Folk medicine, also known as traditional medicine, is an ancient cultural practice used to contain and manage illnesses and diseases. It is not wrong to say that western/modern medicine developed from folk medicine because medicine was practiced with herbs, divination, and superstition. Some people continue to rely on spiritual powers, divination, and herds in treating ill health. Folk medicine continues to be an integral part of healthcare among many ethnic groups despite (...) the advent of western/modern medicine. Its preference and resilience are based on tradition, choice, inexpensiveness, and easy access. Omenala-tradition is the foundation of folk, and its operating principle is Ọfọ and Ogu. This work looks at the main ethical underpinnings of Igbo folk medicine of South-Eastern Nigeria in the context of Omenala. It concludes that the ethical principle of Ọfọ and Ogu make treatment efficacious, promote patient-healer relationships, and guides healers and patients. (shrink)

Folk medicine, also known as traditional medicine, is an ancient cultural practice used to contain and manage illnesses and diseases. It is not wrong to say that western/modern medicine developed from folk medicine because medicine was practiced with herbs, divination, and superstition. Some people continue to rely on spiritual powers, divination, and herds in treating ill health. Folk medicine continues to be an integral part of healthcare among many ethnic groups despite (...) the advent of western/modern medicine. Its preference and resilience are based on tradition, choice, inexpensiveness, and easy access. Omenala-tradition is the foundation of folk, and its operating principle is Ọfọ and Ogu. This work looks at the main ethical underpinnings of Igbo folk medicine of South-Eastern Nigeria in the context of Omenala. It concludes that the ethical principle of Ọfọ and Ogu make treatment efficacious, promote patient-healer relationships, and guides healers and patients. (shrink)

Folk medicine, also known as traditional medicine, is an ancient cultural practice used to contain and manage illnesses and diseases. It is not wrong to say that western/modern medicine developed from folk medicine because medicine was practiced with herbs, divination, and superstition. Some people continue to rely on spiritual powers, divination, and herds in treating ill health. Folk medicine continues to be an integral part of healthcare among many ethnic groups despite (...) the advent of western/modern medicine. Its preference and resilience are based on tradition, choice, inexpensiveness, and easy access. Omenala-tradition is the foundation of folk, and its operating principle is Ọfọ and Ogu. This work looks at the main ethical underpinnings of Igbo folk medicine of South-Eastern Nigeria in the context of Omenala. It concludes that the ethical principle of Ọfọ and Ogu make treatment efficacious, promote patient-healer relationships, and guides healers and patients. (shrink)

Folk medicine, also known as traditional medicine, is an ancient cultural practice used to contain and manage illnesses and diseases. It is not wrong to say that western/modern medicine developed from folk medicine because medicine was practiced with herbs, divination, and superstition. Some people continue to rely on spiritual powers, divination, and herds in treating ill health. Folk medicine continues to be an integral part of healthcare among many ethnic groups despite (...) the advent of western/modern medicine. Its preference and resilience are based on tradition, choice, inexpensiveness, and easy access. Omenala-tradition is the foundation of folk, and its operating principle is Ọfọ and Ogu. This work looks at the main ethical underpinnings of Igbo folk medicine of South-Eastern Nigeria in the context of Omenala. It concludes that the ethical principle of Ọfọ and Ogu make treatment efficacious, promote patient-healer relationships, and guides healers and patients. (shrink)

With the increased acceptance of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) within society, new research reflects deeper folk health histories beyond formal medical spaces. The contested relationships between formal and informal medicine have deep provenance and as scientific medicine began to professionalise in the 19th century, lay health knowledges were simultaneously absorbed and disempowered (Porter 1997). In particular, the ‘medical gaze’ and the responses of informal medicine to this gaze were framed around themes of power, regulation, (...) authenticity and narrative reputation. These responses were emplaced and mobile; enacted within multiple settings by multiple agents and structures over time. The work is drawn from secondary material from Ireland, which identify more indigenous narratives of health and act as potential sources for medical humanities. While assumptions have been made as to the place of folk-medicine being essentially rural, evidence will be presented which shows a more complex network of health beliefs and practices. The narratives of informal practice and folk-medicine drawn from evidence from Ireland point to more fluid and hybrid relations with formal medicine and suggest that the complementary nature of the two models reflected wider cultural debates and models of belief (Del Casino Jnr., Health & Place 10:59-73, 2004). (shrink)

