This paper investigates the effect of corporate social responsibility (CSR) on firm value and seeks to identify the source of that value, by disaggregating the effects on forecasted profitability, long-term growth and the cost of capital. The study explores the possible risk (reducing) effects of CSR and their implications for financial measures of performance. For individual dimensions of CSR, in general strengths are positively valued and concerns are negatively valued, although the effect is not universal across all dimensions of CSR. (...) We show that these valuation effects are principally driven by CSR performance associated with better long run growth prospects, with an additional minor contribution made by a lower cost of equity capital. (shrink)

This paper argues the case that tests of how investors value corporate social performance (CSP) based upon realised stock market returns are liable to be weak tests if markets are efficient and firms change CSP policies infrequently. We provide a theoretical explanation of why this will be the case using examples to illustrate. Subsequently, we set out an alternative theoretical framework for the purposes of investigating whether markets place a positive, or a negative, valuation on CSP, and show why this (...) is superior to tests based upon Tobin’s Q. Using US KLD data, we demonstrate that, as theorised, markets place a positive value on CSP that is not detected by conventional returns-based tests. Our conclusion is that researchers who are interested in the question of whether engagement with a corporate social responsibility agenda is a value-enhancing activity for a company (as argued by some stakeholder theorists) or value destructive (as argued by Friedman, The social responsibility of business is to increase its profits, The New York Times Magazine, 1970), need to look beyond returns-based tests to answer the research question posed. (shrink)

Despite the tendency to think that the justification of revealed truths depends on a verifiable contact with divine reality, this essay argues that the authoritative status of revelations is due to their role in defining a distinctively religious order of judgment. Rather than being immediately apparent to everyone, this kind of authority is local to particular forms of judgment that depend on the principles that frame these ways of thinking. Revelatory claims are logically exempted from the normal demands of justification (...) because of this role they have as definitive judgments, and they share their immunity from ordinary forms of justification with other axiomatic principles. Yet their authority can in certain cases be challenged, and it is a secondary purpose of this essay to bring the various ways of challenging their truth to light. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the source of Plutarch's inspiration for the impressive discourse which he presents from the lips of Ammonius in the De E apud Delphos, and in particular for the following much-quoted passage.

As an illustration of what Phillips called the "heterogeneity of sense," this essay concentrates on differences in what is meant by a "reason for belief." Sometimes saying that a belief is reasonable simply commends the belief's unquestioned acceptance as a part of what we understand as a sensible outlook. Here the standard picture of justifying truth claims on evidential grounds breaks down; and it also breaks down in cases of fundamental moral and religious disagreement, where the basic beliefs that we (...) hold affect our conception of what counts as a reliable ground of judgment. Phillips accepts the resultant variations in our conceptions of rational judgment as a part of logic, just as Wittgenstein did. All objective means of determining the truth or falsity of an assertion presume some underlying conceptual agreement about what counts as good judgment. This means that the possibility of objective justification is limited. But no pernicious relativism results from this view, for as Wittgenstein said, "After reason comes persuasion." There is, moreover, a non-objective criterion of sorts in the moral and religious requirement that one be able to live with one's commitments. In such cases, good judgment is still possible, but it differs markedly from the standard model of making rational inferences. (shrink)

The Middle Platonic tradition forms the main focus of these studies, many of which derive from Professor Whittaker's work on the writings of Alcinous (formerly attributed to Albinus) and their place and importance in that tradition. He follows the transmission of different texts, and the development of the commentaries upon them, from Classical times through the Byzantine world up to the Renaissance and beyond. Most of the articles, however, deal with the evolution of Platonic thought in the first centures A.D., (...) its interaction with other schools of thought, such as Neopythagoreanism, and the influence of Hellenistic philosphy upon the growth of Early Christian thought and theology. Additional notes and references have now been supplied. (shrink)

Kierkegaard occasionally mentions a type of belief which he calls an “existence communication,” and his discussion of such beliefs parallels his discussion of subjective truths (in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript). Existence communications include religious beliefs. I suggest that it is less misleading to focus on this term than it is to wrestle with the difficult and overworked notion of subjective truths; ultimately, his view of religious beliefs can be seen more clearly.His view does not fully emerge, however, without the assistance (...) of some other concepts. My thesis is that existence communications are comparable in their resistance to objective forms of adjudication to first principles, and comparable in their “self-involving” characteristics to teleological principles about the “raison d’etre of existence.This account not only helps to clarify Kierkegaard’s discussion, but it also offers two important hints about modern problems regarding religious belief. It suggest that religious claims may indeed be truth claims, and it suggests that there is more to the justification than comes out in a consideration of evidence. (shrink)

One persistent element of Wittgenstein’s philosophical work is his insistence on self-honesty as a condition for doing logical or sense-oriented philosophy.This gives his work a spiritual weight that is not often appreciated. Yet the connection between self-honesty and logical insights is unclear, and this paper attemptsto clarify it. The paper includes brief introductions to Wittgenstein’s earlier and later thought, along with some religiously relevant examples.

A total of 366 UK children in four different schools, one in Wales, one in Northern Ireland, and two in England, were asked to respond to 20 potentially stressful life experiences. Each event was rated on a scale ranging from 7 to 1 , and the scale value and interquartile range were calculated. In addition, whether or not a given event was actually experienced was noted. Across the groups, there was a very high degree of agreement on all three measures, (...) the median correlations being 0.95 for scale values, 0.70 for interquartile ranges, and 0.92 for incidence. Furthermore, the pooled UK results were found to correlate equally closely with the figures previously obtained in the USA and five other countries. The possibility of a prevalent ‘culture of childhood’, cutting across geo‐political boundaries and ethnic groupings, appears to receive further support. (shrink)

Remarkable in the range that it covers, The Possibilities of Sense testifies to an equally remarkable philosopher. In essays on ethics and thephilosophy of religion, on literature and education, the contributors displaynot only the breadth of D.Z. Phillips's work but also its power. This powercomes largely from Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose significance as a moral and religious philosopher rivals his reputation as a philosopher of language.