The problem of free will as it is know in Western philosophical traditions is hardly known in China. Considering how central the problem is in the West, this is a remarkable fact. We try to explain this, and we offer insights into discussions within Chinese traditions that we think are related, not historically but regarding the issues discussed. Thus we introduce four central Chinese concepts, namely: (1) xīn 心 (heart, heart-mind), (2) xìng 性 (human nature, characteristic tendencies, inborn capacity), (3) (...) mìng 命 (lifespan, fate, command, allotment, endowment), and (4) zìrán 自然 (self-so, so of itself, nature, spontaneity), and we indicate how these concepts and their discussions can be related to discussions on free will. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is a criticism of reductionism ? both in its ?static? interpretation (usually referred to as the layer model or level?picture of science) and in its ?dynamic? interpretation (as a theory of the growth of scientific knowledge), with emphasis on the latter ? from the point of view of Popperian fallibilism and Feyerabendian pluralism, but without being committed to the idiosyncrasies of these standpoints. In both aspects of criticism, the rejection is based on the proposal of (...) a global alternative. Hummell and Opp's research programme for the reduction of sociology to psychology is used as a starting?point and taken as the primary object of criticism. Following the introductory Section I, Section II analyses the three crucial notions of Hummell and Opp's research programme ? their explications of the notions of ?sociology?, ?psychology? and the concept of reduction itself ? and criticizes the authors? deficient ?logic of reduction?. Although the ?local? shortcomings of our authors? ?logic of reduction? do not affect reductionism as such, i.e. logically sound versions of reductionism as devised by Kemeny, Nagel, Oppenheim, Putnam, Woodger et al., it is argued that the logical soundness of sophisticated reductionism cannot compensate for its additional epistemological and methodological deficiencies. Section III analyses the ?dynamic? interpretation of reductionism as a particular developmental pattern of scientific growth. It is argued that even reductionism at its best can produce only cumulative progress, thus ?a priori? excluding scientific revolutions which are inevitably counter?inductive as well as counter?reductive. Section IV discusses the philosophical background of modern reductionism, and examines the effects both of reductionism and of anti?reductionistic pluralism on the autonomy of scientific fields. It is argued that pluralistic anti?reductionism undermines spurious claims for autonomy much more effectively than reductionism. As a ?local? improvement of the reductionistic research programme, the replacement of the predominant one?way reductionism by a less restrictive many?way reductionism is proposed. It is argued that the appropriate treatment for an allegedly backward science (say sociology) is not its reduction to an allegedly more advanced science (say psychology) but its non?reductive replacement by new theories (of the same or of another field) that do not incorporate the older ones. As a ?global? alternative to the reduction of sociology to psychology, the frontier?crossing direct application of psychological theories to sociological phenomena is proposed. A plea is made for a pluralistic science without reduction, based on intra? and interscientific criticism as the proper method for the advancement of knowledge. (shrink)

Translations of Karl Jaspers' work into the English language have so far not been uniform in their choice of technical terminology. This scholarly renditionof Jaspers' ´Introduction´ to his seminal work "The Great Philosophers" stays to theoriginal German text as true possible by upholding its idiomatic cultural expressions, complex sentence structure, and nuanced particularities provided that clarity of communication can be maintained. The substantive contents and the significance of this text, whose principal topic is greatness, are outlined here. Communication with the (...) great philosophers can bring insight into their thought and can enable humans to transcend toward possible authentic Existenz. (shrink)

