I will begin by considering how the social world appears to the scientific observer and ask the question of whether the world of scientific research, with all its categories of meaning interpretation and with all its conceptual schemes of action, is identical with the world in which the observed actor acts. Anticipating the result, I may state immediately that with the shift from one level to the other, all the conceptual schemes and all the terms of interpretation must be modified.Proceeding (...) in this direction, I encounter several problems overlapping with the problem of rational action and the “rational act unit” in Professor ParsonsParsons, Talcott’ sense. First: The conceptual scheme of rational action presupposes a more or less definite knowledge of, or orientation within, the world in which this action is performed. In this sense the term, “rationality”, is not specific to the conceptual scheme of action; it embraces the conceptual scheme of the world in general and is only one element in it. Therefore, we also must examine the problem of orientation in this world. Second: We ought to keep in mind that all interpretation of the social world has to start from the actor’s subjective point of view. Therefore, we cannot accept the term, “unit act”, as such, without trying to reduce it to its subjective meaning. Here I have to discuss in general terms why I insist on the subjective point of view. This is more than the whim of a few social scientists; social science cannot be built up except by taking cognizance of the subjective meaning the actor connects with his acting. Finally, I have to discuss the fact that there are social sciences operating on high theoretical levels that, like economics, apparently prefer to deal with statistical curves and mathematical formulae rather than with actions of human beings in the social world, yet they use the term, “rational action”, as an indispensable element of their systems. I will have to show what modification this term undergoes in these types of social sciences..). (shrink)

A comparison of different societies shows that the cultural patterns of rationality differ considerably. Basic ideas within cultures are relevant to the significance of norms of rationality within a society. Decisive is the basic mode of orientation towards the empirical world. Two contradicting views on the status of rationality in primitive societies are contested. One view holds that – due to scarce technological means in the struggle for survival – early cultures are a kind of prototype of the rational homo (...) economicus. Levy-BruhlLevy-Bruhl, Lucien argued the exact opposite and described primitive thinking as having a pre-logical nature. In his view, they may be characterized as having an undifferentiated irrationality. Both claims are empirically untenable. Studies by MalinowskiMalinowski, Bronislaw and FirthFirth, Raymond have shown that even the simplest societies have many non-economic elements, such as, religious rituals, but also rational and practical technologies.In comparing primitive and advanced societies, it is argued that there is not a naturalistic increase of rationality, but that the status of rational action depends on ideas. One famous point of reference is Max WeberWeber, Max’s thesis of the Protestant ethic as an important source for the development of modern rational economies. For modern society, it was not only Protestantism, but also a “climate of opinion,” for which the emergence of philosophical rationalism and the ideas of natural law and natural order are characteristic examples. (shrink)

The paper approaches the problem of rationality on the basis of the theory of action elaborated in ParsonsParsons, Talcott’ The Structure of Social Action of 1937. The voluntaristic action frame of reference, as it was called, implies the opportunity of choice in the course of actions. Predictability of the consequences of a course of action, as a prerequisite of choice, requires rational empirical knowledge and logical consistency. Choices are also dependent on norms and values, as well as on affective meanings, (...) the balancing of which requires complex calculations of costs and advantages or utilities. Appreciation of rational knowledge implies – and depends upon – a commitment to norms of rationality. The limits of rationality are set by irrationality in the sense of deviance from normative standards, but also by non-rational and non-logical factors such as tradition, religion, or art. The work of ParetoPareto, Vilfredo is taken as an important reference point as it is acknowledged to be “the most ambitious attempt to achieve a generalized formulation of a total social system of rational action.”. (shrink)