Bd. 1. 1791-1794.--Bd. 2. 1793-1795.--Bd. 3.--1794-1796.--Bd. 4. 1797-1798.--Bd. 5. 1798-1799.--Bd. 6. 1799-1800.--Bd. 7. 1800-1801.--Bd. 8. 1801-1806.--Bd. 9. 1806-1807.--Bd. 10. 1808-1812.

Epistemology, as generally understood by philosophers of science, is rather remote from the history of science and from historical concerns in general. Rheinberger shows that, from the late nineteenth through the late twentieth century, a parallel, alternative discourse sought to come to terms with the rather fundamental experience of the thoroughgoing scientific changes brought on by the revolution in physics. Philosophers of science and historians of science alike contributed their share to what this essay describes as an ongoing quest to (...) historicize epistemology. Historical epistemology, in this sense, is not so concerned with the knowing subject and its mental capacities. Rather, it envisages science as an ongoing cultural endeavor and tries to assess the conditions under which the sciences in all their diversity take shape and change over time. (shrink)

Taking a cue from Philo we may ask: If the adoption of the "seeing" approach from Greek philosophy was a misfortune for theology, does the repudiation or overcoming of that approach in a contemporary philosophy provide a conceptual means for theology to reform itself, to become more adequate to its task? Can it thus lead to a new alliance between theology and philosophy after, e.g., the medieval one with Aristotelianism has broken down? The question assumes that some use of philosophy, (...) i.e., of the elucidation of the nature of reality by secular thought, and of the nature of thinking about reality in secular thought, is desirable and even necessary for theology. This assumption must be granted, since theology, as the logos about things divine, is by definition the discursive, in some sense scientific, elucidation of the contents of faith and thus, for one thing, comes under the rules and norms of elucidation and discourse as such; and since the contents of faith comprise the dealings of God with the world and with man, the elucidation of the mundane and human side of this polarity must be informed by a knowledge of what world and man are, and philosophy is supposed to provide such knowledge. It would then follow that that philosophy is most adequate to theology which is most adequate to being, i.e., which is most nearly true—by the criteria of philosophy itself, i.e., by the criteria of secular reason. But since for a decision on this the theologians cannot wait for the consensus of philosophers, nor even necessarily trust its authority, they may be guided in their choice by the appeal of affinity, the lessons of past experience with philosophical liaisons, the present needs of their discipline, and by appraising which philosophy is most helpful to the discharge of theology's task, or least dangerous to its own trust, to its own genuineness, least seductive, least alienating—by any or all of these considerations, but as little as possible by fashion. On all these counts the theologian would do well to exercise a great deal of caution and mistrust. Especially in the face of tempting similarity: what theology needs in this relationship is the otherness of philosophy, not its similarity. On this I need not elaborate before a theological audience. However, the experiment of relationship itself is inescapable, and the one choice closed is abstention. Thus, the openness to contemporary thought shown by theology in the present experiment—as it was shown at all times—is to be welcomed. (shrink)

In this article, I put forward a basic philosophical claim: empirical scientific knowledge, that is, knowledge generated in experimental and observational practices, presupposes real causation. My discussion exploits two core notions from the philosophical analysis of scientific experimentation and observation: the aim of realizing object-apparatus correlations and the required control of the relevant interactions between environment and experimental or observational system. The conclusion is that, without the notion of real causation, acquiring epistemically sound empirical knowledge is impossible. Several empiricist objections (...) to this conclusion are discussed and refuted. As a consequence, empiricism faces an unsolvable dilemma: either it cannot account for empirical knowledge or it should accept the existence of unobservable but real causal interactions. (shrink)

Shared beliefs, collective Emotionscollective and joint intentions are widely recognized to be at the core of the social world. Beliefs, emotions and intentions, however, largely depend on Experience. It is hard to see how the former could be joint, shared, or collective, without any possibility of togetherness at the experiential level. Sharing experiences is thus a key for human sociality.

Rethinking politics in a new vocabulary, Hans Sluga challenges the firmly held assumption that there exists a single common good which politics is meant to realize. He argues that politics is not a natural but a historical phenomenon, and not a single thing but a multiplicity of political forms and values only loosely related. He contrasts two traditions in political philosophy: a 'normative theorizing' that extends from Plato to John Rawls and a newer 'diagnostic practice' that emerged with Marx (...) and Nietzsche and has found its three most prominent twentieth-century practitioners in Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, and Michel Foucault. He then examines the sources of diagnostic political thinking, analyzes its achievements, and offers a critical assessment of its limitations. His important book will be of interest to a wide range of upper-level students and scholars in political philosophy, political theory, and the history of ideas. (shrink)

Ce livre important reprend les concepts clés de l'éthique, de l'éducation, de la politique et de l'histoire. Il discute pied à pied les idéaux du progrès et les utopies et fait toute sa place aux limites de tolérance de la nature, à la souffrance, à la peur et à l'espérance responsable. L'accueil réservé à cette grande oeuvre - des philosophes aux décideurs politiques et des pédagogues aux scientifiques - témoigne de l'urgence d'une telle réflexion.

This chapter contains sections titled: Overcoming Cartesian Dualism with a New Interpretation of Action Creativity or Rationality as the Nexus in Social Theory? How Rational is Rational Choice? Creative Pragmatism and Economic Sociology How Do Values Emerge? The Contingency of Social Change.

In this accessible collection of short meditations on various topics, Blumenberg works as a detective of ideas scouring the periphery of intellectual and philosophical history for clues—metaphors, gestures, anecdotes—essential to grasping human finitude.

