Byung-Chul Han (Seoul, 1959) establishes one of the most meaningful and deep understandings of the experience of the contemporary subject. In his view, temporality has suffered a radical atomization that translates into a fragmented life experience: a collection of isolated instants devoid of a sense of duration. As a by-product of this circumstance, we see our very way of thinking and learning changing accordingly. Where we used to find knowledge, we now see information. The aim of this paper will be (...) to explore the transformative power of education in the context of our “broken” temporality. (shrink)

In this article our aim is to present some of the coordinates of the debate around common good. Starting by recognizing the importance of common good for the Christian worldview after the presence of it in St. Paul’s “the manifestation of Spirit is given for the common good”, we will present two ways of interpreting the development of our moral and emotional tendencies that have to do with two different evolutionary approaches. By the end of the article, we hope to (...) have established the argumental advantage of the cooperativist in front of the social Darwinist, opening the possibility for a possible interpretation of evolution as guided towards common good. (shrink)

This publication articulated in three parts, and twelve chapters endeavours to engage with the complex negative emotions and consequent phenomenon of self-deceit, radicalisation and extremism. First part: Emotions as Lines of Demarcation or Guidelines to Our Self. The Psychodynamic Surrounding of our Intentional Self; second part: Case Studies of Some Concrete Societal Encapsulations of the Negative Passions; and third part: Resisting the Colonisation of Tyrannical Affections. Possible Paths of Mitigating Radicalisation and Extremism. What kind of educational responses can be given (...) to extremist claims of territory, identity, resources, power, and interpretations? How can a dialogue on unifying ethical principles and values aid in developing common grounds for preventing radical and extremist excesses? With authors from three continents, this publication endeavours to not only ask the uncomfortable questions with regard to the exteriorisation of human emotive predispositions and inclinations to ostracize, stigmatise and discriminate. The exit door from the extreme is also clearly presented, through four contributions, notably the interplay of Charvaka philosophy, Sikh wisdom on balanced forms of engagement with strong emotions. (shrink)

A new theory is taking hold in neuroscience. It is the theory that the brain is essentially a hypothesis-testing mechanism, one that attempts to minimise the error of its predictions about the sensory input it receives from the world. It is an attractive theory because powerful theoretical arguments support it, and yet it is at heart stunningly simple. Jakob Hohwy explains and explores this theory from the perspective of cognitive science and philosophy. The key argument throughout The Predictive Mind (...) is that the mechanism explains the rich, deep, and multifaceted character of our conscious perception. It also gives a unified account of how perception is sculpted by attention, and how it depends on action. The mind is revealed as having a fragile and indirect relation to the world. Though we are deeply in tune with the world we are also strangely distanced from it. (shrink)

The problems involved in understanding the Aristotelian notion of an ἀρχή arise from the widely accepted view that Aristotle’s theory of knowledge is torn between irreconcilable empiricist and rationalist tendencies. I argue that several puzzling features of the Aristotelian ἀρχή are clarified when it is understood as akin to the Urphänomen, which plays a central role in the scientific thought of Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. More broadly, I argue that the apparent conflict in Aristotle’s theory of knowledge is resolved by (...) seeing that Aristotle is neither an empiricist, nor a rationalist, but a “rational empiricist” akin to Goethe. (shrink)

If we consider certain features of Spinoza's metaphysics, it can seem very difficult to see how error, or the having of false ideas, is possible. In this paper I want to give the metaphysical background to the problem, before turning to a more detailed consideration of how Spinoza in fact accounts for error, or the having of false ideas. I will show the importance of the notions of adequacy and inadequacy in Spinoza's account. Having done this I will return to (...) the central problem of accounting for the ontological status of false ideas vis a vis both the Infinite Intellect, and finite minds. (shrink)

