L’objectif de cet article est de faire le point sur le programme de recherche PFC (« Phonologie du français contemporain : usages, variétés et structure »), plus de quinze ans après son lancement et d’illustrer le travail mené dans ce cadre par la question du schwa, phénomène bien connu dans le domaine de la variation phonologique et central à la phonologie du français. Après avoir brièvement présenté le programme, nous abordons la question du schwa en français et expliquons son traitement (...) dans PFC. Nous illustrons ensuite le travail effectué en nous penchant tout d’abord sur les variétés méridionales, que nous opposons aux variétés septentrionales, avant d’aborder la question du schwa dans les variétés suisses romandes. (shrink)

Comment concilier le relatif et l’universel? C’est à cette délicate tâche que s’était attelée il y a déjà quelques années Madame Delmas-Marty, spécialement dans le domaine des droits de l’homme. Le présent ouvrage envisage une difficulté supplémentaire en croisant les interrogations sur le pluralisme juridique avec la question de l’effectivité du droit économique. La prise en compte des pluralismes, notamment du pluralisme juridique, contribue-t-elle à une meilleure effectivité du droit économique? Ou bien, au contraire, le pluralisme juridique est-il un facteur (...) d’ineffectivité du droit économique? Dans cette recherche, les auteurs se sont attachés au pluralisme aussi bien dans la production du droit économique que dans le règlement des différends. C’est ainsi que le lecteur est appelé à cheminer dans la diversité des formes nouvelles qu’empruntent les régulations juridiques pour partir à la recherche des multiples intérêts que peut prendre en charge le droit économique, qu’ils soient individuels, collectifs ou même futurs. Le voyage se poursuit, là encore dans les mondes aussi bien des formes que de la substance. L'ouvrage, après avoir cherché à cerner la notion d’effectivité au regard de notions voisines comme l’efficacité ou l’efficience, s’interroge in fine sur l’éventualité des voies d’un dépassement de la notion de pluralisme juridique. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Phaedra's Labyrinth as the Paradigm of Passion: Racine's Aesthetic Formulation of Mimetic Desire Jacques-Jude Lépine Haverford College The actual model of Racine's Phaedra is no more the one that he claims to follow in his preface than one ofthose which his critics have sought in vain to find in the works of his immediate predecessors.1 Indeed, the comparative reading ofRacine's last profane tragedy against his sources (...) shows that Seneca and Euripides only provided a very general framework, one might say a traditional theme, which Racine completely recasts on the level of the plot, structure, characters, poetic esthetics, and theatrical performance. On the other hand, the myth of Phaedra's involuntary passion for her stepson Hippolytus, the hunter who was supposed to be atavistically insensitive to erotic seduction, could very well have been reorganized on the basis of another mythological episode which precedes it, the killing of the Minotaur by Theseus in the Labyrinth. There are many explicit references to this episode throughout Racine's Phaedra. There are even more than a rich but strictly thematic critic has been able to detect (see Racine), underscoring the fundamental point of my essay that the intensely poetic character of the Labyrinth, and particularly its function as a fantastic spatial frame, is not simply of a decorative nature. In Racine's work, as in any other genuine literary masterpiece, there is a unity ofcontent and form. The many references to the Labyrinth are determinant for the very subject ofPhaedra, which is the representation of passion, the only subject of interest for Racine. In fact, I intend to demonstrate that Racine used the unique topography of the Labyrinth as a paradigm of the logic of the relationships between his ' These works are Garnier's "Hippolyte" (1573) and Quinault's "Bellérophon" (1671). 48Jacques-Jude Lépine characters because of its capacity for fully expressing the mimetic origin of passion, a decisive discovery the gradual stages towards which may be traced in all his previous works. The Monster Hunt as a Metaphor of the Dramatic Action In order to demonstrate this point, I will start from the textual data, even though it will be necessary to go beyond a simple inventory of the themes explicitly connected to the Labyrinth. The first of these themes is obviously the one of monstrosity. At some point in the play, all the main characters accuse themselves, or are accused, of being a monster (Barthes 115). The relationship between this moral monstrosity (expressed in ambiguous statements suggesting a physical sign) and the return of Theseus, whose numerous monster hunts Hippolytus recalls in the opening scene,2 is easy to see. As has been already noted, the theme of the monster hunt is present from beginning to end of the play, where the fight between Hippolytus and the sea monster occurs (see Jasenas). But the monsterpar excellence is the Minotaur, whose death at the hands of Theseus Phaedra recalls in a famous speech which serves to reveal her passion to Hippolytus through a series of substitutions in the original cast of characters: Oh, why were you too young top have embarked Within the ship that brought him [Theseus] to our shores? You would have been the monster's killer then, In spite of all the windings of his maze. To find your way in that uncertain dark, My sister would have armed you with the thread. But no! In this design I would have been Ahead of her, my sister! Me, not her, It would have been whom love at first inspired; And I it would have been, Prince, I, whose aid Had taught you all the Labyrinth's crooked ways. A single thread would not have been enough To satisfy your lover's fears for you. I would myself have wished to lead the way, And share the perils you were bound to face. Phaedra, into the Labyrinth, with you Would have descended, and with you returned, To safety, or with you have perished. (647-62) 2 See verses 73-90. References to Margaret Rawlings's translation of Phaedra will be given parenthetically in the text. The verse numbers refer to the French edition... (shrink)