This paper explores some of the important parallels between recent reforms to legal rules for the admissibility of scientific and expert evidence, exemplified by the US Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. in 1993, and similar calls for reforms to medical practice, that emerged around the same time as part of the Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM) movement. Similarities between the “movements” can be observed in that both emerged from a historical context where the quality of (...) class='Hi'>medicine and legal approaches to science were being subjected to growing criticism, and in the ways that proponents of both movements have used appeals to “folk epistemologies” of science to help legitimate their reform aspirations. The term folk epistemology is used to describe the weaving together of formal and informal images of scientific method with normative and pragmatic concerns such as eradicating “junk science”, and promoting medical best practice. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the unfocused breadth of these aspirations the implications of these “reforms” for medical and legal practice have not been straightforward, although they do represent an important new set of rhetorical resources to critique and or legitimate expertise in medical and legal domains. Discussion closes, by noting the growth of calls for these movements to reciprocate in areas where law and medicine intersect, such as medical negligence litigation. (shrink)

Medicine and morality in rural Haiti are shaped both by different local religious traditions and by biomedical and folk medicine practices. People who become ill may seek treatment from Western doctors, but also from herbalists and religious leaders. This study examines the decisions guiding such choices, and considers moral issues arising in a society where suffering is associated with guilt but where different, sometimes conflicting, ethical systems coexist. It also reveals how in the crisis of illness people (...) rework religious identities and are forced to address fundamental social and political problems. (shrink)

Pain is not a primitive sensory event but rather a complexperception and a process by which a person interacts with theinternal and external environments, constructs meaning, andengages in action. Because folk beliefs are central to meaning,folk concepts of pain play multiple causal roles in a painpatient's interaction with health care providers and others.In every case, the notion of pain is linked to a goal-directedbehavior that is useful to the person. The wide variation inconcepts of pain across individuals suffering (...) with painunderscores the richness and complexity of the pain experience.In some cases involving chronic pain, the patient may form amaladaptive cluster of behaviors around the concept of pain.Patient beliefs and expectations are an important part of manychronic pain syndromes, and patients can benefit fromintervention directed at revising the individual's folk model of pain. Memetics offers a framework for identifying the memesthat patients hold and determining whether patient memes fitor clash with provider memes. (shrink)

Consent governs innumerable everyday social interactions, including sex, medical exams, the use of property, and economic transactions. Yet little is known about how ordinary people reason about the validity of consent. Across the domains of sex, medicine, and police entry, Study 1 showed that when agents lack autonomous decision-making capacities, participants are less likely to view their consent as valid; however, failing to exercise this capacity and deciding in a nonautonomous way did not reduce consent judgments. Study 2 found (...) that specific and concrete incapacities reduced judgments of valid consent, but failing to exercise these specific capacities did not, even when the consenter makes an irrational and inauthentic decision. Finally, Study 3 showed that the effect of autonomy on judgments of valid consent carries important downstream consequences for moral reasoning about the rights and obligations of third parties, even when the consented-to action is morally wrong. Overall, these findings suggest that laypeople embrace a normative, domain-general concept of valid consent that depends consistently on the possession of autonomous capacities, but not on the exercise of these capacities. Autonomous decisions and autonomous capacities thus play divergent roles in moral reasoning about consent interactions: while the former appears relevant for assessing the wrongfulness of consented-to acts, the latter plays a role in whether consent is regarded as authoritative and therefore as transforming moral rights. (shrink)

In the Caribbean as in many other areas costly biomedical resources and personnel are limited, and more and more people are turning to alternative medicine and folk practitioners for health care. To meet the goal of providing health care for all, research on nonbiomedical therapies is needed, along with legal recognition of folk practitioners to establish standards of practice.

