The author Strielkova Yuliya A. in the article «Demythologization and existential theology: formation of paradigm» analyzed the conception of the demythologization of Sacred Scripture and Sacred translation as a fundamental setting not only within the dialectical theology of the twentieth century, but also for contemporary searches for the forms of correlation of philosophy and theology in the context of the scientific world pictur. The author outlines the heuristic potential of a reinterpretative approach to the concept of demythologization, (...) considered beyond the conceptual and chronological framework of dialectical theology. Also, attention was focused on clarifying the heuristic content of the concept of "demythologization" for the modern philosophical and theological tradition, as well as the nature of its genetic connection with the existential paradigm of philosophizing and christology. Particular attention is paid to the paradigmatic and formative aspects of the phenomenon of demythologization; the role of language practices and discursive models in the development of the contemporary picture of the world is accentuated. (shrink)

In the early 1950s Grant McConnell, Jr., called for a political adjudication of our environmental and political visions. He pointed out the arbitrary nature of Gifford Pinchot's noble-sounding formula (“The greatest good for the greatest number over the longest time”), noting that such a determination depended on whom you asked. No technocrat can determine the greatest good on the basis of some secret expertise or privileged knowledge. We need to resolve our disparate visions of the uses of nature and human (...) beings politically, without recourse to privileged knowledge.But does such a political adjudication imply the unimpeded domination of the will of the majority? Not necessarily, because there is no overall majority for a total “bundle” of policies and programs — these must be horse-traded and haggled over on the basis of shifting coalitions. Yet, can it not be argued that even so, some very deeply held values of minorities will be trounced and trampled? It would be dishonest not to admit to such a danger. What we must do is try to define and develop a workable conception of baseline human rights that will be inviolable by the will of temporary majorities, and this itself is a tenuous political process which we have only just embarked on in recent times.The danger of Valentin Rasputins, Vernadskii cultists, and Deep Ecologists everywhere is that they are arguing from privileged knowledge. “We know what is really best for you, what will cure you,” they assert. They alone know the distinction between natural harmony and disorder, social health and corruption, pollution and purity, alienation and unity. They do not recognize the social construction of their ethical beliefs and political visions; they absolutize their individual truths. They may be right, but what if they are not...?It is therefore all the more important for those of us who wish to preserve a maximum of biotic and human diversity for our-selves and for future humans (and nonhumans) to be explicit about the moral and political agendas we embrace. The soundest way for us to prevail is to persuade our neighbors on this planet that our visions have something of value for them, too. We must keep in mind the fact that in a world where there exists more than one fanaticism, peaceful coexistence is in principle impossible.And if fanaticisms, including ecological ones, are the products of the fear or the fact of material, cultural, or spiritual dispossession, then we must work harder to make a world in which each of us and our interests are treated with equal respect. We cannot get there through the tainted means of absolutizing individual truths.Aldo Leopold, in his testament Sand County Almanac, as much as called for a new myth, for us to “think like a mountain.”57 He called for a new myth because he believed that humans were dangerous (to ourselves, first of all, and to the planet), and that inculcating a myth was the only way to effect a deep behavioral change on a massive enough scale to save the situation.58 It is my belief that myths are often more dangerous than the situations they seek to remedy. We need to cultivate a taste of de-mythologizing, of making our lives more self-aware. We need to become aware of our needs and our value preferences and to take responsibility for them as individual preferences. Then we will be in a good position indeed to respect and compromise with the preferences of our neighbors all around this planet, just as we would have them respect and compromise with ours. *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00005 *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00006 *** DIRECT SUPPORT *** A8402064 00007. (shrink)

Rudolf Bultmann aimed to make the revelation of Jesus a reality for people in the present, but fell short of his objective. In Demythologizing Revelation, Chester O’Gorman picks up where Bultmann left off by demythologizing the Christ event through the philosophy of provocative thinker Slavoj Žižek.

This book calls for a distinction between dangerous, elitist, hierarchizing myths such as Heidegger's and salutary, liberative, empowering myths that foster the humility of justice.

