Analyses, in the simplest form assertions that aim to capture an intimate link between two concepts, are viewed since Russell's theory of definite descriptions as analyzing descriptions. Analysis therefore has to obey the laws governing definitions including some form of a Substitutivity Principle (SP). Once (SP) is accepted the road to the paradox of analysis is open. Popular reactions to the paradox involve the fundamental assumption (SV) that sentences differing only in containing an analysandum resp. an analysans express the same (...) proposition, because analysandum and analysans are the same entity. Following suggestions of Gupta and Belnap it is argued that (SV) should be rejected. (shrink)

Analyses, in the simplest form assertions that aim to capture an intimate link between two concepts, are viewed since Russell's theory of definite descriptions as analyzing descriptions. Analysis therefore has to obey the laws governing definitions including some form of a Substitutivity Principle (SP). Once (SP) is accepted the road to the paradox of analysis is open. Popular reactions to the paradox involve the fundamental assumption (SV) that sentences differing only in containing an analysandum resp. an analysans express the same (...) proposition, because analysandum and analysans are the same entity. Following suggestions of Gupta and Belnap it is argued that (SV) should be rejected. (shrink)

This original and enticing book provides a fresh, unifying perspective on many old and new logico-philosophical conundrums. Its basic thesis is that many concepts central in ordinary and philosophical discourse are inherently circular and thus cannot be fully understood as long as one remains within the confines of a standard theory of definitions. As an alternative, the authors develop a revision theory of definitions, which allows definitions to be circular without this giving rise to contradiction (but, at worst, to “vacuous” (...) uses of definienda). The theory is applied with varying levels of detail to a circular analysis of concepts as diverse as truth, predication, necessity, physical object, etc. The focus is on truth, and hope is expressed that a deeper understanding of the Liar and related paradoxes has been provided: “We have tried to show that once the circularity of truth is recognized, a great deal of its behavior begins to make sense. In particular, from this viewpoint, the existence of the paradoxes seems as natural as the existence of the eclipses” (p. 142). We think that this hope is fully justified, although some problems remain that future research in this field should take into account. (shrink)

Current debates in social ontology are dominated by approaches that view institutions either as rules or as equilibria of strategic games. We argue that these two approaches can be unified within an encompassing theory based on the notion of correlated equilibrium. We show that in a correlated equilibrium each player follows a regulative rule of the form ‘if X then do Y’. We then criticize Searle's claim that constitutive rules of the form ‘X counts as Y in C’ are fundamental (...) building blocks for institutions, showing that such rules can be derived from regulative rules by introducing new institutional terms. Institutional terms are introduced for economy of thought, but are not necessary for the creation of social reality. (shrink)

Arthur C. Danto è stato uno dei più rilevanti pensatori del Novecento. La sua multiforme vicenda intellettuale si è tenuta, al fondo, sempre organica all’orizzonte della filosofia di matrice analitica. Da questa prospettiva metodologica, Danto ha elaborato tesi sulla storicità dell’arte e sull’ontologia dell’opera che sollecitano a vario titolo il dibattito europeo da almeno vent’anni. Riprendere il filo di alcune sue ricerche è ancora oggi un atto importante per ripensare lo statuto dell’art...

Achille Varzi è uno dei maggiori metafisici viventi. Nel corso degli anni ha scritto testi fondamentali di logica, metafisica, mereologia, filosofia del linguaggio. Ha sconfinato nella topologia, nella geografia, nella matematica, ha ragionato di mostri e confini, percezione e buchi, viaggi nel tempo, nicchie, eventi e ciambelle; e non ha disdegnato di dialogare con gli abitanti di Flatlandia, con Neo e con Terminator. Tra le sue opere principali: Holes and Other Superficialities e Parts and Places. The Structures of Spatial Representation, (...) entrambi scritti insieme a R. Casati per MIT Press; Il mondo messo a fuoco, Laterza; e il suo libro più recente: Le tribolazioni del filosofare, con C. Calosi, per Laterza. -/- Da una giornata all’Università di Urbino nasce questa conversazione a molte voci sulla e con la filosofia di Achille C. Varzi. In un dialogo critico al quale l’Autore si presta con generosità e onestà intellettuale, Andrea Borghini, Francesco Calemi, Claudio Calosi, Elena Casetta, Valeria Giardino, Pierluigi Graziani, Patrizia Pedrini, Daniele Santoro e Giuliano Torrengo lo interrogano e mettono alla prova sui temi affrontati, nel corso degli anni, in campi diversi. Il risultato è un percorso che si snoda attraverso molti mondi, dalla logica alla metafisica, dalla filosofia del linguaggio alla filosofia della matematica, dalla mereologia alla filosofia del tempo, spingendosi in qualche caso oltre i confini del saggio filosofico. (shrink)