As practiced, medicine bumps along with the rest of us, doing its level best to cope with the contingencies of this often heartbreaking world. Yet it's a commonplace that much of medicine's self‐image, and a good deal of its cultural heft, come from its connection with the natural sciences and, what's more, from a picture of science that has a touch of the transcendental, highlighting the unmatched rigor of its procedures, its exacting rationality, and the reliability of its (...) results.In contrast, the very idea of “queer” carries with it a little taste of the uncanny. What we're inclined to label queer resists understanding, not so much because it's too complicated, but because it tends to be too slippery to capture neatly in our conceptual nets—that queer ache in your side, for instance, or your partner's queer notion of doing laundry. The outmoded use of “queer,” as a way to refer disparagingly to gay people, carried similar uncanny connotations: the unnatural, the perverse.One might think, then, that the reclamation of “queer” as an umbrella term referring to the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender spectrum has a pleasing depth to its irony—not only does it wrench the customary direction of evaluation conveyed by the word from condemnation to celebration, but it also hints that what you find comprehensible depends a good deal on who you are and where you're standing. What from the perspective of many heterosexual and cisgendered people may seem opaque, exotic, threatening—erotic love directed toward someone with the same kind of body you have, lives lived in ways that challenge the immutability of birth‐assigned gender—are to LGBT folk not uncanny at all, but as familiar as breathing.I like this conceit, but alas, it is too simple. It slights the variety of difficulties associated with making sense of queerness that can vex deeply thoughtful people of undoubted good will—as I found out some years ago when I first talked about my efforts to understand my own transgender identity with a ferociously intelligent, highly sophisticated friend. (shrink)

In public health research, tracking folk racial categories (in disease risk, etc.) is a double-edged tool. On the one hand, tracking folk racial categories is dangerous because it reinforces a problematic but fairly common belief in biological race essentialism. On the other hand, ignoring racial categories also runs the risk of ignoring very real biological phenomena in which marginalized communities, likely in virtue of their marginalization, are sicker and in need of improved resources. Much of the conversation among (...) epidemiologists and philosophers of medicine concerning the issue of tracking folk racial categories in public health research springs forth from largely black/white binarized health inequities. While health inequities between black and white Americans are certainly a very important topic, I am interested in investigating the complications to this conversation about the potential harms of tracking folk racial categories in public health research generated by the consideration of Indigenous identities in the US—groups whose health inequities are typically tracked based on the folk racial category of “Native American” or “American Indian,” but whose unique identity categories and community membership problematize the current spectrum of approaches to tracking folk racial categories in epidemiologic research. This paper will draw on scholarship by and about Indigenous people in the US context to address an undertheorized facet of the conversations concerning the potential harms of tracking folk racial categories in public health research, including the potential undermining of American Indian sovereignty and Indigenous epistemologies. I will end on some methodological considerations inspired by the inclusion of Indigenous identities in the US in the conversation about tracking folk racial categories in epidemiologic research. (shrink)

"Through a close reading of rarely studied materials, the author examines the contested position of the body in Renaissance philosophy, showing how abstract metaphysical ideas evolved in tandem with the creation of new metaphors that shaped the understanding of early modern political, cultural, and scientific practices. The result is a new approach to the issues that describes the function of new technologies (such as optics and distillation) and their interaction with popular creeds (such as witchcraft and folk medicine), (...) as well as their relationship to the newly discovered ancient Greek and Roman texts that captured the attention of Renaissance intellectuals. The text also investigates, for the first time, how some philosophers forged their original syntheses from newly available and traditional materials. In so doing, these philosophers contributed in unexpected ways to the formation of new cultural practices--practices that entailed largely unexplored conceptualisations of physical bodies but also linked inextricably to the formation of new and striking metaphors for the physical world."--Publisher. (shrink)

This paper develops an instrumentalistic argumentagainst an eliminativist approach to using the folkconcept of pain in clinical medicine and draws someimplications for biomedical theories of pain. Thepaper argues that the folk concept of pain plays afundamental role in several aspects of clinicalmedicine, including the diagnosis and treatment ofdiseases and symptoms, relieving human suffering, andthe doctor-patient relationship. Since clinicians mustbe able to apply biomedical theories of pain inmedical practice, these theories should not stray toofar from pain's clinical realities. Biomedicaltheories (...) of pain should at least incorporate an analogof the folk concept of pain, even if this concept isrevised in light of scientific advances. (shrink)