Departing from the premise that the poststructuralist paradigm still reigns supreme in feminist and gender theory, that is, despite the niche efforts made in the past two decades to challenge it linked to the so called “speculative” turn or the materialisms (and realisms) emerging from the feminist field itself (such as the Utrecht School, inspired by Rosi Braidotti), we set the call for papers for the issue before you in terms that would invite authors ready to challenge the dominant epistemic (...) framework. We invited papers that engage with materialism(s), realism(s), sciences and projects engaged in rethinking the post-human beyond the poststructuralist (and, we dare say, postmodern/ist) norm. -/- . (shrink)

Master Eckhart’s metaphysics is an idealistic one: Being is not what there is, but only and exclusively what is truthful, i. e. the normativity which reason sets. Further: What is truthful comes about by negation of what there is, because this is itself nothing, pure negation as such. What is truthful is therefore the negation of negation. This is an idealistic thesis which cannot be described as being thomistic, but rather which corresponds to the metaphysics of German Idealism, especially of (...) Fichte. This essay shows that the thesis that Eckhart was thomistic until his Parisian idealistic turn at the beginning of the 14th century is not correct. It argues that Eckhart’s metaphysics is unambiguously idealistic, i. e. non-thomistic, and that this is also the case in works which he certainly wrote before the Parisian Questions. This applies especially to the Rede der underscheidunge und the Tractatus super oratione dominica. (shrink)

Jakob Ohlhorst | : This paper introduces the concept of tragic self-deception. Taking the basic notion that self-deception is motivated belief against better evidence, I argue that there are extreme cases of self-deception even when the contrary evidence is compelling. These I call cases of tragic self-deception. Such strong evidence could be argued to exclude the possibility of self-deception; it would be a delusion instead. To sidestep this conclusion, I introduce the Wittgensteinian concept of certainties or hinges: acceptances that (...) are beyond evidential justification. One particular type of certainties—iHinges, which are adopted for motivational reasons—explain the phenomenon of tragic self-deception: they warrant the subject’s dismissal of the evidence without loss of rationality from the subject’s point of view. Subsequently, I deal with some objections that can be raised against this account of self-deception. | : Cet article présente le concept d’auto-illusion tragique. En prenant la notion de base selon laquelle l’auto-illusion consiste en une croyance motivée à l’encontre de meilleures preuves, je soutiens qu’il existe des cas extrêmes d’auto-illusion qui persistent même face à des preuves contradictoires incontestables. J’appelle ces cas : auto-illusion tragique. On pourrait soutenir que des preuves d’une telle force excluent la possibilité d’auto-illusion et qu’il s’agirait plutôt de délire. Afin d’éviter cette conclusion, j’introduis le concept wittgensteinien de certitudes ou de propositions charnières : des admissions qui se situent au-delà d’une justification de nature probante. Un type de certitudes en particulier – iHinges, qui sont adoptées pour des raisons d’ordre motivationnel – rend compte du phénomène d’auto-illusion tragique. Ces certitudes justifient que le sujet rejette la preuve sans que cela implique, de son propre point de vue, une perte de rationalité. Subséquemment, je traite de certaines objections qui peuvent être soulevées contre cette explication de l’auto-illusion. (shrink)

A diferencia de todos los demás sistemas de imputación, Jakobs ubica el acento de la relevancia jurídico-penal del hecho en su significado normativo, como algo que trasciende la mera causalidad exterior y la finalidad del autor, de manera que lo decisivo para la imputación jurídico-penal no es ni lo psíquicoreal querido por el autor, ni la causalidad desplegada por su conducta, sino el significado normativo de esa conducta como la expresión de un sentido objetivo de desautorización de la vigencia de (...) la norma en un determinado contexto social. (shrink)

Spanish translation of Henry of Ghent’s Sum, article 32, q. 4, the most important place in his work with regard to his opinion about Maimonides’ theory of the divine attributes.

This article shows firs that the text hitherto known as the Prologue to the Works of Propositions by Meister Eckhart is in fact his treatise On Being, What is, and Nothing, to which he himself refers in his Sermons and Lectures on the Twenty-fourth Chapter of «Ecclesiasticus». The article also analyses the relationship between the two extant commentaries on Genesis by Eckhart: the Expositio on Genesis and the Book of the Parables of Genesis.

