The main goal of this article is to investigate the mythical symbolic form in Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Form regarding its connection with visual perception. The article argues that mythical symbolic form is rooted in Gestalt principles of perception for organizing the perceptual field, and shows that these principles shape the main features of space and time in Cassirer’s mythical symbolic form. This argument challenges Heidegger’s critique of Cassirer’s definition of a mythical symbolic form that it is directionless and not (...) grounded in man’s being. The combination of Gestalt principles and mythical symbolic forms supports the argument about the active role of visual perception, and clarifies Cassirer’s application and re-definition of Kantian and Neo-Kantian concepts. The investigation opens a perspective for comprehending the mythic-religious phenomenon as well as for comprehending visual perception. (shrink)

Kant’s theory of cognition aimed to explain the possibility of scientific knowledge. Aesthetics and life science were not considered by Kant in the context of cognition. By contrast, Cassirer set himself a philosophical task to extend Kant’s theory of cognition to all forms of culture, including pre-scientific knowledge and aesthetics. The present study demonstrates how Cassirer explained the possibility of different objective forms, named symbolic, by employing and transforming Kant’s theory of cognition. For this goal, Cassirer took the following steps: (...) modified the definitions of a priori synthesis (the act of understanding) and pure intuition (the forms of space and time) - main building blocks of Kant’s cognition; indicated the necessary correlation of intuition and synthesis; characterized a priori synthesis and the intuition as notions which include contradicted meanings. Cassirer called this contradiction “twofold oppositions” as characteristic of a priori synthesis. The first argument of the article is that the possibility of various synthetic acts is rooted in the nature of a priori synthesis which carries together two different meanings: the act of uniting elements and the initial unity. One synthetic act forms the world of nature and is connected to scientific space and time, and the other is the product of immediate perceptional space and time, from which the world of myth and aesthetics appears. Thus, Cassirer expanded the scope of “pure” synthesis. The second argument is that Cassirer specified a priori synthesis and pure intuition as a functional concept. The functional concept belongs to the model of concept as-relation that Cassirer has elaborated. It includes moments that are separated and united simultaneously. This definition of concept breaks the rules of consistency. The concept of as-relation justifies the contradictory characteristics of a priori synthesis and pure intuition, which include both the combination of moments in a synthesizing act and the initial unity of intuition. (shrink)

Kant’s theory of cognition aimed to explain the possibility of scientific knowledge. Aesthetics and life science were not considered by Kant in the context of cognition. By contrast, Cassirer set himself a philosophical task to extend Kant’s theory of cognition to all forms of culture, including pre-scientific knowledge and aesthetics. The present study demonstrates how Cassirer explained the possibility of different objective forms, named symbolic, by employing and transforming Kant’s theory of cognition. For this goal, Cassirer took the following steps: (...) modified the definitions of a priori synthesis (the act of understanding) and pure intuition (the forms of space and time) - main building blocks of Kant’s cognition; indicated the necessary correlation of intuition and synthesis; characterized a priori synthesis and the intuition as notions which include contradicted meanings. Cassirer called this contradiction “twofold oppositions” as characteristic of a priori synthesis. The first argument of the article is that the possibility of various synthetic acts is rooted in the nature of a priori synthesis which carries together two different meanings: the act of uniting elements and the initial unity. One synthetic act forms the world of nature and is connected to scientific space and time, and the other is the product of immediate perceptional space and time, from which the world of myth and aesthetics appears. Thus, Cassirer expanded the scope of “pure” synthesis. The second argument is that Cassirer specified a priori synthesis and pure intuition as a functional concept. The functional concept belongs to the model of concept as-relation that Cassirer has elaborated. It includes moments that are separated and united simultaneously. This definition of concept breaks the rules of consistency. The concept of as-relation justifies the contradictory characteristics of a priori synthesis and pure intuition, which include both the combination of moments in a synthesizing act and the initial unity of intuition. (shrink)

