Educational research is being subject to damaging criticism from both outside and within the research community. The external critics are impatient of research which does not give evidence‐based answers to the questions they ask. The internal critics condemn the very research which seeks to provide those answers. These differences are reflected in the rigid distinction between quantitative and qualitative research. This paper questions the philosophical positions on which such a distinction relies.

This paper is about the interplay between intuition and reason in Aristotle’s moral psychology. After discussing briefly some other uses of ‘intuition’ in Aristotle’s texts, I look closely at A...

Howard Robinson's *From the Knowledge Argument to Mental Substance* contains two quite different arguments from the vagueness of composite objects to the conclusion that I am not a physical object at all. One of them, developed over the course of several chapters, takes the following form: All composite physical objects (and only composite physical objects are candidates to be a human being) are non-fundamental; non-fundamental things are inevitably vague in various ways; this vagueness shows that we must "make a conceptual (...) interpretation of them", treating them as "artefacts of conceptualisation"; and this in turn precludes our identifying ourselves with any such things. Some interesting morals fall out of close consideration of Robinson's argument; but, in the end, materialists can reasonably resist it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Forgeries and Art Evaluation:An Argument for Dualism in AestheticsTomas Kulka (bio)If a fake is so expert that even after the most thorough and trustworthy examination its authenticity is still open to doubt, is it or is it not as satisfactory a work of art as if it were unequivocally genuine? 1It is a wonderful moment in the life of a lover of art when he finds himself suddenly confronted (...) with a hitherto unknown painting by a great master, untouched, on the original canvas, and without any restoration, just as it left the painter's studio. And what a picture! Neither the beautiful signature... nor the pointillé on the bread which Christ is blessing, is necessary to convince us that we have here—I am inclined to say—the masterpiece of Johannes Vermeer of Delft... quite different from all his other paintings and yet every inch a Vermeer. In no other picture by the great master of Delft do we find such sentiment, such a profound understanding of the Bible story—a sentiment so nobly human expressed through the medium of highest art.2The author of these lines is Professor Abraham Bredius, the nestor of Holland's art historians and the greatest authority on seventeenth-century Dutch painting. The source is The Burlington Magazine for Connoisseurs, the most prestigious periodical for the history of art of the period. The year is 1937. The painting, however, is not a masterpiece of Vermeer but a fake produced by the mediocre Dutch artist Han van Meegeren.The Problem of ForgeryMany art dealers have been financially ruined, and many art historians academically discredited, because of incorrect attribution. Apart from the practical problems that worry curators and art historians, there is also a theoretical problem, which has become a subject of heated discussions since the late 1960s. The dispute gained a momentum with the publication of Nelson Goodman's Languages of Art. In its third chapter titled "Art and Authenticity," [End Page 58] which put the problem of forgeries on the agenda of contemporary aesthetics, Goodman states that a "philosopher of art caught without an answer to [the] question... why there is any aesthetic difference between a deceptive forgery and an original work... is at least as badly off as a curator of paintings caught taking a Van Meegeren Vermeer for a Vermeer."3Although the literature on the problem of forgeries is extensive, the answers that have been put forward fall roughly into three categories: the formalist answer, which states that there is no aesthetic difference between an original painting and a deceptive forgery; the reductionist answer, which claims that there is such a difference and that it can be traced to the minute physical differences between originals and its copies; and the historicist answer, which also asserts that there must be an aesthetic difference but claims that it stems from the different histories of the two objects.The most prominent proponent of the formalist approach is Monroe C. Beardsley. His theory is based on the assumption that "two objects that do not differ in any observable qualities cannot differ in aesthetic value."4 Aesthetic formalism, as the name suggests, maintains that works of art should be judged according to their form. Only the visual features of the painted surface—the configuration of its lines and colors, composition, spatial relations, texture, design, etc., are relevant for its appreciation. The subject of our evaluation is the finished product, not the information pertaining to the history of its production. Who, when, and where painted the picture, just like the intentions of the painter, are irrelevant for the assessment of its aesthetic qualities. Only the "internal" properties, that is, the properties of the "work itself," count. The "external" properties, by which Beardsley means anything that "relates to something existing before the work itself, to the manner in which it was produced, or its connection to antecedent objects," have no bearing on aesthetic value. Hence the conclusion that if fakes resemble the original "in their internal characteristics, so that no one could tell them apart just by looking at them" there can be no aesthetic difference between them.5 Originality is thus excluded... (shrink)