The author interprets the dialogues belonging to Plato’s first Tetralogy, i. e. Euthyphro, Apology, Crito and Phaedo, as a coherent whole, in which the concept of ‘gratuitousness’ plays the leading role. The expression ‘gratuitous’ does not mean here, however, ‘arbitrary’ or ‘as someone likes’ but rather ‘free’, ‘gratis’, ‘for nothing’. Based on such an interpretation the author discusses then the important similarities existing between – on the one hand – Plato’s metaphysics of ‘gratuitousness’ and – on the other hand – (...) Meister Eckhart’s ‘mystics’ and Schelling’s Philosophy of Identity. These three thinkers are all interested in the world as it is not merely for us or for something else – that is not in the world as it merely appears to someone under particular given conditions –, but in the world as it is in itself. However, this distinction between ‘appearances’ and ‘things-in-themselves’ is not to be thought as an epistemological but rather as an ethical or existential one, which is not related to the way how we ‘can know’ the world but rather to the way how we ‘should live’ in it. (shrink)

Mysticism played an important role in the works of Schelling, not only after 1806, that is not only after he went to Munich and came into contact with Franz von Baader, but already at the beginning of his literary career in the 1790s. It seems that he already knows Meister Eckhart’s German Sermons in 1795, namely as he writes the Philosophical Letters on Dogmatism and Criticism, because he uses the concepts ‘grundlos’ and ‘unmittelbar’ in a way we also find in (...) Eckhart’s works. The Mystical thought is crucial to understand not only Schelling’s Identity philosophy, but even his reception of Kant, Spinoza and Fichte’s Doctrine of Science. Yet, these conclusions do not show that Eckhart’s mysticism had paved the way for modern thought, but rather that German Idealism means an attempt at redefinition of modernity, which has his roots in mystical thought. (shrink)

The article presents Plato’s Republic as a work arguing for the fundamental principles which constitute not - as Popper thought - a totalitarian state, but rather our own state, based on the rule of law. Plato is trying to develop here a new form of ‘Enlightenment’ which we should see as a ‘revitalisation’ of traditional positions, which Plato thinks should be regenerated according to rational principles.

A series of recent developments points towards auditing as a promising mechanism to bridge the gap between principles and practice in AI ethics. Building on ongoing discussions concerning ethics-based auditing, we offer three contributions. First, we argue that ethics-based auditing can improve the quality of decision making, increase user satisfaction, unlock growth potential, enable law-making, and relieve human suffering. Second, we highlight current best practices to support the design and implementation of ethics-based auditing: To be feasible and effective, ethics-based auditing (...) should take the form of a continuous and constructive process, approach ethical alignment from a system perspective, and be aligned with public policies and incentives for ethically desirable behaviour. Third, we identify and discuss the constraints associated with ethics-based auditing. Only by understanding and accounting for these constraints can ethics-based auditing facilitate ethical alignment of AI, while enabling society to reap the full economic and social benefits of automation. (shrink)

A series of recent developments points towards auditing as a promising mechanism to bridge the gap between principles and practice in AI ethics. Building on ongoing discussions concerning ethics-based auditing, we offer three contributions. First, we argue that ethics-based auditing can improve the quality of decision making, increase user satisfaction, unlock growth potential, enable law-making, and relieve human suffering. Second, we highlight current best practices to support the design and implementation of ethics-based auditing: To be feasible and effective, ethics-based auditing (...) should take the form of a continuous and constructive process, approach ethical alignment from a system perspective, and be aligned with public policies and incentives for ethically desirable behaviour. Third, we identify and discuss the constraints associated with ethics-based auditing. Only by understanding and accounting for these constraints can ethics-based auditing facilitate ethical alignment of AI, while enabling society to reap the full economic and social benefits of automation. (shrink)