The immediate purpose of this paper is to expound C. S. Peirce's conception of reasoning as he refined it in his mature reflection on the normative sciences and their hierarchical relations (the dependence of logic on ethics and, in turn, that of ethics on esthetics). In order to clarify adequately Peirce's position, however, it is helpful to consider his rejection of Christoph Sigwart's attempt to ground logical soundness in subjective feeling. What is at stake in this debate is nothing less (...) than Peirce's endeavor to articulate a thoroughly pragmatic understanding of truth, not simply his commitment to argue against subjective approaches to logical questions. Accordingly, the ultimate purpose of this paper is to shed light on the problem of objectivity. From a pragmatist perspective, there is an essential relation between an affectively involved agent and a deliberately conducted, successful inquiry. This alone secures the possibility of objectivity in the only form in which finite, fallible agents can hope to attain or, at least, approximate this ideal. (shrink)

Découvert et transcrit par Francesco Saverio Nisio qui en a complété les références bibliographiques, ce texte, proposé en 1880 par le jeune Lucien Lévy à la Revue des études juives qui venait de se créer, et resté inédit depuis, met l’accent sur « l’exactitude et la profondeur des observations » psychologiques de Spinoza, « grand métaphysicien », c’est-à-dire « grand artiste », dans l’ Éthique.

In a famous and controversial paper, B. H. Slater has argued against the possibility of paraconsistent logics. Our reply is centred on the distinction between two aspects of the meaning of a logical constant *c* in a given logic: its operational meaning, given by the operational rules for *c* in a cut-free sequent calculus for the logic at issue, and its global meaning, specified by the sequents containing *c* which can be proved in the same calculus. Subsequently, we use the (...) same strategy to counter Quine's meaning variance argument against deviant logics. In a nutshell, we claim that genuine rivalry between (similar) logics *L* and *L'* is possible whenever each constant in *L* has the same operational meaning as its counterpart in *L'* although differences in global meaning arise in at least one case. (shrink)

I discuss a textual problem at Cratylus 393bc and, after establishing the correct text, argue that the MSS readings point to the existence of a textual variant in the margin of an ancestor of the common source of our MSS, presumably an ancient edition of the dialogue. Then I make the further hypothesis that both readings originated as alternative attempts to interpret Plato's ambiguous orthography.

Francesco Pesce | : Le présent article étudie l’enseignement des évêques italiens sur la famille et quelques questions éthiques, sur une période de dix ans. Pour les catholiques italiens et les Italiens en général, il n’est pas facile de faire la distinction entre le Vatican et la Conférence épiscopale italienne et, par conséquent, on donne de l’importance aux discours d’un évêque en fonction de son rapport à la position « officielle » du pape. Dans ce contexte, on examinera les (...) discours de quatre évêques qui ont une résonance publique, c’est-à-dire des interventions dans lesquelles ces évêques sont conscients de s’adresser non seulement aux catholiques mais aux Italiens. Il en résultera un panorama diversifié, qui montre différentes approches des problèmes de l’homme d’aujourd’hui. | : The article considers the specific Italian situation : Italian Catholics and Italians in general have difficulty distinguishing between the Vatican and the Italian Episcopal Conference. Thus, the voice of a single bishop is evaluated in connection to the “official” position of the Pope. In this context, the speeches taken into consideration have the following features : 1) have wide appeal according to public opinion, 2) are about family and ethical questions, and 3) want to give a contribution to the public discussion on the topics of above. Finally, after a comparison between the various positions and effectiveness and eloquence, a different approach to the problems of contemporary men and women will appear. (shrink)

