Este texto explora a relação entre imagens em movimento e suas formas de representação. Partindo do diálogo entre os campos da antropologia e da sociologia, contribuímos para a discussão acerca da conexão entre imagens, suas formas de representar e educação, através de um exercício de desconstrução crítica de imaginários coloniais. Propomos em seguida uma reflexão localizada em Heidegger, no modo como este observa o trabalho de Kant na Crítica da Razão Pura, particularmente no que ao representar da imagem diz respeito.

Wagner lamenta a seu mestre, no início do Fausto de Goethe: “Meu Deus! É longa a arte. E é tão breve nossa vida!”. Decerto a frase não poderia ser aplicada a Ernst Bloch, que nasceu em Ludwigshafen em 1885 e faleceu em Tübingen em 1977, aos 92 anos de idade, deixando uma obra de dimensões monumentais.

Os juros fazem parte da vida de todos - aparecem tanto nas discussões sobre o crescimento econômico da nação como em aspectos miúdos do dia-a-dia. O Princípio econômico é simples: o devedor antecipa um benefício para desfrute imediato e se compromete a pagar por isso mais tarde, e quem empresta cede algo de que dispõe agora e espera receber um montante superior no final da transação. EM O valor do amanhã, Eduardo Giannetti defende que este aspecto dos juros é (...) apenas parte de um fenômeno natural maior, tão comum quanto a força da gravidade e a fotossíntese. A questão dos juros "não se restringe ao mundo das finanças, [mas atinge] as mais diversas e surpreendentes esferas da vida prática, social e espiritual, a começar pelo processo de envelhecimento a que nossos corpos estão inescapavelmente sujeitos", diz Giannetti. DEsde o momento em que aprendeu a planejar sua vida, o homem antecipa e projeta seus desígnios usando esta prática. MEsmo antes disso, a noção de juros já "está inscrita no metabolismo dos seres vivos e permeia boa parte do seu repertório comportamental". A Prática de dieta, a dedicação aos estudos e os exercícios físicos para melhorar a saúde são situações da vida prática nas quais se manifesta a realidade dos juros. É desta maneira original que Giannetti analisa o tema. AO extrapolar os limites financeiros do fenômeno, o autor mostra que questões concretas - como a alta taxa de juros no Brasil - têm raízes comportamentais e institucionais ligadas à formação de nossa sociedade. O Autor ainda discute os problemas éticos da prática de juros extremamente elevados. APesar de não se propor a "oferecer receitas ou saídas", o trabalho de Giannetti "reflete as experiências, preocupações e esperanças de um cidadão brasileiro enfronhado nas realidades e aspirações do seu país". (shrink)

Nota do tradutor: O escopo da psicologia é o primeiro capítulo do tratado The principles of psychology (Os princípios de psicologia) de William James (1842-1910), publicado originalmente em 1890. Nesse capítulo inaugural, James enfrenta uma questão central e perene na psicologia: a necessidade (e dificuldade) da demarcação do campo psicológico. Como representante de uma tradição que ainda falava da psicologia no singular, James vê na multiplicidade de assuntos, métodos e problemas da psicologia um desafio para uma disciplina que se pretendia (...) científica. De um lado, era necessário assumir o caráter plural dos assuntos que merecem ser agrupados pela palavra psicologia, negando um reducionismo grosseiro, que, em favor de uma integração teórica, alijasse a “vida mental” de sua riqueza imanente. De outro lado, havia ainda a esperança de uma sistematização que pudesse evitar a completa fragmentação do campo psicológico. A história parece ter mostrado que a preocupação de James era, de fato, legítima, pois o que se viu a partir do século XX foi o fracasso de diferentes sistemas de psicologia, levando a um círculo vicioso no qual a dificuldade de demarcação do campo psicológico fragmenta cada vez mais a psicologia, o que, por sua vez, torna ainda mais distante a possibilidade de se encontrar critérios que possam sistematizar toda essa diversidade. Nesse sentido, O escopo da psicologia não é apenas uma introdução ao livro Os princípios de psicologia, mas uma introdução à psicologia moderna. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that classical logic is trivialized in the presence of a transparent truth-predicate. In this paper, we will explain why this point of view must be given up. The hierarchy of metainferential logics defined in Barrio et al. and Pailos recovers classical logic, either in the sense that every classical inferential validity is valid at some point in the hierarchy ), or because a logic of a transfinite level defined in terms of the hierarchy shares its validities (...) with classical logic. Each of these logics is consistent with transparent truth—as is shown in Pailos —, and this suggests that, contrary to standard opinions, transparent truth is after all consistent with classical logic. However, Scambler presents a major challenge to this approach. He argues that this hierarchy cannot be identified with classical logic in any way, because it recovers no classical antivalidities. We embrace Scambler’s challenge and develop a new logic based on these hierarchies. This logic recovers both every classical validity and every classical antivalidity. Moreover, we will follow the same strategy and show that contingencies need also be taken into account, and that none of the logics so far presented is enough to capture classical contingencies. Then, we will develop a multi-standard approach to elaborate a new logic that captures not only every classical validity, but also every classical antivalidity and contingency. As a€truth-predicate can be added to this logic, this result can be interpreted as showing that, despite the claims that are extremely widely accepted, classical logic does not trivialize in the context of transparent truth. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to show that it’s not a good idea to have a theory of truth that is consistent but ω-inconsistent. In order to bring out this point, it is useful to consider a particular case: Yablo’s Paradox. In theories of truth without standard models, the introduction of the truth-predicate to a first order theory does not maintain the standard ontology. Firstly, I exhibit some conceptual problems that follow from so introducing it. Secondly, I show that (...) in second order theories with standard semantics the same procedure yields a theory that doesn’t have models. So, while having an ω- inconsistent theory is a bad thing, having an unsatisfiable theory of truth is actually worse. This casts doubts on whether the predicate in question is, after all, a truthpredicate for that language. Finally, I present some alternatives to prove an inconsistency adding plausible principles to certain theories of truth. (shrink)