This paper argues that some of the major theories in current business ethics fail to provide an adequate account of moral responsibility for the creation of systemic financial risk. Using the trading of credit default swaps during the 2008 financial crisis as a case study, I will formulate three challenges that these theories must address: the problem of risk imposition, the problem of unstructured collective harm and the problem of limited knowledge. These challenges will be used to work out key (...) shortcomings of stakeholder approaches and Integrative Social Contracts Theory. I will argue that pluralist connection models used in political theory can help to overcome these shortcomings. Adopting an approach based on these models shows that financial institutions incur obligations in five main areas: managing their own risk profile; remedying some of the harms caused by financial crises; supporting the development of better epistemic methods; curbing the transmission and amplification of initial losses; and instigating structural reforms. (shrink)

I discuss an influential argument put forward by Hatherley in theJournal of Medical Ethics. Drawing on influential philosophical accounts of interpersonal trust, Hatherley claims that medical artificial intelligence is capable of being reliable, but not trustworthy. Furthermore, Hatherley argues that trust generates moral obligations on behalf of the trustee. For instance, when a patient trusts a clinician, it generates certain moral obligations on behalf of the clinician for her to do what she is entrusted to do. I make three objections (...) to Hatherley’s claims: (1) At least one philosophical account of interagent trust implies that medical AI is capable of being trustworthy. (2) Even if this account should ultimately be rejected, it does not matter much because what we care mostly about is that medical AI is reliable. (3) It is false that trust in itself generates moral obligations on behalf of the trustee. (shrink)

Recent advancements in artificial intelligence have fueled widespread academic discourse on the ethics of AI within and across a diverse set of disciplines. One notable subfield of AI ethics is machine ethics, which seeks to implement ethical considerations into AI systems. However, since different research efforts within machine ethics have discipline-specific concepts, practices, and goals, the resulting body of work is pestered with conflict and confusion as opposed to fruitful synergies. The aim of this paper is to explore ways to (...) alleviate these issues, both on a practical and theoretical level of analysis. First, we describe two approaches to machine ethics: the philosophical approach and the engineering approach and show how tensions between the two arise due to discipline specific practices and aims. Using the concept of disciplinary capture, we then discuss potential promises and pitfalls to cross-disciplinary collaboration. Drawing on recent work in philosophy of science, we finally describe how metacognitive scaffolds can be used to avoid epistemological obstacles and foster innovative collaboration in AI ethics in general and machine ethics in particular. (shrink)

It is common in moral philosophy to test the validity of moral principles by proposing counter-examples in the form of cases where the application of the principle does not give the conclusion we intuitively find valid. These cases are often imaginary and sometimes rather ‘outlandish’, involving ray guns, non-existent creatures, etc. I discuss whether we can test moral principles with the help of outlandish cases, or if only realistic cases are admissible. I consider two types of argument against outlandish cases: (...) 1) Since moral principles are meant for guiding action in this world, cases drawn from other worlds are irrelevant. 2) We lack the capacity to apply our intuitive moral competence to outlandish cases. I argue that while the first approach is importantly flawed, the second approach is plausible, not because our moral competence per se is limited to cases from this world, but because we lack the capacity to imagine outlandish cases, and we cannot apply our moral competence to a case we fail to imagine properly. (shrink)

An exciting theory in neuroscience is that the brain is an organ for prediction error minimization. This theory is rapidly gaining influence and is set to dominate the science of mind and brain in the years to come. PEM has extreme explanatory ambition, and profound philosophical implications. Here, I assume the theory, briefly explain it, and then I argue that PEM implies that the brain is essentially self-evidencing. This means it is imperative to identify an evidentiary boundary between the brain (...) and its environment. This boundary defines the mind-world relation, opens the door to skepticism, and makes the mind transpire as more inferentially secluded and neurocentrically skull-bound than many would nowadays think. Therefore, PEM somewhat deflates contemporary hypotheses that cognition is extended, embodied and enactive; however, it can nevertheless accommodate the kinds of cases that fuel these hypotheses. (shrink)