: The nature/culture dualism has long been criticized for constructing social beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors that fail to respect and value the natural world. One possible way to bridge the divide between the human and non-human worlds is the process of identification. Orangutans, an endangered species found in Indonesia and Malaysia, enable individuals to bridge, connect, and identify with a seemingly separate natural world. Through identification with orangutans, humans come to reevaluate their own perspectives and dichotomous ways of thinking about (...) their relationships with nature. (shrink)

Dualism holds that experiences are non-physical states that exist alongside physical states. Dualism leads to the postulation of psychophysical laws that generate experiences by operating on certain sorts of physical states. What sorts of physical states? To the limited extent that dualists have addressed this question, they have tended to favor a brain-based approach that locates the physical basis of experience in the head. In contrast, this paper develops an argument for a form of dualism on which experience has a (...) physical basis that reaches out into the world. Specifically, the argument uses a puzzle about spatial experience to support a theory I call _tracking dualism_. On tracking dualism, a psychophysical law generates experiences by operating on complex physical states that involve both brain states and tracking relations that they bear to features of the environment. To develop the argument, I discuss tracking dualism alongside its more familiar physicalist counterpart, the tracking intentionalist theory associated with Dretske, Lycan, and Tye. I conclude by outlining a tracking dualist research agenda. (shrink)

The paper argues that dualism can explain mental causation and solve the exclusion problem. If dualism is combined with the assumption that the psychophysical laws have a special status, it follows that some physical events counterfactually depend on, and are therefore caused by, mental events. Proponents of this account of mental causation can solve the exclusion problem in either of two ways: they can deny that it follows that the physical effect of a mental event is overdetermined by its mental (...) and physical causes, or they can accept that the physical effect is overdetermined but claim that this is unproblematic because the case is sufficiently dissimilar to prototypical cases of overdetermination. (shrink)

Was Descartes a Cartesian Dualist? In this controversial study, Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris argue that, despite the general consensus within philosophy, Descartes was neither a proponent of dualism nor guilty of the many crimes of which he has been accused by twentieth century philosophers. In lively and engaging prose, Baker and Morris present a radical revision of the ways in which Descartes' work has been interpreted. Descartes emerges with both his historical importance assured and his philosophical importance redeemed.

Descartes develops a science of matter, But not of mind. To develop a cartesian science of mind the author compares the idea of matter as empty space with the idea of mind as empty of content. Then he asks: what moves the mind? God introduces motion into matter to cause bodies which in turn act on the mind to cause or activate ideas. The motion of bodies is determined, But the mind is said to be free. He thus argues that (...) descartes does not develop a science of mind because its unification with the science of matter would imply that the mind is not free. (shrink)

My overall aim here is to intersect two issues central to Max Velmans' wide-ranging paper. The first concerns one of the most vexing problems in consciousness research — how best to approach the terms 'mental' and 'physical'. The second looks at the phenomenology of volition, and the degree to which information presumably necessary for making voluntary conscious decisions is, or is not, present in consciousness. Velmans offers three general reasons to motivate his position: the physical world is 'causally closed' to (...) the influence of consciousness; consciousness does not contain the information necessary for making volitional decisions; conscious feelings of volition occur before the acts they supposedly cause. It seems to me that none of this holds up well under scrutiny. I will concentrate on the first two reasons, since I think they involve more basic and widespread aspects of consciousness research. (shrink)

: In this paper I argue that the famous problems of dualism between mind (soul) and body, that is, the problems of interaction and unification, concerned philosophers already in a medieval Aristotelian tradition. The problems, although traceable earlier, become particularly visible after William Ockham in the early fourteenth century, and in formulating his own position on the animal and human souls I argue that Buridan realized these problems and laid down the only views on the soul he thought to be (...) possible in an Aristotelian framework. His discussion then sets the stage for the following centuries. In presenting the background to Buridan's discussion I treat Aquinas, Ockham, Walter Chatton and Adam Wodeham. (shrink)

