Aus ganz unterschiedlichen Blickwinkeln, sei es aus musikhistorischer oder ethnomusikologischer Sicht, umkreisen zehn Beitrage das Thema aMusik - Zu Begriff und Konzepteno. Unter dieses Thema ein internationales Symposion in Berlin zu stellen, das zum Gedenken an Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht (1919-1999) veranstaltet wurde, erschien umso naheliegender, zumal Eggebrecht die Frage aWas ist Musik'o existenziell beruhrte, sie grundierte und sein Forscherleben als Musikwissenschaftler von den fruhen Veroffentlichungen nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg bis zu den letzten Arbeiten durchzog. Inhalt Bruno Nettl: Was ist (...) Musik? Ethnomusikologische Perspektive Sabine Ehrmann-Herfort: Die Kantate. Musik zwischen asthetischer Autonomie und Ideologie Christian Berger: aMusiko nach Kant Erich Reimer: aMusikanto und aMusiko. Zur Geschichte einer wechselvollen Beziehung Christian Kaden: Musik bei denen, die keine aMusiko haben Hans-Joachim Hinrichsen: Hugo Riemann und der Musikbegriff der Musikwissenschaft Klaus-Jurgen Sachs: Musik - erfahren und erortert durch Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929) Wolf Frobenius: Gestische Musik. Zur Fruhgeschichte des Begriffs Albrecht von Massow: Tonkorper - ein eigenstandiger Parameter der Wesensbestimmung und der Analyse von Musik Christian Thorau: Symphony in White - Musik als modus der Referenz. (shrink)

Défendre Auguste Comte contre ses détracteurs les plus célèbres à l’époque : tel est l’objectif que se fixe le jeune docteur Heinrich Waentig dans Auguste Comte und seine Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der Socialwissenschaft (Auguste Comte et son importance pour le développement de la science sociale). C’est particulièrement le cas dans le chapitre ici traduit. Waentig y répond à Wilhelm Dilthey, professeur de philosophie à Berlin et à Carl Menger, professeur d’économie à Vienne. Le premier a...

Die Verfahrenlehre als Wegweiser für die Wissenschaften und die Kultur, von W, Heinrich. -- Zur Logik der Unbestimmtheitsbeziehungen, von A., Meyer-Abich. -- Wandlungen des Kantbildes, von M. Wundt. -- Die romantische Soziallehre im Weltbild der Gegenwart, von J. Baxa. -- Organische Wirtschaftsgestaltung? Von W. A. Jöhr. -- über die Rechtsnatur des Völkerrechtes, von J. Lob. -- Der Leistungsgedanke in der Betriebswirtschaftslehre, von K. Oberparleiter. -- Das Problem der Ganzheit im Verfahren der Rechts-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, von R. Stanka. -- Motives of (...) economic planning, von T. Surányi-Unger. -- Die soziale Frage als Quelle der Wandlungen in der Wirtschaftstheorie in der Wirtschaftstheorie der Gegenwart, von F. A. Westphalen. -- Die geschichtliche Stellung des Kunstwerks, von G. Egger. -- Gemeinschaft und kultische Ordnung, von O. Höfler. -- Vom Ursprung der Sprache, von H. Machold. -- Die Bedeutung des ganzheitlichen Denkens für die Kunstgeschichte, von H. Riehl. -- Das Problem des Schönen. von W. Troll. -- Ganzheit und Gestalt in der Psychologie, von A. Wellek. -- Die Blüte als polare Ganzheit, von H. André. -- Ganzheitliches Denken in der Medizin, von O. Kaufmann. -- Die Bedeutung von Othmar Spann's "Kategorienlehr" für die Biologie und Medizin, von A. Müller. -- Ganzheitliches Denken und Wirken im Agrarwesen, von E. Rudroff. -- über Symmetrie und Schönheit, von K. L. und H. C. Wolf. (shrink)

Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt -- Christian Freyherrn von Wolf Erinnerung, wie er es künftig mit den Einwürfen halten will, die wider seine Schriften gemacht werden.

The Sophists owe their place in the history of philosophy to Plato – but also their bad reputation. He uses them to profile his image of the philosopher against them. For him, sophistry is the ultimate in distance from philosophy while at the same time being close to philosophy; it is as related to this »as the wolf is to the dog«. I first trace the negative exaggeration of sophistry and the sophists in Plato, which is reflected in the (...) ineradicable negative connotation of »sophist« and »sophistic«. The great intellectual-historical importance of the Sophists does not lie primarily in what they independently contributed to philosophy, but in the establishment of a conception of rhetoric as we encounter it in Isocrates, which became the most important educational institution in antiquity alongside and before philosophy. (shrink)