Donner, est-ce possible? Dès lors qu'il engage dans le cercle de l'échange, le don semble s'annuler. Pour donner, il faudrait ne rien attendre en retour. Rien espérer, rien escompter de ce qui doit rester incalculable. Plus gravement encore, et avant même que rien ne s'inscrive dans une économie des signes ou des choses, il suffit peut-être qu'il y ait intention de donner, il suffit que le don apparaisse comme tel à la conscience ou que dans son sens il devienne présent (...) pour disparaître et se perdre aussitôt en faisant retour : comme s'il était impossible de connaître par l'expérience ce que nous pensons et désirons sous le nom de don ; comme si même il était impossible de désirer le don ou de vouloir donner ; comme si le don était voué à l'irresponsabilité ; comme si, pour dire " il y a don ", il fallait renoncer au présent - et à dire : " le don est " ou " le don existe ". Renouant avec le fil d'analyses antérieures, Jacques Derrida tente ici de formaliser les conditions et les effets de cette aporie, à savoir l'incompatibilité apparente du don et du présent. La nécessité pour le don d'excéder le retour circulaire à son origine implique une interprétation du temps, qui fut souvent représenté comme un cercle. Avec la question du don et du présent, comme question de la répétition, il y va donc du temps : du temps de l'être, du temps du monde, du temps social, du temps de la conscience et de l'inconscient. A travers des lectures de Heidegger, de Mauss ou de Benveniste ; il s'agit ici de ressaisir la grande question du don à la racine commune de l'ontologie et de la sémantique, de l'anthropologie et de l'économie politique. Et de la littérature, : la seconde partie de ce premier volume est en effet consacrée à la lecture d'un bref récit de Baudelaire, La fausse monnaie, qui oriente en vérité tout l'ouvrage. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt s’est imposée comme un penseur politique de premier plan en 1951 par son étude des Origines du totalitarisme. L’auteur de l’article qui suit a tenté de montrer dans divers travaux, à commencer par La Fille de Thrace et le Penseur professionnel 1, que dans ses analyses de la vie active et de la vie de l’esprit, Arendt poursuit un débat constant avec Heidegger dont elle avait été l’élève à Marbourg avant la publication de Sein und Zeit. Le but (...) de l’article est de démontrer à la lumière de ce débat que l’indubitable compromission de Heidegger avec le national-socialisme avait ses racines non pas dans l’idéologie nazie mais dans une réappropriation spécifique de la pensée politique de Platon, telle qu’elle est exposée dans la République. (shrink)

Cet article vise à analyser les racines biologiques et psychopathologiques de l’antisémitisme. Il privilégie la notion de dialectique afin de comprendre la transition de l’anti-judaïsme à l’antisémitisme comme passage d’une opposition d’essence spirituelle et religieuse à un rejet d’ordre national et racial. Historiquement, ce passage est contemporain de l’émergence de la biologie de la race qui a, entre autres, cristallisé les thèmes majeurs d’une tradition mythique, ayant, pendant des siècles, structuré l’identité occidentale. L’antisémitisme proprement dit, dont le terme n’apparaît qu’en (...) 1873, a transformé une opposition dialectique à l’altérité juive en ce qu’Adorno a appelé la « dialectique négative », visant à résoudre définitivement la « question Juive » par la suppression de son objet. A travers une analyse historicoconceptuelle, cet article suggère une nouvelle approche de la genèse du racisme et de l’antisémitisme nazi, d’une part, et des rapports entre la science et l’éthique, d’autre part. (shrink)