Текст Десяти заповедей Библии предписывает поклоняться только единому Богу и запрещает создавать изображения Бога и изваяния. Цель данной статьи исследовать взгляды Мендельсона, Когена и Кассирера на связь между предписанием поклоняться единому Богу и запретом идолопоклонства в иудаизме. В статье рассматривается вопрос, почему Мендельсон и Коген определяют запрет на изображение Бога как запрет, характеризующий сущность иудаизма как религии разума. Анализируя понятие знака, Мендельсон объясняет поклонение идолам как непонимание указывающей функции знака; подобное непонимание ведет к ошибочному восприятию. Коген раскрывает с помощью этого (...) запрета уникальность истинного Бога иудаизма. Понятия знака и символа в текстах Мендельсона стали ключевыми для философии Кассирера. Посредством этих понятий он создает свою философию культуры и теорию восприятия. Мой аргумент состоит в том, что в свете философии Кассирера, идолопоклонство (как ошибочное восприятие) характеризует не только ушедшие в прошлое этапы развития религиозного сознания, но также является необходимым моментом в структуре восприятия. Abstract: The text of the Decalogue in the Bible orders to worship the one God and forbids creating images of God and any cultic statues. The aim of this paper is to inquiry the views of Mendelssohn, Cohen, and Cassirer - the Jewish German-speaking rational philosophers - regarding the link between the precept to worship the one God and the prohibition of the idolatry in Judaism. Why idolatry was identified with making images of God? The article will investigate the arguments, according to which Mendelssohn and Cohen define the prohibition of God’s images in Judaism as the essential law for religion based on reason. Mendelssohn’s understanding of idolatry is a result of his theory of sign. Analysing the concept of sign, Mendelssohn explains idol worship as misunderstanding of the sign’s function to denote things. Idolatry, in his terms, is an erroneous perception. For Cohen the prohibition of God’s images reveals the uniqueness of the true God of Judaism. The unique God has no image, and to make image of him is the same as to create another god. Mendelssohn’s concepts of sign and symbol became key concepts for Cassirer’s philosophy of culture and theory of perception. My final argument is that in light of Cassirer's philosophy, idolatry (defined previously as erroneous perception) characterizes not only past stages of religious consciousness, but also constitutes necessary moment in the structure of perception. -/- . (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Dewey, Implementation, and Creating a Democratic Civic UniversityIra HarkavyThinking begins in... a forked-road situation, a situation that is ambiguous, that presents a dilemma, that poses alternatives.—John Dewey (How We Think 122)The social philosopher, dwelling in the region of his concepts, “solves” problems by showing the relationship of ideas, instead of helping men solve problems in the concrete by supplying them hypotheses to be used and tested in projects of (...) reform.—John Dewey (Reconstruction in Philosophy 192)Democracy must begin at home, and its home is the neighborly community.—John Dewey (The Public and Its Problems 213)democracy, as we all know, is seriously threatened throughout the world (Fisher). In the United States, the chasm-like inequities laid bare by COVID-19, the ongoing killing of black Americans, the violent insurrection at the Capitol, and the continuing attempt to subvert the electoral process are powerful indicators of a system under severe strain (Guardian Staff; Rubin). These developments are also a sign of deep and chronic problems, including the following:1. Increasing economic, political, social, educational, and health inequalities2. Increasing racism, anti-Semitism, and xenophobia3. Increasing attacks on science, knowledge, and democracy itself4. Declining trust in nearly all major institutionsMany things, obviously, contribute to the present situation. Among them is the failure of universities to successfully do what they are supposed to do: educate students to be ethical, empathetic, engaged, democratic citizens, and [End Page 49] advance knowledge for the continuous betterment of the human condition (Benson et al., Knowledge). To use a Marxian framework, but to reject its economic determinism, universities, in my judgment, are not a part of society’s superstructure. They are, to the contrary, a core component of its base (Marx, “Preface”). What they do matters enormously, significantly determining the kind of society we have now and will have in the future.Universities, as former Harvard president Derek Bok and others have emphasized, have become the central societal institutions in the world (Bok, Universities and the Future 3). Research universities, in my judgment, are the most central. They develop new ideas and technologies, incubate businesses, serve as cultural and artistic centers, and are engines of local, national, and global economies. As anchor institutions, they often engage in partnerships with government, the private sector, and community-based organizations to revitalize local neighborhoods and schools (“Anchor Institutions Task Force”). It is the university’s role as an educational institution, however, that is most important.The schooling system increasingly functions as the core subsystem—the strategic subsystem—of modern information societies. Schooling, more than any other subsystem, as John Dewey claimed, influences the functioning of the societal system as a whole. Viewed systemically, it has on balance the greatest “multiplier” effects, direct and indirect, short-term and long-term. Restating these points somewhat differently, I strongly agree with the Chilean sociologist Eugenio Tironi that the answer to the question “What kind of education do we need?” is to be found in the answer to the question “What kind of society do we want?” (Tironi). Education and society are dynamically interactive and interdependent. If human beings hope to maintain and develop a particular type of society, they must develop and maintain the particular type of education system conducive to it. As Dewey in effect argued: No effective democratic schooling system, no democratic society.1For William Rainey Harper, who, as the first president of the University of Chicago, brought Dewey to Chicago, universities are the primary shapers of the American schooling system. In an 1899 speech at the University of California, he perceptively observed that “[t]he school system, the character of which, in spite of itself, the university determines and in a large measure controls.... [T]hrough the school system every family in this entire broad land of ours is brought into touch with the university; for from it proceed the teachers or the teachers’ teachers” (Harper 25). Agreeing with Harper, I contend that higher education institutions powerfully shape the learning, values, and aspirations of students from kindergarten through graduate school. [End Page 50]Given the university’s societal role and influence, creating and sustaining an inclusive, just democratic society requires a... (shrink)