Max Deutsch’s new book argues against the commonly held ‘myth’ that philosophical methodology characteristically employs intuitions as evidence. While I am sympathetic to the general claim that philosophical methodology has been grossly oversimplified in the intuition literature, the particular claim that it is a myth that philosophers rely on intuitions as evidence is open to several very different interpretations. The plausibility and consequences of a rejection of the ‘myth’ will depend on the notion of evidence one employs, the notion of (...) intuition one holds, and how one understands the idea of ‘relying on’ or ‘employing’ something as evidence. I describe what I take to be the version of The Myth which is most plausibly undermined by Deutsch’s arguments; however, I also argue that the falsity of this myth has only minimal consequences for the viability of the experimental philosophy research project. (shrink)

MARX AS POLITICIAN by David Felix Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1983. 308pp., $27.50.

John Caputo’s Demythologizing Heidegger represents an important, distinctive, and intriguing attempt to make sense of Heidegger’s notorious involvement with Nazism. Where others have tended to emphasize biographical and sociological factors in understanding Heidegger’s involvement with Nazism, Caputo traces that involvement to fateful turns in Heidegger’s development as a thinker. While I am sympathetic with such an undertaking, I find Caputo’s account highly questionable and even self-opposed, especially as regards hisapparent valorization of Kierkegaard and of biblical faith as influences that could (...) have saved Heidegger from Nazism had he not turned away from them in favor of Nietzsche and the presocratic Greeks. (shrink)

In this paper, I address some puzzles about Frege’s conception of how we “grasp” thoughts. I focus on an enigmatic passage that appears near the end of Frege’s great essay “The Thought.” In this passage Frege refers to a “non-sensible something” without which “everyone would remain shut up in his inner world.” I consider and criticize Wolfgang Malzkorn’s interpretation of the passage. According to Malzkorn, Frege’s view is that ideas [Vorstellungen] are the means by which we grasp thoughts. My counter-proposal (...) is that language enables us to grasp thoughts (ideas are merely their baggage or “trappings,” as Frege puts it). One significant consequence of my interpretation is that it helps challenge the standard reading of Frege according to which he is a metaphysical platonist about thoughts. My interpretation thus provides support for the deflationary, anti-ontological reading spelled out by readers like Thomas Ricketts and Wolfgang Carl. As Ricketts puts it, Frege’s distinction between the objective and the subjective, rather than being an ontological doctrine, “lodges in the contrast between asserting something and giving vent to a feeling.”. (shrink)

HEIDEGGER COULD NEVER RESIST A GOOD STORY. He could never resist giving what he had discovered about alëtheia and the oblivion of Being a narrative form. In Being and Time we were promised a story--which was to be written backwards--of the "destruction of the history of ontology." Beginning at the end, with Kant, it was to feel its way back through the tradition in a deconstructive gesture, looking for what had all along been blocking the discovery of the temporal meaning (...) of Being which had at last begun to emerge in Kant. In the later works this story is considerably recast. Again, the vantage point is the end, but now the end is the age of the Gestell, the enframing, the "end of philosophy," which holds us all in its grip. The end is not conceived as a modern breakthrough but as an eschaton, a dead end into which the West has run. The task of thought is to make its way back into the primordial "Beginning" in order to recapture that fleeting moment which will make it possible for us today to begin anew, to make the present into an "authentic" end, which means a transition to another beginning. (shrink)

, Philip Kitcher has argued that science ought to meet both the epistemic goals of significant truth and the nonepistemic goals of serving the interests of a democratic society. He opposes this science as servant model to both the theology of science as source of salvific truth and the theology of science as anti-Christ. In a recent critical comment, Paul A. Roth argues that Kitcher remains entangled in the theology of salvific truth, not realizing that its goal is either vacuous (...) or unattainable. Instead of theologies, Roth proposes demythologization. In the end, science attains neither truth nor value, for these goals are incomprehensible and unattainable. Consequently, science’s goals are entirely pedestrian and without special interest. Adopting Kitcher’s own scientific naturalistic epistemology, the author argues for a naturalized theology of science, using a science as mediator model, in which both nature and scientist have a role in the acquisition of significant truth. Key Words: epistemic values • Kitcher • nonepistemic values • Roth • science and values • scientific realism • scientific truth. (shrink)