Ce livre est le fruit d'un travail mené par Jacques Arènes depuis plusieurs années sur les conditions psychiques du fait religieux dans le monde contemporain. La démarche de l'ouvrage réfute l'approche fonctionnaliste du fait religieux - étudié dans le contexte chrétien -, et cherche à mettre en tension mutuelle les discours laïcs, "scientifiques", concernant l'intériorité et ceux, plus anciens, issus du christianisme. L'auteur soutient l'hypothèse que la "laïcisation" du psychisme, induite par les nouvelles théories de l'intériorité, s'est traduite en (...) un travail psychique inédit, sur le plan individuel autant que collectif. L'intuition fondamentale de l'ouvrage est que la religion est aujourd'hui en relation forte avec le processus de subjectivation : dans un cadre historique où les institutions productrices de sens sont devenues incertaines, le sujet contemporain "utilise" ainsi la religion comme lieu de construction personnelle. L'ouvrage aborde les configurations, hautement individuelles, de la spiritualité d'aujourd'hui, et analyse la manière dont la quête de sens s'articule avec des démarches religieuses plus classiques. Le fait spirituel contemporain se saisit ainsi des méthodes et des démarches psychothérapiques pour les intégrer dans une problématique croyante. La confrontation des paradigmes utilisés par les théories religieuses de l'intériorité et par les sciences du psychisme conduit à une discussion approfondie sur les articulations du psychique et du spirituel. Cette tension entre les différents discours sur l'intériorité joue à l'intérieur d'une nouvelle donne anthropologique où le sujet coupable des temps freudiens, hanté par la faute, laisse progressivement la place au sujet blessé, peinant à porter sa destinée. Plus largement qu'une approche de la sphère religieuse, cette étude donne donc des éléments de compréhension sur le sujet contemporain en recherche de sens et en quête de soi. Un ouvrage du même auteur, à paraître prochainement aux Editions du Cerf, explorera plus précisément le positionnement du sujet croyant affronté au "trauma" d'une culture commune remettant en cause les racines de sa foi. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage cherche à cerner les contours du travail de deuil que suscite aujourd'hui ce que Marcel Gauchet a appelé la sortie du religieux. Dans la lignée de son livre précédent, La Quête spirituelle hier e! aujourd'hui, Jacques Arènes analyse le travail psychique qu'impose au sujet croyant une culture remettant en cause les racines de sa foi. Il explore la manière dont le sujet supporte, ou non, ce déficit de sens. Ce traumatisme peut-il néanmoins constituer une chance? Jacques (...) Arènes se penche sur la notion de " trauma ", clans ses risques et ses fruits incertains. Il décrit " l'assèchement " de l'espace psychique du croyant, débarrassé des fioritures du langage religieux et " amaigri " de ses représentations. Au coeur du désert des images, le modèle créatif devient essentiel. Le religieux prend sans cesse le chemin qui borde le gouffre de la " non-foi ". Bien au-delà du seul registre de la foi, cet ouvrage interroge les voies d'une créativité possible dans un contexte de deuil. Existe-t-il un " gain " dans les pertes inéluctables de la vie Si la pensée psychanalytique joue un rôle essentiel dans la " purification " de l'imaginaire religieux, le savoir religieux apporterait alors les ressources d'une pensée de l'émergence, du surgissement de la nouveauté à travers les failles et les épreuves de nos existences, qui sont plus qu'avant complexes et diffuses. (shrink)

L'oeuvre de Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962) explore les deux versants de la culture moderne : la connaissance scientifique dans ses formes les plus innovantes et l'expérience poétique, de la rêverie spontanée aux grandes créations de la littérature dans ses expressions les plus immémoriales. Au-delà de ces rapports entre science et poésie, entre théorème et poème, ne pourrait-on pas trouver aussi, en filigrane, les lignes profondes d'une philosophie pratique, d'un humanisme et d'une sagesse? Les ouvrages de Bachelard livrent une mine de positions (...) et propositions, sous forme d'innombrables éclairs et éclairages sur l'être humain, toujours en devenir entre l'être et le devoir-être, entre l'être et le néant. Mais en dégageant une éthique de la connaissance et une autre de la création poétique, Bachelard dévoile une double dimension éthique, l'une plutôt marquée par la tradition chrétienne et kantienne, l'autre plutôt par un eudémonisme aristotélicien. Faut-il voir dans ce double discours éthique une contradiction, une incohérence, une négligence? Ou ne pourrait-on pas, de manière inattendue, conclure que pour Bachelard l'homme est double jusque dans sa vie morale? Contre l'éthique unidimensionnelle classique, Bachelard plaiderait donc pour une éthique plurielle. Jamais un philosophe n'avait osé s'aventurer dans pareille direction, et nous n'avons pas fini de méditer cette double racine morale de l'homme, et les conséquences théoriques et pratiques de cette proposition singulière. (shrink)

Jean Cavaillès (15 mai 1903-17 février 1944) était un philosophe français, héros et l'un des organisateurs de la Résistance, avant d'être fusillé à 40 ans par les nazis. Une journée d'hommage lui a été consacrée le 17 février 2014 à l'Ecole normale supérieure de Paris. Pierre-Yves Canu, Tommy Murtagh, Hourya Benis Sinaceur, Paul Cortois, Alya Aglan, Baptiste Mélès, Gerhard Heinzmann et Jacques Lautman présentent un Cavaillès indissociablement philosophe et Résistant, explorent les racines de sa pensée, montrent l'actualité de ses (...) concepts. Jean-Jacques Szczeciniarz et Christian Houzel proposent une analyse du Mouvement de la jeunesse allemand, un historique de la société Les Amis de Jean Cavaillès, éditrice du présent recueil, et deux hommages à celui qui la présida de 1989 à 1995, le mathématicien Henri Cartan. (shrink)

" Pourquoi inventa Poppaea de masquer les beautés de son visage, que pour les renchérir à ses amants? " demande Montaigne. Le caché fascine. Voir, regarder, c'est désirer saisir, pénétrer, posséder. Devenir " œil vivant " : tel est le vœu formulé par Rousseau. Interrogeant quelques grandes œuvres - Corneille, Racine, La Bruyère, Rousseau, Stendhal, Jean Starobinski montre comment, dans la création littéraire, l'exigence du regard, dépassant et détruisant la réalité visible, entraîne dans le monde de l'imaginaire ; comment (...) aussi, aiguisée par l'obstacle et la déception, elle incite à toutes les perversions : exhibitionnisme, voyeurisme, sadisme, refus de la réflexion. (shrink)

