Floridi’s Theory of Strongly Semantic Information posits the Veridicality Thesis. One motivation is that it can serve as a foundation for information-based epistemology being an alternative to the tripartite theory of knowledge. However, the Veridicality thesis is false, if ‘information’ is to play an explanatory role in human cognition. Another motivation is avoiding the so-called Bar-Hillel/Carnap paradox. But this paradox only seems paradoxical, if ‘information’ and ‘informativeness’ are synonymous, logic is a theory of inference, or validity suffices for rational inference; (...) a, b, and c are false. (shrink)

This book is intended to serve as an advanced text and reference work on modal logic, a subject of growing importance which has applications to philosophy and linguistics. Although it is based mainly on research which I carried out during the years 1969-1973, it also includes some related results obtained by other workers in the field. Parts 0, 1 and 2, can be used as the basis of a one year graduate course in modal logic. The material which they contain (...) has been taught in such courses at Stanford since 1970. The remaining parts of the book contain more than enough material for a second course in modal logic. The exercises supplement the text and are usually difficult. I wish to thank Stanford University and Bar-Han University for making it possible for me to continue and finish this work, and A. Ungar for correcting the typescript. Bar-Ilan University, Israel Dov M. GABBA Y PART 0 AN INTRODUCTION TO GENERAL INTENSIONAL LOGICS CHAPTER 0 CONSEQUENCE RELATIONS Motivation We introduce the notions of a consequence relation and of a semantics. We show that every consequence relation is complete for a canonical semantics. We define the notion of one semantics being Dian in another and study the basic properties of this notion. The concepts of this chapter are generalizations of the various notions of logical system and possible world semantics found in the literature. (shrink)

Sovetlər dönəmində ictimai elmlər, xüsusən də, daha çox ideolojiləşmiş sahələrdən biri olmuş fəlsəfə, hakim ideologiyanın kursunu tutmağa çalışırdı. Bu cəhət isə, fəlsəfə və fəlsəfə tarixi ilə bağlı aparılan tədqiqatların obyektivliyinə kifayət qədər xələl gətirirdi. XX əsrin Sovet fəlsəfə tarixçisi olan Şeydabəy Məmmədovun (1912-1984) Mirzə Fətəli Axundzadənin ictimai-fəlsəfi görüşlərinin təhlili ilə bağlı tədqiqatları da, bu mənada, ideoloji xarakteri ilə seçilməkdədirlər. Ş.Məmmədov tədqiq etdiyi Axundzadəni görmək istədiyi kimi göstərməyə çalışır. Onun tədqiqatları Axundzadənin irsini araşdırmaqdan daha çox, böyük maarifçini müasirləşdirmək və Sovetlər dönəminin (...) ideoloji formatında təqdim etməyə yönəlmişdir. Ş.Məmmədovun ideoloji örtüklü tədqiqatları təbii ki, Axundzadənin ictimai-fəlsəfi görüşlərinin analizində şişitmələr və təhrifləri də qaçılmaz edir. Onun bütün tədqiqatlarında Axundzadə, Sovetlər dönəminin ruhuna uyğun mübariz materialist və qatı ateist kimi təqdim olunur. Ş.Məmmədov Axundzadənin maarifçiliyini fransız maarifçiliyi ilə əlaqələndirsə də, konkret səbəbləri açıqlamır. O, fransız maarifçilərinin Axundzadənin materialist və ateist kimi formalaşmasında rollarını qeyd etmək ilə kifayətlənir. O, həm də, maarifçilik dövrünün sonrakı inkişaf prosesi və XX əsrdəki tənqidləri haqqında da danışmır. Sovetlər dönəmində Azərbaycan mədəniyyətinin nümayəndələri haqqında aparılmış belə tədqiqatlar müasir dövrdə aktuallıq kəsb edir. Bu mənada, fəlsəfi irsimizin ayrılmaz tərkib hissəsi olan Sovetlər dövrü tədqiqatlarının konstruktiv tənqidi vacibdir. Məqalədə Ş.Məmmədovun Axundzadə haqqında əsərlərinin tədqiqində də, bu metoda müraciət edilmişdir. Konstruktiv tənqid Sovetlər dövründə fəlsəfənin müxtəlif sahələri üzrə aparılan tədqiqatlara yeni aktuallıq qazandırır. (shrink)