Important decisions that impact humans lives, livelihoods, and the natural environment are increasingly being automated. Delegating tasks to so-called automated decision-making systems can improve efficiency and enable new solutions. However, these benefits are coupled with ethical challenges. For example, ADMS may produce discriminatory outcomes, violate individual privacy, and undermine human self-determination. New governance mechanisms are thus needed that help organisations design and deploy ADMS in ways that are ethical, while enabling society to reap the full economic and social benefits of (...) automation. In this article, we consider the feasibility and efficacy of ethics-based auditing as a governance mechanism that allows organisations to validate claims made about their ADMS. Building on previous work, we define EBA as a structured process whereby an entity’s present or past behaviour is assessed for consistency with relevant principles or norms. We then offer three contributions to the existing literature. First, we provide a theoretical explanation of how EBA can contribute to good governance by promoting procedural regularity and transparency. Second, we propose seven criteria for how to design and implement EBA procedures successfully. Third, we identify and discuss the conceptual, technical, social, economic, organisational, and institutional constraints associated with EBA. We conclude that EBA should be considered an integral component of multifaced approaches to managing the ethical risks posed by ADMS. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has many times been suggested as a promising recipe for the construction of artificial moral agents due to its emphasis on moral character and learning. However, given the complex nature of the theory, hardly any work has de facto attempted to implement the core tenets of virtue ethics in moral machines. The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate how virtue ethics can be taken all the way from theory to machine implementation. To achieve this goal, we (...) critically explore the possibilities and challenges for virtue ethics from a computational perspective. Drawing on previous conceptual and technical work, we outline a version of artificial virtue based on moral functionalism, connectionist bottom–up learning, and eudaimonic reward. We then describe how core features of the outlined theory can be interpreted in terms of functionality, which in turn informs the design of components necessary for virtuous cognition. Finally, we present a comprehensive framework for the technical development of artificial virtuous agents and discuss how they can be implemented in moral environments. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there is at least a pro tanto reason to favor the control account of the right to privacy over the access account of the right to privacy. This conclusion is of interest due to its relevance for contemporary discussions related to surveillance policies. We discuss several ways in which the two accounts of the right to privacy can be improved significantly by making minor adjustments to their respective definitions. We then test the improved versions (...) of the two accounts on a test case, to see which account best explains the violation that occurs in the case. The test turns out in favor of the control account. (shrink)

Climate change mitigation has become a paradigm case both for externalities in general and for the game-theoretic model of the Tragedy of the Commons (ToC) in particular. This situation is worrying, as we have reasons to suspect that some models in the social sciences are apt to be performative to the extent that they can become self-fulfilling prophecies. Framing climate change mitigation as a hardly solvable coordination problem may force us into a worse situation, by changing real-world behaviour to fit (...) our model, rather than the other way around. But while this problem of the performativity of the ToC has been noted in a recent paper in this journal by Matthew Kopec, his proposed strategies for dealing with their self-fulfilling nature fall short of providing an adequate solution. Instead of relying on the idea that modelling assumptions are always strictly speaking false, this paper shows that the problem may be better framed as a problem of underdetermination between competing explanations. Our goal here is to provide a framework for choosing between this set of competing models that allows us to avoid a ‘Russian Roulette’-like situation in which we gamble with existential risk. (shrink)

The fate of cells arrested in mitosis by antimitotic compounds is complex but is influenced by competition between pathways promoting cell death and pathways promoting mitotic exit. As components of both of these pathways are regulated by Cdc20‐dependent degradation, I hypothesize that variations in Cdc20 protein levels, rather than mutations in checkpoint genes, could affect cell fate during prolonged mitotic arrest. This hypothesis is supported by experiments where manipulation of Cdc20 levels affects the response to antimitotic compounds. The observed differences (...) in Cdc20 levels between cell lines likely reflects differences in the rate of synthesis or degradation of the protein; therefore, understanding these pathways at a molecular level could pave the way for modulating the activity of Cdc20, in turn presenting novel therapeutic possibilities. (shrink)