Many philosophers argue that exclusion arguments cannot exclude non-reductionist physicalist mental properties from being causes without excluding properties that are patently causal as well. List and Stoljar (2017) recently argued that a similar response to exclusion arguments is also available to dualists, thereby challenging the predominant view that exclusion arguments undermine dualist theories of mind. In particular, List and Stoljar maintain that exclusion arguments against dualism require a premise that states that, if a property is metaphysically distinct from the sufficient (...) cause of an effect, this property cannot be a cause of that effect. I argue that this premise is indeed likely to exclude patently causal properties, but that exclusion arguments against dualism do not require this premise. The relation that enables metaphysically distinct properties to cause the same effect in the relevant way turns out to be tighter than the relation typically posited between dualist conscious properties and their underlying physical properties. It is therefore still plausible that the latter causally exclude the former and that compelling exclusion arguments against dualism can be formulated by using a weaker exclusion premise. I conclude by proposing such a formulation. (shrink)

본 논문은 칸트가 1792년 4월에 『베를린 월보』(Berlinische Monatsschrift)에 발표했으며, 1793년에 『순전한 이성의 한계 안에서의 종교』의 제1편으로 출간한 ｢악의 원리가 선한 원리와 동거함에 대하여, 또는 인간 자연 본성에서의 근본악에 대하여｣(이하 ｢근본악｣)에 대한 하나의 새로운 해석을 시도한다. 주지하다시피 ｢근본악｣은 칸트의 실천철학과 관련하여 가장 흥미롭고도 문제적인 저작으로 간주된다. 특히 이 저작에서 칸트가 개진한 악의 근본성, 그리고 이를 가능케 하는 근거인 “선택의지의 자유”(Freiheit der Willkür)에 대한 이론이, “자율”(Autonomie)로 압축되는 그의 1780년대의 실천철학적 입장과 어떠한 관계를 가지는지의 문제는 칸트 연구에 있어 가장 뜨거운 쟁점 중 하나이다. (...) 한편으로 많은 연구자들은 ｢근본악｣에서 제시된 선택의지의 자유가 『실천이성비판』(1788)의 자율 개념과 모순됨을 강조한다(Ortwein(1983), Prauss(1983)). 이러한 해석에 반대하는 또 다른 한편에서는 ｢근본악｣의 입장을 철저히 『실천이성비판』의 연장선에서 읽어내려 한다. 이 두 번째 입장에 따르면 ｢근본악｣에서의 선택 의지의 자유는 『실천이성비판』(1788)의 자율 개념과 다른 새로운 어떠한 점도 내포하고 있지 않다(Bojanowski(2007)). 본 논문은 ｢근본악｣에 대한 종래의 해석을 대표하는 이 두 가지 입장을 모두 비판한다. 본문의 첫 번째 장(2장)에서 필자는, 칸트가 ｢근본악｣에서 제시하게 될 추동자담지자 간의 기능적 이원론이라는 체계 모델은 이미 『실천이성비판????의 논의를 가능케 하는 이론적 지반으로 기능하고 있음을 밝힌다. 이를 통해 본 논문은 『실천이성비판』과 ｢근본악｣의 연속성을 드러내 보이고, 이를 근거로 종래 연구 중 첫 번째 입장의 부당성을 드러내고자 한다. 이어지는 장(3장)에서는, 비록 추동자담지자의 기능적 이원론이 이미 『실천이성비판』의 이론적 지반으로 기능하지만, 이 체계 모델의 온전한 해명은 ｢근본악｣에서 “선택의지의 자유”와 “인격성의 소질”이라는 개념을 제시함을 통해 비로소 이루어지게 된다는 점을 밝힌다. 나아가 이러한 새로운 개념을 통해 ｢근본악｣에서 칸트는 비로소 도덕적 악의 가능성을 해명할 이론적인 실마리를 마련하게 됨을 본 논문은 밝히고자 한다. 이상에서 언급한 ｢근본악｣의 고유한 이론적 성취를 드러냄을 통해 본 논문은 종래 연구 중 두 번째 입장이 가지는 부당성을 밝히고자 한다. 아울러 추동자담지자의 기능적 이원론으로 표현될 수 있는 칸트 자유 이론의 면모가 ｢근본악｣을 통해 비로소 온전히 드러나게 됨으로써, 그의 자유 이론이 가지는 문제의 핵심이 이 저작에서 표면으로 부상하게 된다는 점을 본 논문의 마지막 장(4장)에서 지적하고자 한다. (shrink)