This article investigates the characteristics of the phenomenon of fear in work relationships in contemporary society. In this sense, the first part describes the dynamics of current life, emphasizing the role of organizations, their bad reputation, and characterizing their operational center as a society of performance. The second part describes the phenomenon of fear, starting from some representative origins of the term, Martin Heidegger’s phenomenological perspective, and recent studies within the field of organizations. Finally, a survey conducted in the first (...) semester of 2023 with 160 workers from different sectors about their perception of fear in the organization is presented. The findings are interpreted in light of the studied perspectives connected with the ethical responsibility of institutions and the pursuit of comprehensive well-being in work relationships. (shrink)

La problemática que guiará gran parte de la discusión será la peculiar relación entre la obra y el autor, dando lugar a analizar qué tan adecuado sería involucrar en un análisis de carácter filosófico elementos que de entrada no harían parte de la “obra” de un pensador, por ejemplo, cartas, discursos, comentarios. Al mismo tiempo vale la pena considerar el hacer referencia a acciones de carácter político o privado; de ser así ¿qué daría a este tipo de referencia un carácter (...) filosófico? Inquietudes como estas son las que tiene que enfrontar cualquier lector que quiera acercarse filosóficamente al pensamiento de Heidegger, y a su figura. (shrink)

BackgroundThe COVID-19 pandemic has resulted in some populations being confined to their homes as part of infection control measures. This situation can be hard to cope with due to separation from loved ones, prohibition of regular activities, fear of infection, loss of freedom, and so on. These negative impacts cause considerable psychological stress, and all the more so when the situation continues for an extended period, as was the case in Spain. The present study was aimed at investigating the effects (...) of COVID-19 quarantine on the emotional functioning of confined Spanish individuals after 8 weeks of lockdown by means of a cross-sectional study. The possible associations between changes in emotional functioning and demographic variables, health habits, social support, and resilience were also analyzed.MethodsA total of 906 Spanish adults completed an online survey to gather information about their prevailing mood and affects, using the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule, and other variables related to their habits and protective factors.FindingsAs expected, the data indicated an increase in negative affects and a decrease in positive affects after 8 weeks under lockdown, as well as a general decline in overall mood. The largest increases in negative affects were observed in young adults and women. We did not find any differences between people who were or were not diagnosed with COVID-19. Adhering to a routine, maintaining the same weight, and moderate physical exercise were associated with fewer negative affects, which indicates they are important protective factors, as are perceived social support and resilience.ConclusionIn order to mitigate the psychological impact of confinement, it is important to develop psychoeducational measures that encourage subjects to adhere to health habits and promote social support and resilience as protective factors. A special preventive focus should be placed on the most vulnerable population groups, namely women and young adults. For a public health lockdown to succeed, its negative consequences must be minimized insofar as possible through adequate knowledge of the risk factors and protective factors, and by means of prevention-oriented organization. (shrink)

Reseña del libro: Amparo de Jesús Zárate Cuello y Orietta Ivonne Beltrán Casas. Del diagnóstico preimplantatorio al niño medicamento en Colombia: una mirada en torno a la eugenesia positiva. Legislación comparada con el ordenamiento jurídico español. Bogotá: Editorial Neogranadina, 2020. DOI: https://doi.org/10.18359/9789585103122.

We may succed in the fulfilment of our desires but still fail to properly own our practical life, perhaps because we acted as addicts, driven by desires that are alien to our will, or as “wantons,” satisfying the desires that we simply happen to have (Frankfurt, 1988 ). May we equally fail to own the outcomes of our epistemic life? If so, how may we attain epistemic ownership over it? This paper explores the structural parallellism between practical and epistemic rationality, (...) building on Williamson’s ( 2002 ) suggestion that we should commence with successful performances as the foundation for both domains, be it action or knowledge. By highlighting the limitations of higher-order regulative approaches in epistemology, exemplified by Sosa ( 2007, 2011, 2015, 2021 ), the paper introduces a form of teleological epistemic constitutivism inspired by Velleman ( 2000, 2009 ). The proposal is that epistemic ownership is not attained in the mere pursuit of truth or knowledge, but requires furthermore a struggle to understand what we know. (shrink)