Francesco Fronterotta | : La psychologie platonicienne de la République semble être affectée par une contradiction en relation avec la thèse de la tripartition de l’âme. Celle-ci est esquissée dans le livre IV et est toujours présente dans les livres VIII et IX ; Socrate semble pourtant l’abandonner lorsque, dans le livre X, il introduit la thèse selon laquelle l’âme est une réalité double, et peu après parvient, dans la suite du livre X, à démontrer son immortalité, en la (...) décrivant comme une réalité simple, unique et unitaire. J’essaierai de montrer que ces changements de perspective dépendent du point de vue assumé par Platon dans son traitement de la nature et de la fonction de l’âme, dans les contextes que j’appellerai « génétiques », c’est-à-dire là où l’analyse touche à la question du statut ontologique de l’âme, et dans les contextes que j’appellerai « opérationnels », c’est-à-dire lorsque ce sont les fonctions, les compétences et les motivations de l’âme dans sa direction du corps qui font l’objet de l’analyse. | : There is a seeming contradiction in the Republic in Plato’s psychology of the tripartite soul, which is dealt with in Book IV and which recurs in Books VIII and IX. Socrates seems to retract this view when in Book X he introduces the theory that the soul is actually dual, and then later in the same Book demonstrates its immortality, presenting it in this case as something simple, single and unitary. I shall try to show how this see-sawing depends on the different point of view that Plato takes when he deals with the nature and the function of the soul, respectively in the “genetic” contexts, where his examination touches directly on the question of the soul’s ontological status, and the “operative” contexts, when what is being analysed are the functions, scope and motivations of the soul that intervene in its action of controlling the body. (shrink)

Francesco Valerio Tommasi - Rhetoric & Dialectic in the Time of Galileo - Journal of the History of Philosophy 43:3 Journal of the History of Philosophy 43.3 358-359 Jean Dietz Moss and William A. Wallace. Rhetoric & Dialectic in the Time of Galileo. Washington, D.C.:The Catholic University of America Press, 2003. Pp. ix + 438. Cloth, $69.95. "The setting for this book is Northern Italy in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a time when arguments were more than (...) entertaining verbal duels, where they might mean death or imprisonment for the orator or the author" . It defines the background in which the case of Galileo takes place, while delving into the scientific constitution of rhetoric and dialectic, the disciplines that.. (shrink)

C’è prima la persona o prima la società? Per non cadere in una risposta dualistica, bisogna risalire alle radici antropologiche della vita sociale, che stanno alla base delle diverse forme che essa storicamente può assumere. Questo saggio esamina il rapporto tra le tendenze socializzanti innate e le virtù relazionali, alla luce di un’antropologia integrale, nella quale la persona umana è considerata nella sua globalità somatico-psichico-spirituale. Vengono qui esaminati il tessuto di legami in cui è inserita la nostra esistenza e la (...) responsabilità che compete a ognuno nei confronti del cosiddetto capitale sociale. (shrink)

Le contrôle de constitutionnalité, dont la magistrature parlementaire de l’Ancien Régime revendiquait le plein droit, n’était pas fondé uniquement sur les lois fondamentales du royaume, mais sur l’ensemble des principes (« les maximes ») tirés de la « Tradition ». Cette dernière était composée en premier lieu par le droit divin et le droit naturel, c’est-à-dire par des systèmes juridiques qui nécessitaient, tous les deux, une interprétation juridictionnelle ‘sapientiale’. Cette activité interprétative était ‘révélatrice’ d’un corpus de valeurs métaphysiques à laquelle (...) seule la Scientia Juris des magistrats pouvait puiser. Mais dans la sphère de la Tradition juridique rentraient aussi le « dépôt légal », c’est-à-dire l’ensemble de toutes les lois, même des lois ainsi dites « ordinaires », c’est-à-dire celles qui avaient été produites par la simple manifestation de volonté souveraine d’un roi prédécesseur « car tel avait été son plaisir » (moderne formulation du brocarde de droit romain : « quidquid principi placuit legis habet vigorem »). Ainsi la juridiction parlementaire donnait lieu à un jugement de constitutionnalité qui était normalement exercé de manière très flexible par le corps de la magistrature, dépendant des circonstances et des intérêts politiques momentanés des situations juridiques qu’elle voulait protéger. La hiérarchie des normes était ainsi un formidable instrument de protection de cet ordre juridique dont les legum doctores se sentaient les tuteurs. Elle était, donc, directement liée au gouvernement politique des juges. (shrink)

This contribution provides a new collection of the textual extant remains (reliquiae) of the Peripatetic philosopher Cratippus of Pergamon (I c. bc), and a full and detailed overview of the biographical and doctrinal features of this thinker.