In Science, Truth and Democracy, Philip Kitcher has argued that science ought to meet both the epistemic goals of significant truth and the nonepistemic goals of serving the interests of a democratic society. He opposes this science as servant model to both the theology of science as source of salvific truth and the theology of science as anti-Christ. In a recent critical comment, Paul A. Roth argues that Kitcher remains entangled in the theology of salvific truth, not realizing that its (...) goal is either vacuous or unattainable. Instead of theologies, Roth proposes demythologization. In the end, science attains neither truth nor value, for these goals are incomprehensible and unattainable. Consequently, science’s goals are entirely pedestrian and without special interest. Adopting Kitcher’s own scientific naturalistic epistemology, the author argues for a naturalized theology of science, using a science as mediator model, in which both nature and scientist have a role in the acquisition of significant truth. (shrink)

An attempt to defend Bultmann's existentialist re-interpretation of Protestant Theology against its critics. The major areas of disagreement center around the existentialists' rejection of the subject-object scheme in epistemology, rival conceptions of history, and the relation of faith to the Bible as an historical document. Provides an interesting view of the troubled waters of contemporary Protestant Theology.--R. G. S.

이 연구는 성서텍스트에 대한 나이브한 접근인 “1차 단순성”을 해체한 불트만의 비신화화를 비판하면서 리쾨르가 성서의 신화를 해석학적으로 복원하는 논증이다. 소위 2차 단순성(seconde naïveté)을 해명하기 위해 이 논문의 3장부터 리쾨르가 본격적으로 비판하게 될 불트만은 성서의 신화에서는 사유할 거리가 있는 그 어떤 것도 찾아내지 못한다. 말하자면 불트만은 신화를 너무 무가치한 것으로 본 것이다. 게다가 불트만은 자신의 신앙을 보존하기 위해 결국 이성에서 벗어나야만 했다. 고로 비합리적이고 실존적인 결단력에 의한 믿음의 비약이 그에게 필요했으며 이것이 바로 ‘신앙주의’로 불리게 된다. 반면 리쾨르는 신화에서조차 인간이 사유할 거리를 발견하면서 (...) 이성의 외부로 신화를 던져버리지 않는다. 그는 결코 합리적 반성의 외부에서는 판단하지 않을 이 신화들의 공헌으로부터 자신을 단절하지 않은 채 믿음의 보존을 바란 것이다. 요컨대 리쾨르는 신화를 다룬 그리스비극 및 성서텍스트가 인류학적 차원에서 중요할 뿐만 아니라, ‘주체의 발견’과 같은 인간 조건에 대한 인식에도 공헌한다고 강조하면서 불트만을 비판함으로 해석학적 철학을 재구성한 것이다. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to reconstruct Husserl’s two-pronged approach of sensory givenness. On the one hand, the phenomenological focus on intentional consciousness implies a virulent criticismof the positivistic myth of the sensory given. On the other hand, there is also a positive appeal to sensory givenness in phenomenology, without which phenomenology would not be worthy of its name and would, ultimately, be nothing other than a form of neo-Kantianism. In the context of transcendental genetic phenomenology, Husserl manages to (...) rehabilitate sensory givenness in a reduced, viz. demythologized form. This reconstruction of Husserl’s ambivalent reference to the given can help phenomenology defend itself against some actual trends, which tend to reduce it to phenomenalismor to conceptualism. (shrink)

The review offers a critical examination of P.N. Kondrashov’s monograph, Nine Myths of Karl Marx’s Philosophy: From Demythologization to the Reconstruction of the Original Ideas. Kondrashov employs an expansive definition of myth, encompassing any distorted interpretation of Marx’s philosophy that is prevalent within certain groups. Kondrashov posits that these distortions primarily stem from misattributions to Marx, decontextualization of his statements, and subsequent reinterpretations that invert their original meaning. However, the book’s author can only partially substantiate the existence and prevalence (...) of these distortions. As a result, his understanding of the “degree of prevalence” affords him almost unlimited discretion to classify as myths both widespread misconceptions and contentious interpretations known only to a narrow circle of specialists. Consequently, the debunking of these “myths,” which in many cases can only loosely be classified as such, transforms into a critique of revisionism and other forms of “bourgeois ideology and propaganda.” Kondrashov often “reconstructs” what he perceives to be “myths about Marx’s philosophy,” only to subsequently refute them, thereby reaffirming his own interpretations of contentious aspects of Marx’s philosophy. In conclusion, while Kondrashov’s primary contribution lies in his positive exposition of the reconstructed ideas of Marx, the framing of this process as “demythologization” could potentially lead to confusion. (shrink)

