A multitude of scholars have recently argued that inherently ambivalent reactions ought to be accepted, and our drive toward overcoming them resisted, in order to preserve a reflectively accurate account of oneself. By contrast, I argue that a genuine commitment to overcome ambivalence aims less at avoiding than acknowledging and understanding, as well as possibly resolving, whatever conflicts led us to become ambivalent in the first place. On the other hand, certain forms of ‘reflective ambivalence’ are especially vulnerable to the (...) very kind of self‐deception they aim to prevent. (shrink)

I explore the connection between pragmatism and common sense by reflecting upon two seemingly contrasting Peircean remarks about the pragmatic method: (a) its “basis on the doctrine of common sense” and (b) the recommendation that a proposition p be explicated in light of critical, deliberate, or “self-controlled” conduct ensuing from a belief that p. I show that Peirce’s focus on phenomena of self-control is situated within his broader interest in the nature of reasoning. The “secret of rational consciousness,” according to (...) Peirce, does not consist in the reflective or self-conscious nature of our most deliberate forms of conduct, per se, “as in the review of the process of self-control in its entirety.” The rationality of an inference consists in its capacity to restore the stability our “acritical” beliefs enjoyed before being unsettled by doubts. On this view, Peirce’s pragmatic theory of rational inquiry as aiming at the fixation of belief depends on a conception of belief as constituted by a tendency toward stability. In the rest of the paper, I argue that this conception avoids the shortcoming of purely “motivational” accounts of belief without denying this status of belief to our acritical intellectual dispositions – a denial which is often implied by standard “truth-directed” accounts. (shrink)

Entrando direttamente nel cuore del realismo di Peirce, il presente articolo vuole rispondere alla domanda: come si può affermare l’essenziale conoscibilità dell’essere senza minarne l’irriducibile alterità? La risposta a questa domanda esigerà un radicale ripensamento del concetto stesso di realtà. L’ipotesi di Peirce è che l’indipendenza del reale, invece che determinarne la costitutiva inaccessibilità, è al contrario condizione per l’emergenza, lo sviluppo e il compimento finale della ricerca.Pointing directly to the core of Peirce's Realism, the present article asks the question: (...) how can we affirm the essential intelligibility of being without undermining its irreducible alterity? To answer this question requires a radical re-conception of the notion of reality. Peirce's hypothesis is that the independence of reality, far from determining its constitutive inaccessibility, represents the very condition for the emergence, development and final settlement of inquiry. (shrink)

The immediate purpose of this paper is to expound C. S. Peirce's conception of reasoning as he refined it in his mature reflection on the normative sciences and their hierarchical relations (the dependence of logic on ethics and, in turn, that of ethics on esthetics). In order to clarify adequately Peirce's position, however, it is helpful to consider his rejection of Christoph Sigwart's attempt to ground logical soundness in subjective feeling. What is at stake in this debate is nothing less (...) than Peirce's endeavor to articulate a thoroughly pragmatic understanding of truth, not simply his commitment to argue against subjective approaches to logical questions. Accordingly, the ultimate purpose of this paper is to shed light on the problem of objectivity. From a pragmatist perspective, there is an essential relation between an affectively involved agent and a deliberately conducted, successful inquiry. This alone secures the possibility of objectivity in the only form in which finite, fallible agents can hope to attain or, at least, approximate this ideal. (shrink)