According to robust versions of virtue epistemology, the reason why knowledge is incompatible with certain kinds of luck is that justified true beliefs must be achieved by the agent . In a recent set of papers, Pritchard has challenged these sorts of views, advancing different arguments against them. I confront one of them here, which is constructed upon scenarios affected by environmental luck, such as the fake barn cases. My objection to Pritchard differs from those offered until now by Carter (...) , Jarvis or Littlejohn in that it is based on the claim that cognitive performances may not be properly considered as achievements beyond the scope of the agent’s intentional action—an idea that confers more explanatory power on my argument, and contributes to stregthening links between knowledge and agency. (shrink)

We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first, I contribute to motivate that drift; and second, I defend that we ought to partially resist it. An anti-risk diagnosis is valid and preferable for fake barn cases, but we still (...) need an anti-luck diagnosis for classic Gettier cases. The paper thus defends the Solomon-like result that we need both concepts—epistemic luck and epistemic risk—to deal with all the cases where knowledge is undermined. (shrink)

This paper advances new theses about the relationship between luck and risk, using recent work by Duncan Pritchard (2014, 2015, 2016) as its foil. Once Pritchard’s views are introduced in section 1, the rest of the paper completes two different tasks, one critical and one constructive. By focussing on some epistemological cases that Pritchard’s model would fail to identify, section 2 shows that it relies on a difference that is in fact inessential: the one between the occurrence and the non‐occurrence (...) of an event. Section 3 sketches and defends an alternative account of the luck/risk distinction, based on the consideration of situations (instead of events) from different temporal perspectives: luck assessments track a situation’s past, considering it the actual outcome of some previous event, whereas risk assessments look at the situation’s future, regarding it as the initial condition of some unsettled event. (shrink)

We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many. My goal in this paper is twofold: first, I contribute to motivate that drift; and second, I defend that we ought to partially resist it. An anti-risk diagnosis is valid and preferable for fake barn cases, but we still (...) need an anti-luck diagnosis for classic Gettier cases. The paper thus defends the Solomon-like result that we need both concepts—epistemic luck and epistemic risk—to deal with all the cases where knowledge is undermined. (shrink)

Apresentamos os resultados dos nossos estudos entre os processos educacionais e processos de subjetivação. Associamos este fato com a dificuldade dos educadores deslocarem o corpo do lugar de quem ensina para o lugar de quem aprende. Estudamos as implicações do corpo nos processos educacionais e sugerimos uma “atitude moderna” a partir do “cuidado de si”, apoiados em Foucault, como a ação do educador que “toma partido” do educando.

El presente estudio intenta identificar el pensamiento filosófico que se esconde en la obra de K. Rahner. La filosofía de Rahner no es algo meramente ocasional, sino algo expresamente buscado y tenido constantemente en cuenta en la teología que desarrolla. El autor intenta hacer una exposición unitaria que la filosofía de Rahner desarrolla de una manera muy dispersa y casi siempre encajada bajo puntos de vista teológicos.

El libro desarrolla un análisis de la hermenéutica en general para centrarse luego en la pregunta religiosa. Destaca la necesidad de ambos niveles del preguntar y también de algún tipo de respuesta. Las religiones aparecen en este estudio como intentos de respuesta a la pregunta del ser humano por lo absoluto.