This paper investigates two related aspects of Aristotle’s conception of primary substances in the Categories. In Section 1 I distinguish different interpretations of the relation between a primary substance and its accidental attributes: one (A) according to which a primary substance encompasses all of its attributes, including the accidental ones; another (B) according to which a primary substance encompasses only its essential attributes, whereas the accidental attributes are extrinsic to the substance, though related to it; and a third, intermediate one (...) (C) according to which a primary substance encompasses neither all of its attributes nor only the essential ones, but all the necessary ones. I trace the history of all three interpretations and argue in favour of (B). In Section 2 I defend the view that a particular human being, their soul, and their body all count as primary substances, and that the relation between these three substances is that soul and body are parts of the substance. I show that this hypothesis harmonizes both with some views advanced in the Categories and with some passages from other Aristotelian works. I conclude by drawing a comparison between this view and Aristotle’s mature hylomorphic doctrine. (shrink)

The interpretation of Eth. Nic. C 1, and particularly of the notion of ``voluntariness'' and ``involuntariness'' is often distorted by the inappropriate overlap of questions deriving from modern moral philosophy. Firstly, this paper presents the scholarly debate on the topics frequently connected with the Aristotelian concepts of ἑκούσιον/ἀκούσιον (determinism/indeterminism, mixed acts and dirty hands theory, mixed acts vs. instrumental acts, role of circumstances, etc.). The next step is the analysis of the relevant passages of Eth. Nic. through a close examination (...) of the relationship between the notions of ``choice'' and ``voluntariness'': what is crucial for the voluntariness of an action is the individuation of the efficient cause. On this basis it is possible to clarify the role and the significance of mixed acts and of other kinds of actions described by Aristotle. Finally, the topics previously displayed are re-examined in order to shed some light on the distortions arising from the adoption of inadequate lens in interpreting ancient texts. (shrink)

v. 1. A-B -- v. 2. C -- v. 3. D-F --- v. 4. G-L -- v. 5. M-Q -- v. 6. R-Z.

Vol I. A -- Vol II. B -- Vol. III. C -- Vol. IV. D -- Vol. V. E-F -- Vol VI. G -- Vol VII. H-L -- Vol. VIII. M -- Vol. IX. N-Q -- Vol X. R-S -- Vol XI. T-V -- Vol XII. X-Z.

Dans cet article je propose un examen de la lecture traditionnelle du fr. B3 de Parménide (τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι), qui suppose une « identité » forte entre penser et être, pour lui préférer l’hypothèse d’une « correspondance » de ce qui est pensable et de ce qui est. Ces considérations me conduisent a défendre une traduction du fr. B3, qui me paraît la moins anachronique: « c’est en effet une seule et même chose que l’on (...) pense et qui est ». Je m’interroge ensuite sur le sens du verbe νοεῖν et des termes apparentés dans le Poème de Parménide (particulièrement dans le fr. B4). Je présente trois options d’interprétation du νοεῖν : 1. comme connaissance purement intellectuelle de l’être vrai (c’est à dire de l’intelligible) ; 2. comme connaissance discursive ou « véritative » qui concerne donc la vérité ou la fausseté d’une proposition ; 3. comme capacité de « réaliser une situation », de « reconnaître » quelque chose ou quelqu’un, en supposant un sens d’« être » qui vise la simple constatation de l’être des choses et du monde sensible. (shrink)

In 1898 C. S. Peirce declares that the medieval doctrine of consequences had been the starting point of his logical investigations in the 1860s. This paper shows that Peirce studied the scholastic theory of consequentiae as early as 1866–67, that he adopted the scholastics’ terminology, and that that theory constituted a source of logical doctrine that sustained Peirce for a lifetime of creative and original work.