Les cinq penseurs présentés ici par Patrick Chastenet partagent le même amour de la liberté et de la nature. Trois se réclament de l'anarchisme, deux en sont proches, tous ont profondément enrichi le terreau libertaire de l'écologie politique. L'auteur s'est lié d'amitié avec Jacques Ellul, dont il est un spécialiste reconnu. Il a sympathisé avec Ivan Illich et Bernard Charbonneau avant de découvrir les oeuvres d'Élisée Reclus et de Murray Bookchin. Son livre, rigoureux et vivant, nous introduit aux pensées (...) de ces précurseurs encore trop méconnues mais dont l'actualité n'a pas fini de nous étonner"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

"On ne cesse d'oublier d'aller jusqu'au fondement. On ne pose pas assez profond les points d'interrogation", écrivait Wittgenstein. L'oeuvre de Francis Jacques est une franche réplique à cette "remarque". Aussi occupe-t-elle une place originale dans la philosophie de notre temps. L'entreprise était audacieuse ; et elle devait être innovante. Les obstacles philosophiques étaient nombreux ; il fallait les reconnaître et les interroger jusqu'à leurs plus profondes racines. La démarche analytique, en l'occurrence, a fait merveille. Elle ne fut qu'un point (...) de départ. Mais il était décisif parce qu'il conduisait à bouleverser l'échiquier sur lequel la tradition des siècles avait construit ses systèmes philosophiques. Sur le chemin ainsi frayé, l'espace logique de l'interlocution a supplanté le subjectivisme-roi des philosophies de la conscience. L'exploration du dialogisme communicationnel a été la voie d'un questionnement approfondi qui, d'un point de vue métaphysique, a découvert la relation comme source originaire et fondationnelle de la pensée. À cette source pure puise l'exigence transcendantale qui, alliée aux structures formelles du travail de la pensée, commande l'érection du sens. En faisant du questionnement patiemment poursuivi l'activité génétique et critique de la pensée, l'interrogation radicale est devenue, en raison de sa portée ontologique, une élévation spirituelle. Aussi la sagesse peut-elle désormais défier les pathologies qui gangrènent les manifestations de l'existence. L'horizon s'éclaire de la lumière divine : il est un lieu de confiance et d'espérance. Au processus de "dé-construction" généralisée que développent aujourd'hui tant d'ouvrages, l'oeuvre de Francis Jacques oppose le mouvement d'une reconstruction spirituelle que commande, outre l'alliance hardie de la logique et de la métaphysique, l'écoute de la théologie. En fouillant les puissances originaires de l'interrogativité dont l'intégralité et la radicalité font la noblesse de la pensée, elle trace l'itinéraire au long duquel elle propose, contre la désespérance d'un temps de crise, de philosopher autrement pour retrouver les repères effacés et reconquérir, sur le chemin de l'Absolu, l'humanité perdue de l'homme. C'est un recommencement. (shrink)

Au-dela des idees convenues, comment penser les fondements d'une crise sociale inscrite dans le temps long? La guerre civile perpetuelle evalue dans plusieurs domaines les ravages politiques de la philosophie de la modernite. Cette etude examine d'abord sa capacite a detruire a la racine la possibilite du lien social naturel, pour tenter par la suite de le recreer au moyen de divers artifices. Loin de se limiter au simple constat d'echec, l'originalite et la force de cet ouvrage resident dans (...) l'analyse des causes d'un processus logique qui tend a imposer sa violence intrinseque au coeur de la relation sociale. Avec les contributions de: Miguel Ayuso Torres, Guillaume Bernard, Jacques Bonnet, Danilo Castellano, Bernard Dumont, Gilles Dumont, Jose Miguel Gambra, Carlo Gambescia, Isabelle Huten, Aude de Kerros, Teodoro Katte Klitsche de la Grange, Marc de Launay, Pierre de Lauzun, Alain Mescheriakoff, Dalmacio Negro Pavon, Monica Papazu, Claude Polin, Christophe Reveillard, Giovanni Turco. (shrink)

Qu'est-ce qui fonde la souveraineté? De quand date-t-elle? Quelle était sa place dans les régimes politiques antérieurs à la Révolution française? Pour répondre à ces questions, un économiste laïque, Jacques Sapir, et un philosophe dominicain, Bernard Bourdin, se confrontent. Quand le premier évoque les fondements du pouvoir à Athènes, dans la Rome impériale et au Moyen Age, l'autre revient aux origines de la notion de peuple dans l'Ancien Testament, sur l'essence de l'autorité papale et la doctrine de La Trinité. (...) C'est aussi l'occasion pour eux de dialoguer avec d'illustres penseurs : Platon, saint Augustin, Bodin, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke ou encore Marx. Cette réflexion d'ordre historique et philosophique montre qu'il n'y a pas d'humanité sans racines, sans origines, sans legs, que ce soit pour celui qui croit au ciel comme pour celui qui n'y croit pas. Un ouvrage indispensable pour comprendre les enjeux de la souveraineté nationale dans son rapport au phénomène religieux en Occident. (shrink)