This paper explores two aspects of Hume's skeptical crisis in the conclusion to _Treatise<D> Book I: his involved personal experience of the crisis, and his detached naturalistic reflection on it. I discuss several distinct states of mind reported in the text, ranging from extreme skepticism that rejects all belief, to natural dogmatism that rejects all reflection, to mitigated skepticism that tries to reconcile reflection and belief. I argue against interpretations according to which Hume's skepticism supports his naturalism, and I suggest (...) that Hume's extreme skepticism ultimately depends on a predisposition to think of the crucial elements of human cognition as "trivial", as epistemically disabling rather than enabling. (shrink)

In her (1996) Kadri Vihvelin argues that autoinfanticide is nomologically impossible and so that there is no sense in which time travelers are able to commit it. In response, Theodore Sider (2002) defends the original Lewisian verdict (Lewis 1976) whereby, on a common understanding of ability, time travelers are able to kill their earlier selves and their failure to do so is merely coincidental. This paper constitutes a critical note on arguments put forward by both Sider and Vihvelin. I argue (...) that although Sider’s criticism starts out promisingly he doesn’t succeed in establishing that Vihvelin’s analysis fails, because (a) he neglects to rule out a class of counterfactuals to which Vihvelin’s sample-case may belong; and (b) (together with Lewis) he is wrong to suggest that future facts are irrelevant in the evaluation of time travelers’ abilities. I show instead that Vihvelin’s argument is viciously circular, indicating that even if there are nomological constraints on autoinfanticide these cannot be established a priori. (shrink)

Lewisian Genuine Realism about possible worlds is often deemed unable to accommodate impossible worlds and reap the benefits that these bestow to rival theories. This thesis explores two alternative extensions of GR into the terrain of impossible worlds. It is divided in six chapters. Chapter I outlines Lewis’ theory, the motivations for impossible worlds, and the central problem that such worlds present for GR: How can GR even understand the notion of an impossible world, given Lewis’ reductive theoretical framework? Since (...) the desideratum is to incorporate impossible worlds into GR without compromising Lewis’ reductive analysis of modality, Chapter II defends that analysis against objections. The rest of the thesis is devoted to incorporating impossible worlds into GR. Chapter III explores GR-friendly impossible worlds in the form of set-theoretic constructions out of genuine possibilia. Then, Chapters IV-VI venture into concrete impossible worlds. Chapter IV addresses Lewis’ objection against such worlds, to the effect that contradictions true at impossible worlds amount to true contradictions tout court. I argue that even if so, the relevant contradictions are only ever about the non-actual, and that Lewis’ argument relies on a premise that cannot be nonquestion- beggingly upheld in the face of genuine impossible worlds in any case. Chapter V proposes that Lewis’ reductive analysis can be preserved, even in the face of genuine impossibilia, if we differentiate the impossible from the possible by means of accessibility relations, understood non-modally in terms of similarity. Finally, Chapter VI counters objections to the effect that there are certain impossibilities, formulated in Lewis’ theoretical language, which genuine impossibilia should, but cannot, represent. I conclude that Genuine Realism is still very much in the running when the discussion turns to impossible worlds. (shrink)

