I argue that the freedom which is to coexist with the freedom of choice of others in accordance with a universal law mentioned in Kant's Rechtslehre is not itself freedom of choice. Rather, it is the independence which is a condition of being able to exercise genuine free choice by not having to act in accordance with the choices of others. Kant's distinction between active and passive citizenship appears, however, to undermine this idea of independence, because the possession of a (...) certain type of property right on the part of some citizens makes it possible for them to dominate others. Kant's account of property in this way turns out to be central to the question as to whether his Rechtslehre represents an internally consistent account of how freedom can be guaranteed within a legal and political community. I go on to argue that Kant's attempt to justify a pre-political right of property cannot be viewed as a successful justification of private property, and that he should have abandoned the notion of su... (shrink)

The Addresses to the German Nation is one of Fichte's best-known works. It is also his most controversial work because of its nationalist elements. In this book, David James places this text and its nationalism within the context provided by Fichte's philosophical, educational and moral project of creating a community governed by pure practical reason, in which his own foundational philosophical science or Wissenschaftslehre could achieve general recognition. Rather than marking a break in Fichte's philosophy, the Addresses to the German (...) Nation and some lesser-known texts from the same period are shown to develop themes already present in his earlier writings. The themes discussed include the opposition between idealism and dogmatism, the role of Fichte's 'popular' lectures and writings in leading individuals to the standpoint of idealism, the view of history demanded by idealism and the role of the state in history. (shrink)

In this study of Fichte's social and political philosophy, David James offers an interpretation of Fichte's most famous writings in this area, including his Foundations of Natural Right and Addresses to the German Nation, centred on two main themes: property and virtue. These themes provide the basis for a discussion of such issues as what it means to guarantee the freedom of all the citizens of a state, the problem of unequal relations of economic dependence between states, and the differences (...) and connections between the legal and political sphere of right and morality. James also relates Fichte's central social and political ideas to those of other important figures in the history of philosophy, including Locke, Kant and Hegel, as well as to the radical phase of the French Revolution. His account will be of importance to all who are interested in Fichte's philosophy and its intellectual and political context. (shrink)

The claim that Rousseau's writings influenced the development of Kant's critical philosophy, and German idealism, is not a new one. As correct as the claim may be, it does not amount to a systematic account of Rousseau's place within this philosophical tradition. It also suggests a progression whereby Rousseau's achievements are eventually eclipsed by those of Kant, Fichte and Hegel, especially with respect to the idea of freedom. In this book David James shows that Rousseau presents certain challenges that Kant (...) and the idealists Fichte and Hegel could not fully meet, by making dependence and necessity, as well as freedom, his central concerns, and thereby raises the question of whether freedom in all its forms is genuinely possible in a condition of human interdependence marked by material inequality. His study will be valuable for all those studying Kant, German idealism and the history of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century ideas. (shrink)

Fichte's definitions of property appear to diverge from modern common linguistic usage, especially his identification of leisure as the object of an absolute right of property, and they may even appear arbitrary. I argue that these definitions are not in fact arbitrary. Rather, any divergence from common linguistic usage can be explained in terms of a conceptual innovation which consists in expanding or modifying a concept by thinking it through, thereby generating new content. In the case of Fichte's theory of (...) property, this content turns out to be leisure as the primary object of a theory of distributive justice. The conceptual innovation found in Fichte's theory of property invites a reconceptualization of the relation between work and freedom. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out to consider the extent to which Horkheimer and Adorno's account of the transition from Kant's philosophy to key features of the novels of the Marquis de Sade in the Second Excursus of their Dialectic of Enlightenment can be viewed as a fragment of the ‘history of philosophy’ and to explain this account in a way that allows us to ask whether it succeeds in establishing a necessary connection between Kant's philosophy and Sade's novels. In (...) connection with, a particular problem emerges. This problem concerns the role played by a non-instrumental form of reason in Horkheimer and Adorno's attempt to establish an essential connection between Kant's theoretical philosophy and Sade's novels, in which the practical implications of the theoretical employment of reason allegedly become explicit. It will be shown that, despite appearances to the contrary, an employment of reason of the relevant type is not identified by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

Taking a well-known passage from the third volume of Capital as my starting point, I explain on what grounds Marx thinks that freedom and necessity will be compatible in a communist society. The necessity in question concerns having to produce to satisfy material needs. Unlike some accounts of this issue, I argue that the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society has more to do with how production is organized than with the direct relation of the worker to the (...) object produced or to his or her own productive activity. Moreover, I show how self-realization and a form of activity that possesses an intrinsic value are made possible by the organization of the production process and how this is integral to Marx's account of the compatibility of freedom and necessity in communist society. (shrink)