The logic DAI of demodalised analytic implication has been introduced by J.M. Dunn as a variation on a time-honoured logical system by C.I. Lewis’ student W.T. Parry. The main tenet underlying this logic is that no implication can be valid unless its consequent is “analytically contained” in its antecedent. DAI has been investigated both proof-theoretically and model-theoretically, but no study so far has focussed on DAI from the viewpoint of abstract algebraic logic. We provide several different algebraic semantics for DAI, (...) showing their equivalence with the known semantics by Dunn and Epstein. We also show that DAI is algebraisable and we identify its equivalent quasivariety semantics. This class turns out to be a linguistic and axiomatic expansion of involutive bisemilattices, a subquasivariety of which forms the algebraic counterpart of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. This fact sheds further light on the relationship between containment logics and logics of nonsense. (shrink)

Trois dossiers distincts, mais complémentaires, et rattachés à la ville d’Éphèse sont convoqués pour éclairer des cas concrets de transmission de pratiques, de savoirs ou de vocabulaire rituels. Tout d’abord, les associations dionysiaques d’Éphèse permettent d’aborder la question des référents à partir desquels se constitue un rituel, vu que chaque association est un cas unique, au profil cultuel particulier. Ensuite, l’examen de la Lettre aux Éphésiens d’Ignace d’Antioche souligne l’utilisation par un des premiers auteurs chrétiens d’un vocabulaire associatif et mystérique (...) pour véhiculer son message chrétien. Cela suppose une large diffusion et une connaissance partagée de pratiques rituelles. Enfin, une inscription d’Éphèse met en lumière le rôle du hiérophante public comme indispensable « passeur de tradition » dans l’exécution des rites publics par les magistrats et insiste sur la séparation des tâches et des savoirs en matière rituelle. La mise en parallèle de ces trois cas permet de remettre en question la distinction entre un savoir proprement cultuel et des connaissances fondées plus largement sur des références culturelles : dans un savoir religieux en action, c’est le rite effectif qui devient lui-même référence culturelle. (shrink)

In 'Fiction and Fictionalism', Mark Sainsbury has recently dubbed “Selection Problem” a serious trouble for Meinongian object theories. Typically, Meinongianism has been phrased as a kind of realism on nonexistent objects : these are mind-independent things, not mental simulacra, having the properties they have independently from the activity of any cognitive agent. But how can one single out an object we have no causal acquaintance with, and which is devoid of spatiotemporal location, picking it out from a pre-determined, mind-independent set (...) ? In this paper, I set out a line of response by distinguishing different ways in which a thing may not exist. I show that the selection problem (a) does not arise for past, currently nonexistent objects ; (b) may not arise also for future existents (provided one massages naïve intuitions a bit) ; and (c) even for mere possibilia ; but (d) is a real snag for purely fictional objects, such as Holmes or Gandalf. As for (d), I propose a solution that forces Meinongianism to introduce a kind of ontological dependence of purely fictional nonexistents upon existents. The strategy complicates the intuitively simple, naïve Meinongian framework a bit, but looks quite promising. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to emphasize a number of important points that will provide a better understanding of the history of philosophical thought concerning scientific knowledge. The main points made are: (a) that the principal way of viewing abstraction which has dominated the history of thought and epistemology up to the present is influenced by the original Aristotelian position; (b) that with the birth of modern science a new way of conceiving abstraction came into being which is better (...) characterized by the term idealization, the name that was later, in fact, to be used by scientists to describe their scientific activity; (c) that, however, on account of the influence of empirical and inductive philosophy, scientists have often not had sufficient methodological awareness of this new way of viewing abstraction; (d) that this new concept of abstraction has frequently been expressed in the framework of philosophies that lie outside the mainstream of contemporary epistemology or even exhibit marked anti-scientific tendencies; (e) that the theme of idealization has been taken up again in the last few decades and a great contribution in this direction has been made by the so-called Pozna school of methodology. (shrink)