The literature on Kierkegaard is often content to paraphrase. By contrast, Michael Theunissen articulates one of Kierkegaard's central ideas, his theory of despair, in a detailed and comprehensible manner and confronts it with alternatives. Understanding what Kierkegaard wrote on despair is vital not only because it illuminates his thought as a whole, but because his account of despair in The Sickness unto Death is the cornerstone of existentialism. Theunissen's book, published in German in 1993, is widely regarded as the best (...) treatment of the subject in any language. Kierkegaard's Concept of Despair is also one of the few works on Kierkegaard that bridge the gap between the Continental and analytic traditions in philosophy. Theunissen argues that for Kierkegaard, the fundamental characteristic of despair is the desire of the self "not to be what it is." He sorts through the apparently chaotic text of The Sickness unto Death to explain what Kierkegaard meant by the "self," how and why individuals want to flee their selves, and how he believed they could reconnect with their selves. According to Theunissen, Kierkegaard thought that individuals in despair seek to deny their authentic selves to flee particular aspects of their character, their past, or the world, or in order to deny their "mission." In addition to articulating and evaluating Kierkegaard's concept of despair, Theunissen relates Kierkegaard's ideas to those of Heidegger, Sartre, and other twentieth-century philosophers. (shrink)

Due to the exponential growth of science and, recently, the explosive expansion of the extrascientific information of computerized 'Data' of all sorts, a New Cognitive Order of Society comes into existence. The invalidation of the 'Old Order' with its classical conditions for the production, processing, application and fairly equal social distribution of knowledge is a result of technological developments, especially of the rise of Information Technology. What may be called the Cognitive-Technological Complex is rapidly developing. This causes a fundamental change (...) of the situation of knowledge in the Information Society so-called. It confronts philosophy with the task, 'to climb up' the growing information mountains and to analyse its contents and structures, i.e., old and new sorts of knowledge in huge quantities and mixtures, with different rationality-structures, etc. This cannot be done without new theories of knowledge and rationality. What is practically needed, involves a new philosopher's comprehensive competence for handling the whole information stuff, ranging from classical theory-knowledge to modern data-knowledge. Technical competence for computers is not enough. Thus, information technology opens philosophy and philosophers an unexpected, perhaps undeserved chance to keep pace with the most progressive cognitive and technological developments. To take advantage of the new situation of knowledge and to explore the constitutive conditions of the New Cognitive Order is the first task of contemporary philosophy, in close cooperation with all cognitive sciences. (shrink)

In this essay I to do three things. First, I discuss a statement from the Tractatus which says that our free will consists in our ignorance of future actions: “The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie in the future. We could know them only if causality were an inner necessity like that of logical inference.” (5.1362) I think this statement might well be inspired by a claim Moore made in connection with free (...) will in his 1912 book Ethics: “We can hardly ever know for certain beforehand, which choice we actually shall make”. But I think Moore’s claim in favor of free will is not convincing. Second, I discuss a question raised in Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein asks what remains if we “subtract” the fact that my arm goes up from the fact that I raise my arm, and he adds in brackets: “Are the kinaesthetic sensations my willing?” (621) This added reflection is a reaction to ideas put forward by William James. Wittgenstein opposes these ideas. He argues that we should not think of the will as a cause at all, kinaesthetic or not, but rather as something embedded in, and constituted by, certain contexts of learning, expectation, practice, and lack of surprise. This is a strong claim. He also returns to the question about the predictability of the future: “When people talk about the possibility of foreknowledge of the future they always forget the fact of the prediction of one’s own voluntary movements” (629). The question is whether Wittgenstein has solved, or dissolved, the problem of free will. Some think that this is the case. I doubt it is. This is the third point I wish to discuss. (shrink)

Von den Sachen und vom Widerspruch. Der eigene Gegenstand der Geisteswissenschaften -- Steinzeit. Das Erwachen der Vernunft. Judaismus -- Ockhams Willkürgott in der Schleuse des Widerspruchsprinzips. Miniaturen -- Ockham in der Geschichte. Wissenschaftstheorie und Bewusstsein -- Mythos und Evidenz. Ockhams Rekalzitranz -- Kausalität und Affektbezug. Die Annäherung an Gott -- Die Subtilität in den Materien der Philosophie. Gott, wir und die Welt -- Die Brücke vom Diesseits zum Jenseits, oder, Der Abstand der Neuzeit zum Mittelalter -- Der Sinn bei Begriffen (...) und Schlüssen. Der Scharfsinnige und der mehr als Scharfsinnige -- Satz und Satzgefüge. Der Beweis ohne Gegenständlichkeit -- Am Torweg. Der nicht unabänderliche Wille Gottes. (shrink)