Peter van Inwagen's Direct Argument (DA) for incompatibilism purports to establish incompatibilism with respect to moral responsibility and determinism without appealing to assumptions that compatibilists usually consider controversial. Recently, Michael McKenna has presented a novel critique of DA. McKenna's critique raises important issues about philosophical dialectics. In this article, we address those issues and contend that his argument does not succeed.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Hume Studies Volume 30, Number 1, April 2004, pp. 33-50 Constancy, Coherence, and Causality IRA M. SCHNALL According to David Hume, we believe in the existence of an external world because of the phenomena of constancy and coherence (T 1.4.2.18-43; SBN 194-210).1 Hume delineated these two aspects of our sensory experience, and claimed that they influence the imagination in such a way as to generate belief in the existence (...) of unperceived objects, independent of the mind. There is disagreement among philosophers as to the proper way to characterize constancy and coherence and the ways in which they respectively lead us to believe in external objects. The most straightforward account of coherence seems to make it the same as Hume's concept of causality. Yet Hume denies that they are the same ; and commentators disagree as to how to understand Hume's distinction between the two. As to constancy, many philosophers, following H.H. Price,2 have argued that it is really just a special case of coherence, and that its role in generating belief in external objects is the same as that of coherence. There is consequent puzzlement as to why Hume attributed a different, and more important, role to constancy. In an important recent book, Louis E. Loeb has proposed a very interesting two-part solution to this last puzzle: First, Hume is convinced that the commonsense view of the external world is patently false; so he cannot allow that it results from something as reasonable as causal inference. But the way coherence leads to belief in external objects is a form of causal inference. So, Hume wants constancy to lead to belief in external objects in a different, less reasonable way; and he wants constancy to be more important than coherence in leading to belief in the external world. Second, Hume did not realize that constancy is simply a special case of coherence (or causality), because of certain assumptions about causality that he Ira M. Schnall is at the Department of Philosophy, Bar-Ilan University, Ramat-Gan, Israel 52900. e-mail: [email protected] 34 Ira M. Schnall had inherited from his predecessors (i.e., he did not see the causality involved in the relation between an object's existing at one moment and its existing at a later moment). Therefore he appealed to non-rational mechanisms of the imagination to explain how constancy leads us to posit external objects.3 I will try to show that solutions such as Loeb's, which grant the affinity between coherence and causality and the reducibility of constancy to coherence, are unnecessary. I will propose a way to make sense of Hume's claim that coherence is not the same as causality; and I will argue that what Hume calls 'constancy' is not, and should not be, the same as, or reducible to, coherence. After introducing some basic terms, including 'constancy' and 'coherence' themselves (in section I), I will discuss the proper characterization of coherence and how it differs from causality (section II). Then I will discuss Hume's account of constancy and how it leads to belief in external obj ects; and I will contrast it with the alternative account, referred to above, that is widely held to be preferable (section III). I will argue that Hume's own account has certain advantages over the alternative (section IV) and that the main arguments against Hume's account are inconclusive (sections V and VI). The argument of section IV will yield an explanation of Hume's assigning more importance to constancy than to coherence. Finally, I will suggest (in the concluding section) that though Hume considered constancy and coherence to be merely the psychological "causes" that "induce us to believe in the existence of body," we can use them as a basis of an epistemological justification of our belief in the external world. I will make extensive use of H. H. Price's Hume's Theory of the External World; for much of the current understanding, as well as misunderstanding, of Hume's concepts of constancy and coherence is the result of the detailed analyses and arguments in that work.4 I First of... (shrink)

Emotions can be understood as a coherent, integrated system of general-purpose coping strategies, guided by appraisal, for responding to situations of crisis and opportunity (when specific-purpose motivational systems may be less effective). This perspective offers functional explanations for the presence of particular emotions in the emotion repertoire, and their elicitation by particular appraisal combinations. Implications of the Emotion System model for debated issues, such as the dimensional vs. discrete nature of appraisals and emotions, are also discussed.

In this major intellectual history, Ira Katznelson examines the works of Hannah Arendt, Robert Dahl, Richard Hofstadter, Harold Lasswell, Charles Lindblom, Karl Polanyi, and David Truman, detailing their engagement with the larger project of reclaiming the West's moral bearing.

With the same sense of historical responsibility and veracity he has exemplified in his studies on Voltaire, Ira O. Wade turns now to Voltaire's milieu and begins an account of the French Enlightenment which will explain its genesis, its nature and coherence, and its diffusion in the modern world. To understand the movement of ideas that produced the spirit of the Enlightenment, Mr. Wade identifies and examines the people, events, and rich development of philosophy in the Renaissance and seventeenth century. (...) He considers, in turn, the challenges of the Renaissance and the responses of its leading writers (Rabelais, Bacon, and Montaigne); Baroque thought (Descartes, Hobbes, Pascal, the Freethinkers); and Classicism (Moliere, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Newton). Mr. Wade begins his discussion by examining the critical literature on the Enlightenment and concludes with a theoretical chapter, "The Making of a Spirit." As the history of an intellectual culture, his study makes vivid the power of thought in the making of a civilization. Originally published in 1971. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

A brief outline of the themes and literature around impossible worlds in philosophy.