A theory of truth is usually demanded to be consistent, but -consistency is less frequently requested. Recently, Yatabe has argued in favour of -inconsistent first-order theories of truth, minimising their odd consequences. In view of this fact, in this paper, we present five arguments against -inconsistent theories of truth. In order to bring out this point, we will focus on two very well-known -inconsistent theories of truth: the classical theory of symmetric truth FS and the non-classical theory of naïve truth (...) based on ᴌukasiewicz infinitely valued logic: PAᴌT. (shrink)

Este documento ofrece una propuesta desde la perspectiva de la bioética para la elaboración de un protocolo de triaje en el contexto de la pandemia de COVID-19. Dicha propuesta incluye recomendaciones sobre las normas procedimentales y normas sustantivas que deben regir la asignación y reasignación de recursos terapéuticos en condiciones de escasez extrema.

Semantic paradoxes pose a real threat to logics that attempt to be capable of expressing their own semantic concepts. Particularly, Curry paradoxes seem to show that many solutions must change our intuitive concepts of truth or validity or impose limits on certain inferences that are intuitively valid. In this way, the logic of a universal language would have serious problems. In this paper, we explore a different solution that tries to avoid both limitations as much as possible. Thus, we argue (...) that it is possible to capture the naive concepts of truth and validity without losing any of the valid inferences of classical logic. This approach is called the Buenos Aires plan. We present the logic of truth and validity, $$\mathsf {STTV}_{\omega }$$ based on the hierarchy of logics $$\textsf{ST}_{\omega }$$, whose validity predicate has the same semantic conditions as the material conditional. We argue that $$\mathsf {STTV}_{\omega }$$ is capable of blocking the problematic results while keeping the deductive power of classical logic as much as possible and offering an adequate semantic theory. On the other hand, one could object that it is not possible to reason with $$\mathsf {STTV}_{\omega }$$ because it is not closed under its logical principles. We respond to this objection and argue that the local characterization of validity shows how to make inferences using the logic $$\textsf{ST}_{\omega }$$. (shrink)

This work is focused on the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. This philosopher is one of the most important impeller of modern review of Neoplatonism. The subjects considered in this paper they are the relationship between goodness, freedom and difference in Levinas' thought. Levinas' thesis is that thought and freedom are originated by the relationship with the others. Thought and freedom suppose the difference.