In this chapter we consider the tension between how pain researchers today typically define pains and the dominant, ordinary conception of pain. While both philosophers and pain scientists define pains as experiences, taking this to correspond with the ordinary understanding, recent empirical evidence indicates that laypeople tend to think of pains as qualities of bodily states. How did this divide come about? To answer, we sketch the historical origins of the concept of pain in Western medicine, providing evidence that (...) during large swaths of this history, medical experts characterized pains as laypeople tend to today—that is, as qualities of bodily states. The conception of pains as experiences that we find in contemporary definitions seems to be a relatively recent development corresponding with changes in the diagnostic tools available to doctors. We argue that this history is important and suggests that the most prominent current scientific definition of pain (IASP) is partly stipulative and fails to match how laypeople most often think of pain. We suggest that either we should acknowledge this stipulative character, or else should amend the IASP definition in a pluralistic fashion that notes both bodily and experiential conceptions of pain. (shrink)

Folke Tersman explores what we can learn about the nature of moral thinking by examining moral disagreement. He explains how diversity of opinion on moral issues undermines the idea that moral convictions can be objectively valued. Arguments on moral thinking are often criticized for not being able to explain why there is a contrast between ethics and other areas in which there is disagreement, but where one does not give up the idea of an objective truth, as in the natural (...) sciences. Tersman shows that the contrast has to do with facts about when, and on what basis, moral convictions can be correctly attributed to an agent or speaker. (shrink)

The idea of reflective equilibrium remains the most popular approach to questions about method in ethics, despite the masses of criticism it has been faced with over the years. Is this due to the availability of compelling responses to the criticisms or rather to factors that are independent of its reasonableness? The aim of this paper is to provide support for the first answer. I particularly focus on the recent discussion. Some recent objections are related to general arguments against the (...) possibility of moral knowledge, such as so-called “evolutionary debunking arguments.” I argue that nothing that has come to light in that debate, or in the recent discussion about IRE more generally, decisively strengthens the case against it. If anything, the recent developments show that IRE deserves its present status. (shrink)

A recent study of moral intuitions, performed by Joshua Greene and a group of researchers at Princeton University, has recently received a lot of attention. Greene and his collaborators designed a set of experiments in which subjects were undergoing brain scanning as they were asked to respond to various practical dilemmas. They found that contemplation of some of these cases (cases where the subjects had to imagine that they must use some direct form of violence) elicited greater activity in certain (...) areas of the brain associated with emotions compared with the other cases. It has been argued (e.g., by Peter Singer) that these results undermine the reliability of our moral intuitions, and therefore provide an objection to methods of moral reasoning that presuppose that they carry an evidential weight (such as the idea of reflective equilibrium). I distinguish between two ways in which Greene's findings lend support for a sceptical attitude towards intuitions. I argue that, given the first version of the challenge, the method of reflective equilibrium can easily accommodate the findings. As for the second version of the challenge, I argue that it does not so much pose a threat specifically to the method of reflective equilibrium but to the idea that moral claims can be justified through rational argumentation in general. (shrink)

The fact that debunkers can turn to the argument from disagreement for help is ofcourse not a surprise. After all, both types of challenge basically pursue the same,skeptical conclusion. What I have tried to show, however, is that they are related in amore intimate way.

Dovring explores some of the limits of science, the scientific method, and our approaches to conceptualizing problems.

A common anti-realist strategy is to argue that moral realism (or at least the non-naturalist form of it) should be abandoned because it cannot adequately make room for moral knowledge and justified moral belief, for example in view of an evolutionary account of the origins of moral beliefs or of the existence of radical moral disagreement. Why is that (alleged) fact supposed to undermine realism? I examine and discuss three possible answers to this question. According to the answer that I (...) think holds most promise, it undermines realism because it renders realism “epistemically incoherent” (in a sense explicated in the paper), and a central aim of the paper is to elaborate and defend that suggestion against certain objections. I end by briefly commenting on the more general significance of the discussion, by considering some other areas (epistemology and vagueness) where similar questions might be raised. (shrink)

It is usually the case that scientists examine either ecological systems or social systems, yet the need for an interdisciplinary approach to the problems of environmental management and sustainable development is becoming increasingly obvious. Developed under the auspices of the Beijer Institute in Stockholm, this new book analyses social and ecological linkages in selected ecosystems using an international and interdisciplinary case study approach. The chapters provide detailed information on a variety of management practices for dealing with environmental change. Taken as (...) a whole, the book will contribute to the greater understanding of essential social responses to changes in ecosystems, including the generation, accumulation and transmission of ecological knowledge, structure and dynamics of institutions, and the cultural values underlying these responses. A set of new (or rediscovered) principles for sustainable ecosystem management is also presented. Linking Social and Ecological Systems will be of value to natural and social scientists interested in sustainability. (shrink)

