Artykuł omawia analizę fenomenu życia religijnego w filozofii Williama Jamesa (1842-1910). Wskazano na kalwińskie korzenie twórcy pragmatyzmu a zwłaszcza na prezbiteriański schemat zwany sylogizmem praktycznym, który w powodzeniu życiowym szukał potwierdzenia posiadania łaski religijnej. Twórca pragmatyzmu, rozpoczął swoje badania od analizy przeżyć ludzkich z perspektywy psychologicznej. Pod koniec życia coraz więcej uwagi poświęcił analizie fenomenu życia religijnego. Poglądy swoje wyłożył w wykładach edynburskich w roku 1901, które zostały wydane w książce Doświadczenia religijne. Analizie przeżyć religijnych poświęcone są też końcowe partie (...) Pragmatyzmu (1907). James wskazuje na znaczenie przeżyć religijnych w życiu człowieka. Uważa, że istotę religii stanowi poczucie zależności, odczucie obecności tego, co nadprzyrodzone. W religii nie chodzi o dogmaty, instytucje czy rytuały, lecz o pożytek, jaki przynosi ona jednostce, porządkując jej życie. Głównym celem religii pozytywnych jest wyzwolenie człowieka od zła. Tak opisana religijność jawi się jako swoista sapientia, życiowa mądrość, która porządkuje ludzkie życie i wnosi w nie wartość dodatnią. Stąd takie rozumienie religii zostaje określone w artykule mianem sapientia pragmatica. (shrink)

"Filozofjo po ślōnsku, czyli heft do historje filozofje Dziadka Kika" to podróż przez dzieje filozofii światowej napisane ze śląskiej perspektywy przez doktora filozofii Marcina Kika. Tyn heft niy jest tak ruby jak niywtore buchy, ale to jest heft, w kerym wjela ciykawygo i ważnygo możno znolyź… I to żech tam znoloz dlo siebje. Ale najsamprzōd musza pedzieć, że jest to heft, w kerym dziadek szukoł som siebje i chcioł sie dowjedzieć czegoś ô sobje samym i śwjecie, w kerym –szczynśliwje lub (...) niy, jak sie to wto forszteluje – prziszło mu żyć. A napisane na niym było "Filozofjo" – prawje jak heft do jakigoś przedmjotu we szkole. Wstęp dr hab. Jacek Surzyn: "Autor przeprowadza czytelnika przez historię filozofii, opowiada ją po śląsku, pewnym siebie głosem zatrzymując go tam, gdzie trzeba na chwilę przystanąć. Jest to historia nie w sensie faktograficznym, ale historia jako proces rozwoju problematyki filozoficznej, to znaczy jest to wędrówka przez odpowiedzi na najważniejsze i podstawowe filozoficzne pytania." Strony: 257 SPIS FILOZOFÓW Presokratycy 24 Sokrates 32 Sofiści, cynicy, cyrenaicy i megarejczycy 36 Platon 41 Arystoteles 45 Sceptycyzm, stoicyzm i epikureizm 49 Plotyn 56 Aureliusz Augustyn z Hippony 59 Tomasz z Akwinu 63 William z Ockham 68 Jean Buridan 70 Mikołaj z Kuzy 72 Francis Bacon 75 Kartezjusz (René Descartes) 79 Baruch Spinoza 83 Blaise Pascal 87 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz 90 John Locke 94 George Berkley 98 David Hume 100 Jeremy Bentham 103 John Stuart Mill 106 Bernard de Mandeville 108 Jean Jacques Rousseau 110 Immanuel Kant 114 Arthur Schopenhauer 122 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel 126 Ludwig Feuerbach 131 Max Stirner 134 Karol Marks 136 Sigmunt Freud 143 Søren Kierkegaard 149 Friedrich Nietzche 155 Henri Bergson 162 Edmund Husserl 166 Martin Heidegger 172 Max Scheler 177 Nicolai Hartmann 181 Karl Jaspers 187 Egzystencjalizm 191 William James 198 Helmuth Plessner 202 Arnold Gehlen 206 Ludwig Wittgenstein 209 Emmanuel Mounier 213 Karol Wojtyła 217 Gabriel Marcel 221 Emmanuel Lévinas 224 Jozef Tischner 228 Jean-François Lyotard 232 Zygmunt Bauman 236 Karl Raimund Popper 239 Viktor Emil Frankl 243. (shrink)