Horkheimer and Adorno make claims that imply a complete rejection of the idea of a universal history developed in classical German philosophy. Using Kant’s account of universal history, I argue that some features of the idea of a universal history can nevertheless be detected in the Dialectic of Enlightenment and some of Adorno’s remarks on freedom and history. This is done in connection with the kind of rational self-mastery that they associate with the story of Odysseus. Some claims made by (...) Adorno in particular will be shown to imply that this self-mastery is a necessary condition of a better, freer society, especially in relation to this society’s material conditions. On the other hand, certain essential features of the idea of a universal history are clearly absent in virtue of the ultimate contingency of events and states of affairs that Adorno seeks to preserve. I show that the absence of these features and the preservation of contingency are, in fact, the means of saving the notion of the possibility of progress which informs the idea of a universal history. (shrink)

In a series of lectures from 1804–05, Johann Gottlieb Fichte sets out a conception of enlightenment whose basic structure is, I argue, to some extent reproduced in two more famous accounts of enlightenment found in post-Kantian German philosophy: Hegel’s account of the Enlightenment’s struggle with faith in his Phenomenology of Spirit and the conception of enlightenment rationality presented in Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. The narrative I offer serves to highlight, moreover, the critical role played by the notion of (...) an unconditional good in Fichte’s and Hegel’s critiques of enlightenment. The lack of an explicit appeal to, and account of, this notion in Horkheimer and Adorno’s critique of enlightenment will be shown to raise questions concerning how successful their critique of enlightenment can really be thought to be. (shrink)

The idea of ‘public reason’ has recently been associated with Rousseau’s views on the formation of a general will. Advocates of this idea in the Kantian tradition tend to emphasize reflective acts of rational deliberation which, I suggest, are more suited to written than to spoken language. Rousseau’s accounts of the role of spoken language as a means of expressing human needs and the role of pity in the development of a moral form of reasoning, which allows one properly to (...) take into account the interests of others, show that he cannot be so easily interpreted as an advocate of the idea of public reason. This is because his views on the importance of spoken language in democratic politics and the essential part played by the sentiment of pity in the development of moral reasoning imply the legitimacy of modes of expression in the formation of a general will that are not, in any obvious sense, compatible with the demands of public reason. (shrink)

Introduction -- The symbolic form of art -- Kant's theory of the mathematical sublime and the boundlessness of the symbolic form of art -- The classical sublimity of Judaism -- The classical form of art -- The original epic -- The ideal -- The transition to the revealed religion and the romantic form of art -- The revealed religion -- Representational thought and the romantic form of art -- Traces of left-hegelianism in Hegel's lectures on aesthetics -- The end of (...) mythology -- The significance of Kierkegaard's interpretation of Don Giovanni in relation to Hegel's theory of the end of art -- The end of art -- The opera as a modern art form -- Hegel and Lukács's on the possibility of a modern epic -- The problem of a modern epic -- The modern epic and history -- Civil society as the background to the modern epic -- Myth and society : a common theme in the thought of Hegel and Sorel -- Sorel's myth of the general strike -- Myth and modern ethical life. (shrink)

I discuss J. G. Fichte’s theory of property and its implications in relation to the claim made by C. B. Macpherson that, by broadening the meaning of the term ‘property’, it becomes possible to reconcile two principles of liberal democratic theory that seem to be at odds with each other: the right to property, understood as the right to exclude others from the use or benefit of something, and the right to use and develop one’s capacities. I argue that Fichte’s (...) broad conception of property can be viewed as an example of how this might be done. I also show, however, that Fichte demonstrates that a political reconciliation of these rights is demanded by the conceptual reconciliation of them, and that such political reconciliation may demand placing considerable limitations, in the form of state regulation and the redistribution of resources, on human freedom. (shrink)

(2008). The significance of kierkegaard's interpretation of Don Giovanni in relation to Hegel's philosophy of art1. British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 147-162.

