En un momento de gran efervescencia feminista, se entremezclan las reclamaciones políticas del movimiento con las peligrosas reapropiaciones que de sus núcleos de lucha hace el neoliberalismo. Las tensiones que se presentan en este contexto son muchas y variadas, algunas evidentes y otras invisibles, pero todas contribuyen a la torsión actual del feminismo. En el presente artículo se abordarán algunas de estas tensiones que nacen en la intersección entre feminismo y neoliberalismo: desde la publicidad como posible herramienta feminista hasta los (...) discursos sobre el emprendimiento y el empleo, pasando por el diseño de políticas públicas, y la mercantilización de los cuerpos femeninos. También se abordarán algunas de las posibles rearticulaciones y respuestas políticas feministas ante esta realidad, mostrando la complejidad de los retos a los que tienen que hacer frente los feminismos hoy.In times of great feminist effervescence, the political claims of the movement are intermingled with the dangerous reappropriations that neoliberalism makes of its struggle nuclei. The tensions that appear in this context are many and varied, some obvious and some invisible, but all of them contribute to the torsion of feminism. This article will address some of the tensions that arise from the intersection between feminism and neoliberalism: from advertising as a possible feminist tool, to speeches on entrepreneurship and employment, through the design of public policies, and the commodification of female bodies. Some of the possible re-articulations and feminist political responses to this reality will be addressed, showing the great complexity of the challenges that feminisms face today. (shrink)

El pasado 23 de agosto de 2018 murió Vicent Martínez Guzmán, filósofo com-prometido, autor prolífico y gran persona. Vicent, nacido en La Vall d'Uixó en 1949, nos deja un importante y amplio legado académico, de investigación y de política universitaria.

Presentación de la sección de Homenaje a Vicent Martínez Guzmán.

Abstract: Introspection reveals that one is frequently conscious of some form of inner speech, which may appear either in a condensed or expanded form. It has been claimed that this speech reflects the way in which language is involved in conscious thought, fulfilling a number of cognitive functions. We criticize three theories that address this issue: Bermúdez’s view of language as a generator of second-order thoughts, Prinz’s development of Jackendoff’s intermediate-level theory of consciousness, and Carruthers’s theory of inner speech as (...) a rehearsal of action-schemata. We contend they have problems to account for those cases in which inner speech is fragmentary, and for the difference with those instances in which it appears as more sentence-like. In addition, we present verbal overshadowing as a phenomenon that neither of them can easily explain. Finally, we propose an account in which inner speech is fundamentally silent outer speech and argue that it is more explanatory than the alternatives. (shrink)

A partir de análise da argumentação habermasiana realizada em sua obra “Conhecimento e Interesse” original de 1968, a qual trabalhamos a partir da tradução de 1987; e ancorados nos trabalhos dos filósofos brasileiros Durão, publicado em seu livro “A crítica de Habermas à dedução transcendental de Kant” de 1996 e Hansen, em seu artigo publicado na Revista Crítica, intitulado “Os riscos da crítica da sociedade” de 1998, refletimos, nesse artigo, sobre como Habermas resgata a Teoria do Conhecimento da maneira desvirtuada (...) que a legou o positivismo comteano, perpassando por Freud e Marx para recuperá-la como uma Teoria Crítica da Sociedade. E, apresentamos o advento da Era da Informação e as facilidades de comunicação que a acompanham, para apresentar o modelo da Educação à Distância como uma forma eficaz de ampliar o alcance da Crítica Social como autorreflexão que torna o conhecimento um instrumento crítico não só do indivíduo, mas também da sociedade. (shrink)

Hamas’s deliberate attack on October 7th against innocent civilians is absolutely wrong. Therefore, it should be universally condemned. And yet, I wonder how a universal recognition of an absolute duty of respect for human dignity can help solving the existential conflict confronting Israelis and Palestinians. Ideally, a two-state solution proposed by the international community can be seen as a reasonable and fair compromise. Nevertheless, the reality on the ground is different. Thus far the existence of one state has precluded the (...) existence of another with no end in sight to their mutually destructive violence. Their conflict demands that people who are reasonable and fair-minded try to understand it holistically and to offer an impartial assessment of this intractable conflict without relativizing the undeserved human suffering of all those involved and affected by it. (shrink)