Physicists use different theories to describe the world on different scales. In particular, they use the standard model of particle physics at very high energies, but move to various effective field theories, such as quantum electrodynamics, when modelling lower energy scattering processes. One way to explain this methodological fact is pragmatic in spirit. According to this view, physicists move to an effective field theory at lower energies in order to extract predictions and qualitative understanding which would be difficult or impossible (...) to extract directly from a more fundamental theory. By contrast, another way of accounting for the methodological data is metaphysical in spirit. On this view, the reason that physicists use different theories at different scales is that the world actually exhibits different nomic structure on different scales. These two positions have recently been thrown into sharp relief in a debate between Woodward (2016) and Batterman (2021), with Woodward taking the pragmatist line and Batterman the metaphysical line. One difficulty with the metaphysical answer is that its content is unclear: in what sense exactly could an effective field theory provide a better representation of the nomic structure of the world in its domain of applicability than our world’s fundamental theory? This talk attempts to provide an answer to this question by developing a simple metaphysical model. I start by assuming a set of possible worlds which are nomically possible according to some fundamental theory (I suggest that one is free to adopt either a Humean or Non-Humean view of these fundamental nomic necessities). I then introduce an equivalence relation between possible worlds: two worlds are scale-E equivalent if they assign the same values to physical quantities below energy scale E (up to some finite level of precision P). The key question now is whether this relation induces equivalence classes on the set of nomically possible worlds. I argue that in the case of current quantum field theories this does indeed occur, as evidenced by the possibility of “integrating out” high energy degrees of freedom in the renormalisation group framework. The formation of equivalence classes in the fundamental theory's possibility space indicates that some of its high energy features do not make a difference to its low energy dynamical behaviour. This suggests the following reading of the claim that an effective field theory provides a better representation of the nomic structure of the world in its domain of applicability: the solutions of the effective field theory stand in one-to-one correspondence with equivalence classes induced by the scale-E equivalence relation, whereas the fundamental theory overcounts the physical possibilities which are relevant at scale E. In this sense, the effective field theory provides a more natural representation of low energy physics than the fundamental theory. I conclude by explaining how this metaphysical model offers a reduction compatible understanding of multiple realisability, once again pointing to renormalisation group results in quantum field theory to support this. (shrink)

The chapter discusses moral nihilism and moral relativism, with some sympathy, especially to relativism. It considers some arguments for the views, some arguments against them, and some arguments designed to decide between them. Moral nihilism and moral relativism are meta-ethical theories, theories of the nature of morality. Nihilism is the view that there are no moral facts, that nothing is right or wrong, or morally good or bad. Relativism is the view that moral statements are true or false only relative (...) to some standard or other, that things are right or wrong relative to Catholic morality, say, and different things are right or wrong relative to Confucian morality, but nothing is right or wrong simpliciter. (shrink)

It has been argued that the primary acquisition of genericity in early child speech poses a problem for standard quantificational approaches to generics and instead motivates the claim that generics give voice to an innate, default mode of generalising. This article argues that analogous puzzles involving the acquisition of A‐quantifiers undermine the empirical support for a purely cognition‐based approach to generics. Instead, these acquisition puzzles should be solved by generalising the core insight of the cognitive defaults theory to these expressions, (...) reconciling formal semantic approaches with the role that cognitive development plays on lexical competence. (shrink)

This paper reevaluates Kaplan’s (Themes from Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 481–563, 1989b) infamous ‘compulsive talker’ objection to Reichenbach’s (Elements of symbolic logic, AQ1 Macmillan, New York, 1947 ) token-reflexive theory of indexicals. It argues that Kaplan’s objection depends on the modal status of Reichenbachian tokens. On one interpretation, Kaplan’s objection stands. But on another, equally plausible interpretation, the following points hold: (i) Reichenbach’s theory effectively preempts contemporary discussion of rigid definite descriptions, (ii) Kaplan’s own analysis of indexicals in (...) terms of _dthat_-terms comes extremely close to Reichenbach’s own analysis, and (iii) Kaplan’s ‘compulsive talker’ objection should be rejected. (shrink)