I argue that although in the Foundations of Natural Right Fichte adopts a theory of cosmopolitan right that is in a number of important respects formally identical to the one developed by Kant, he later came in The Closed Commercial State to reassess his earlier Kantian cosmopolitanism. This work can in fact be seen to identify a problem with Kant's cosmopolitanism, namely, Kant's failure to recognize the possibility of an indirect form of coercion based on unequal relations of economic dependence. (...) I argue that Kant's failure to acknowledge such a possibility stems from his uncritical acceptance of this type of relation. Whereas Fichte's awareness of the possibility of one-sided forms of economic dependence leads him to offer a solution to the problems it raises: the severing of all commercial relations with other states. This solution is itself highly problematic, however, as I indicate with reference to Fichte's remarks on ‘natural frontiers’. (shrink)

I consider the extent to which Fichte might be classed as a German Jacobin. I argue that if we think of the history of Jacobinism as being driven by two main forces, a concern for private rights and a concern for the public good, then Fichte might be classed as a Jacobin because his ethical and political thought combines these two concerns. I also suggest that his argument for the right of existence in the Foundations of Natural Right and his (...) idea of ‘public’ virtue, which can be found in his main work on ethics, The System of Ethics, provide a link between his philosophy and the radical phase of the French Revolution. (shrink)

The possibility of achieving ectogenesis, or the growing of a human fetus to term in an artificial womb, is approaching reality as a result of advances in treatment of premature newborns and in in vitro fertilization techniques. In their 1984 book, The Reproductive Revolution, issued in North America as Making Babies, Peter Singer and Deane Wells offered several arguments for ectogenesis. James examines their arguments and rejects two of them, that ectogenesis offers a less problematic alternative to surrogate motherhood, and (...) that ectogenesis could make it possible to reconcile fetal rights with the right to abortion on demand. He grants Singer and Wells' argument that the childless have a claim to state support of their desire to nurture, but contends that government-supported ectogenesis should still be rejected because the adoption of unwanted children is a preferable alternative to the use of an exotic, expensive, and still unproven technology. (shrink)

This paper is a comprehensive examination of the ethical issues surrounding artificial insemination. The interests of parents, AI children and society are identified and compared, and a variety of arguments for and against AIH and AID are examined. Although various criticisms of the natural law position are offered, this paper comes to the similar conclusion that donor artiricial insemination is not morally justified.

I argue that two aims can be detected in Fichte’s theory of punishment: a technical aim that concerns adopting the appropriate means of punishing the criminal with a view to ensuring public securit...

It is claimed that Hegel denies the possibility of a modern epic and that his lectures on aesthetics demand the condemnation of all the art of his own time. I use the available student transcripts of his lectures on aesthetics, in conjunction with Lukács's views on the novel, to show that Hegel suggests that the novel might count as a modern epic and that it may perform a significant function in modern ethical life (Sittlichkeit) as presented in his own philosophy (...) of right. While Hegel raises questions concerning the possibility of a modern epic, he also presents the novel with a task that Lukács's interpretation of Balzac's Illusions perdues shows the novel is able to fulfill. This becomes evident when we consider Hegel's remarks on the novel in connection with his theory of civil society. (shrink)

In the first section of this essay I show how Hegel’s account of the struggle for recognition can be explained in terms of the role that Fichte accords to recognition in his deduction of the concept of right and, in particular, in terms of a problem to which this deduction gives rise. In the second section, I show how Hegel seeks to resolve this problem by means of his account of the struggle for recognition. Finally, in the third section, I (...) show how Fichte’s and Hegel’s claims concerning the necessity of mutual recognition do not prevent them from regarding slavery as justified in certain circumstances, or at least as being as much the fault of the person enslaved as the person who has enslaved him or her, despite the fact that slavery represents one of the clearest possible examples of a situation in which mutual recognition is absent. One may therefore question the extent to which they regard mutual recognition as an absolutely fundamental norm of social relations. There is the difference, however, that Hegel’s position appears to be that mutual recognition becomes such a norm in the course of history, whereas Fichte implies that the absence of mutual recognition may be justified simply whenever an individual has failed to raise him-or herself to the level of a being whose attitude towards him-or herself as demonstrated through his or her actions is proof of a status that demands recognition from others. (shrink)

In this paper, I set out to consider the extent to which Horkheimer and Adorno's account of the transition from Kant's philosophy to key features of the novels of the Marquis de Sade in the Second Excursus of their Dialectic of Enlightenment can be viewed as a fragment of the ‘history of philosophy’ and to explain this account in a way that allows us to ask whether it succeeds in establishing a necessary connection between Kant's philosophy and Sade's novels. In (...) connection with, a particular problem emerges. This problem concerns the role played by a non-instrumental form of reason in Horkheimer and Adorno's attempt to establish an essential connection between Kant's theoretical philosophy and Sade's novels, in which the practical implications of the theoretical employment of reason allegedly become explicit. It will be shown that, despite appearances to the contrary, an employment of reason of the relevant type is not identified by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason. (shrink)

