Este documento ofrece una propuesta desde la perspectiva de la bioética para la elaboración de un protocolo de triaje en el contexto de la pandemia de COVID-19. Dicha propuesta incluye recomendaciones sobre las normas procedimentales y normas sustantivas que deben regir la asignación y reasignación de recursos terapéuticos en condiciones de escasez extrema.

Los Estados confederados proyectan la existencia de un doble sistema normativo: federal y local. Esto provoca el surgimiento de colisiones y contradicciones entre ambos sistemas, lo que se pensaría debería ser resuelto por el derecho internacional, atendiendo el principio de subsidiariedad, no obstante, esto no siempre es así, ya sea porque el derecho internacional no regule ese caso concreto o bien, porque el Estado en cuestión no haya otorgado su consentimiento y la respuesta no le sea vinculante. Estas reflexiones invitan (...) a contrastar la naturaleza de las normas del derecho local y del derecho internacional, pues mientras que las primeras son asociativas, dado que no necesariamente requieren ser consentidas para ser vinculantes, las segundas, aparentemente, sí requieren el consentimiento de los Estados para que tengan efectos vinculantes. En este artículo pretendemos postular una posible solución al problema del conflicto entre los distintos órdenes normativos, partiendo desde una postura cuasi-voluntarista. Las obligaciones cuasi-voluntarias son aquellas que no surgen del consentimiento, pero tampoco completamente de los roles que tienen los Estados en el sistema internacional. Estas obligaciones nacen en el núcleo de grupos dominantes, a los que llamaremos grupos autocontenidos en el ámbito internacional, que tienen como rol la creación y socialización de las normas y obligaciones de derecho internacional, logrando que los otros grupos simplemente las sigan como si tuvieran un deber de hacerlo. Para ello, servirá como referencia el análisis del caso de las disimiles normas migratorias entre California y Texas dentro de Estados Unidos. (shrink)

I analyze some traditional distinctions around euthanasia. In contrast to those who most discuss the justification of active versus passive, or direct versus indirect euthanasia. I claim, following and expanding a Holly Smith´s argument, that the possibility of active and/or direct euthanasia cannot be morally excluded, once we have accepted passive and/or indirect euthanasia, even though we assume the asymmetry between killing and letting die, or between killing someone intentionally as a means and doing that as an undesired side-effect . (...) I evaluate then some objections and limits of the argument and make a shorter reference to the problem of voluntariness. (shrink)

Fishkin claims that the three liberals principles concerning assignment of social positions constitute a “trilemma”: the realization of any two of these principles precludes the realization of the third. In this paper, I try to prove that this is the case, only if these principles are interpreted in an extreme way. Liberalism, however, has strong reasons to reject such interpretation of each of these principles. Moreover, these reasons are independent from the question of whether their conjunction may be conflictive or (...) not. If we assume moderate versions of the principles , the trilemma disappears or, at least, becomes much weaker. (shrink)

Si bien en las últimas décadas se ha hecho énfasis en las ciencias sociales como disciplinas interpretativas, no por hecho han dejado de realizarse ?y en algunos casos consolidarse? las investigaciones de corte cuantitativo, en este sentido consideramos de primera importancia recuperar la discusión..

“Moral luck” alludes to the fact of being responsible for things over which we have no control. Typically, we have neither control over the consequences of our acts of will nor over the circumstances in which these acts are performed. The Kantian thesis on oral responsibility claims that every kind of moral responsibility claims that every kind of moral luck should be eliminated from our moral language and practice. In the case of consequences, this aim does not seem impossible. But (...) circumstances are more difficult to avoid because the act of will itself has to be performed within the framework of circumstances that the agent cannot control at all, and these circumstances will dramatically bear on his/her responsibility. Therefore, the following anti-Kantian argument can be construed. Either we reject circumstantial luck argument can be construed. Either we reject circumstantial luck or we accept it. If we reject it, then every attribution of responsibility becomes impossible. If we accept it, then we no longer have a good argument against consequential luck, the core of the Kantian rejection of moral luck. In this paper, I defend the Kantian position from this argument, claiming that both kinds of moral luck are relevantly different. This will, nevertheless, lead to a revision of the scope of our judgments of responsibility. They compare how someone acted with how others would act in identical 8or similar) circumstances. (shrink)

I try to show that Steiner’s theory has very implausible normative consequences since it does not accept the prima facie character or rights. This theory is unable to solve the conflicts of interests in which the only intuitively plausible solution consists in overriding someone’s rights.

This paper develops what we can call a first approach into a “possible communication epistemology” through certain conceptions from Serres. These conceptions are characterized by an open perspective that breaks the notions of limit, frontier, barrier and competence that have distinguished epistemolo..