I analyze some traditional distinctions around euthanasia. In contrast to those who most discuss the justification of active versus passive, or direct versus indirect euthanasia. I claim, following and expanding a Holly Smith´s argument, that the possibility of active and/or direct euthanasia cannot be morally excluded, once we have accepted passive and/or indirect euthanasia, even though we assume the asymmetry between killing and letting die, or between killing someone intentionally as a means and doing that as an undesired side-effect . (...) I evaluate then some objections and limits of the argument and make a shorter reference to the problem of voluntariness. (shrink)

Fishkin claims that the three liberals principles concerning assignment of social positions constitute a “trilemma”: the realization of any two of these principles precludes the realization of the third. In this paper, I try to prove that this is the case, only if these principles are interpreted in an extreme way. Liberalism, however, has strong reasons to reject such interpretation of each of these principles. Moreover, these reasons are independent from the question of whether their conjunction may be conflictive or (...) not. If we assume moderate versions of the principles , the trilemma disappears or, at least, becomes much weaker. (shrink)

Si bien en las últimas décadas se ha hecho énfasis en las ciencias sociales como disciplinas interpretativas, no por hecho han dejado de realizarse ?y en algunos casos consolidarse? las investigaciones de corte cuantitativo, en este sentido consideramos de primera importancia recuperar la discusión..

“Moral luck” alludes to the fact of being responsible for things over which we have no control. Typically, we have neither control over the consequences of our acts of will nor over the circumstances in which these acts are performed. The Kantian thesis on oral responsibility claims that every kind of moral responsibility claims that every kind of moral luck should be eliminated from our moral language and practice. In the case of consequences, this aim does not seem impossible. But (...) circumstances are more difficult to avoid because the act of will itself has to be performed within the framework of circumstances that the agent cannot control at all, and these circumstances will dramatically bear on his/her responsibility. Therefore, the following anti-Kantian argument can be construed. Either we reject circumstantial luck argument can be construed. Either we reject circumstantial luck or we accept it. If we reject it, then every attribution of responsibility becomes impossible. If we accept it, then we no longer have a good argument against consequential luck, the core of the Kantian rejection of moral luck. In this paper, I defend the Kantian position from this argument, claiming that both kinds of moral luck are relevantly different. This will, nevertheless, lead to a revision of the scope of our judgments of responsibility. They compare how someone acted with how others would act in identical 8or similar) circumstances. (shrink)

I try to show that Steiner’s theory has very implausible normative consequences since it does not accept the prima facie character or rights. This theory is unable to solve the conflicts of interests in which the only intuitively plausible solution consists in overriding someone’s rights.

In this paper, I start by describing and examining the main results about the option of formalizing the Yablo Paradox in arithmetic. As it is known, although it is natural to assume that there is a right representation of that paradox in first order arithmetic, there are some technical results that give rise to doubts about this possibility. Then, I present some arguments that have challenged that Yablo’s construction is non-circular. Just like that, Priest (1997) has argued that such formalization (...) shows that Yablo’s Paradox involves implicit circularity. In the same direction, Beall (2001) has introduced epistemic factors in this discussion. Even more, Priest has also argued that the introduction of infinitary reasoning would be of little help. Finally, one could reject definitions of circularity in term of fixed-point adopting non-well-founded set theory. Then, one could hold that the Yablo paradox and the Liar paradox share the same non-well-founded structure. So, if the latter is circular, the first is too. In all such cases, I survey Cook’s approach (2006, forthcoming) on those arguments for the charge of circularity. In the end, I present my position and summarize the discussion involved in this volume. En este artículo, describo y examino los principales resultados vinculados a la formalización de la paradoja de Yablo en la aritmética. Aunque es natural suponer que hay una representación correcta de la paradoja en la aritmética de primer orden, hay algunos resultados técnicos que hacen surgir dudas acerca de esta posibilidad. Más aún, presento algunos argumentos que han cuestionado que la construcción de Yablo no sea circular. Así, Priest (1997) ha argumentado que la formalización de la paradoja de Yablo en la aritmética de primer orden muestra que la misma involucra implícitamente circularidad. En la misma dirección, Beall (2001) ha introducido factores epistémicos en esta discusión. Más aún, Priest ha también argumentado que la introducción de razonamiento infinitario como complemento de la formalización en la aritmética sería de poca ayuda. Finalmente, se podría rechazar todo intento de dar definiciones de circularidad en términos de puntos fijos adoptando teoría de conjuntos infundados. Entonces, se podría sostener que la paradoja de Yablo y la del mentiroso comparten la misma estructura infundada. Por eso, si la última es circular, también lo es la primera. En todos los casos, presento el enfoque de Roy Cook (2006, en prensa) sobre estos argumentos que atribuyen circularidad a la construcción de Yablo. En el final, presento mi posición y un breve resumen de la discusión involucrada en este volumen. (shrink)