A conversational implicature is an inference that consists in attributing to a speaker an implicit meaning that goes beyond the explicit linguistic meaning of an utterance. This paper experimentallyinvestigates scalar implicature, a paradigmatic case of implicature in which a speaker's use of a term like Some indicates that the speaker had reasons not to use a more informative one from the samescale, e.g. All; thus, Some implicates Not all. Pragmatic theorists like Grice would predict that a pragmatic interpretation is determined (...) only after its explicit, logical meaning is incorporated (e.g. whereSome means at least one). The present work aims to developmentally unpack this prediction by showing how younger, albeit competent, reasoners initially treat a relatively weak term logically beforebecoming aware of its pragmatic potential. Three experiments are presented. Experiment 1 presents a modal reasoning scenario offering an exhaustive set of conclusions; critical among these isparticipants' evaluation of a statement expressing Might be x when the context indicates that the stronger Must be x is true. The conversationally-infelicitous Might be x can be understood logically(e.g. as compatible with Must) or pragmatically (as exclusive to must). Results from five-, seven-, and nine-year-olds as well as adults revealed that a) seven-year-olds are the youngest to demonstratemodal competence overall and that; b) seven- and nine-year-olds treat the infelicitous Might logically significantly more often than adults do. Experiment 2 showed how training with the modal taskcan suspend the implicatures for adults. Experiment 3 provides converging evidence of the developmental pragmatic effect with the French existential quantifier Certains (Some). Whilelinguistically-sophisticated children (eight- and ten-year-olds olds) typically treat Certains as compatible with Tous (All), adults are equivocal. These results, which are consistent with unanticipatedfindings in classic developmental papers, reveal a consistent ordering in which representations of weak scalar terms tend to be treated logically by young competent participants and morepragmatically by older ones. This work is also relevant to the treatment of scalar implicatures in the reasoning literature. (shrink)

Researchers have found undeniable variability and irrefutable evidence of consistencies in emotional responses across situations, individuals, and cultures. Both must be acknowledged in constructing adequate, enduring models of emotional phenomena. In this article I outline an empirically-grounded model of the structure of the emotion system, in which relatively variable actions may be used to pursue relatively consistent goals within discrete emotion syndromes; the syndromes form a stable, coherent set of strategies for coping with crises and opportunities. I also discuss a (...) framework that can integrate dimensional and discrete perspectives on emotions. (shrink)

Hume raises the issue of how common life and philosophy are related. He presents the possibility that they are irreconcilably opposed, that philosophy rigorously and honestly pursued must lead to skepticism. I discuss some prominent interpretive issues about Hume in light of this opposition between common life and philosophy. I also argue that this opposition is a deep and general philosophical problem, and sketch an approach to this problem. ;These are my interpretive claims: I argue that Hume has constructive aims (...) in his epistemology, and that he is surprised when his naturalism subverts these constructive aims and leads to skepticism. I argue that Hume does not entertain a moral skepticism similar to his skepticism about the external world and causal relations, but that he should have entertained such a skepticism. I argue that, in the Dialogues, Philo does not concede that religious belief is natural and therefore secure despite its unreasonableness. Rather, Philo contends that religious belief is not natural, and contends that this lack of naturalness gives us principled grounds for preferring causal and moral beliefs to natural ones. However, I argue, the problem of general philosophical skepticism keeps this religious skepticism from being satisfactory. ;I use the interpretation of Hume to clarify and deepen Hume's Problem, and to begin working toward a solution of that problem. I argue that there is a perspective we can take up that makes skepticism about the status of our physical and moral beliefs and practices seem inevitable. To resolve Hume's Problem, we must show that this perspective is the wrong perspective on human life, or at least that there is some alternative perspective that does not lead to skepticism but is no less rational than the perspective that does lead to skepticism. (shrink)

Mindsets are shifting where the work areas of the students vary. The class furniture will vary from size and shape of tables, to couches, to a variety of chairs. Students must have the freedom to make choices to take ownership of their learning. This means that mistakes will happen. The classroom should be a comfortable learning environment.

1. Readers of Hume, even those who call attention to the depth and variety of his skeptical excursions, now happily admit that Hume is, in crucial respects, a “naturalist.” A naturalist is, broadly, someone who emphasizes the natural sources of our beliefs, attitudes, and practices; and Hume surely is at least this kind of naturalist. But understanding Hume’s naturalism to include only this general explanatory commitment obscures as much as it reveals, I will argue, about the text of Treatise I (...) iv, where Hume examines various skeptical “systems of philosophy.” To understand that part of the Treatise, we must, I will argue, understand Hume’s shifting allegiances to different kinds of naturalism. (shrink)

We describe an experiment that investigated levels-of-processing effects in recognition memory for famous faces. The degree of conscious control over the recognition decisions was manipulated by using a response deadline procedure, and memory awareness associated with those decisions was assessed using a standard remember-know paradigm. Levels-of-processing effects were found at both short and long response deadlines, and at both deadlines those effects occurred only in remembering. Moreover, knowing, as well as remembering, increased with the greater opportunity for conscious control over (...) recognition decisions at the long deadline. These results have implications for dual-process theories that distinguish between a slower, more controlled recollection process, reflected in remembering, and a faster, more automatic familiarity process, reflected in knowing. (shrink)

v. 1. Esprit philosophique.--v. 2. Esprit révolutionnaire.