Das Verhältnis der Begriffe bei Ockham -- Suppositionslogische Identität und Kontingenz -- Zum Verhältnis der Satzformen -- Fides et scientia -- Aus dem innern Gottes -- Theologie und Logikbegriff -- Formbegriff und reale Wahrheit -- Glaube und Welt. Im Vorhof der Naturphilosophie -- Ontologie und Induktion -- Beweis, Satz, Akt -- Abstraktion und scholastischer Beweiszweck -- Verflechtung und Abgrenzung der Akte -- Naturgrund und Realerkenntnis -- Widerspruch und Accidens.

Als in der spätscholastischen Epoche der philosophische Ausdruck sich von der streng theologischen und religiösen Exegese entfernt und einer genuin humanen Selbstvertretung annähert, ist Ockham am ehesten und im Grunde allein erfolgreich in der Formulierung eines rationalen Formativs, worin der Mensch zur Gegenstellung gegen die göttliche Person, ihre Intellektion und Willenshaltung und die offenbarte Wahrheit gelangt. Er erweist sich als brillant und virtuos in der Handhabung von Induktion, persuasio und Reprobation, d.h. im Prinzip: der Widerlegung fremder Meinungen. Er ist weniger (...) erfolgreich bei der direkten Fixierung der Fehlgriffe anderer Scholastiker, wenn sie methodisch nicht ausgewiesenen Lösungen zuneigen, worin jede Problematik unterlaufen wird. Ockham hat da, ausser bei Duns Scotus, auch keine aristotelische Expertise mehr zur Verfügung. Das verweist darauf, dass neuzeitliche wissenschaftliche Antworten gefordert waren, die mit der scholastischen Einstellung nichts mehr gemein hatten. Das war in der mittelalterlichen Epoche aber nicht verhandelbar. Ebenso konnten Ockhams Abgrenzungsversuche nicht verstanden werden. Schon die Bestrebungen, Scholastiker umstandslos vor kirchliche Strafgerichte zu ziehen, offenbaren die Erschöpfung des Zeitalters"-- Back cover. (shrink)

A comparison of different societies shows that the cultural patterns of rationality differ considerably. Basic ideas within cultures are relevant to the significance of norms of rationality within a society. Decisive is the basic mode of orientation towards the empirical world. Two contradicting views on the status of rationality in primitive societies are contested. One view holds that – due to scarce technological means in the struggle for survival – early cultures are a kind of prototype of the rational homo (...) economicus. Levy-BruhlLevy-Bruhl, Lucien argued the exact opposite and described primitive thinking as having a pre-logical nature. In his view, they may be characterized as having an undifferentiated irrationality. Both claims are empirically untenable. Studies by MalinowskiMalinowski, Bronislaw and FirthFirth, Raymond have shown that even the simplest societies have many non-economic elements, such as, religious rituals, but also rational and practical technologies.In comparing primitive and advanced societies, it is argued that there is not a naturalistic increase of rationality, but that the status of rational action depends on ideas. One famous point of reference is Max WeberWeber, Max’s thesis of the Protestant ethic as an important source for the development of modern rational economies. For modern society, it was not only Protestantism, but also a “climate of opinion,” for which the emergence of philosophical rationalism and the ideas of natural law and natural order are characteristic examples. (shrink)