The thymus is a unique primary lymphoid organ that supports the production of self‐tolerant T‐cells essential for adaptive immunity. Intrathymic microenvironments are microanatomically compartmentalised, forming defined cortical, and medullary regions each differentially supporting critical aspects of thymus‐dependent T‐cell maturation. Importantly, the specific functional properties of thymic cortical and medullary compartments are defined by highly specialised thymic epithelial cells (TEC). For example, in the medulla heterogenous medullary TEC (mTEC) contribute to the enforcement of central tolerance by supporting deletion of autoreactive T‐cell (...) clones, thereby counterbalancing the potential for random T‐cell receptor generation to contribute to autoimmune disease. Recent advances have further shed light on the pathways and mechanisms that control heterogeneous mTEC development and how differential mTEC functionality contributes to control self‐tolerant T‐cell development. Here we discuss recent findings in relation to mTEC development and highlight examples of how mTEC diversity contribute to thymus medulla function. (shrink)

This Is A New Release Of The Original 1899 Edition.

Beauty is a particular kind of aesthetic experience. Aesthetic experience can be divided into various categories according to the kind of aesthetic property (beautiful, sublime, elegant, cool, profound, etc.) that is attributed to the object. The phenomenal bases of these different properties are the objective qualities shared by the objects to which the category is attributed. That is, objects that are, for example, perceived as sublime can be shown to have certain objective qualities in common. This holds true of all (...) nameable aesthetic properties except for beauty. Even within the same class of objects, there are no discoverable common objective qualities that are necessarily present in every attribution of beauty. This lack of content to beauty has led to the word being used informally as a blanket term for aesthetic value. However, where this use has entered aesthetics (as the philosophy of art), obfuscation has resulted. (shrink)

Mass incarceration is an ethical crisis. Yet it is not only the magnitude of the system that is troubling. Mass incarceration has been created and sustained by racism, classism, and ableism, and the problems of the criminal legal system will not be solved without meaningfully intervening upon these forms of oppression. Beyond that, incarceration itself—whether of one person or 2 million—represents a moral failing. To punish and control, rather than invest in community and healing, is antithetical to the values of (...) the field of bioethics. This commentary, which responds to the article “Fifty Years of U.S. Mass Incarceration and What It Means for Bioethics,” by Sean Valles, considers abolition as a crucial form of justice that must be centered in the work of bioethics. Abolition is both an antiracist intervention and a means of considering the ways health care broadly and bioethics specifically have allowed for the perpetuation of carcerality in the United States. (shrink)

This essay explores how vulnerability, understood not as precarity but as capacious responsiveness, much as the Philosopher Judith Butler identifies it, and recognition are key moral concepts that are prior conditions for the expression of conscience. Appreciating Thomas Aquinas' argument that conscience is neither a power or a habit, but rather an act, the essay argues that Aquinas' inclination synderesis, that prompts us to the good and away from evil, functions in a way similar to vulnerability. Fundamentally, vulnerability prompts us (...) to recognize the neighbor who needs our response. (shrink)

Mysticism is condemned as often as it is praised. Much of the condemnation comes from mysticism’s apparent disregard of morality and ethics. For mystics, the experience of “union” transcends all moral concern. In this careful examination of the works of such practitioners or examiners of mysticism as Paul Tillich, Thomas Merton, Evelyn Underhill, and Martin Buber, the author posits a spectrum of uneasy relationships between mysticism and morality. Horne explores the polarities of apophatic (imageless) and imaginative mysticism, the contemplative and (...) the active life, and morality and amorality. He stresses the importance of the distinction between “proper-name” (entirely personal) morality and “social” morality, for the history of Christian mysticism is a mix of minimal moral concern, proper-name morality, and social morality. The volume will be of interest to students of religious experience, ethics, and the recent history of mysticism. Carefully reasoned and documented, the argument is couched in clear prose, easily accessible to lay readers as well as to scholars. (shrink)