El ataque deliberado de Hamás el 7 de octubre contra civiles inocentes es absolutamente inicuo. Por lo tanto, debe ser condenado universalmente. Y, sin embargo, me pregunto cómo un reconocimiento universal de un deber absoluto de respeto por la dignidad humana puede ayudar a resolver el conflicto existencial al que se enfrentan israelíes y palestinos. Idealmente, una solución de dos Estados propuesta por la comunidad internacional puede ser vista como un compromiso razonable y justo. Sin embargo, la realidad sobre el (...) terreno es diferente. Hasta ahora, la existencia de un Estado ha impedido la existencia de otro, sin que se vislumbre el final de su violencia mutuamente destructiva. Su conflicto exige que las personas razonables e imparciales traten de entenderlo de manera holística y de ofrecer una evaluación justa de este conflicto insoluble sin relativizar el sufrimiento humano inmerecido de todos los involucrados y afectados por él. (shrink)

Corporate, Social, Ethical and Environmental Reporting should ideally discharge the accountability of an organisation to its stakeholders. Voluntary reporting has been characterised by a dearth of neutral and objective information such that the advocates of SEER recommend that it be made compulsory. Their underlying rationale is that legally specified disclosure requirements and enforcement mechanisms will enhance the quality of such reporting. This paper sets out to explore how realistic this scenario actually is, in view of the conflicting interpretations in the (...) literature on this subject. To that end, a survey of the reporting patterns of 78 of the largest Spanish companies between 2001 and 2003 examines the extent of their compliance with the ICAC-2002 standard, which obliged them to make environmental disclosures in their financial statements. The results suggest that progressive and improved regulation could increase the volume and quality of SEER disclosures. They also suggest, however, that persistent non-compliance means that the problems associated with voluntary disclosure still exist. Finally, through an impression management perspective, the study reveals, the diverse strategies, ranging from dismissal to concealment, that are employed by companies to avoid transparency. As regulation improves and enforcement expectations rise, it becomes more difficult to dismiss compulsory reporting norms. As a result, some firms engage in more complex concealment strategies to attain corporate legitimacy, depriving stakeholders of regulatory information. The latter point serves to reconcile apparently contradictory explanations in the literature as to whether legitimacy theory might explain partial compliance with SEER regulation. (shrink)

I offer a hopefully compelling defense of the view of those whom I refer to as hard-core opponents of terrorism. For hard-core opponents, terrorism is categorically wrong and, therefore, morally and legally unjustified. I view terrorism as either equivalent to murder or man slaughter in domestic law, or equivalent to crimes against humanity or war crimes in international law. If my argument is compelling, at least two important results follow from it. First, that under no circumstances is terrorism justified. And (...) second, that even if my argument were to be compelling, it will not necessarily end debates about the nature, justification, or excuse of terrorism. (shrink)

El artículo consta de cuatro partes. En la primera parte, la introducción, señalo algunos aspectos de la importancia del proyecto. Segundo, describo y evalúo como Varela interpreta la filosofía. Tercero, exploro su eclecticismo dentro de su filosofía. Por último, explico el concepto de utilidad en el quehacer filosófico de Varela. Estos tres conceptos: filosofía, eclecticismo y utilidad están correlacionados en su obra. La filosofía con la recta razón. El eclecticismo, o lo que Varela llama la “verdadera filosofía,” con la sabia (...) selección de argumentos, incluyendo diversos métodos para explorar nuestras experiencias cotidianas, y la utilidad con la mesurada evaluación de nuestra conducta, incluyendo el bien común. Dado que estos tres conceptos son polisémicos, ellos pueden ser manipulados, y de hecho han sido tergiversados, por pensadores que han tratado de explicar el pensamiento filosófico vareliano con fines partidistas, ya sea con buenas intenciones o con fines ideológicos tendenciosos. (shrink)

First, I argue that the contestability of the term “terrorism” is insufficient to justify the targeting of those who are innocent noncombatants beyond reasonable doubt; second, that states could be as vicious, if not even more so, than nonstate actors could be in perpetrating acts that might be described as terrorism, and, third, that an adequate definition of international terrorism must focus on the actual victims of such despicable acts.