In the framework of his transcendental philosophy, Kant strictly separates morality from aesthetics. The pleasure in the good and the pleasure in the beautiful are two different kinds of pleasure (Arten des Wohlgefallens). As a consequence, a moral act as such cannot be beautiful. It is only in a second step that Kant indicates possible connections, in his comments on aesthetic ideas, symbolism, the sensus communis, and education in general. In Confucius on the other hand we do not find such (...) a radical separation between beauty and morality. Ritual is a source of both. Moral acts can be beautiful. One might wonder whether Confucius missed a point, or whether Kant overdid the separation. Or is it that their conceptions are so fundamentally different that they cannot easily be translated and identified across different philosophical traditions? (shrink)

This essay is about Wittgenstein, first about his views on ethics, second about his conception of language games. Third, it combines the two and shows how problems arise from this. Wittgenstein rejects theories of ethics and emphasises the variety of language games. Such language games are marked by what I call “inner relativity”. Wittgenstein himself was not a relativist, but it seems to me his views easily lead to what I call “outer relativism”. In matters of ethics this is particularly (...) problematic. (shrink)

In this essay I point out parallels between Kant’s theory of aesthetics and Wittgenstein’s discussion of rule following. Although Wittgenstein did not write an aesthetics and Kant did not discuss Wittgensteinian rule-following problems, and although both Kant and Wittgenstein begin at very different starting points and use different methods, they end up dealing with similar issues, namely issues about rules, particularity, exemplarity, objectivity, practice, and as-if statements.

In the preface to On Certainty Anscombe and von Wright say that in 1949 Malcolm suggested to Wittgenstein to think again about Moore’s “Defense of Common Sense” (1925) and “Proof of an External World” (1939). Malcolm himself had written on the issue in “Defending Common Sense” (1949). In the preface to the Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein quotes Nestroy saying that there is usually very little progress in philosophy. But I think some progress has been made from Moore and Malcolm to Wittgenstein (...) regarding skepticism. There is more awareness of practice and perspective and this opens the discussion in novel ways. But it also gives rise to new problems, in particular of morality and relativity. (shrink)

The question is whether the message of early Christianity was revolutionary and aimed at a revolutionary change in history? Had this change already begun in the life of primitive Christianity in a way that is exemplary to all later life based on the message?

Enth. u. a.: S. 57-68: Berliner "Exil" und Schweizer "Heimat": Johann Georg Zimmermanns Reflexionen über die Rolle des Schweizer Gelehrten / Simone Zurbuchen. - S. 137-150: Medizinische Aufklärung bei Johann Georg Zimmermann : zum Verhältnis von Macht und Wissen bei einem Arzt der Aufklärung / Martin Dinges.

Keinen Menschen der Antike kennen wir so gut wie Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 v.Chr.). Wir verdanken dies dem Umstand, dass ein großer Teil seiner Korrespondenz überliefert ist, im ganzen etwa 780 Briefe, davon gut die Hälfte an seinen Freund Titus Pomponius Atticus (110-32 v.Chr.) gerichtet. Die Atticus-Briefe sind insofern eine historische Quelle außerordentlichen Ranges, als Cicero sich in ihnen unbefangen und vorbehaltlos äußert. So folgen wir in zahlreichen Krisen seines Lebens zuweilen Tag für Tag den wechselnden Stimmungen, erleben den Kampf (...) um gesellschaftliche und politische Anerkennung, erkennen aber auch Ciceros heiße Vaterlandsliebe, erhalten Einblick in die privaten Verhältnisse, kurzum, alle Züge seines Wesens erscheinen in klarer Kontur wie in einem Spiegel. Die Atticus-Briefe vermitteln uns das Bild eines antiken Menschen, der zwar nicht der Weltgeschichte ihren Lauf gewiesen hat, der aber doch zu den bedeutendsten Persönlichkeiten einer Zeit gehörte, in der Weltgeschichte gemacht wurde, und der darüber zu berichten weiß. Darin liegt der nicht zu schätzende Wert der Sammlung. Mit Einführung, Erläuterungen, Registern und Zeittafel. (shrink)