The study of bi- and multilingualism in the ancient Mediterranean has come into its own in recent decades. The evidence is far greater for the Hellenistic and Roman periods than the Classical, so naturally scholarly attention has focussed less on the earlier era. This has led to some enduring notions about bilingualism in the fifth century b.c.e. which are yet to be fully scrutinized, including the idea that a Greek's speaking another tongue was inherently transgressive. What did it mean for (...) a Greek to speak a second language? This article re-evaluates the evidence for individual bilingualism in Herodotus and Thucydides in their fifth-century context, focussed on our two best-documented examples of bilingual Greek individuals (Histiaeus of Miletus and Themistocles of Athens). Close reading of Herodotus and Thucydides suggests that not only does the notion of an inherently transgressive bilingualism hold little water for this period, but bilingualism may even be a sign of μῆτις. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:From Báñez with Love:A Response to a Response by Taylor Patrick O'NeillJames Dominic Rooney O.P.From where I stand, the traditional options of Molinism and Báñezianism seem logically exhaustive possible accounts of the way in which God can cause people to love him, under the influence of grace, while at the same time being able to affirm that those people remain free. Either God's giving efficacious grace to an individual (...) is such as to cause that individual to act a certain way, merely in virtue of giving that grace to that individual, or it is not. If that grace is not intrinsically efficacious, then you need to explain the way in which God can cause an action by giving grace which does not require grace to be intrinsically efficacious. On the latter front, Molinists aim to affirm that human beings are free even while acting under the influence of God's grace, and hold that God's grace is not such as to make it that one could not have done otherwise. They explain this by appeal to counterfactual truths about what human beings would do, metaphysically prior to and independent of God's subsequent decisions to give or withhold grace. These "counterfactuals of freedom" are central to Molinist accounts of freedom, since the truth of these counterfactuals alone secures the fact that human beings are acting freely even when God gives them grace and causes them to perform certain actions. Those human beings could have acted otherwise. Conversely, since God knows these truths, he can use them in order to give grace to an individual at those times when he knows it will be efficacious.To me, the Molinist view is a non-starter. What these truths consist in, what grounds them, how God uses them—I find the critiques compelling [End Page 675] and Molinist answers to these questions metaphysically problematic.1 I am committed to finding a Báñezian solution, therefore, to the riddle. From my perspective, the mystery of predestination invites confusion ultimately because the issue is a subtle philosophical, not a theological, problem. The resolution to the riddle of grace and free will can come only through an adequate account of the nature of human freedom. And I remain unsatisfied by a lack of philosophical clarity among Báñezian authors on the nature of freedom. In a recent paper, I therefore posed a problem for Báñezianism that resembles what is called the "grounding problem" for Molinism: where do the truths about alternative possibilities come from? And I illustrated the problem in the context of the account of grace given by one famous defender of the view, Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, whose work in turn was recently promoted by Taylor Patrick O'Neill.In short, Garrigou-Lagrange appears to accept that there need to be alternative possibilities if human action is to be free. He gives an accounting of those possibilities as follows. On one side, when I sin, Garrigou-Lagrange argues that God's denial of efficacious grace, even though this denial occurs prior to anything I do or could have done, does not necessitate my sin because I performed the sin by means of my normally operating volitional and intellectual capacities (which God merely refrained from interfering in), and I had alternative possibilities provided by the possibility of God providing efficacious grace. Then, on the other, when I do good, he appeals at many points to non-culpable "defects" regarding my intellectual or volitional capacities as grounding those alternative possibilities that I could have sinned even when acting under efficacious grace. In both cases, my acts are still metaphysically contingent. However, neither case provides a sufficient grounding for alternative possibilities (I argued), because I had no relevant control over God's decision to deny efficacious grace, nor were those "defects" in light of which I could have sinned under my control. Instead, I argued that Garrigou-Lagrange's account of humans having alternative possibilities for action would be successful only if there were facts about what I would have done under sufficient grace, truths prior to and independent of God's decision to give efficacious... (shrink)

Every work on Jewish thought and law since the twelfth century bears the imprint of Maimonides. A.N. Whitehead's famous dictum that the entire European philosophical tradition 'consists of a series of footnotes to Plato' could equally characterize Maimonides' place in the Jewish tradition. The critical studies in this volume explore how Orthodox rabbis of different orientations--Shlomo Aviner, Naftali Zvi Yehudah Berlin (Netziv), Kalonymus Kalman Shapira, Joseph Kafih, Abraham Isaac Kook, Aaron Kotler, Joseph Soloveitchik, and Elhanan Wasserman--have read and provided footnotes (...) to Maimonides in the long twentieth century. How well did they really understand Maimonides? And where do their arguments fit in the mainstream debates about him and his works? Each of the seven core chapters examines a particular approach. Some rabbis have tried to liberate themselves from the influence of his ideas. Others have sought to build on those ideas or expand them in ways which Maimonides himself did not pursue, and which he may well not have agreed with. Still others advance patently non-Maimonidean positions, while attributing them to none other than Maimonides. Above all, the essays published here demonstrate that his legacy remains vibrantly alive today. (shrink)