Fichte’s deduction of the concept of right in the first main division of the Foundations of Natural Righthelped make recognition into a central concept of social and political philosophy, albeit indirectly through its influence on Hegel’s account of recognition.1This deduction consists of an attempt to explain the possibility of self-consciousness, which in this particular context means consciousness of oneself as a free, rational agent capable of realizing one’s ends by effecting changes in the world. In the first main division of (...) the Foundations of Natural Right, Fichte sets out an argument which aims to show that self-consciousness requires an object that qua object is independent of the subject but qua object of self-consciousness is not purely external to the subject and non-identical with it. Rather, the object reflects what the subject itself essentially is, that is to say, self-determining. What we have is, in effect, a practical form of the identity of subject and object which is presupposed by any conscious experience, but which, as the condition of any experience whatsoever, can itself never become a direct object of experience. (shrink)

In his early Some Lectures concerning the Scholar’s Vocation, J. G. Fichte developed an account of the social role of the scholar. This role concerns the task of furthering human culture and progress, which Fichte considers to be a moral duty for the scholar. In these lectures, Fichte also outlined the capabilities and knowledge that the scholar needs in order to be able to fulfill the task in question, including the possession of historical knowledge. The article argues that the later (...) Addresses to the German Nation represent an attempt on Fichte’s part to realize his earlier conception of the scholar’s vocation, because these addresses aim to help usher in a new, superior epoch in human history. Particular attention is paid to the use that Fichte makes of history in them. In effect, he instrumentalizes history, and justifies his doing this in terms of a higher purpose and the ‘merely’ empirical status of historical fact and evidence. This use of history is compared to some things that Nietzsche has to say about history in his essay On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life; and it invites questions concerning the possible dangers of such a use of history and its compatibility with Fichte’s idea that the vocation of the scholar is a moral one. (shrink)

I offer an interpretation of Hegel's account of the essential differences between the original epic and the modern epic which supports two claims that have been made on the basis of the available student transcripts of Hegel's lectures on the philosophy of art: Hegel never asserted that art had come to an end in the sense of its having no further significance or interest in the modern world; and Hegel was keen to understand art as a cultural and historical phenomenon, (...) with the result that he came to limit the significance of art in the modern world on account of its no longer being able to perform the same historical function that it performed in the ancient world. While I seek to illustrate these two points through my interpretation of Hegel's account of the original epic and his remarks on the modern epic, I also argue that, given certain other aspects of his thought, Hegel could have accorded the modern epic a greater potential than he does; moreover, I argue that this suggests a greater continuity between the original epic and its modern day counterpart than Hegel himself appears to allow. (shrink)

Towards the end of the second part of Leviathan, there is a short passage in which Hobbes describes a process of colonization and the reasons behind it. I explain this passage in terms of Hobbes's definition of freedom as the absence of external impediments tomotion and the role that he assigns to the passions in explaining human behaviour. On this basis, I argue that Hobbes implies that colonization is both natural and necessary. The willingness of some individuals to risk their (...) lives in an attempt to free themselves from colonial power and Hobbes's account of the sovereign's role in the process of colonization will be shown, however, to indicate the possibility of an alternative conception of freedom and an alternative explanation of human behaviour, thereby introducing an element of contingency. Colonization turns out in this way not to be as natural and necessary as Hobbes makes it seem. (shrink)

Both Hegel and Marx appear committed to the idea that the Reign of Terror was in some sense necessary. I argue that Hegel explains this necessity in terms of the concept of ‘absolute freedom’, together with the associated self-conception and normative picture of the world. It will be argued that Marx also views the Reign of Terror as necessary because of an abstract conception of political freedom and the citizen which conflicts with a determinate individuality that is characterized by particular (...) interests and identities. In connection with Marx’s critique of Hegel’s theory of the modern state I draw attention to a puzzle, the discussion of which will lead to a brief account of how Marx’s attempt to overcome the opposition between the state and civil society differs from Hegel’s. (shrink)

Hegel's Elements of the Philosophy of Right, one of the classic texts of German Idealism, is a seminal work of legal, social and political philosophy that has generated very different interpretations since its publication in 1821. Written with the advantage of historical distance, the essays in this volume adopt a fresh perspective that makes readers aware of the breadth and depth of this classic work. The themes of the essays reflect the continuing relevance of the text, and include Hegel's method, (...) the concept of property, Hegel's view of morality, the concept of Sittlichkeit, the modern family, the nature and tensions of civil society, and the question of the modernity of the Hegelian state. The volume will be of interest to all scholars and students of German Idealism and the history of political thought. (shrink)

Offers a re-assessment and overview of Hegel's philosophy of right, a key element of his political thought.