Todas as dimensões do ensino de geografia contribuem para a construção de referenciais de leitura do mundo, conferem poder a indivíduos e grupos em suas interações e relações, do mesmo modo que os posiciona, tanto do ponto de vista geográfico quanto social. A Geografia tem, portanto, na perspectiva de Santos (2009), relação direta com a constituição da ideia de raça e com a instauração de formas de relações raciais. Neste artigo tem-se como objetivo identificar como as dimensões das colonialidades, ou (...) seja, a colonialidade o poder, do saber e do ser se reproduzem do ensino de Geografia na interface com as relações étnico-raciais e, ao mesmo tempo, analisar como as epistemes decoloniais e a perspectiva de educação antirracista, em conformidade com a lei 10.639/2003, interpelam os processos de racialização e produção do conhecimento acerca das relações étnico-raciais no ensino de Geografia. (shrink)

La libre movilidad internacional es una meta política clásica del igualitarismo cosmopolita. Sin embargo, en la actualidad, el impacto de las fronteras en las oportunidades de las personas a nivel global no deriva solo de sus mecanismos de exclusión, sino también de su permeabilidad a ciertas formas de migración. Este artículo analiza las implicaciones de la emigración cualificada para la justicia productiva y defiende que, en determinadas circunstancias, los igualitaristas cosmopolitas deberían apoyar restricciones a la libertad de movimiento para articular (...) una defensa de ese derecho básico que sea más coherente con el conjunto de sus compromisos normativos. (shrink)

You cannot overcome addiction or impulsiveness through abstract patterns alone. They show you the way to go, but do not fuel the effort. Some further variable is needed in the equation, some internal force or motivational mechanism, whatever its nature. Overlooking this leads to a neo-Socratic exaggeration of the role of cognition in selfcontrol.

https://revistes.uab.cat/enrahonar/article/view/v11-mosterin.

Any inconsistent theory whose underlying logic is classical encompasses all the sentences of its own language. As it denies everything it asserts, it is useless for explaining or predicting anything. Nevertheless, paraconsistent logic has shown that it is possible to live with contradictions and still avoid the collapse of the theory. The main point of this paper is to show that even if it is formally possible to isolate the contradictions and to live with them, this cohabitation is neither desired (...) by working scientists not desirable for the progress of science. Several cases from the recent history of physics and cosmology are analyzed. (shrink)

BackgroundMoral distress (MD) is the psychological damage caused when people are forced to witness or carry out actions which go against their fundamental moral values. The main objective was to evaluate the prevalence and predictive factors associated with MD among health professionals during the pandemic and to determine its causes.MethodsA regional, observational and cross-sectional study in a sample of 566 professionals from the Public Health Service of Andalusia (68.7% female; 66.9% physicians) who completed the MMD-HP-SPA scale to determine the level (...) of MD (0-432 points). Five dimensions were used: i) Health care; ii) Therapeutic obstinacy-futility, iii) Interpersonal relations of the Healthcare Team, iv) External pressure; v) Covering up of medical malpractice.ResultsThe mean level of MD was 127.3 (SD=66.7; 95% CI 121.8-132.8), being higher in female (135 vs. 110.3; p<0.01), in nursing professionals (137.8 vs. 122; p<0.01) and in the community setting (136.2 vs. 118.3; p<0.001), with these variables showing statistical significance in the multiple linear regression model (p<0.001; r2=0.052). With similar results, the multiple logistic regression model showed being female was a higher risk factor (OR=2.27; 95% CI 1.5-3.4; p<0.001). 70% of the sources of MD belonged to the dimension "Health Care" and the cause "Having to attend to more patients than I can safely attend to" obtained the highest average value (Mean=9.8; SD=4.9).ConclusionsFemale, nursing professionals, and those from the community setting presented a higher risk of MD. The healthcare model needs to implement an ethical approach to public health issues to alleviate MD among its professionals. (shrink)