David Lewis famously dismisses genuine impossible worlds on the basis that a contradiction bound within the scope of his modifier ‘at w’ amounts to a contradiction tout court—an unacceptable consequence. Motivated by the rising demand for impossible worlds in philosophical theorising, this paper examines whether anything coherent can be said about an extension of Lewis’ theory of genuine, concrete possible worlds into genuine, concrete impossible worlds. Lewis’ reasoning reveals two ways to carve out conceptual space for the genuinely impossible. The (...) first is to abandon Lewis’ classical translation schema for negation, on the basis that it begs the question against incomplete and inconsistent worlds. I argue that, whilst this option incurs some loss in the semantics, it preserves the core spirit of Lewis’ metaphysics. The alternative is to bite the bullet, abandon classical logic and embrace true contradictions. The key challenge with this strategy is that the resulting theory seems committed to a particularly strong kind of dialethism—one that even dialethists would be reluctant to accept. I motivate such a dialethic account of genuine impossibilia using Lewis’ own methodology and defend it against triviality objections. I close with a few comments on why impossible worlds should not be reduced to set theoretic constructs out of possible worlds. (shrink)

The connective or can be treated as an inclusive disjunction or else as an exclusive disjunction. Although researchers are aware of this distinction, few have examined the conditions under which each interpretation should be anticipated. Based on linguistic-pragmatic analyses, we assume that interpretations are initially inclusive before either (a) remaining so, or (b) becoming exclusive by way of an implicature ( but not both ). We point to a class of situations that ought to predispose disjunctions to inclusive interpretations and (...) to situations that encourage exclusive interpretations. A disjunction's ultimate interpretation is based on its potential informativeness, where the interpretation of the disjunctive utterance having the smallest number of true conditions is considered most informative. Our investigation leads to five experiments employing arbitrary materials. Among the problems expected to encourage inclusive interpretations are those that present disjunctions in the antecedents of conditionals and in question forms. The best candidates to produce implicatures are those disjunctions that underdetermine an expected conjunctive conclusion, although other disjunctive utterances that are more informative as exclusive are discussed and tested. (shrink)

Several theists have adopted a position known as ‘sceptical theism ’, according to which God is justified in allowing suffering, but the justification is often beyond human comprehension. A problem for sceptical theism is that if there are unknown justifications for suffering, then we cannot know whether it is right for a human being to relieve suffering. After examining several proposed solutions to this problem, I conclude that one who is committed to a revealed religion has a simpler and more (...) effective solution. In particular, according to traditional Judaism, God has permitted us, indeed commanded us, to relieve suffering, so we know that it is right for us to do so. I further show how God's command, according to Judaism, that we save lives provides an answer to an analogous argument put forward by David Hume. Thus, revealed theistic religions can sometimes solve problems more effectively than theism alone. (shrink)

Mixed emotions are conceptualized as involving the co-occurrence of states opposite in valence. One might expect that combinations of opposites would show diminished overall emotion intensity. But is this always the case? If not, when will mixed emotions be characterized by high intensity, and when by low intensity? In this article, theories of emotion-eliciting appraisal and emotion intensity are employed to understand mixed emotions and phenomena of passion. It is proposed that intense emotions are produced by transformative events: perceived motive-relevant (...) changes that are important, large, and rapid. Transformative events that can move a person between greatly motive-inconsistent and greatly motive-consistent outcomes constitute one potent path to passion. Illustrative phenomena of passion, mixed emotions, and related research are discussed. (shrink)

Although little noticed by practicing theorists, narrative voice influences theoretical work. This essay presents a demonstration of voice as method, concentrating on brief segments of works by Garfinkel and Goffman. We attend to two methodological themes: how theorists use voice to establish intellectual autonomy, and how the use of voice influences credibility with readers. Garfinkel maximizes his autonomy by using narrative techniques that isolate him from his readers, and produce little common context with them as a result. Goffman maintains a (...) context for credibility with his readers by using a personal voice, but he uses this voice to request their indulgence as he follows his autonomous muse. Goffman's narrative self-indulgence prevents him from fashioning a coherent theoretical program for his readers, something Garfinkel's distant voice enables him to achieve. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Two rival approaches to property rights dominate contemporary political philosophy: Lockean natural rights and egalitarian theories of distributive justice. This article defends a third approach, which can be traced to the work of David Hume. Unlike Lockean rights, Humean property rights are not grounded in pre-institutional moral entitlements. In contrast to the egalitarian approach, which begins with highly abstract principles of distributive justice, Humean theory starts with simple property conventions and shows how more complex institutions can be justified against (...) a background of settled property rights. Property rights allow people to coordinate their use of scarce resources. For property rules to serve this function effectively, certain questions must be considered settled. Treating existing property entitlements as having prima facie validity facilitates cooperation between people who disagree about distributive justice. Lockean and egalitarian theories endorse moral claims that threaten to unsettle property conventions and undermine social cooperation. (shrink)