The rise of modern science and the proclaimed 'death' of God in the nineteenth century led to a radical questioning of divine action and authorship - Bultmann's celebrated 'demythologizing'. Remythologizing Theology moves in another direction that begins by taking seriously the biblical accounts of God's speaking. It establishes divine communicative action as the formal and material principle of theology, and suggests that interpersonal dialogue, rather than impersonal causality, is the keystone of God's relationship with the world. This original contribution to (...) the theology of divine action and authorship develops a new vision of Christian theism. It also revisits several long-standing controversies such as the relations of God's sovereignty to human freedom, time to eternity, and suffering to love. Groundbreaking and thought-provoking, it brings theology into fruitful dialogue with philosophy, literary theory, and biblical studies"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

J.C.D. Clark demythologizes the history of Thomas Paine, understanding the impact he has had on modern human rights, democracy, and internationalism.

Rebirth and the Stream of Life explores the diversity as well as the ethical and religious significance of rebirth beliefs, focusing especially on Hindu and Buddhist traditions but also discussing indigenous religions and ancient Greek thought. Utilizing resources from religious studies, anthropology and theology, an expanded conception of philosophy of religion is exemplified, which takes seriously lived experience rather than treating religious beliefs in isolation from their place in believers' lives. Drawing upon his expertise in interdisciplinary working and Wittgenstein-influenced approaches, (...) Mikel Burley examines several interrelated phenomena, including purported past-life memories, the relationship between metaphysics and ethics, efforts to 'demythologize' rebirth, and moral critiques of the doctrine of karma. This range of topics, with rebirth as a unifying theme, makes the book of value to anyone interested in philosophy, the study of religions, and what it means to believe that we undergo multiple lives. (shrink)

The process of turning a myth into a fairy tale, its internal and external causes, patterns, consequences... It may be difficult to find a more traditional way of exploring a fairy tale than this one. We will not avoid it either, because whatever aspect of the fairy tale analysis we choose, it is impossible to bypass this side of its genesis. And the choice of the method of explication of this problem largely predetermines both the angle of her vision and (...) the means of solution. The same traditions have already been given peculiar power lines that urge more and more researchers to move in the area of ​​these lines and to cover more and more varieties of the same dimensions of the object: demythologization and desacralization of the hero, his actions, his environment; giving the myth an exoteric character, with the elements of fiction and irony that are inconceivable as a result; the shrinking of the scale of the hero's actions, and hence the replacement of the mystery of myth with mysteriousness, intrigue in the fairy tale, the decline of the mythological worldview. The topics of branching of the subjects through the myth to the fairy tale, finding and researching common for both phenomena of binary oppositions, etc., are densely addressed. (shrink)

This article, which introduces the special section on The Urban Problematic, takes as its starting point the ways in which categories associated with the ‘urban’ have broken down, such that the once singular and coherent concept ‘city’ has disintegrated in certain ways: the notion has been demythologized, so that representations of the city must now be regarded as partial and invested; and cities themselves have become opaque and unpredictable both to urban scholars and to governments, planners and various kinds of (...) welfare organizations. The indications of crisis, captured for instance by concerns about the slums, favelas and shanty towns of the world’s megacities, also indicate that much of what counts in modern urban life is in some way connected with the marginal, the unofficial, and the supplemental. The article takes a supplemental view of the current state of urban dwelling. This involves at the same time a longer, more patient, historical view in its attempt to understand the current state of the city as part of a shift in the play of heterogeneous forces. With reference to the articles contained in The Urban Problematic, this introductory article finally draws attention to some of the urgent and critical issues of contemporary urbanism. (shrink)