The questions ‘Do I know p?’ and ‘shall I take p as a reason to act?’ seem to belong to different domains — or so claims Ernest Sosa in his Judgment and Agency, the latest version of his virtue epistemology. According to Sosa, we may formulate the first question in a purely epistemological way — a matter of knowledge “full stop” —, while the second one is necessarily intruded by pragmatic factors — a matter of “actionable knowledge”. Both should be (...) answered, in his view, considering the reliability of my belief, but the former could be faced in total abstraction from my personal practical concerns. In this paper I dispute Sosa’s view, and claim that no purely epistemic level of knowledge “full stop” is conceivable, at least within a reliabilist framework. A case is put forward in order to show that some given belief may not be considered as reliable by itself, as a token, but always as a member of a type, belonging to some class of reference of other beliefs. And the relevant class of reference may only be chosen considering personal practical interests. (shrink)

Gilbert Ryle famously denied that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, a thesis that has been contested by so-called “intellectualists.” I begin by proposing a rearrangement of some of the concepts of this debate, and then I focus on Jason Stanley’s reading of Ryle’s position. I show that Ryle has been seriously misconstrued in this discussion, and then revise Ryle’s original arguments in order to show that the confrontation between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists may not be as insurmountable as it seems, (...) at least in the case of Stanley, given that both contenders are motivated by their discontent with a conception of intelligent performances as the effect of intellectual hidden powers detached from practice. (shrink)

En este artículo examino las posiciones de McDowell y Davidson acerca del dualismo de esquema y contenido. Defiendo que este dualismo no puede recuperarse de las críticas de Davidson incluso en la sugestiva forma defendida por McDowell. Defiendo que McDowell falla al evaluar el verdadero alcance y significado de los argumentos davidsonianos y que su empirismo mínimo no puede evitar algunos de los problemas que otras posiciones empiristas muestran.

The aim of this paper is to discuss a basic assumption tacitly shared by many philosophers of mind and language: that whatever can be meant, can be said. It specifically targets John Searle's account of this idea, focusing on his Principle of Expressibility . In the first part of the paper, PE is exposed underlining its analyticity and its relevance for the philosophy of language , mind , society and action . In the critical part, the notion of Background is (...) taken into account in order to re-evaluate two basic distinctions: the one between sentence and utterance meanings , and the one between native and type speakers . PE is reconsidered in the light of the previous arguments as a methodological strategy that does not prevent uses of language from eventual semantic excesses and deficits , and a complementary Principle of Expression Fallibility is finally proposed. (shrink)

Intermediate filament (IF) proteins form the largest family of cytoskeletal proteins in mammalian cells. The function of these proteins has long been thought to be only structural. However, this single function does not explain their diverse tissue‐ and differentiation‐specific expression patterns. Evidence is now emerging that IF also act as an important framework for the modulation and control of essential cell processes, in particular, signal transduction events. Here, we review the most recent developments in this growing and exciting new field. (...) BioEssays 24:836–844, 2002. © 2002 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Claims of epistemic credit in social context Resumen: En este ensayo explico la propuesta fundamental de Conocimiento expropiado (Broncano 2020) en el marco agencial y fiabilista que asume el autor. A continuación, me centro en su análisis de las situaciones de injusticia testimonial, contraponiendo los caminos seguidos por Miranda Fricker (enfocado en el prejuicio del intercambio testimonial) y Broncano (enfocado en el desajuste estructural). Tras señalar las deficiencias de cada modelo, apunto una propuesta alternativa: la injusticia testimonial se produce cuando (...) la atribución de credibilidad es efecto de un juicio identitario, ya sea este ajustado o no, con respecto al colectivo al que pertenece la testigo. Abstract: In this essay, I explain the main claim of Conocimiento expropiado (Broncano 2020) against the background of the agential and reliabilist framework that its author assumes. I then focus on his analysis of situations of testimonial injustice, opposing Miranda Fricker’s approach (focused on prejudice in testimonial exchanges) and Broncano’s one (focused on structural imbalances). By pointing out the shortcommings of both models, I skech an alternative proposal: testimonial injustice is produced when the credibility assessment results from an identity judgment, whether it is effectively appropriate regarding the collective or not. Palabras clave: Epistemología política, fiabilismo agencial, injusticia testimonial, credibilidad. Keywords: Political Epistemology, agent reliabilism, testimonial injustice, credibility. (shrink)