A corporate executive is miserable and seeks the help of a psychotherapist. A college student is unhappy in her current major and goes to her academic advisor. A married couple struggles with discord and seeks the help of a licensed counsellor. In each case, the diagnosis and prescription will likely be the same: you are miserable because you are not doing what you want. Your path to happiness thus lies in figuring out what you enjoy doing, coming up with a (...) strategy to satisfy these desires, and then executing your plan. This is the standard approach to happiness used in much of today's counselling and psychotherapeutic practice. The Socratic, Stoic, and Confucian philosophical traditions tell a different story: you are miserable because you are not doing what you must. Through historical and contemporary case studies, analyses of key novels, reviews of modern psychological research, interviews with struggling people, and close readings of philosophical texts, The Joy of Duty illuminates the intimate connection between human joy and the performance of ethical obligation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS Unbaptized God. The Basic Flaw in Ecumenical Theology. By ROBERT W. JENSON. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992. Pp. v + 152. $16.95 (paper). The thesis of this potentially revolutionary book is nicely summarized in its title: the basic flaw in ecumenical theology is the unbaptized-that is, insufficiently trinitarian-God of Christians East and West, Protestant and Catholic. The book is revolutionary because it proposes a new way of reading (...) the logic of a myriad of ecumenical dialogues over the last quarter century; as a result, ecumenical theology and praotice for which God is among the " settled " issues ought be appropriately chastised by this book. But I think that Unbaptized God is only "potentially " revolutionary because I think Jenson leaves two crucial questions unanswered. Jenson's daring argument is made with rare clarity and compactness. Consider the argument in three stages. First, in an introduction, Jenson describes " the frustration of dialogue." He does not mean the frustration created by the meager knowledge or acceptance of the results of ecumenical dialogues on the popular level-or the reception without action of these results by Church officials (p. 2). He focuses on " a third mode of frustration ": a dialogue will proceed toward a " convergence," not without "tolerable divergence "; but the initially tolerable divergence eventually yields " a newly virulent division." The process is seemingly "circular" (p. 3). "No set of convergences ever seems to be enough, once the separations are there " (p. 4). Why? And what can be done about this? Second, Jenson illustrates the frustration and starts showing the way beyond it in several different ways. He describes the dialogues in the first two parts of the book. In Part One, Jenson takes up "The Early Ecumenical Convergences " on issues central to the sixteenth century reformations, Ca.tholic and Protestant: Justification (ch. 1), Real Presence (ch. 2), and Eucharistic Sacrifice (ch. 3). Part Two takes up Churchly Office (ch. 4), Episcopacy (ch. 5), Roman Primacy (ch. 6), and The Church's Mediation (ch. 7). The distinctions between the issues of Part One and Part Two seem to be both historical and logical. Historically, the issues of Part Two are what Walter Kasper called the surprising "displacement of the problematic" (p. 44) from issues 677 678 BOOK REVIEWS considered central by Trent and the Reformers (especially justification and the eucharist) to issues that emerged after the Reformation (especially ecclesiology). Logically, the distinction between Part One and Part Two is the distinction between the traditional matters of controversy (Part One) and what are claimed to be differences "hidden at some conceptual level deeper than that occupied by the traditional matters of controversy" (Part Two) (p. 7). I will not rehearse Jenson's splendid summaries of the many dialogues in English, French, and German (although the book ought be recommended on these grounds alone). The unofficial Groupe des Dombes is regularly regarded as the most ecumenically insightful, and the Dominican J. M. R. Tillard plays a particularly crucial role among Roman Catholic theologians. It is enough to say that Jenson successfully shows how each dialogue can be read as an instance of the frustration he initially mentioned: a " convergence " occurs on each topic which later turns into a " divergence " which later is converted into a " convergence " and so forth. By the end (ch. 7), everything seems to circle back to the doctrine of justification (ch. 1). But the appearances, Jenson argues, are deceiving. "The pattern of the dialogue's history proves to be more like a spiral than a circle on a plane" (p. 103). Thus, besides describing the dialogues, Jenson must also prove that the dialogues exhibit a non-circular movement. One of the fascinating features of Jenson's argument at this stage is that he does this in a slightly different way in each of the first seven chapters. For example, he sometimes clears away "illusory dissensus" (p. 22). He sometimes concludes that "the Catholic side is right." Indeed, the Catholic side seems right on most crucial issues-on convictions about the temporal constitution of persons that constitute the background for arguments over Real Presence (p. 32); on the "new" Catholic theology of eucharistic sacrifice (p. 41) ; on episcopal succession (p. 74... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“The Blessed in the Kingdom of Heaven Will See the Punishments of the Damned So That Their Bliss May Be More Delightful to Them”: Nietzsche and AquinasJames Lehrberger O.Cist.NO DECENT HUMAN BEING can read those words of St. Thomas Aquinas, which Frederick Nietzsche quotes in On the Genealogy of Morals1 (GM) without feeling horror, shock, and disgust: “‘The blessed in the kingdom of heaven,’ he [Aquinas] says meek as (...) a lamb, ‘will see the [End Page 425] punishments of the damned so that their bliss might be more pleasing to them.’” Nietzsche scholars regularly notice and comment on this passage from the Summa theologiae.2 The typical gloss takes it to show the spirit of hatred that lies at the heart of Aquinas’s Christianity. Thus Walter Kaufmann reads the quotation as showing how the Christian faith enables its adherents “to indulge their lust for revenge by hoping for the eternal torture and destruction of their persecutors.”3 Weaver Santinello echoes this sentiment when she claims that “‘the great teacher and saint [Aquinas]’ had a ‘bloodthirsty vision of Hell.’”4 Even so sensitive a Christian as Merold Westphal reads Nietzsche’s Aquinas in this way. “[I]t is hard to deny that the spirit of resentment and longing for vengeance burns hot in these passages... in them the final judgment makes the Final Solution seem almost moderate.”5 Similar comments and observations so abound in the scholarship that they form a virtual consensus on this Summa passage’s teaching.6This proliferation of such statements on Aquinas’s meaning, however, contrasts sharply with the absence of careful analyses [End Page 426] of the passage. I do not know, in fact, of a single article, book chapter, or study that takes Nietzsche’s quotation of Aquinas for its theme. More generally, despite the vast literature on Nietzsche and Christianity, comparative studies of Nietzsche and Aquinas are rare.7 The absence of substantive studies on the Genealogy’s use of the Aquinas quotation is doubly unfortunate. First, it silences or at least muffles the voice of Nietzsche. He cites Aquinas’s text in the specific context of Treatise I of the Genealogy. The quotation reveals the full meaning that Nietzsche intended it to convey only when it is read in that context. Second, it obscures and distorts the thought of Aquinas: the quotation must be read in its own context in the Summa theologiae to grasp the teaching that Aquinas intended his words to express.In light of Aquinas’s importance as a Christian theologian and the crucial role he plays in the Genealogy’s critique of moral values, I intend to examine Nietzsche’s presentation of this text. Careful study of this matter can shed light on a key question which has long been discussed and debated: Is Nietzsche’s account of Christianity as life-inimical rooted in an extraordinarily perceptive reading of the Christian psyche? Or is it based, rather, on a profound misunderstanding of that psyche? I will argue for two points: (1) that Nietzsche has utterly misconstrued Aquinas’s teaching; and (2) that Aquinas’s Christian morality, far from being life-inimical, is life-affirming. [End Page 427] More specifically, I will show not only that Aquinas is completely free from the hatred, envy, and vengefulness that Nietzsche attributes to him, but also that the virtues and beliefs he embraces, such as meekness, mercy, and divine justice, are strong and supportive of human flourishing.I will proceed in the following steps. First, I will investigate Nietzsche’s understanding of the Aquinas quotation in terms of the role it plays in the Genealogy’s First Treatise. As already noted, recognizing Nietzsche’s purpose in quoting Aquinas requires understanding the objections he develops to Christianity throughout that Treatise. Hence I will highlight the principal criticisms of Aquinas’s Christianity found there. Second, I will analyze the quotation from Aquinas in its own context in the Summa theologiae. Lastly, I will compare and contrast Nietzsche and Aquinas in terms of those issues which the quoted passage has brought to the fore. Nietzsche’s take on Aquinas, however, is the only question I will address. I do not... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 525 ever, Scharlemann's work is carefully reasoned, and should serve to encourage further reflection on the manner of human existence that is implied in the relation of discipleship. The book is in general well-printed, but there are some errors. The title of Chapter 4 is given incompletely in the table of contents. On p. 79, read intellectus quaerens fidem for intellectuals quaerens fidem. The Catholic University of (...) America Washington, D.C. JOHN P. GALVIN Time and Eternity. By BRIAN LEFTOW. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pp. xii + 377. $42.95 (cloth). This is a considerable book on a considerable topic-the logical relation of time to eternity, the possibility of a simple God's knowing temporal events, and their presence in God. The book aims to make sense of and defend the claim that God is in fact timeless, and to explore the relations between such a timeless being and temporal beings. The book is thus something of a tour de force which, as Professor Stump herself remarks in a review, no subsequent discussions of the topic will be able to neglect. It is also a mine of information about discussions of this venerable topic, ancient, medieval, and modern, with special emphasis on contemporary controversies. After plainly setting out his working assumptions, Leftow examines the possibility of the timeless and the logic of eternity. He argues that timeless entities do, or at least can, exist, whether or not God exists and is timeless. He argues further that if God exists and is timeless, " coexisting " with time does not make God temporal. Proper discourse of the eternal requires its own peculiar " eternal-present" tense. The author then turns to the classic discussions of these topics in Augustine, Boethius, and Anselm. His treatment of Boethius is mainly based on the contemporary interpretation by Eleanor Stump and Norman Kretzmann-indeed a great deal of the first half of the book consists in fencing with their view. Leftow argues that Stump and Kretzmann are correct in concluding that the Boethian concept of eternity is that of " atemporal duration," though he thinks they arrived at this conclusion for the wrong reasons. Having argued that one can understand Boethian eternity in terms of a form of duration, Leftow goes on to maintain that one can also understand it on the model of an extensionless point. At the same time, he maintains that God's life has earlier and later "positions" in a manner that this reviewer finds reminiscent of the Whiteheadian view 526 BOOK 1mvrnws of the genetic analysis of an actual occasion, or perhaps even of White· head's conception of divine everlastingness. In the long run, however, Leftow finds the Boethian view (at least as interpreted by Stump and Kretzmann) unsatisfactory. The reason is, if I have got it right, that he thinks that for Boethius as well as for Thomas Aquinas and others, God is aware of temporal things inasmuch as they are "present to God" in God's eternity. At the same time Leftow supposes (mistakenly) that for Aquinas God's knowledge is that of an observer, and he goes on to write: "Now if a temporal thing is really present to God, it seems to fallow that God and that thing exist simultaneously" (161, my emphasis). I fail to grasp how that seems to follow, unless one confuses the ontological order with the intentional, hut on the supposition that it does follow, Leftow argues that Boethius can't have it both ways: that God's knowledge, not being simultaneous with temporal events, is not foreknowledge and so does not impede human freedom, yet is truly omniscient, and so simultaneous with temporal events after all. Leftow then turns to the view of Anselm, which he judges more defensible, for he believes he finds in Anselm a position in which the temporal events that God knows are in a real sense thereby in God, and so simultaneous with God's knowledge of them. "On this alternative,... temporal events occur all at once in eternity, in addition to occurring at various points in time.... Temporal events occur at once for God and really do occur at once, in eternity" (219... (shrink)

The present dilemma in philosophy -- What pragmatism means -- Some metaphysical problems pragmatically considered -- The one and the many -- Pragmatism and common sense -- Pragmatism's conception of truth -- Pragmatism and humanism -- Pragmatism and religion.

Truth-talk exhibits certain features that render it philosophically suspect and motivate a deflationary account. I offer a new formulation of deflationism that explains truth-talk in terms of semantic pretense. This amounts to a fictionalist account of truth-talk but avoids an error-theoretic interpretation and its resulting incoherence. The pretense analysis fits especially well with deflationism’s central commitment, and it handles truth-talk’s unusual features effectively. In particular, this approach suggests an interesting strategy for dealing with the Liar paradox. This version of deflationism (...) has advantages over the formulations currently available in the literature, mainly because it offers a more satisfying account of the generalizing role deflationary views take as truth-talk’s central function. Explaining the notion of truth in terms of pretense generates some special concerns, but none we cannot address through careful consideration of how pretense operates in truth-talk and of the attitudes instances of pretending involve. (shrink)