This paper investigates modular combinations of temporal logic systems. Four combination methods are described and studied with respect to the transfer of logical properties from the component one-dimensional temporal logics to the resulting combined two-dimensional temporal logic. Three basic logical properties are analyzed, namely soundness, completeness, and decidability. Each combination method comprises three submethods that combine the languages, the inference systems, and the semantics of two one-dimensional temporal logic systems, generating families of two-dimensional temporal languages with varying expressivity and varying (...) degrees of transfer of logical properties. The temporalization method and the independent combination method are shown to transfer all three basic logical properties. The method of full join of logic systems generates a considerably more expressive language but fails to transfer completeness and decidability in several cases. So a weaker method of restricted join is proposed and shown to transfer all three basic logical properties. (shrink)

I address here the question what sense to make of the idea that there can be thought prior to language. I begin by juxtaposing two familiar and influential philosophical views, one associated with the work of Paul Grice, the other associated with the work of Donald Davidson. Grice and Davidson share a broad, rationalist perspective on language and thought, but they endorse conflicting theses on the relation between them. Whereas, for Grice, thought of an especially complex sort is a precondition (...) of linguistic meaning, for Davidson, there can be no genuine thought without language. I argue that both views present us with unpalatable alternatives concerning our understanding of the natural origins of objective thought and meaningful language. Drawing on what I take to be key insights from Grice and Davidson, I then lay out some broad desiderata for an intermediate position. I finally turn to a certain form of nonlinguistic communication of the sort of which both prelinguistic children and languageless animals are capable, viz., expressive communication. I propose that a proper appreciation of the character and function of expressive communication can help us trace the outlines of the desired intermediate position. (shrink)

Brouwer’s intuitionism was a far-reaching attempt to reform the foundations of mathematics. While the mathematical community was reluctant to accept Brouwer’s work, its response to later-developed brands of intuitionism, such as those presented by Hermann Weyl and Arend Heyting, was different. The paper accounts for this difference by analyzing the intuitionistic versions of Brouwer, Weyl, and Heyting in light of a two-tiered model of the body and image of mathematical knowledge. Such a perspective provides a richer account of each story (...) and points to a possible connection between the community’s reaction and the changes each mathematician had proposed. (shrink)

Contemporary discussions of self-knowledge share a presupposition to the effect that the only way to vindicate so-called first-person authority as understood by our folk-psychology is to identify specific “good-making” epistemic features that render our self-ascriptions of mental states especially knowledgeable. In earlier work, I rejected this presupposition. I proposed that we separate two questions: How is first-person authority to be explained? What renders avowals instances of a privileged kind of knowledge?In response to question, I offered a neo-expressivist account that, I (...) argued, is compatible with a variety of non-deflationary, substantive answers to question. Here I re-evaluate the relative merits of the neo-expressivist account in light of some recent attempts to capture first-person authority by appealing to the so-called transparency of mental self-attributions. I then canvass two recent appeals to transparency that give priority to question. Bearing in mind.. (shrink)

Suppose, as I stare at a glass in front of me, I say or think: There.

Quine’s philosophy comprises a bewildering set of views whose integrating principle is his "confirmed extensionalism". The paper offers a historical as well as an intellectual reconstruction of extensionalism. Traditional extensionalism (Boole) freed logic from Aristotelian essentialism that had inhibited the development of logic. Quine’s confirmed extensionalism is the acceptance, as a matter of course, of the validity of Frege’s criticism of [Boole’s] extensionalism. His confirmed extensionalism is a generalized version of the philosophy of science known as conventionalism. As such, it (...) places the advancement of science outside the province of science proper. It is, thus, at odds with Quine’s repeated expressions of alliance with the Popperian (hypothetico-deductive) model of science. (shrink)

John Forrester’s book Thinking in Cases does not provide one ultimate definition of what it means to ‘think in cases’, but rather several alternatives: a ‘style of reasoning’ (Hacking), ‘paradigms’ or ‘exemplars’ (Kuhn), and ‘language games’ (Wittgenstein), to mention only a few. But for Forrester, the stories behind each of the figures who suggested these different models for thinking (in cases) are as important as the models themselves. In other words, the question for Forrester is not only what ‘thinking in (...) cases’ is, but also who might be considered a ‘thinker in cases’. Who could serve as a case study for such a thinker? The major candidates that Forrester considers in his book to be ‘thinkers in cases’ are Kuhn, Foucault, Freud, and Winnicott. In what follows, I will argue that one name is missing from this list, as well as from Forrester’s book more generally: Michael Balint. This name is missing not only because Balint was a great ‘thinker in cases’, but also because we have some reasons to believe that Forrester himself thought so and wished to add him to the list. Forrester, I will argue, found in Balint an exemplar for a thinker in cases that combined elements from Winnicott’s psychoanalytic theory and Foucault’s philosophy of the case-based sciences. (shrink)