AbstractAccording to the standard view, Montaigne’s Pyrrhonian doubts would be in the origin of Descartes’ radical Sceptical challenges and his cogito argument. Although this paper does not deny this influence, its aim is to reconsider it from a different perspective, by acknowledging that it was not Montaigne’s Scepticism, but his Stoicism, which played the decisive role in the birth of the modern internalist conception of subjectivity. Cartesian need for certitude is to be better understood as an effect of the Stoic (...) model of wisdom, which urges the sage to build an inner space for self-sufficiency and absolute freedom.KeywordsScepticism, Stoicism, subjectivity, Michel de Montaigne, René DescartesResumenSegún el punto de vista general, las dudas pirronianas de Montaigne se situarían en el origen de los desafíos escépticos radicales del argumento cogito de Descartes. Si bien este artículo no niega tal influencia, nuestro objetivo es reconsiderarla desde una perspectiva diferente mediante el reconocimiento de que no fue el escepticismo de Montaigne sino su estoicismo el que jugó un papel decisivo en el nacimiento del concepto moderno internalista de la subjetividad. La necesidad cartesiana de certeza se entiende mejor como un efecto del modelo estoico de sabiduría, el cual impulsa al sabio a construir un espacio interior para la autosuficiencia y la libertad absoluta.Palabras claveEscepticismo, estoicismo, subjetividad, Michel de Montaigne, René Descartes. (shrink)

Le rapport à l'alténté en général et à autrui en particulier condense un noyau de possibilités multiples qui, selon l'hypothèse esquissée, s'exprìme et s'interprète dans le mode de penser et de vivre le Désir d'avenir. Oscillant entre hétérophagie et hétérophilie, ce type fondamental d'érotisme temporel s'incarne dans des configurations phénoménologiques dont la typologie idéale fait covarier une décision métaphysique avec une attitude éthique . L'analyse des contrastes qui définissent les positions onto-éthiques de Sartre, Merleau-Ponty et Lévinas devient une méthode heuristique (...) pour mettre en évidence la topologie de l'incommensurable et de l'optatif. The relation to alterity in general and to others in particular encapsulates a logical space of multiple possibilities which, according to the author's hypothesis, may be expressed and interpreted in the manner of thinking and living the Desire of future. Oscillating between heterophagia and heterophilia, this fundamental type of temporal eroticism embodies vanous phenomenological configurations whose ideal typology reveals a deep correlation between a metaphysical decision with an ethical attitude . The analysis of mutual contrasts defining Sartre's, Merleau-Ponty s and Lévinas' onto-ethic stances is adopted as a methodological device in order to elucidate a broad topology of incommensurabilia and desiderata. (shrink)

Ante la imposibilidad de alcanzar un análisis reductivo del concepto de mentira, Tobies Grimaltos y Sergi Rosell han propuesto una concepción basada en sus condiciones paradigmáticas, entre las que destaca la de engañar al oyente. La relación entre la mentira y el engaño sería, si bien fundamental para entender los casos prototípicos del concepto, meramente contingente —una tesis que tiene importantes implicaciones para su valoración moral—. Presento aquí su propuesta y avanzo tres objeciones a la misma: primero, que la teoría (...) de la mentira debería de construirse sobre una teoría de la aserción, que ya de por sí delimita lo propiamente dicho en los usos parasitarios del lenguaje (como la metáfora o la ironía). Segundo, que es preciso distinguir los usos de la mentira de sus aspectos constitutivos, entre los cuales destaca la intención de mentir, y no la de engañar. Y tercero, que un modelo paradigmático de la mentira debería de asumir una condición epistémica, y no meramente doxástica, según la cual mentir es, paradigmáticamente, decir algo que uno sabe falso. (shrink)