In the five-year period 2005-2009, Brazil dramatically reduced carbon emissions by about twenty-five percent and at the same time maintained a stable economic growth rate of 3.5% annually. This combination of economic growth and emissions reduction is unique in the world. It was driven by a dramatic reduction in deforestation in the Amazonian forest and the Cerrado Savannah. This shift empowered the sustainability social forces in Brazil to the point that in December 2009 Congress passed a very progressive law internalizing (...) carbon constraints and promoting the transition to a low-carbon economy. The Article first analyzes the Brazilian position in the global carbon cycle and public policies since 2005, including the progressive shift in 2009 and the contradictory dynamic in 2010-2012. It then analyzes the potential for a transition to a low-carbon economy in Brazil and the impact on global climate governance. (shrink)

A partir de la crítica que Franz Hinkelammert emite al pensamiento trascendental-abstracto, el cual ostenta y soporta a la modernidad iluminista-capitalista a través de sus ciencias empíricas: derecho, economía, sociología, se ha realizado este texto. Éste resalta las repercusiones del pensamiento en la realidad histórica, de ahí que junto a Hinkelammert y la tradición del pensamiento crítico se considera que pensamiento-contexto social e histórico se implican e influyen entre sí. Por otro lado, el pensamiento trascendental-abstracto de la modernidad iluminista-capitalista ha (...) encubierto la realidad histórica, por ello sólo expone y mienta lo que le permite sostenerse y reproducirse en la historia. Asimismo, la crítica al pensamiento trascendental-abstracto no supone la renuncia respecto a la razón, sino preponderantemente la superación de una de sus formas, o sea, la versión científica-tecnológica. Así pues, criticar y superar la razón moderna iluminista-capitalista tiene por objetivo vislumbrar-proponer otras formas de reproducir la vida, mismas que no requieran la explotación y la violencia sistemática para persistir históricamente. (shrink)

By the beginning of the 19th century Hegel's dialectic turned contradiction (conceived as unity of a concept with its determined negation) into distinguished inference. In the course of 20th century a family of systems known as "paraconsistent" formalized dialectical logic according to the contemporary paradigm of inference, oriented to truth-preserving, and not powered anymore solely by contradiction. In this way, nevertheless, Hegel's idea of logic as unfolding of concepts ordered by degree of "determination" reached at every step of the process, (...) was put aside. We attempt to recover the importance of that idea for the hegelian concept of "logical necessity", pointing out in addition that it may well play the role of an order relation for dialectical inference. (shrink)

This work-in-progress aims to explain as accurately as possible the philosophical meaning given by Wittgenstein to the silence in both of his major books, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and the Philosophical Investigations. REMARKS ARE WELL RECEIVED.

The article, as part of a broader reflection on the criticism of the right to development and its impact on the modes of legal and political subjectivation of children and adolescents, questions the child's condition as a subject without speech, or a speech conditioned to criteria of maturation, dictated by the adult referential, in a field, moreover, limited to what is said to be pertinent to their manifestation. Guided by the thought of exteriority, we return to the Foucauldian debate on (...) the relation between truth and justice, in light of the monstrous unspeakability of legal and judicial practices and the ubuesco of state power. We will analyze, through the contributions of classic cynicism, supported by Foucault, and Sloterdijk, Nieheus-Pröbsting, the resistant practices - beyond language – available to children and adolescents, and rethink these power struggles in the context of human rights and the possibility of justice, through the thought of Derrida, Rancière, Butler and Foucault. Our text will develop along the following axes of analysis: 1. Contextualizing the Foucaultian debate on truth and justice and the place of the “sayable”; 2. Considering the sayability at the heart of law, childhood and monstrosity; 3. Framing the struggle between ubuesco power and cynic resistance, and 4. Speculating on our notions of “child” and the possibility of justice. (shrink)

En la primera parte del artículo se propone un análisis de la insuficiencia constitucional del ser humano en el contexto de la filosofía griega. Se presenta una crítica al concepto de autarquía y se analiza el carácter contracultural de los movimientos filosóficos del cinismo, estoicismo y epicureísmo. La negación relativa y absoluta de la alteridad son igualmente analizadas. En la segunda parte, se analiza la insuficiencia constitucional desde el concepto de pobreza en el contexto de la orden franciscana y su (...) renuncia a la propiedad. También se hace referencia a los argumentos de los teólogos de la escuela de Salamanca y finalmente se plantea en qué medida el discurso franciscano está presente hoy como discurso político revolucionario. El objetivo general de las dos partes es presentar dos momentos anómalos de nuestra historia filosófica y su posible carácter contracultural válido para una crítica al capitalismo actual. (shrink)