"Monteverdi et Wagner : hiatus, mariage impossible, défiance à l’entendement. Le mélomane proteste. Mais le parallèle n’est pas inédit. Car mettre en relation Monteverdi et Wagner, qu’a priori tout oppose, permet de lever le voile sur l’essentiel. À deux siècles d’intervalle, les changements de paradigme opérés par les deux artistes ont un terreau commun. Au-delà des analogies formelles, les attaques portées aux deux compositeurs et leurs répliques sous forme d’écrits théoriques mettent en évidence un monde d’idées. Nietzsche commença sa carrière (...) philosophique en le soulignant. À travers Ficin et Politien pour Monteverdi – Hölderlin, Schelling et Novalis pour Wagner –, les racines néoplatoniciennes communes aux deux créateurs constituent une autre correspondance révélatrice. On les retrouve au seuil du baroque comme du symbolisme. Venise, Pétrarque et Le Tasse ne laissent pas de réunir Monteverdi et Wagner, tandis qu’Orphée et Tristan offrent au chercheur une série d’analogies frappantes. Alors pourquoi ce rapprochement a-t-il été si peu approfondi? Certes, la dénonciation des frontières interdisciplinaires propres au système académique n’est pas nouvelle. Mais faut-il rester muet devant leur persistance? Il existe aujourd’hui toute une philosophie de la musique, ou précisément de la musique instrumentale. Mais où est la philosophie de l’opéra? Après avoir évoqué les apports lumineux de Romain Rolland et de Jean-Jacques Nattiez à la musicologie, Olivier Lexa établit un bref historique de la philosophie de l’opéra, de Rousseau à Nietzsche en passant par Hegel, Novalis, Schopenhauer et Kierkegaard. Par la suite, l’auteur aborde la portée exemplaire de l’histoire de l’art, de l’histoire culturelle et de l’esthétique analytique, avant de se pencher sur les relations que plusieurs grands penseurs récents et contemporains ont entretenues avec l’art lyrique : Adorno, Lévi-Strauss, Barthes, Deleuze, Foucault, Bourdieu, Badiou, Lacoue-Labarthe et Žižek. Sera-t-on surpris de retrouver les noms de Monteverdi et Wagner parmi les récurrences dominantes?" -- Site internet de l'éditeur. (shrink)

One of Jacques Derrida’s richest and most provocative works, Life Death challenges and deconstructs one of the most deeply rooted dichotomies of Western thought: life and death. Here Derrida rethinks the traditional philosophical understanding of the relationship between life and death, undertaking multidisciplinary analyses of a range of topics, including philosophy, linguistics, and the life sciences. In seeking to understand the relationship between life and death, he engages in close readings of Freudian psychoanalysis, the philosophy of Nietzsche and Heidegger, (...) French geneticist François Jacob, and epistemologist Georges Canguilhem. Derrida gave his “Life Death” seminar over fourteen sessions between 1975 and 1976 at the École normale supérieure in Paris as part of the preparation for students studying for the agrégation, a notoriously competitive qualifying exam. The theme for the exam that year was “Life and Death,” but Derrida made a critical modification to the title by dropping the coordinating conjunction. The resulting title of Life Death poses a philosophical question about the close relationship between life and death. Derrida argues that death must be considered neither as the opposite of life nor as the truth or fulfillment of it, but rather as that which both limits life and makes it possible. Through these captivating sessions, Derrida thus not only questions traditional understandings of the relationship between life and death, but also ultimately develops a new way of thinking about what he calls “life death.”. (shrink)

This collection of essays and interviews, some previously unpublished and almost all of which appear in English for the first time, encompasses the political and ethical thinking of Jacques Derrida over thirty years. Passionate, rigorous, beautifully argued, wide-ranging, the texts shed an entirely new light on his work and will be welcomed by scholars in many disciplines--politics, philosophy, history, cultural studies, literature, and a range of interdisciplinary programs. Derrida's arguments vary in their responsiveness to given political questions--sometimes they are (...) vivid polemics on behalf of a position or figure, sometimes they are reflective analyses of a philosophical problem. They are united by the recurrent question of political decision or responsibility and the insistence that the apparent simplicity or programmatic character of political decision is in fact a profound avoidance of the political. This volume testifies to the possibility and the necessity of a philosophical politics. Negotiations assembles some of the most telling examples of the intrinsic relationship, so often affirmed by Derrida in more abstract philosophical terms, between deconstructive reading practices and what is called the "political"--more precisely, politics in an almost down-to-earth, pragmatic, and commonsense use of the word. Among the many subjects covered in the book are: the death penalty in the United States, the civil war in Algeria, globalization and cosmopolitanism, the American Declaration of Independence, Jean-Paul Sartre, the value of objectivity, politics and friendship, and the relationship between deconstruction and actuality. (shrink)

It is widely held that assertions are partially governed by an epistemic norm. But what is the epistemic condition set out in the norm? Is it knowledge, truth, belief, or something else? In this paper, I defend a view similar to that of Stanley (2008), according to which the relevant epistemic condition is epistemic certainty, where epistemic certainty (but not knowledge) is context-sensitive. I start by distinguishing epistemic certainty, subjective certainty, and knowledge. Then, I explain why it's much more plausible (...) to think that "certain", rather than "know", is context-sensitive. After that, I respond to an important worry raised by Pritchard, according to which the proposed view is too strong to accommodate our current practice of assertion. I then show that the main linguistic and conversational data advanced in the recent literature in favour of the knowledge condition are best explained by the certainty view. Finally, I offer two principled considerations: the certainty view is the only one compatible with three independently plausible claims and it fits very well with the common thought that knowledge does not entail certainty. (shrink)