In this paper, it is argued that terrorism undermines the justification of perspective relativism. The cliché, “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter,” is offered as an example of perspective relativism. Perspective relativists argue that moral principles and judgments have no universal moral import. Those who defend the cliché expression presuppose that the evaluation of terrorism is necessarily perspectival. For them, there are no morally objective differences, e.g., between deliberately killing combatants and deliberately killing innocent noncombatants. Yet there are (...) morally objective differences between these two acts. While the first act might be justified, the second act is considered murder. Hence, the evaluation of terrorism is not necessarily perspectival. Therefore, in the face of the evil that terrorists bring about, it is argued that perspective relativists have a substantive burden of proof to show that there are no transcultural moral values. (shrink)

I will argue that President Biden has not only the right to nominate an African American woman for SCOTUS, but, if he chooses a suitable candidate, he will be doing a great service to our country.

David Wong has introduced the notion of moral ambivalence in the philosophical debate. In this paper, we focus on the nature of moral ambivalence and on its interpretation. We hold that moral ambivalence is not a phenomenon that provides evidence for relativism, as Wong claims, and as relativism is usually understood. Rather, ambivalence denotes a pluralist attitude, an attitude characterized by the thought that two different, even incompatible, courses of action can both be permissible when considered from a single perspective. (...) We distinguish pluralism from relativism and argue that it is more appropriate to consider Wong’s position as an objectivist pluralism. We also highlight the similarity between Wong and Hume’s accounts. (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to show that there are many phenomena that pertain to the construction of truth-conditional compounds that follow characteristic patterns, and whose explanation requires appealing to knowledge structures organized in specific ways. We review a number of phenomena, ranging from non-homogenous modification and privative modification to polysemy and co-predication that indicate that knowledge structures do play a role in obtaining truth-conditions. After that, we show that several extant accounts that invoke rich lexical meanings to (...) explain such phenomena face problems related to inflexibility and lack of predictive power. We review different ways in which one might react to such problems as regards lexical meanings: go richer, go moderately richer, go thinner, and go moderately thinner. On the face of it, it looks like moderate positions are unstable, given the apparent lack of a clear cutoff point between the semantic and the conceptual, but also that a very thin view and a very rich view may turn out to be indistinguishable in the long run. As far as we can see, the most pressing open questions concern this last issue: can there be a principled semantic/world knowledge distinction? Where could it be drawn: at some upper level (e.g. enriched qualia structures) or at some basic level (e.g. constraints)? How do parsimony considerations affect these two different approaches? A thin meanings approach postulates intermediate representations whose role is not clear in the interpretive process, while a rich meanings approach to lexical meaning seems to duplicate representations: the same representations that are stored in the lexicon would form part of conceptual representations. Both types of parsimony problems would be solved by assuming a direct relation between word forms and (parts of) conceptual or world knowledge, leading to a view that has been attributed to Chomsky (e.g. by Katz 1980) in which there is just syntax and encyclopedic knowledge. (shrink)

The adage, “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter,” is offered as a plausible example of evoking moral relativism. Moral relativists recognize no transcultural moral facts. So, for them, even the concept of harm would be subjective or context-sensitive. Yet one can appeal to cogent transcultural moral reasons to distinguish between deliberately and unjustifiably harming impeccably innocent people and those who might engage in justifiably harming those guilty of grave crimes. In the face of the preventable evil acts that (...) terrorists frequently perpetrate against impeccably innocent people, it is argued that moral relativists have a substantive burden of proof to demonstrate that no cogent transcultural moral reasons exist against the practice of terrorism. In the absence of such a demonstration, it is reasonable to believe that the practice of terrorism, while not totally defeating moral relativism, seems to undermine its credibility. (shrink)

In my replies to some of my critics I argue that while the practice of terrorism is never justified, I concede that it is rarely but sometimes excused. As result, those who engage in excusable terrorism has a substantial burden of proof. They need to offer a compelling argument to show that the harm caused by their terrorist violence is actually excused by the extenuating circumstances and the goal that they are trying to achieve, so they will not be morally (...) or legally blameworthy for bringing about such harm. I am assuming that they will need to demonstrate that the alleged harm is excusable because it is necessary to accomplish a worthy goal and there is no other reasonable way to obtain such a worthy goal without deliberately harming those who can be reasonably conceived of as impeccably or objectively innocent. That is, those who are innocent beyond reasonable doubt. (shrink)