Over the last decade in Germany, a number of neuroscientists—and among them most prominently Wolf Singer—have claimed to be able to offer scientific evidence derived from neurophysiologic findings to conclusively negate the existence of human free will. In this paper, Singer’s position is examined according to its principal characteristics in order to answer the question whether it is a novel position as opposed to a position pertaining to one of the traditions of western philosophy and anthropology. Furthermore, we try (...) to judge whether the neurobiological findings Singer and others use to justify their position are apt to satisfy the criteria for the presence of scientific evidence, i.e., if they are good reasons to believe that human will is unfree. (shrink)

Over the last decade in Germany, a number of neuroscientists—and among them most prominently Wolf Singer—have claimed to be able to offer scientific evidence derived from neurophysiologic findings to conclusively negate the existence of human free will. In this paper, Singer’s position is examined according to its principal characteristics in order to answer the question whether it is a novel position as opposed to a position pertaining to one of the traditions of western philosophy and anthropology. Furthermore, we try (...) to judge whether the neurobiological findings Singer and others use to justify their position are apt to satisfy the criteria for the presence of scientific evidence, i.e., if they are good reasons to believe that human will is unfree. (shrink)

The topic of self-interest raises large and intractable philosophical questions–most obviously, the question “In what does self-interest consist?” The concept, as opposed to the content of self-interest, however, seems clear enough. Self-interest is interest in one's own good. To act self-interestedly is to act on the motive of advancing one's own good. Whether what one does actually is in one's self-interest depends on whether it actually does advance, or at least, minimize the decline of, one's own good. Though it may (...) be difficult to tell whether a person is motivated by self-interest in a particular instance, and difficult also to determine whether a given act or decision really is in one's self-interest, the meaning of the claims in question seems unproblematic. My main concern in this essay is to make a point about the content of self-interest. Specifically I shall put forward the view that meaningfulness, in a sense I shall elaborate, is an important element of a good life. It follows, then, that it is part of an enlightened self-interest that one wants to secure meaning in one's life, or, at any rate, to allow and promote meaningful activity within it. Accepting this substantial conception of self-interest, however, carries with it a curious consequence: the concept of self-interest which formerly seemed so clear begins to grow fuzzy. Fortunately, it comes to seem less important as well. In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit distinguishes three sorts of theories about self-interest–hedonistic theories, preference theories, and what he calls “objective-list theories." Hedonistic theories hold that one's good is a matter of the felt quality of one's experiences. (shrink)

This essay is primarily concerned with one type of moral luck – luck in how things turn out. Do acts that actually lead to harm deserve the same treatment as similar acts that, by chance, do not lead to harm? This paper argues that we must recognize the truth in two, opposing tendencies in such cases.

Philosophers frequently distinguish between causal responsibility and moral responsibility, but that distinction is either ambiguous or confused. We can distinguish between causal responsibility and a deeper kind of responsibility, that licenses reactive attitudes and judgments that a merely causal connection would not, and we can distinguish between holding people accountable for their moral qualities and holding people accountable for their nonmoral qualities. But, because we sometimes hold people deeply responsible for nonmoral qualities of behavior and character, these distinctions are not (...) the same. A number of recent accounts of responsibility identify deep responsibility with moral responsibility and in consequence miss some key features of the concept of which they are trying to give an account. A view that distinguishes two levels of responsibility, according to which the conditions of attributability are weaker than the conditions of accountability, might seem to account for a kind of non.. (shrink)

Previously issued as author's dissertation, 1999/2000, Universiteat Berlin.

February 21st will mark the two-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of the death of Spinoza, which occurred on February 21st, 1677. The visitor to the Hague may still see, in the Paviljoensgragt, the small two-storied house in the top rooms of which Spinoza spent the last six years of his short life. A tablet placed under the top windows commemorates the fact. It was in these rooms that Spinoza completed his Ethica, which may perhaps be regarded as the greatest masterpiece in the history (...) of Metaphysics. The house is in danger of being pulled down, and the Spinoza Society is endeavouring to secure it as a memorial to Spinoza, and a centre of philosophic studies. It is not so long since the house-breakers I had their way with the home of Erasmus in Rotterdam. It would be sad indeed if the abode of another of the greatest Humanists were to meet with a like fate. It is to be hoped that the revived I interest in Spinoza which we are witnessing now may take the I practical form of saving this precious relic, which may well serve to promote the peace and goodwill among men which Spinoza had so much at heart. (shrink)

Imagination has recently attracted considerable attention from epistemologists and is recognized as a source of belief and even knowledge. One remarkable feature of imagination is that it is often and typically agentive: agents decide to imagine. In cases in which imagination results in a belief, the agentiveness of imagination may be taken to give rise to indirect doxastic control and epistemic responsibility. This observation calls for a proper understanding of agentive imagination. In particular, it calls for the development of a (...) semantics of imagination ascriptions. In the present paper an earlier suggestion by Ilkka Niiniluoto for a logic of imagination is considered. This proposal does not capture the agentive nature of imagination, and an alternative semantics is suggested. The new semantics combines the modal logic of agency with the neighbourhood semantics from alethic modal logic. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the case of Tay, the Microsoft AI chatbot that was launched in March, 2016. After less than 24 hours, Microsoft shut down the experiment because the chatbot was generating tweets that were judged to be inappropriate since they included racist, sexist, and anti-Semitic language. We contend that the case of Tay illustrates a problem with the very nature of learning software that interacts directly with the public, and the developer's role and responsibility associated with it. (...) We make the case that when LS interacts directly with people or indirectly via social media, the developer has additional ethical responsibilities beyond those of standard software. There is an additional burden of care. (shrink)

Einleitung.--Die begriffliche Erkenntniss der Körperwelt.--Natur und Geist.--Natur und Geschichte.--Die historische Begriffsbildung.--Naturphilosophie und Geschichts-Philosophie.

