The Face of the Other and the Trace of God contain essays on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, and how his philosophy intersects with that of other philosophers, particularly Husserl, Kierkegaard, Sartre, and Derrida. This collection is broadly divided into two parts: relations with the other, and the questions of God.

Jeffrey Bloechl traces the evolution of Levinas's thought to argue that his conception of God is dependent on his existential phenomenology.

Mimesis is one of the root words of Ancient Philosophy and again plays an important role in contemporary French thought. In this essay, an original interpretation of mimesis is given which throws new light on art and literature, reading and writing, the mirror and the example, identity and difference, and last but not least on the traditional opposition between reality and illusion, between appearing and being.

More than an introduction to Levinas's philosophical itinerary and the position where it matures, Liturgy of the Neighbor is also a critical discussion and original response to an acknowledged master of the twentieth century. The Levinas who appears in this dialogue is a thinker not only determined to get free of Western tradition, but also one whose project and claims shed new and penetrating light on the major figures whose work stood in his way. By moving to this level, where (...) Levinas's teachers and opponents speak for themselves and not only in the voices Levinas has assigned to them, Bloechl presses the discussion beyond an evaluation of Levinas's readings of his interlocutors, and beyond the question of his success in getting free of them, to the more urgent task of weighing the stakes of reestablishing religion, and the ethics where it has meaning, after Nietzche and, above all, Heidegger. (shrink)

Noam Chomsky and Frances Egan argue that David Marr’s computational theory of vision is not intentional, claiming that the formal scientific theory does not include description of visual content. They also argue that the theory is internalist in the sense of not describing things physically external to the perceiver. They argue that these claims hold for computational theories of vision in general. Beyond theories of vision, they argue that representational content does not figure as a topic within formal computational theories (...) in cognitive science. I demonstrate that Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims about Marr’s theory are false. Marr’s computational theory contains a mathematical theory of visual content, based on empirical psychophysical evidence. It also contains mathematical descriptions of distal physical surfaces and objects, and of their optic projection to the perceiver. Much computational research on vision contains these types of intentional and externalist components within the formal, mathematical, theories. Chomsky’s and Egan’s claims demonstrate inadequate study and understanding of Marr’s work and other research in this area. Computational theories of vision, by containing empirically based mathematical theories of visual content, to this extent present naturalizations of semantics. (shrink)

_Contents:_ Translator's Introduction_ Selected Bibliography Note on the Text _ The Vocation of Man__ Preface Book One: Doubt Book Two: Knowledge Book Three: Faith.

Contents \t\t\t\t\t \tTRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION \t\t1 \t \tNOTE ON THE TRANSLATION \t\t39 \t OBSERVATIONS ON THE FEELING OF THE BEAUTIFUL AND SUBLIME \t\t\t\t\t \tSECTION ONE: \t\t\t\t \t\tOf the Distinct Objects of the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime \t\t45 \tSECTION TWO: \t\t\t\t \t\tOf the Attributes of the Beautiful and Sublime.

We claim that adjustable parameters play a crucial role in building and applying simulation models. We analyze that role and illustrate our findings using examples from equations of state in thermodynamics. In building simulation models, two types of experiments, namely, simulation and classical experiments, interact in a feedback loop, in which model parameters are adjusted. A critical discussion of how adjustable parameters function shows that they are boon and bane of simulation. They help to enlarge the scope of simulation far (...) beyond what can be determined by theoretical knowledge, but at the same time undercut the epistemic value of simulation models. (shrink)

This paper distinguishes four senses of naturalism: reductive physicalism; a naturalism that departs from what Thompson calls “natural-historical judgments”; a naturalism that recognizes that physical nature is located within the space of reasons; and a phenomenological naturalism that shifts the focus to the “natural” experiences of subjects who encounter the world. The paper argues for a “phenomenological neo-Aristotelianism” that accounts both for the internal justification of our first-order moral experience and the need for a broader grounding in a universalistic account (...) of the goods of agency. (shrink)

The display of artefacts always implies an external mediation that influences, and often codifies, the reception of the exhibits. Objects are manipulated, restored, appropriated, staged, in short displayed, through various representational strategies that include pedestals, labels, and showcases. These elements, that we could define as parerga, are often ignored because of their utilitarian function. Yet, they play an important role in the history of the artefacts and define the setting in which the objects can exert their agency. They not only (...) shape their meaning, but also determine the effect that these artefacts have on their viewers. Framing devices create the conditions for interactions between the individual and the object to take place. This publication aims to explore the relation between artefacts and viewers as they are manifested in framing devices, and to develop a new theoretical framework for thinking about the power of objects on display. (shrink)