Virtue ethics has many times been suggested as a promising recipe for the construction of artificial moral agents due to its emphasis on moral character and learning. However, given the complex nature of the theory, hardly any work has de facto attempted to implement the core tenets of virtue ethics in moral machines. The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate how virtue ethics can be taken all the way from theory to machine implementation. To achieve this goal, we (...) critically explore the possibilities and challenges for virtue ethics from a computational perspective. Drawing on previous conceptual and technical work, we outline a version of artificial virtue based on moral functionalism, connectionist bottom–up learning, and eudaimonic reward. We then describe how core features of the outlined theory can be interpreted in terms of functionality, which in turn informs the design of components necessary for virtuous cognition. Finally, we present a comprehensive framework for the technical development of artificial virtuous agents and discuss how they can be implemented in moral environments. (shrink)

Departing from popular imaginations around artificial intelligence (AI), this article engages in the I in the AI acronym but from perspectives outside of mathematics, computer science and machine learning. When intelligence is attended to here, it most often refers to narrow calculating tasks. This connotation to calculation provides AI an image of scientificity and objectivity, particularly attractive in societies with a pervasive desire for numbers. However, as is increasingly apparent today, when employed in more general areas of our messy socio-cultural (...) realities, AI- powered automated systems often fail or have unintended consequences. This article will contribute to this critique of AI by attending to Nicholas of Cusa and his treatment of intelligence. According to him, intelligence is equally dependent on an ability to handle the unknown as it unfolds in the present moment. This suggests that intelligence is organic which ties Cusa to more contemporary discussions in tech philosophy, neurology, evolutionary biology, and cognitive sciences in which it is argued that intelligence is dependent on having—and acting through—an organic body. Understanding intelligence as organic thus suggests an oxymoronic relationship to artificial. (shrink)

Melanin, and other pigments have recently been shown to preserve over geologic time scales, and are found in several different organisms. This opens up the possibility of inferring colours and colour patterns ranging from invertebrates to feathered dinosaurs and mammals. An emerging discipline is palaeo colour: colour plays an important role in display and camouflage as well as in integumental strengthening and protection, which makes possible the hitherto difficult task of doing inferences about past ecologies, behaviours, and organismal appearance. Several (...) studies and techniques have been presented in the last couple of years that have described ways to characterize pigment patterns. Here, I will review the available methods and the likely applications to understand past ecologies. A golden age of colourized dinosaurs and other animals is now dawning upon us, which may elucidate the nature of ancient predator prey interactions and display structures.Also watch the Video Abstract. (shrink)

Predictive processing (PP) is now a prominent theoretical framework in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This review focuses on PP research with a relatively philosophical focus, taking stock of the framework and discussing new directions. The review contains an introduction that describes the full PP toolbox; an exploration of areas where PP has advanced understanding of perceptual and cognitive phenomena; a discussion of PP's impact on foundational issues in cognitive science; and a consideration of the philosophy of science (...) of PP. The overall picture is that PP is a fruitful framework, with exciting new directions awaiting exploration. (shrink)

The article discusses the use of algorithmic models in finance. Algo trading is widespread but also somewhat controversial in modern financial markets. It is a form of automated trading technology, which critics claim can, among other things, lead to market manipulation. Drawing on three cases, this article shows that manipulation also can happen in the reverse way, meaning that human traders attempt to make algorithms ‘make mistakes’ by ‘misleading’ them. These attempts to manipulate are very simple and immediately transparent to (...) humans. Nevertheless, financial regulators increasingly penalize such attempts to manipulate algos. The article explains this as an institutionalization of algo trading, a trading practice which is vulnerable enough to need regulatory protection. (shrink)

Virtue ethics is traditionally a conservative project. It analyses the virtues that humanity has been relying on since antiquity. This conservatism unduly limits the potential of virtue ethics to contribute to moral progress. Instead, we should pay more attention to constructionist virtue ethics with the help of conceptual engineering. I will argue that revising and ameliorating the virtue concepts which a community uses directly and indirectly leads to a change of the virtues that exist in this community. By revising and (...) innovating virtue concepts, we can re-make and improve the virtues that we have. (shrink)