In the wake of business scandals at Enron, Arthur Andersen, Global Crossing, Tyco—the list grows daily—there is an increasing sense among employees, executives, investors, and the public that the “anything goes” culture of the New Economy is over. Today, businesses must act responsibly, transparently, and with integrity. Using in-depth case studies and examples from over 50 companies that range from Starbucks to Citigroup, General Motors to General Electric, DuPont to Dell, Ira A. Jackson, former director of the Center for Business (...) and Government at Harvard’s Kennedy School, shows the quantifiable and enduring business advantage to “doing the right thing.” Companies that give back to their employees and society—focusing on values and purpose as well as profitability—often gain commpetitive advantage and improve their brand image, consumer loyalty, and employee satisfaction. Identifying seven principles of making values integral to business processes and practices, PROFITS WITH PRINCIPLES opens the door to a new kind of capitalism, providing a wealth of practical recommendations companies of all sizes can model their own efforts after. (shrink)

The amount of social support literature in the field of interpersonal communication has increased steadily. In the last decade, however, no one has pushed for a conclusion as to what kind of phenomenon social support is. This article aims to describe the essence of social support. The essence is what must be present in all the phenomena that claim to be social support. The study uses phenomenological reduction and imag¬inative variation (1) on social support definitions and (2) on the empirical (...) material of support in men’s friendships. The synthesis of the two sets of material deduces the essence of social support both theoretically and empirically. According to the phenomenological reduction the essence of social support is the awareness of a real or potential void in a person’s life experience, and of otherness that intends to alter that experience to achieve wholeness. Supportive communication is the manifestation of the essence of social support in interpersonal relationships. (shrink)

Giving Voice to Values as a Professional Physician provides students with the theoretical background and practical applications for acting on their values in situations of ethical conflict. It is the first medical ethics book that utilizes the Giving Voice to Values methodology to instruct students in medical ethics and professionalism. In doing so, it shifts the focus of ethics education from intellectually examining ethical theories and conflicts to emphasizing moral action. Each section of the book explains how moral decision-making and (...) action can be implemented in the healthcare arena. Medical ethics cases are provided throughout in order to assist students in giving voice to their values and developing skills for professional action. The Giving Voice to Values methodology, and the cases in this book, do not focus on the big questions of academic ethics, but rather on the ethics of the everyday, even if the challenges presented are difficult. In other words, the ethical questions students will have to face, in this book and in medical education and practice, are about how to interact with others, whether they be patients or colleagues, who might have different ethical positions. The book provides a unique guide for professional identity formation and the teaching of ethics in medical schools. (shrink)

Philosophers have often applied a distinctively epistemic framework to the question of how moral knowledge can be derived from fictional literature, by considering how true propositions, or their argumentative support, can be the cognitive fruits of reading works of fiction. I offer an alternative approach. I focus not on whether readers fail to assent to the truth of a proposition or fail to provide it rational support. Instead, I focus on how readers fail to accord a truth (which they already (...) accept) adequate importance in their web of beliefs about living a good human life. This is a form of ignorance, but in the form of neglect, or failure to pay proper regard – which is one sense of the term ‘forgetfulness’. I argue that works of fictional literature may, at times, stimulate audience members to overcome their own particular forms of forgetfulness in this respect. And I use Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich as a case in point. (shrink)

_The Bus Kids_ offers a compelling and uniquely detailed examination of the experiences of kindergarten students in California participating in a voluntary school desegregation program. Ira Lit focuses on the day-to-day school life of a group of minority children bussed from their poor-performing home school district to an affluent neighboring district with high-performing schools. Through these kindergarteners’ experiences, the book sensitively illuminates the processes of school transition, socialization, and adaptation, and addresses an array of important issues relating to American education. (...) Lit acutely observes these “bus kids” and the quality of their social, emotional, cultural, and academic experiences. He presents a moving picture of the complexity of challenges, often unrecognized by teachers and parents, each young student confronted every day. (shrink)

The Argument from Fine-Tuning, a relatively new version of the Design Argument, has given rise to an objection, based on what is known as the An­thropic Principle. It is alleged that the argument is fallacious in that it involves an observation selection effect—that given the existence of intelligent living observers, the observation that the universe is fine-tuned for the existence of intelligent life is not surprising. Many find this objection puzzling, or at least easily refutable. My main contribution to the (...) discussion is to offer an analysis of what is wrong (and what is right) in the objection. (shrink)