Phenomenology has attended often to the theme of pain, but less to suffering. Careful study of the latter leads to results that correspond with observations appearing in the philosophy of medicine and in literature. The difference between pain and suffering exposes the fact that in some instances the latter defies conceptions of subjectivity widely accepted in phenomenology. The subject who suffers is a subject who struggles to give meaning to his or her experience, and in some instances loses the capacity (...) entirely. A phenomenological account of these possibilities sharpens the challenge brought to the theology that, under the heading of theodicy, defends the unitary meaning of all experience. The theology that abandons theodicy may thereby recover a strong sense of its own biblical roots, which nurture a love of the God-man who suffers out of love for us. (shrink)

Aim of the lectures -- Early Brahmanical literature -- Panini's grammar -- A passage from the Chandogya Upanisad -- The structures of languages -- The Buddhist contribution -- Vaisesika and language -- Verbal knowledge -- The contradictions of Nagarjuna -- The reactions of other thinkers -- Sarvastivada Samkhya -- The Agamasastra of Gaudapada -- Sankara -- Kashmiri Saivism -- Jainism -- Early Vaisesika -- Critiques of the existence of a thing before its arising -- Nyaya -- Mimamsa -- The Abhidharmakosa (...) bhasya of Vasubandhu -- The Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga and its bhasya -- Bhartrhari -- The problem of negation -- Dignaga and verbal knowledge -- The Bodhisattvabhumi -- Prajnakaragupta -- Indian thinkers and the correspondence principle -- Appendix. The Mahaprajnaparamitasastra and the Samkhya tanmatras. (shrink)

This essay interprets and responds to Richard Kearney's metaphysics of possibility and hermeneutics of religion against the background of Nietzsche's proclamation of the death of God and the theodicy problem. Kearney's work is thus read as an interesting but ultimately problematic attempt to preserve or perhaps reinstate religious thought after the modern critique of idols. In addition, his positions are compared and contrasted with some of authors with whom he seems to be in limited agreement (for example, Plotinus, Hillesum) as (...) well as some with whom he clearly breaks (for example, Girard, Sölle). (shrink)

It is Heidegger who asks what there is to be thought after the end of metaphysics, and indeed his own work is never far from a response to the question. This is neither to say that there is only one such response, nor even to suppose that Heidegger’s thinking provides only one response. To be sure, the origin of the question is not difficult to identify. Metaphysics, as the grounding of known beings in some anterior or first being, comes to (...) its end as thinking becomes capable of grasping it as a sum of relations. This occurs when thinking is awakened to the difference between inquiring about beings , including the first being, and asking the question of the meaning of Being . In an important sense, then, the “end” of metaphysics coincides with the appearing of its place within a more primordial horizon. Attending more closely to the historical configuration of this metaphysics, Heidegger often concentrates on the recurrence, or else the persistence, of an urge in thinkin .. (shrink)

To act mercifully is to do more than what is required for justice. The act appears as a positive exception to the rule of law, and thus exhibits an intentionality irreducible to consciousness of a social or political order. In this philosophy of Levinas, occasional references to mercy shed some light on the goodness of the good that is otherwise occluded by overt concentration on social or political justice. However, Levinas’s account of the act itself is not entirely convincing, and (...) attempts to improve upon it lead toward a different conception of being and nature than one finds in his works. (shrink)

Will St. Paul have been a philosopher no less than an apostle and a believer? The proposal interests Stanislas Breton not so much as an occasion to redefine the relation between faith and reason as perhaps the site of their original emergence, together and at once, from a common source. In the image of Paul—who is Jewish, Greek, and Roman—struck down before the Cross, Breton sees the birth not only of a faith that transcends all particularity but also of a (...) reason that refuses empty universality. (shrink)

Will St. Paul have been a philosopher no less than an apostle and a believer? The proposal interests Stanislas Breton not so much as an occasion to redefine the relation between faith and reason as perhaps the site of their original emergence, together and at once, from a common source. In the image of Paul—who is Jewish, Greek, and Roman—struck down before the Cross, Breton sees the birth not only of a faith that transcends all particularity but also of a (...) reason that refuses empty universality. (shrink)

Paul Moyaert proposes to resolve persistent difficulties in Freud's theory of drive by appealing to a metaphysics of mutually irreducible forces. His argument is persuasive on many points, but raises questions about others. Three of them are mentioned here: one each pertaining to the implications of his position for the body and sexuality, the analytic relation, and ethics.