Primero, arguyo que aunque el término “terrorismo” es debatible eso no es suficiente para justificar el ataque a personas que pudieran ser consideradas como no combatientes o civiles inocentes más allá de cualquier duda razonable; segundo, que los estados pueden ser tan crueles y viciosos, o aún más, que los propios actores no estatales en perpetrar actos que pudiéramos describir como actos terroristas, y tercero, que una definición adecuada del término “terrorismo internacional” debe estar enfocada en identificar y valorar sobre (...) todo a las víctimas inocentes de estos actos macabros de violencia. (shrink)

La polémica fue un importante evento cultural durante el siglo XIX en Cuba. De 1838 a 1840 se debatieron en los principales periódicos de la isla temas en torno a la metafísica, la epistemología, la ética, la pedagogía y la influencia del eclecticismo de Víctor Cousin. Exploro en esta investigación brevemente algunos de los hechos históricos que antecedieron a esta polémica. Arguyo que es inexacta la interpretación predominante que esta polémica fue motivada por el deseo de independizar a Cuba de (...) España. Tal interpretación promueve un mito de emancipación. Según mi análisis, cuando en su intervención en la polémica José de la Luz y Caballero apela al patriotismo, establece sin saberlo un precedente peligroso que usarán los autodenominados protectores del patriotismo para restringir los debates públicos. -/- La polémica filosófica en la Habana se refiere a una serie de debates públicos que acaecieron en el siglo XIX en Cuba principalmente entre jóvenes intelectuales de la época. Con frecuencia estos debates resultaron en argumentos apasionados y algunas veces en ataques ad hominem entre los participantes de dicha polémica. -/- . (shrink)

Vitoria and Suárez defend the categorical immunity of the innocent not to be intentionally killed. But they allow for inflicting collective punishment on the innocent and the noninnocent alike during and after a just war. So they allow for deliberately harming them. Inflicting harm on the innocent can often result in their death. Hence, holding both claims seems incoherent. First, the objections against using the term “innocent” are explained. Second, their views on just war are explored. And third, by appealing (...) to Aquinas' double-effect reasoning, it is shown how they try to avoid the above-mentioned incoherence. Still, their appeal might be insufficient to palliate the tension between the above-mentioned claims. If just wars are possible, the deliberate harming of the innocent is reasonably unavoidable for defeating and punishing those who wage them. Hence, defenders of just wars, whether from a religious or a secular perspective, must live with such a tension. (shrink)

This paper explores whether terrorist violence could be morally justified or excused. It defends the absolute immunity of innocent people against those who might want to sacrifice them for other goals. The defense is based on recognizing people’s stringent natural duty of nonmaleficence, which entails an obligation on moral agents to refrain from intentionally bringing about harm or significant risk of it to the innocent. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part distinguishes between unconditional and conditional critics’ (...) arguments regarding the use of terrorist violence, and between a narrow and a broad definition of terrorism. While unconditional critics accept the narrow definition or one akin to it because they equate terrorism with murder, conditional critics accept the broad definition or one akin to it because they attempt to justify or excuse the use of terrorism based, e.g., on an analogy with a just war approach, consequentialism, moral relativism, supreme emergency or last resort. Exception is taken with the latter arguments since they attempt to justify or excuse morally unjustifiable and inexcusable actions such as the deliberate use of violence against the innocent. The second part explores plausible conditional critics’ reasons for justifying or excusing the 9/11/01 attacks and find them wanting. If the argument works, then, with minor modifications, it could also apply to the 3/11/04 attacks in Madrid, the 7/7/05 attacks in London, and similar attacks elsewhere. (shrink)

Nuestra intuición nos dice que a pesar de pertenecer a un mundo determinado físicamente somos libres. Nosotros argumentaremos que tras este postulado se encuentra una concepción errónea de sujeto, que ilusoriamente nos hace creer que nosotros elegimos hacer lo que acabamos haciendo. Contra este argumento, Galen Strawson plantea una objeción basada precisamente en la imposibilidad del agente de configurarse a sí mismo, pero es una objeción que recae en la misma equivocada noción de sujeto. A partir de aquí analizaremos los (...) argumentos dennettianos a favor del compatibilismo, lo que nos permitirá concluir apuntando a la correcta dirección que debería recorrer todo intento de estipulación de una noción de individuo plausible.Our intuition says us that in spite of belonging to a determinate world we are physically free. We will argue that after this postulate is an erroneous conception of subject that very falsely makes us think that we chose to do what we ended up doing. Against this argument, Galen Strawson raises an objection based indeed on the impossibility of the agent to form itself, but it is an objectionthat falls to the same one mistaken subject notion. From this point, we will analyze the dennettian arguments in favour of the compatibilism which will allow us to conclude pointing at the correct direction that would have to cross all attempt of stipulation of a reasonable notion of individual. (shrink)