The claim according to which there is a categorial gap between meaning and saying ¿ between what sentences mean and what we say by using them on particular occasions ¿ has come to be widely regarded as being exclusively a claim in the philosophy of language. The present essay collection takes a different approach to these issues. It seeks to explore the ways in which that claim ¿ as defended first by ordinary language philosophy and, more recently, by various contextualist (...) projects ¿ is grounded in considerations that transcend the philosophy of language. More specifically, the volume seeks to explore how that claim is inextricably linked to considerations about the nature of truth and representation. It is thus part of the objective of this volume to rethink the current way of framing the debates on these issues. By framing the debate in terms of an opposition between "ideal language theorists" and their semanticist heirs on the one hand and "communication theorists" and their contextualist heirs on the other, one brackets important controversies and risks obscuring the undoubtedly very real oppositions that exist between different currents of thought. (shrink)

Regarding the linguistic turn in History of Ideas, there are logical topics to be considered in order to increase the accuracy of reconstruccions oriented to describe and explain conceptual formations of the past. This paper propose an overview of these topics and a methodological approach to deal with its difficulties.

El Libro de Arena, de J. L. Borges imagina un libro poblado de infinitas páginas. Esta infinidad se manifiesta de varias formas, cada una de las cuales puede ser asimilada con alguna propiedad de los conjuntos numéricos. Exploraremos dicha similitud y veremos emerger el Libro de Arena como un símbolo complejo, pero no autónomo. En efecto, no sólo el libro y sus páginas, sino asimismo los personajes y cada elemento puesto en escena se articulan en el desarrollo del relato y (...) allí pierden su apariencia de objetos para revelarse como funciones en la producción del sentido final. (shrink)

Las «metáforas», «analogías» o «alegorías» tienen un lugar bien ganado en la tradición filosófica. Han sido atacadas por dar lugar a una interpretación poco rigurosa de las nociones que describen, pues permite asociarles propiedades que originalmente no se había pensado (ni resulta deseable) que formen parte de su concepto. Sin embargo, a pesar del reclamo en favor de procedimientos estrictos de definición, el uso de una imagen apropiada suele ser el mejor modo de explicar esas cuestiones que cada siglo escapan (...) a la disección que el filo de las mejores definiciones pretendía darle. Tal es el caso de las ilustraciones usadas por Charles S. Peirce en sus artículos "Algunas consecuencias de cuatro incapacidades" y "Cómo esclarecer nuestras ideas" para dar cuenta del pensamiento. Primero veremos el papel que juegan estas imágenes en la argumentación conque Peirce establece dos principios importantes de su filosofía: el de que toda cognición se encuentra determinada por otras cogniciones previas, y el de que no tenemos ningún poder de introspección. Luego hallaremos que dos de las imágenes presentan cierta incompatibilidad en un aspecto especialmente relevante desde el punto de vista de lo que tratan de ilustrar. Para finalizar, consideraremos una explicación que sea consistente con los textos y que permita resolver la discrepancia, brindando una mejor comprensión conjunta de ambas ilustraciones . (shrink)

(Spanish) La argumentación es un aspecto publico y comunicativo, quizás no el único, de los procesos cognitivos inferenciales en la especie humana. Aunque los propios procesos cognitivos inferenciales no son exclusivos de los seres humanos, su expresión a través de la comunicación lingüística, su utilización en los procesos sociales para la conformación y cambio de las creencias y la conducta es propiamente humana. Una explicación correcta del concepto de argumentación es por tanto importante para captar nuestro concepto de racionalidad, de (...) uso de la razón. EI trabajo explora la forma que tiene el concepto de argumentación en la cultura occidental utilizando las herramientas de teorías cognitivas recientes sobre la naturaleza de los conceptos, sugiriendo sus consecuencias para el concepto de razón. -/- (English) The argumentation is a public and communicative aspect, maybe not the only one, of inferential cognitive processes in the human species. While the very inferential, cognitive processes are not exclusive of the human beings, their expression through the linguistic communication, their use in social processes to shape and change beliefs and behaviour is properly human. An accurate description of the concept of argumentation is important then to grasp our concept of rationality, of the use of the reason. This paper explores the form of the concept of argumentation in western culture using the tools of recent cognitive theories on the nature of concepts, suggesting its consequences for the concept of reason. (shrink)