In section 12 of the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Hume presents several skeptical arguments, including "popular" and "philosophical" objections to inductive reasoning. I point out a puzzling aspect of Hume's treatment of these two kinds of objection, and I suggest a way to deal with the puzzle. I then examine the roles of both kinds of objection in leading to "mitigated" skepticism. In particular, Hume claims that the philosophical objection can lead to limiting investigation to matters of common life; but (...) several philosophers have noted that this objection, far from leading to this result, seems to be inconsistent with it. I examine attempts to establish consistency, and I suggest a way to understand how the philosophical objection, along with the popular objections, can indeed provide reasons for mitigated skepticism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Hume and Hume’s Connexions ed. by M. A. Stewart, John P. WrightIra SingerM. A. Stewart and John P. Wright, eds. Hume and Hume’s Connexions. University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1995. Pp. xvi + 266. Cloth, $40.00. Paper, $18.95.This collection is organized around the theme of Hume’s connections with his philosophical predecessors, contemporaries, and successors.In a historical prelude, Roger Emerson meticulously describes the factions that supported and opposed (...) Hume’s efforts to gain a professorship. Emerson attributes Hume’s failure not only to the charges of impiety leveled against him, but also to the intricate workings of a political patronage system.Four essays about moral theory follow. James Moore attacks the conventional view that Hume’s moral theory is deeply similar to Hutcheson’s. In fact, Moore argues, surface similarities here mask systematic disagreements about justice, self-interest, teleology, theology, reason’s role within a sentimentalist framework, and about whether morality is, fundamentally, justified approbation for benevolence (Hutcheson) or sympathy’s merely natural tendency to generate feelings of approbation (Hume). These differences make sense, Moore notes, in light of Hutcheson’s debts to Stoicism, and Hume’s debts to Epicureanism. Stephen Darwall argues that, by parting company with Hutcheson on one crucial point, Hume opens up a logical space for Bentham’s Utilitarianism. Hutcheson explains the goodness of natural [End Page 141] goods, such as happiness, in terms of our distinctively moral approval of benevolence: happiness is good because a benevolent person wills general happiness. Hume instead explains our moral approval of qualities of character in terms of natural goods and the psychological mechanism of sympathy: a benevolent person receives moral approval because she produces happiness for herself and others, including sympathetic spectators. Darwall claims that Hume thus foreshadows Bentham’s efforts to set our moral judgments on an uncontroversial nonmoral foundation. Pauline C. Westerman discusses the relation between Hume and the natural lawyers. Hume shares some of their characteristic concerns, such as accounting for the origin of private property, and employs some of their terminology. Still, Westerman argues, while Grotius and Pufendorff wanted to justify morality, Hume wants only to explain it. Finally, John P. Wright invokes Butler’s account of habit to illuminate Hume’s notion of a calm passion. Butler argues that, as a habit develops, repetition weakens feelings while strengthening the tendency to act: distress will seldom shock someone habituated into generosity, who will reliably act to relieve that distress. Citing this psychological dynamic, Wright argues, helps to explain what a calm passion is, and how it can prevail over a violent passion.Two essays concern philosophy of mind and epistemology. P. B. Wood uses Thomas Kuhn’s concept of texts that are “exemplars” for working scientists to illuminate the “science of mind” as Hume and Reid practiced it. David Owen puts “inductive skepticism” into historical context, arguing that in that context, Hume appears as neither the victim nor the opponent of deductivism about rationality. Instead, Hume’s focus is Locke’s account of probable reasoning, according to which such reasoning involves a chain of associated ideas (not a formal structure of propositions). Hume’s argument is that our causal thinking proceeds differently than Locke requires, because in it we do not follow an unbroken series of associated perceptions, but rather leap over the gap between our impressions up to now and the general causal idea.The book’s centerpiece is a fragmentary Hume manuscript, discovered in 1993, about the problem of evil. The manuscript appears in both facsimile and transcription. In introducing the manuscript, M. A. Stewart argues plausibly that it is one of the “nobler parts” that Hume cut from the Treatise to avoid offending Bishop Butler.Four essays discuss philosophy of religion. Reflecting on miracles, Stewart traces a tradition of critically examining religious testimony back to the Port-Royal Logic and to Locke; moreover, Stewart emphasizes that Hume’s method in “Of Miracles” is similar to his method in debunking the Ossian poems. Michel Malherbe, taking as his point of departure those remarks by “Pamphilus” that preface the Dialogues, and reviewing in detail Shaftesbury’s pronouncements about the art of philosophical dialogue, discusses... (shrink)