Is knowledge the epistemic norm of action and assertion? Gettier and justified-false-belief cases have been raised as counterexamples to the necessity direction of that claim. Most knowledge normers reply by distinguishing permissibility from excusability. An important objection to this move, however, is that it requires a still lacking view of epistemic excuses sufficiently general to cover all the cases, correctly relating the supposed excuse to the subject's cognitive life, and not collapsing into an account of the fundamental normative standard (see (...) Gerken 2017). In this paper, I rely on independent work in epistemology and cognitive science to suggest a novel account of epistemic excuses in terms of epistemic feelings. In contrast to other existing accounts, this account is immune from the above objection and can thus be used to rescue the knowledge norm. (shrink)

We apply Benacerraf’s distinction between mathematical ontology and mathematical practice to examine contrasting interpretations of infinitesimal mathematics of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, in the work of Bos, Ferraro, Laugwitz, and others. We detect Weierstrass’s ghost behind some of the received historiography on Euler’s infinitesimal mathematics, as when Ferraro proposes to understand Euler in terms of a Weierstrassian notion of limit and Fraser declares classical analysis to be a “primary point of reference for understanding the eighteenth-century theories.” Meanwhile, scholars like (...) Bos and Laugwitz seek to explore Eulerian methodology, practice, and procedures in a way more faithful to Euler’s own. Euler’s use of infinite integers and the associated infinite products are analyzed in the context of his infinite product decomposition for the sine function. Euler’s principle of cancellation is compared to the Leibnizian transcendental law of homogeneity. The Leibnizian law of continuity similarly finds echoes in Euler. We argue that Ferraro’s assumption that Euler worked with a classical notion of quantity is symptomatic of a post-Weierstrassian placement of Euler in the Archimedean track for the development of analysis, as well as a blurring of the distinction between the dual tracks noted by Bos. Interpreting Euler in an Archimedean conceptual framework obscures important aspects of Euler’s work. Such a framework is profitably replaced by a syntactically more versatile modern infinitesimal framework that provides better proxies for his inferential moves. (shrink)

A translation of the Écrits logiques, edited by Jean Van Heijenoort, published in 1968.

Distinguer pour unir, ou Les degres du savoir was first published in 1932 by Jacques Maritain. In this new translation of The Degrees of Knowledge, Ralph McInerny attempts a more careful expression of Maritain's original masterpiece than previous translations. Maritain proposes a hierarchy of the forms of knowledge by discussing the degrees of rational and suprarational understanding. Nine appendices, some longer than the chapters of the book, advance Maritain's thought, often by taking on criticism of earlier editions of the (...) work. Rightly called Maritain's cardinal work, The Degrees of Knowledge is a magnificent and sagacious achievement. Jacques Maritain's masterpiece proposes a hierarchy of forms of knowledge that culminate in mystical experience and wisdom, which is a gift of the Holy Ghost. Maritain argues that the intellectual life is meant to be complemented by the spiritual life and should culminate in sanctity. (shrink)

According to a widely discussed view, knowledge plays a significant normative role in action: It is epistemically rational to treat p as your reason for action if and only if you know that p. As many philosophers have observed, however, this view clashes with the claim that knowledge is moderate and stable. For, granting that claim, there will be high stakes cases in which knowledge seems insufficient. To deal with such cases, some philosophers embracing the knowledge norm combine three independently (...) plausible claims. First, they say that no non-trivial condition is luminous; second, they say that doing something while not being in a position to know that that is appropriate is bad (in high stakes cases); third, they say that in the high stakes cases in question, the subject knows but fails to be in a position to know that she knows (Williamson Philos Q 55:213–235, 2005). This paper argues that this account can overcome the main objections already raised in the literature, but that it still faces the apparently insurmountable challenge of providing a natural and helpful way of substantiating the second claim. (shrink)

Background: Fetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD), a complex diagnosis that includes a wide range of neurodevelopmental disabilities, results from exposure to alcohol in the womb. FASD remains poorly understood by Canadians, which could contribute to reported stigma faced by both people with FASD and women who drink alcohol while pregnant. Methods: To better understand how information about FASD is presented in the public sphere, we conducted content analysis of 286 articles from ten major English-language Canadian newspapers (2002-2015). We used inductive (...) coding to derive a coding guide from the data, and then iteratively applied identified codes back onto the sample, checking inter-coder reliability. Results: We identified six major themes related to clinical and scientific media content: 1) prevalence of FASD and of women’s alcohol consumption; 2) research related to FASD; 3) diagnosis of FASD; 4) treatment of FASD and maternal substance abuse; 5) primary disabilities associated with FASD; and 6) effects of alcohol exposure during pregnancy. Discussion: Across these six themes, we discuss three instances of ethically consequential exaggeration and misrepresentation: 1) exaggeration about FASD rates in Indigenous communities; 2) contradiction between articles about the effects of prenatal alcohol exposure; and 3) scientifically accurate information that neglects the social context of alcohol use and abuse by women. Respectively, these representations could lead to harmful stereotyped beliefs about Indigenous peoples, might generate confusion about healthy choices during pregnancy, and may unhelpfully inflame debates about sensitive issues surrounding women’s choices. (shrink)