This article reconstructs the complex diplomatic negotiations that led to the peculiar organization of molecular biology at the European level, by focusing in particular on the establishment of the European Molecular Biology Conference (EMBC), the intergovernmental structure founded in 1969–70 to support the scientific program of the European Molecular Biology Organization (EMBO). By combining the analysis of the informal decision-making kept in the Nobel Prize laureate John C. Kendrew’s personal papers (Oxford) with the in-depth exploration of the institutional documentation available (...) in the EMBO and CERN archives (Heidelberg and Geneva) and the Swiss Federal Archives (Bern), the article sheds light on the importance of the EMBC not only for the construction of molecular biology as a scientific, social, and political field in the European context, but also for the broader process of definition of the European research policy. Far from being just a mere replica of CERN, the EMBO/EMBC inaugurated in fact an alternative and flexible ‘bottom-up’ model of science policy in the European context, based on competition, networking, and scientific excellence, which paved the way to the establishment of the European Research Council (ERC) in the early 2000s. (shrink)

Cet article s’intéresse au Contrat social de Rousseau afin d’examiner si cet ouvrage permet de penser une révolte populaire contre l’État et, si oui, à quelles conditions. Dans cette perspective, nous nous concentrons principalement sur quelques détails apparemment marginaux : l’oscillation, par exemple, entre une conception de la « crise » comme occasion de régénération ou de renaissance de l’État ; l’hésitation entre une conception des mœurs et des coutumes comme formant le cœur de la législation et qui garantit la (...) survivance du corps en deçà de la condition de mort apparente engendrée par les conflits, et une conception dans laquelle ces mœurs et ces coutumes s’avèrent constituer le résultat du conflit lui-même ; l’indécision entre une définition de la légitimité politique comme entièrement réabsorbée par la simple légalité et une autre où cette légitimité déborde toutes les formes et les limitations légales. De cette façon, l’article met en évidence la présence, dans le Contrat lui-même, de deux logiques opposées. D’une part, une logique d’après laquelle toute séparation entre le peuple et l’État disparaît. Dans cette perspective, tout contraste entre les deux pôles est inconcevable, et ce qui à première vue semble être une révolte du peuple contre l’État doit être lu comme une intervention du souverain visant à rétablir l’ordre légitime violé. D’autre part, une logique qui admet au contraire une relative autonomie du peuple par rapport aux institutions établies, et qui par là même permet de penser un conflit entre les deux pôles. (shrink)

1. Un petit ouvrage qui donne à penser Dans cette contribution, je me propose essentiellement d’envisager d’une façon critique un petit ouvrage de Rosenzweig. L’ouvrage en question a été rédigé en 1917, donc, pendant la phase conclusive de la Première Guerre mondiale, lorsque son auteur faisait son service militaire sur le front des Balkans. Il s’intitule « Globus. Studien zur weltgeschichtlichen Raumlehre », c’est-à-dire « Le globe. Études sur la doctrine historico-universelle de l’espace »....

La contribution s’articule en trois sections. Dans la première on esquisse une reconstruction panoramique du profil global de la « pensée nouvelle » rosenzweigienne. Cette dernière s’avère être marquée par l’intrigue indénouable de deux éléments constitutifs, c’est‑à-dire, l’élément spéculatif et l’élément événementiel. Dans la deuxième section on montre comme Rosenzweig pense cette intrigue selon le chiffre emblématique de la compréhension biblique du miracle, qui articule ce dernier dans les deux moments synergiques de la prophétie et de l’ accomplissement. La « (...) pensée nouvelle » se déploie en effet en une sorte de prophétie purement spéculative, qui trouve toutefois son accomplissement dans l’ événement d’une révélation, qui tranche décidément sur la spéculation, tout en y trouvant son incontournable ancrage rationnel. Dans la troisième section on montre que cet événement de révélation connaît sa figure primordiale, selon le penseur, dans la langue parlée quotidiennement par les hommes, comprise comme le cadeau matinal que le Créateur fait à ses créatures. (shrink)