The earth is not just a piece of rock, water and soil; she is a living being. This fact is demonstrated by millennia of her life‘s history, growing in ages, having tempers, moods and seasons, and allowing all forms of life living on her and interacting with them and their interactions. Recent natural disasters and accidents, caused by humans in their drive to cultivate and to control, have again brought the powers of the earth and the land to our attention. (...) A new dimension in the visions and virtues of cultivation needs to extend on a global scale the Hippocratic ‗do no harm‘ virtue and principle from the singular doctor-patient interaction towards all forms of life, including the life of the earth.This paper interprets the Bioethical Imperative, developed by Fritz Jahr in 1927, into land ethics and earth ethics; it also discusses the concept of cultural geography of Ernst Kapp, 1845 in Germany, and the land ethics of Aldo Leopold, 1949 in the USA. Of particular new moral and cultural concern is the risk of radiation to the genetic heritage of all forms of life, to livable biotopes and interactive environments. The Bioethical Imperative includes Land Ethics and the Earth: ―Respect mother earth with all her forms of life, whether natural or man-made, basically as goals in themselves and treat them, if possible, as such.‖“The guiding rule for our actions may be the Bioethical Demand: Respect every living being on principle as an end in itself and treat it, if possible, as such!”- Fritz Jahr. (shrink)

Conversation about expected translation into Ukrainian of Gumbrecht's book Production of Presence. What Meaning Cannot Convey (Stanford UP: Stanford, 2004).

1947 legt Hans Blumenberg aus Bargteheide in Holstein an der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel seine unter schwierigsten persönlichen Umständen entstandene Dissertation 'Beiträge zum Problem der Ursprünglichkeit der mittelalterlich-scholastischen Ontologie" vor. Hinter diesem Titel verbirgt sich eine mit ständigem Bezug auf die Philosophie Heideggers und seine "Fundamentalontologie' geführte Auseinandersetzung mit dem Denken des christlichen Mittelalters, in dem die Frage nach dem Grund des Seins eine so krisenhafte wie produktive Zuspitzung erfahren hatte. Die Dissertation wird von den Gutachtern Ludwig Landgrebe und Rudolf (...) Schneider mit "ausgezeichnet" bewertet, aber sämtliche Bemühungen, zeitnah einen Verlag für die Arbeit zu finden, scheitern. Blumenbergs brillantes Erstlingswerk blieb mehr als 70 Jahre ungedruckt. Nun wird es erstmals publiziert in einer leserorientierten Edition, die unter anderem Übersetzungen der zahlreichen altsprachlichen Zitate wie auch ein "Verzeichnis der Referenzliteratur" bietet, das die Lücke des im Original fehlenden Literaturverzeichnisses schliesst und dieses darüber hinaus durch heute zugängliche Ausgaben ergänzt. In ihrem Nachwort beleuchten die Herausgeber den Entstehungskontext dieses Werks, das überraschende Perspektiven auf Blumenbergs Biographie und Denkentwicklung eröffnet. (shrink)

The act of `setting the law' enjoys a central position in Kelsen's theory of authority. His analysis of this act criticizes, amongst others, the assumption of natural-law doctrines that norms are objective when they duplicate a content given directly to cognition and independently of the act whereby the norm is enacted. Correctly, Kelsen attacks the concept of representation underlying this assumption as an example of metaphysical dualism and a copy theory of knowledge. Does, then, an alternative understanding of authority require (...) scrapping representation from a theory of positive law? Or does it require interpreting representation differently? Following the second path, this paper reconstructs the act of setting the law in terms of the critical concept of representation developed by Ernst Cassirer and suggests how, thus reconstructed, the structure of this act can account for the law's authority and its contingency. (shrink)

It has been argued by a number of philosophers that relativism of rationality and truth is inconsistent with the preconditions for radical interpretation of speech. For radical interpretation involves the imposition of certain universal standards of rationality and truth upon the material to be interpreted. Hence an anti-Relativist argument ensues. Against this, I argue that the principles of radical interpretation leave sufficient slack for relativism of a non-Trivial sort to creep in.

Die moderne Philosophie hat seit Descartes und Kant und vollends seit dem Ausgang des 19. Jahrhunderts ihre Grundlegung in der Subjekttheorie gesucht. Unter Verdrängung von Metaphysik und Ontologie hat bevorzugt die Anthropologie den Platz der "ersten Philosophie" eingenommen. Hans Heinz Holz möchte demgegenüber die Anthropologie in den Rahmen einer allgemeinen Ontologie und Naturphilosophie zurückführen. Er greift dabei Ansätze auf, die sich aus dem Werk Helmuth Plessners ergeben, und die er im Sinne einer Dialektik der Natur weiterentwickelt.

Hans Rochelt erlautert den -sprachperspektivischen Ansatz- im dialogischen Denken des osterreichischen Philosophen Ferdinand Ebner. Ausgehend von Worten aus dem Alten und dem Neuen Testament setzt er sich kritisch mit Erscheinungen in Philosophie, Theologie, Psychologie, Naturwissenschaften und Sozialwissenschaften auseinander, zu denen das Denken Ebners in aufschlussreichem Zusammenhang oder im Kontrast steht. Die Grenzen wissenschaftlicher Verfahrensweisen und insgesamt einer sakularisierten Lebensform gegenuber dem real in der Sprache sich vollziehenden Verhaltnis zwischen Ich und Du werden exemplarisch sichtbar gemacht. Fur eine -Unterscheidung der (...) Geister- in zunehmend perspektivloser Zeit eroffnet die Schrift glaubwurdige Perspektiven.". (shrink)