A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe “knowledge” can be influenced by practical factors. For revisionary proposals, they indicate that the truth‐values of “knowledge” ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on the contrary, nothing surprising is happening. Standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures and psychological approaches to the idea that belief formation is influenced by practical factors. Conservative proposals have not yet offered a fully satisfactory explanation, though. In this article, I introduce and (...) defend a third conservative proposal which I call “Refined Invariantism”. The two main claims of this proposal are that (1) we should distinguish between high stakes cases in which the subject does not believe (that he knows) the target proposition and those in which he believes (that he knows) the target proposition and that (2) we should adopt a psychological treatment for the first kind of case and a pragmatic treatment based on the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and action for the second kind of case. I argue that this new combined approach avoids the main pitfalls of its two conservative rivals and that it gives new life to the generality objection levelled against revisionary views. (shrink)

. Fresh evidence from Free Choice Items (FCIs) in French question the current perception of the class. The role of some standard distinctions found in the literature is weakened or put in a new perspective. The distinction between universal and existential is no longer an intrinsic property of FCIs. Similarly, the opposition between variation-based vs intension-based analyses is relativized. We show that the regime of free choiceness can be characterized by an abstract constraint, that we call Non-Individuation (NI), and which (...) can be satisfied in different ways that match current distinctions. NI says that the information conveyed by a sentence containing a FCI should not be reducible to a referential situation, that is a situation in which particular individuals satisfy the sentence in the current world. The widely used resource of modal variation becomes a particular scenario of free-choiceness, not its essence. In fact, we show that under certain conditions, FCIs can occur in episodic, non-modal sentences, a fact that NI can accommodate. We also discuss more fine-grained aspects of the semantics of FCIs, such as their emotional colour. (. . .) the tripod fell spontaneously, because, though it stood on its feet so as to serve for a seat, it did not fall so as to serve for a seat. Aristotle, Physics II,6. (shrink)

Among the main reactions to scepticism, fallibilism is certainly the most popular nowadays. However, fallibilism faces a very strong and well-known objection. It has to grant that concessive knowledge attributions—assertions of the form “I know that p but it might be that not p”—can be true. Yet, these assertions plainly sound incoherent. Fallibilists have proposed to explain this incoherence pragmatically. The main proponents of this approach appeal to Gricean implicatures (Rysiew in Noûs 35(4):477514, 2001; Dougherty and Rysiew in Philos Phenomenol (...) Res 78(1):123132, 2009; Dougherty and Rysiew in Synthese 181(3):395403, 2011). Very recently, some philosophers have observed that fallibilists can also explain this apparent incoherence pragmatically if they embrace a (context-sensitive) certainty norm for assertion (Petersen in Synthese 196(11):4691–4710, 2019; Beddor in Philos Impr 20(8), 2020; Vollet in Dialectica 74:3, 2020). In this paper, I argue for the superiority of this latter explanation over its older rivals. (shrink)

The traditional view in epistemology has it that knowledge is insensitive to the practical stakes. More recently, some philosophers have argued that knowledge is sufficient for rational action: if you know p, then p is a reason you have (epistemically speaking). Many epistemologists contend that these two claims stand in tension with one another. In support of this, they ask us to start with a low stakes case where, intuitively, a subject knows that p and appropriately acts on p. Then, (...) they ask us to consider a high stakes version of the case where, intuitively, this subject does not know that p and could not appropriately act on p without double-checking. Finally, they suggest that the best explanation for our shifty intuitions is that p is a reason the subject has in the low stakes case but not in the high stakes case. In short, according to this explanation, having a reason (in the epistemic sense) is sensitive to the stakes. If so, either knowledge is sensitive to the stakes or else you can know that p even if p is not a reason you have (in the epistemic sense). In this paper, I consider more closely the relation between having a reason (in the epistemic sense) and having a reason to check. I argue that the supposition that if one has p as a reason (in the epistemic sense) then one has a reason not to check whether p, or no reason to check whether p, is highly doubtful. On the contrary, I suggest, it is plausible that, given our fallibility, one always has an epistemic reason to check whether p, whether or not p is a reason one has (in the epistemic sense). On the basis of this observation, I show that one can offer a new way of explaining the cases in question, allowing us to reconcile the traditional view about knowledge and the sufficiency of knowledge for rational action. (shrink)

A certain number of philosophers are attracted to the idea that knowledge is the epistemic norm of practical reasoning in the sense that it is epistemically appropriate to rely on p in one’s practical reasoning if and only if one knows that p. A well-known objection to the sufficiency direction of that claim is that there are cases in which a subject supposedly knows that p and yet should not rely on p. In light of the distinction between sufficient and (...) insufficient reasons, some philosophers contend that these cases are inconclusive. In this paper, I argue that this insufficient reason manoeuvre is defective because it either misconstrues the relevant cases or is at odds with strong intuitions about how we (should) reason. I then put forward further considerations relative to the instability of some pieces of reasoning and show how they can be explained by a certainty norm for practical reasoning. (shrink)

The paper presents the notion of “Spirit of Nature” in Henry More and describes its position within More’s philosophical system. Through a thorough analysis, it tries to show in what respects it can be considered a scientific object and in what respects it cannot. In the second part of this paper, More’s “Spirit of Nature” is compared to Newton’s various attempts at presenting a metaphysical cause of the force of gravity, using the similarities between the two to see this notorious (...) problem of Newton scholarship in a new light. One thus sees that if Newton drew from Stoic and Neo-Platonic theories of aether or soul of the world, we need to fully acknowledge the fact that these substances were traditionally of a non-dualistic, half-corporeal, half-spiritual nature. Both More’s “Spirit of Nature” and Newton’s aether can thus be understood as different attempts at incorporating such a pneumatic theory into the framework of modern physics, as it was then being formed. (shrink)