This paper clarifies why and how Wittgenstein’s animating idea of social practices should be considered as expressing a fundamental pragmatist commitment.To this end, I do not take the retrospective perspective, which traces “pragmatism” back to the criteria of use fixed by the inventor of the word, C. S. Peirce, but rather replace Wittgenstein in the context of contemporary debates. I focus in particular on R. Brandom’s attempt to understand Wittgenstein’s second philosophy as belonging to an intellectual tradition from which his (...) own rationalist pragmatism derives. A confrontation follows between Brandom and Wittgenstein, whose aim is to highlight the specific tactics of Wittgenstein’s pragmatism as a refusal of Brandom’s idealist rationalism. First, I present and defend R. Brandom’s reading of Wittgenstein’s argument on rule-following as a decisive clarification of the general idea of social practices. Second, I criticize Brandom’s narrow Kantian framework, explaining why it prevents us from understanding Wittgenstein’s conception of rules and concepts, and, therefore, of the very normativity of concepts. In light of the distinction between two kinds of conceptual norms, empirical and grammatical, I finally show, through a reading of On certainty, that the function assigned by Wittgenstein to social practices is to account for the conditions of possibility of conceptual contentfullness as expressed in rational activity. (shrink)

La science politique moderne n'est pas la science politique des modernes. La science politique moderne l'a recouverte et enfouie. La science politique des modernes ressurgit cependant là où l'on ne l'attend pas : dans la pratique des sciences sociales, pour autant qu'une vision du social s'y trouve engagée que la sociologie explicite dans sa signification et sa portée politiques. Telle est la thèse qu'avance ce livre, en revenant aux fondations que Durkheim a su donner à cette science, pour en préciser (...) le sens et en montrer la pertinence toujours actuelle. Ce que vise en propre la sociologie et qu'elle cherche à instaurer par son discours, c'est un certain rapport à l'action. Car le social qu'elle s'attache à objectiver est lui-même de cette nature : non pas un ordre réalisé, mais un processus toujours en cours dans lequel on agit, sur un plan inséparablement scientifique et politique. De quelle action s'agit-il alors? De celle conduite à l'intérieur de la division du travail, animée par un idéal d'autonomie de la personne qui demande à être sans cesse clarifié. La science politique des modernes rejoint ici sa nécessité. Elle nous aide à mesurer la distance qui sépare encore nos sociétés de leur plus profonde aspiration : devenir des sociétés démocratiques, capables de se gouverner elles-mêmes dans et par l'institution libre et juste du social. C'est à cette reformulation du projet d'autonomie qu'aboutit la sociologie, lorsqu'elle reste fidèle à la vocation critique que lui assigne son inscription dans la modernité. (shrink)

This article explores Pan-Asianism; that is, the loose set of convictions which predicate, firstly, that Asia—beyond its complex and changing geographical, cultural, and religious characteristics—c...

"Orpheos Bakkikos: La cruz desaparecida". La pequeña piedra de Orpheos Bakkikos grabada con la representación de una crucifixión, se ha perdido desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial. A principios del siglo pasado, la piedra se consideraba original, pero en la década de 1920 surgieron dudas sobre su de 1920 surgieron dudas sobre su autenticidad debido a su clasificación como paleocristiana. la actualidad. Los argumentos a favor y en contra de la se examinan los argumentos a favor y en contra de la (...) autenticidad del artefacto. que la aporía puede resolverse no considerando la piedra unilateralmente como órfica o cristiana, sino situándola en su contexto histórico original. contexto histórico original. La argumentación de apoyo va desde el culto imperial romano a través de los Iobakchoi atenienses del siglo II d.C., así como de los siglo II d.C., así como a los poetas romanos y a los Cultores Liberi de la época de Augusto, hasta los funerales de Julio César, donde una efigie de cera del asesinado, que se parece mucho a la "figura crucificada" del grabado de Orpheos Bakkikos en un tropaeum cruciforme y se mostraba a la gente. Sobre estas bases se establecen hipótesis que explican tanto la aplicación de la piedra Orpheos Bakkikos como crucifixum signum en el ápice del flamen Divi Iulii, que se ha conservado en los tocados del Papa y los Patriarcas, así como el origen de los crucifijos articulados, que se han transmitido desde la Antigüedad y que se utilizan hasta hoy durante la Semana Santa. (shrink)