans and, more specifically, the most spectacular illustration of it, the conquest of Mexico. By “exemplary” I do not at all mean that the behavior of our ancestors should be imitated; we know (...) that the immediate result of that encounter was an extermination of human beings in proportions that had never been seen before and have never been attained afterward, in spite of the efforts made in this regard in the twentieth century. The conquest of America is exemplary in that it produced many varied and elaborated attitudes and that it gave rise to a wealth of texts that allow us to envisage the problem in all its complexity. (shrink)