Many philosophers agree that there is an epistemic norm governing action. However, they disagree on what this norm is. It has been observed that the word ‘know’ is prominent in ordinary epistemic evaluations of actions. Any opponent of the knowledge norm must provide an explanation of this fact. Gerken has recently proposed the most developed explanation. It invokes the hypothesis that, in normal contexts, knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary and very frequently sufficient (Normal Coincidence), so that knowledge-based assessments would be (...) a good heuristic for practical reasoning and epistemic evaluations of action. In this paper, I raise three problems for this approach. First, I argue that Normal Coincidence is ad hoc: it relies on an unsupported frequency hypothesis that we should expect to be false given the warrant account that Gerken also endorses. Second, I argue that, in any case, Normal Coincidence is insufficient to support the hypothesis that knowledge-based evaluation of action constitutes a good heuristic. Third, I consider three other hypotheses close to Normal Coincidence apparently more likely to support the heuristic hypothesis, but I argue that they seem even more ad hoc than Normal Coincidence. (shrink)

At eighty-five, Jacques Maritain, the most distinguished Catholic philosopher of the twentieth century, has written what he offers as his last book, and it turns out to be a shocker. The peasant, as Maritain calls himself in the title, is a man who calls a spade a spade; and a storm of controversy descended immediately on the book's publication in France, as both Right and Left reeled from the force of Maritain's criticism.The Peasant of the Garonne is a sharp (...) attack on the new philosophy, hoping to cool off the fever for change that Maritain believes is imperiling the church's traditional spirituality and even the substance of doctrine. There is sardonic humor in his treatment of Teilhardians, phenomenologists, existentialists, new-style biblical critics, and clerical Freudians, but Maritain is deeply serious in warning that their capitulation to fashioniable trends represents a kind of kneeling before the world. (shrink)

This paper outlines a phenomenological approach for describing physiological reactions occurring immediately after vital threats. This exemplified by data taken from previous studies relative to chemical intoxications of rats by a neurotoxical drug. The survival rate of the animals and the variations of their cerebral acetylcholinesterese activity are both reported as a function of the drug concentration, and with respect to their age. The collecting of the results may be described as the cusp, a bifurcation set of Thom's Catastrophe Theory.The (...) young animals react by a vital burst which modifies the shape of the cusp. A new fold or pocket takes place, changing it to the butterfly bifurcation set. This pocket supports the survival attractor concept, which appears reactional, transitory and variable in its intensity. (shrink)

Many philosophers agree that there is an epistemic norm governing action. However, they disagree on what this norm is. It has been observed that the word ‘know’ is prominent in ordinary epistemic evaluations of actions. Any opponent of the knowledge norm must provide an explanation of this fact. Gerken has recently proposed the most developed explanation. It invokes the hypothesis that, in normal contexts, knowledge-level warrant is frequently necessary and very frequently sufficient (Normal Coincidence), so that knowledge-based assessments would be (...) a good heuristic for practical reasoning and epistemic evaluations of action. In this paper, I raise three problems for this approach. First, I argue that Normal Coincidence is ad hoc: it relies on an unsupported frequency hypothesis that we should expect to be false given the warrant account that Gerken also endorses. Second, I argue that, in any case, Normal Coincidence is insufficient to support the hypothesis that knowledge-based evaluation of action constitutes a good heuristic. Third, I consider three other hypotheses close to Normal Coincidence apparently more likely to support the heuristic hypothesis, but I argue that they seem even more ad hoc than Normal Coincidence. (shrink)

In 1996 Jacques Derrida gave a lecture at the Museum of Modern Art in New York on the occasion of Antonin Artaud: Works on Paper, one of the first major international exhibitions to present the avant-garde dramatist and poet's paintings and drawings. Derrida's original title, "Artaud the Moma," is a characteristic play on words. It alludes to Artaud's calling himself Mômo, Marseilles slang for "fool," upon his return to Paris in 1946 after nine years in various asylums, while playing (...) off of the museum's nickname, MoMA. But the title was not deemed "presentable or decent," in Derrida's words, by the very institution that chose to exhibit Artaud's work. Instead, the lecture was advertised as "Jacques Derrida... will present a lecture about Artaud's drawings." For Derrida, what was at stake was what it meant for the museum to exhibit Artaud's drawings and for him to lecture on Artaud in that institutional context. Thinking over the performative force of Artaud's work and the relation between writing and drawing, Derrida addresses the multiplicity of Artaud's identities to confront the modernist museum's valorizing of originality. He channels Artaud's specter, speech, and struggle against representation to attempt to hold the museum accountable for trying to confine Artaud within its categories. Artaud the Moma, as lecture and text, reveals the challenge that Artaud posed to Derrida—and to art and its institutional history. A powerful interjection into the museum halls, this work is a crucial moment in Derrida's thought and an insightful, unsparing reading of a challenging writer and artist. (shrink)