This book is the culmination of Heinrich Meier's acclaimed analyses of the controversial thought of Carl Schmitt. Meier identifies the core of Schmitt's thought as political theology--that is, political theorizing that claims to have its ultimate ground in the revelation of a mysterious or supra-rational God. This radical, but half-hidden, theological foundation unifies the whole of Schmitt's often difficult and complex oeuvre, cutting through the intentional deceptions and unintentional obfuscations that have eluded previous commentators. Relating this religious dimension to (...) Schmitt's support for National Socialism and his continuing anti-Semitism, Meier compels the reader to come to terms with the irreconcilable differences between political theology and political philosophy. His book will give pause to those who have tended to gloss over the troubling aspects of some of Schmitt's ideas. With editions in German, French, Italian, and now English, Meier's two books on Schmitt have dramatically reoriented the international debate about Carl Schmitt and his significance for twentieth-century political thought. "Standing far above the rest . . . is Heinrich Meier's new study, Die Lehre Carl Schmitts , which covers all of Schmitt's writings. . . . Meier's work has forced everyone to take a second look at the assumptions underlying Schmitt's better-known writings and reconsider some that have been ignored."--Mark Lilla, reviewing the German edition in The New York Review of Books. (shrink)

Many contextualist accounts in epistemology appeal to ordinary language and everyday practice as grounds for positing a low-standards knowledge (knowledgeL) that contrasts with high-standards prevalent in epistemology (knowledgeH). We compare these arguments to arguments from the height of “ordinary language” philosophy in the mid 20th century and find that all such arguments face great difficulties. We find a powerful argument for the legitimacy and necessity of knowledgeL (but not of knowledgeH). These appeals to practice leave us with reasons to accept (...) knowledgeL in the face of radical doubts raised by skeptics. We conclude by arguing that by relegating knowledgeH to isolated contexts, the contextualist fails to deal with the skeptical challenge head-on. KnowledgeH and knowledgeL represent competing, incompatible intuitions about knowledge, and we must choose between them. A fallibilist conception of knowledge, formed with proper attention to radical doubts, can address the skeptical challenge without illicit appeal to everyday usage. (shrink)

Many philosophers have been persuaded that if we don’t create our own characters, we cannot be responsible for acts that flow from our characters; they also raise doubts about whether acts that do not flow from our characters can fairly be attributed to us. Both these concerns, however, reflect a simplistic and implausible conception of character and of its relation to our actions and our selves. I suggest a different relationship between character and responsibility: We can be responsible for acts (...) that are in character and also for acts that are out of character, but to be capable of being responsible at all is closely related to the capacity to have a character. I relate this capacity to the exercise of active intelligence—a capacity that is manifested in actions in or out of character, but not in the display of many psychological conditions or disorders. (shrink)

Arthur James Balfour was born at Whittinghame, East Lothian, on July 25, 1848. He was barely ten years old when his father died, and he succeeded to the estate. He entered Eton in 1862, and there met Lord Rosebery. In 1866 he went to Trinity College, Cambridge, where he studied philosophy under Henry Sidgwick. In 1869 he obtained a second-class in the Moral Sciences Tripos. In an autobiographical note, written long afterwards, Lord Balfour made the following reference to his mental (...) attitude as an undergraduate: “I went to Cambridge with a very small equipment of either philosophy or science, but a very keen desire to discover what I ought to think, and why . For the history of speculation I cared not a jot. Dead systems seemed to me of no more interest than abandoned fashions. My business was with the groundwork of living beliefs: in particular with the groundwork of that scientific knowledge whose recent developments had so profoundly moved the world.” Considering his attachment to the past in matters of Church and State, Lord Balfour's contempt for the history of philosophy seems to betray a curious limitation. Unfortunately for him, the history of philosophy was not an important feature in the Cambridge philosophical curriculum, and the defect avenged itself by marring his subsequent philosophy in various ways. No doubt Sidgwick did all he could to encourage and develop Balfour's critical powers. Cambridge philosophy, under the influence of Sidgwick, was critical rather than imaginative, just as Oxford philosophy, under the influence of Green, was imaginative rather than critical. (shrink)

A unique and interdisciplinary collection in which scholars from Philosophy join those from Film Studies, English, and Comparative Literature to explore the nature and limits of love through in-depth reflection on particular works of literature and film.