Crispin Wright holds that moral realism is implausible since it is not a priori that every moral disagreement involves cognitive shortcomings. I develop two responses to this argument. First, a realist may argue that it holds for at least one of the parties to any disagreement that he holds false background beliefs (moral or otherwise) or that his verdict to the disputed judgment fails to cohere with his system. Second, he may argue that if none of the verdicts involves shortcomings, (...) the appropriate conclusion is that the disagreement is not genuine, since we must otherwise attribute an inexplicable error. (shrink)

At the beginning of the series, a dozen young women are introduced as potential mates for the eligible young bachelor. The audience accompanies the couples on their limo-escorted dates, meets the bachelor's family and friends, listens to their evaluation of the bride, and watches expectantly as the smiling Prince Charming singles out a few finalists for his attention. As the weeks pass by, one by one, tearful young women are dismissed from the show as the presentation of the final rose (...) that signifies singular devotion draws near. In the end, only two young women remain, and only one can receive…. (shrink)

These essays, first presented at a conference, “Coping with Sickness,” held in Italy in 1997, address ethical and regulatory medical issues within a historical context. Many of the essays, while addressing interesting topics, combine policy analysis and critical cultural theory. Critical cultural theory can be intellectually engaging at times but is generally irrelevant to public officials concerned with specific policy issues.Coping with Sickness is the third and final volume derived from a series of conferences cosponsored by the European Science Foundation (...) and the Euroconferences Activity of the European Union. The eight essays are organized chronologically and cover a range of disparate topics: medical practitioners and the Spanish Inquisition , the history of autopsy legislation in German since 1800 , the history of “sadism” as a medical term in the nineteenth century , folk medicine in Holland in the late nineteenth century , abortion in Weimar Germany , drug testing in Africa in the early twentieth century , comparative policies toward STDs , and the debate over brain death in Germany . As might be expected in an anthology of this sort, the quality varies considerably. Nonetheless, the subjects addressed in this volume are engaging—much to the credit of the editors.Two pieces in particular represent the range of these collected essays. In “Vacher the Ripper and the Construction of the Nineteenth‐Century Sadist,” Angus McLaren, one of the best historians writing on the history of sexuality today, explores the “discovery” of sadism in the late nineteenth century by focusing on the dramatic trial of Joseph Vacher, who was charged in 1895 for the brutal sexual murder of a woman in Champuis. He later confessed to the murder and the sexual violation of another seven females and four males. Vacher had a long history of mental illness; indeed, he had been institutionalized in July 1893 following a failed attempt at suicide that left a bullet lodged in his head. At the trial the criminologist Alexandre Lacassagne was brought in as an expert witness to testify that Vacher was not insane but an antisocial sadist, as revealed by his dabbling in anarchism, vagabondism, and homosexuality. As a consequence, Vacher was found guilty and given a death sentence.McLaren finds in this trial an example of the social construction of a new medical concept, “sadism.” The emergence of the concept of sadism, he argues, reflected a “gendered notion” of defining appropriate male and female behavior; physicians at the turn of the century believed that “civilized men were most threatened, not by excess passion, but by the enervation spawned by urban life” . The concept of sadism was also employed by doctors to enhance their own authority and to alert the public to the dangers of a male manifesting “feminine traits” and to “beat back” homosexuality.There is much interesting conjecture to McLaren's study, but what policy lessons should be drawn from this remains unclear. If every concept is actually a social construction, reflecting the social anxieties of the age, then is the fashionable concept of social construction itself socially constructed to enhance the authority of the medical historian?More interesting methodologically is Claudia Wiesemann's absorbing essay on the historical debate in Germany over “brain death.” Relying on Ulrich Beck's social theory of simple and reflexive modernization, she shows that, when confronted with complex scientific questions, the public has to decide between competing plausible scientific claims; as a result, political groups make use of scientific expertise and counterexpertise to push their favorite practical and legal solutions. (shrink)