Türkiye hosts approximately 3.6 million Syrian refugees, which accounts for roughly 4.5% of Türkiye's population. This places undeniable pressure on public institutions, particularly on healthcare services. The objective of this study is to document the healthcare structure for Syrian refugees and various challenges faced by Syrians when seeking healthcare and to highlight the ethical concerns emerging from those challenges. To achieve this, we conducted a comprehensive review of several qualitative studies and reports conducted by various organizations and institutions, specifically focusing (...) on health or including a dedicated chapter on health issues, published between 2011 and 2023. Following an extensive analysis of the secondary literature, we classified the challenges into three categories: procedural, cultural, and psychosocial. We argue that each of these challenges is linked to overarching medical ethics concerns. Finally, we propose three possible means to mitigate the challenges Syrians experience in accessing and uptake of healthcare services in Türkiye. (shrink)

Brouwer’s intuitionistic program was an intriguing attempt to reform the foundations of mathematics that eventually did not prevail. The current paper offers a new perspective on the scientific community’s lack of reception to Brouwer’s intuitionism by considering it in light of Michael Friedman’s model of parallel transitions in philosophy and science, specifically focusing on Friedman’s story of Einstein’s theory of relativity. Such a juxtaposition raises onto the surface the differences between Brouwer’s and Einstein’s stories and suggests that contrary to Einstein’s (...) story, the philosophical roots of Brouwer’s intuitionism cannot be traced to any previously established philosophical traditions. The paper concludes by showing how the intuitionistic inclinations of Hermann Weyl and Abraham Fraenkel serve as telling cases of how individuals are involved in setting in motion, adopting, and resisting framework transitions during periods of disagreement within a discipline. (shrink)

This paper compares the enactive approach to perception, which has recently emerged in cognitive science, with the phenomenological approach. Inspired by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the enactive theorists Alva Noë and Evan Thompson take perception to be a result of the interaction between the brain, the body and the environment. Their argument turns mostly on the role of self-motion and sensorimotor knowledge in perceptual experience. It was said to be entirely consistent with phenomenology, indeed its revival. However, this issue is under (...) debate. To show this, I begin with analyzing the enactive conception as a physicalist attempt to overcome the challenge of dualism and representationalism. I then turn to Husserl’s transcendental method and argue that Noë’s solution, unlike Husserl’s, remains naturalistic, as it does not take the phenomenon of intersubjectivity and the constitution of the “cultural world” into account. Afterwards I turn to Merleau-Ponty and demonstrate that there is some certain common ground with Noë, but also major differences. I conclude that the enactive approach is not completely refuted by the phenomenological one, insofar as the latter partly contains the first. Yet the enactivists deal merely with the necessary physiological conditions of perception qua animal perception, not with the sufficient sociocultural conditions for the understanding of human perception, like the inquiry into the historical and linguistic circumstances under which the understanding of human mind is made possible. The reason why the recent transformation of phenomenology into neurophenomenology is perceived as a revival is virtually inherent to the specific scientific ethos of enactivism and reveals a certain oblivion of the objectives of philosophical phenomenology. (shrink)

In Strangers in Our Midst, David Miller develops a philosophical position that is intended to guide the complex decisions that liberal democratic states face regarding immigration policy. While it is not likely that Miller’s arguments will convince anyone who is principally committed to the kind of open borders that truly enable the free movement of people across them, Miller has much to offer to those who are either (a) trying to make sense of the position of people who object to (...) unrestricted migration or (b) are searching for a principled yet more restrictive position that to the extent possible does justice to as many of the people who have stakes in immigration policy, including not only potential immigrants, refugees, as well as economic migrants, but also the people who already live in and are attached to their nations and states. Miller also attempts to do justice to states in their relations with each other. (shrink)

Logical analysis is in Frege primarily not an analysis of a concept but of its sense. Five Fregean philosophical principles are presented as constituting a framework for a theory of logical or conceptual analysis, which I call analytical explication. These principles, scattered and sometime latent in his writings are operative in Frege's critique of other views and in his constructive development of his own view. The proposed conception of analytical explication is partially rooted in Frege's notion of analytical definition. It (...) may also be the basis of what is required of a reduction of one domain to another, if it is to have the philosophical significance many reductions allegedly have. (shrink)