Quine and Slater on paraconsistency and deviance

Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (5):531-548 (2003)
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Abstract

In a famous and controversial paper, B. H. Slater has argued against the possibility of paraconsistent logics. Our reply is centred on the distinction between two aspects of the meaning of a logical constant *c* in a given logic: its operational meaning, given by the operational rules for *c* in a cut-free sequent calculus for the logic at issue, and its global meaning, specified by the sequents containing *c* which can be proved in the same calculus. Subsequently, we use the same strategy to counter Quine's meaning variance argument against deviant logics. In a nutshell, we claim that genuine rivalry between (similar) logics *L* and *L'* is possible whenever each constant in *L* has the same operational meaning as its counterpart in *L'* although differences in global meaning arise in at least one case

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Francesco Paoli
Universita di Cagliari

Citations of this work

The Logics of Strict-Tolerant Logic.Eduardo Barrio, Lucas Rosenblatt & Diego Tajer - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (5):551-571.
Logical Pluralism, Meaning-Variance, and Verbal Disputes.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):355-373.
Disagreement about logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (6):660-682.

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Philosophy of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1970 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Edited by Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons.
Truth and other enigmas.Michael Dummett - 1978 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
In contradiction: a study of the transconsistent.Graham Priest - 1987 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.

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