El artículo aborda la evolución de Fichte a lo largo del año1793, y en particular se enfrenta a la clásica consideración de la Reseña de Enesidenzo como momento de ruptura con Reinhold y punto de partida de la WL. Se afirma en este sentido que la distancia frente a Reinhold estaba ya dada en la lectura práctica que Fichte hace de Kant, encontrando ésta una primera manifestación en la 2' edición del VeKaO, respecto de la que muestranuna perfecta continuidad todos (...) los escritos del 93. A la luz de todo ello, la lectura de Enesidemo no habría sido el detonante deldescubrimiento de la WL, sino más bien el pretexto para elevar a un nivel sistemático y fundamental las ideas ya elaboradas por Fichte, lo que se traduce en la afirmación de un primer principio alternativo. (shrink)

In this article, I contend that the three Cuban philosophers/pedagogues of the nineteenth century – Félix Varela y Morales, José de la Luz y Caballero, and Enrique José Varona were responsible for overcoming the teaching of late scholastic at the Royal and Pontifical University of St. Jerome of Havana. Against late scholastic philosophers and pedagogues who preferred syllogistic logic and the authority of tradition over induction, they argued in favor of the latter over the first. Since they defended liberal and (...) republican ideas, they also argued against those who appeal to the authority of tradition rather than to our ordinary experiences. Of course, their liberal spirit challenged not only the tyrannical regime imposed by Spain at the time but any other regime whose authority depends on force rather than on the will of the people. (shrink)

'. . . this book will be valuable to upper-division and graduate students interested in the validity of SC theories.'-PERSPECTIVES ON POLITICAL SCIENCE.

Different forms of contractarianism are assessed and explained. The concept of the social contract, as it is used by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls, is found to be inadequate for the development of a coherent political philosophy. Moreover it is argued that both contractarians as well as the anti-contractarians I shall consider fail in their account of political authority and in their account of political obligation. If this is so, then it follows that there is no general prima facie (...) moral obligation to obey the state and its institutions. Thus it is argued that most citizens do not have political obligations. The legitimacy of the state and its institutions will ultimately depend upon its moral qualities. (shrink)

Este libro recoge los fundamentos de la Filosofía para la Paz en la que se viene investigando desde hace más de quince años en la Universitat Jaume I de Castellón. La Filosofía para la Paz pretende dar un sentido más aplicado a la reflexión filosófica que ayude al análisis de desafíos actuales como son la interculturalidad, el género, los conflictos, el compromiso de las empresas y la sensibilización de los medios de comunicación. Para conseguir este objetivo la Filosofía para la (...) Paz parte del principio de la interdisciplinariedad y por este motivo entra en diálogo con las diferentes áreas de estudio con las que nutrir su reflexión. El libro no se muestra sólo como una herramienta útil para las personas que quieren acercarse a los estudios para la paz desde la filosofía, sino también para quienes sienten una inquietud y un compromiso con la transformación pacífica del sufrimiento humano y de la naturaleza. Irene Comins Mingol es profesora contratada doctora del Departamento de Filosofía y Sociología de la Universitat Jaume I de Castellón y codirectora del Máster Universitario y Doctorado Internacional en Estudios de Paz, Conflictos y Desarrollo. Algunas de sus publicaciones son La ética del cuidado y la construcción de la paz y Filosofía del cuidar. Sonia París Albert es doctora por la Universitat Jaume I y profesora contratada doctora del Departamento de Filosofía y Sociología de la Universitat Jaume I. Actualmente, es vicedirectora de la Cátedra UNESCO de Filosofía para la Paz y Coordinadora de Investigación del Máster Universitario Internacional en Estudios de Paz, Conflictos y Desarrollo de la UJI. Su último libro se titula Filosofía de los Conflictos. (shrink)