There is no notion of postmortem Heaven and Hell in both ancient Israeli and Confucian traditions, and the two traditions also share quite a number of similarities about the idea of immortal life after death. Therefore, a comparison of the commonness in this field, e.g. the Jewish Levirate Marriage custom and the Confucian custom of adopting one’s son as heir; the idea of name surviving death in Biblical Judaism and that of glorifying one’s parents by making one’s name (...) famous in future ages in Confucianism, can help us reveal the common pursuit in the two traditions: the postmortem fulfillment of an individual is realized in the form of the continuation of one’s family/ tribe/ nation of which they were, and forever remain, a generational link. In addition, this can help clarify a long faulted Confucian dogma of “Having no male heir being the gravest of the three cardinal offences against filial piety”. (shrink)

Confucian writings on ritual from the classical period (ca 8th-3rd centuries BCE), including instruction manuals, codes of conduct, and treatises on the origins and function of ritual in human life, are impressive in scope and repay careful engagement. These texts maintain that ritual participation fosters social and emotional development, helps persons deal with significant life events such as marriages and deaths, and helps resolve political disagreements. These early sources are of interest not only to historians and Sinologists, but also to (...) philosophers and social scientists; they contain enduring insights into the nature and status of rituals more generally. This chapter surveys classical Confucian theories of the origins and functions of ritual, and summarizes some strident critiques of them from contemporary thinkers in the Mohist, Daoist, and Legalist schools of thought. The aim is to indicate key issues as well as promising strategies for analyzing ritual in Confucian thought and action. (shrink)

There exists a serious shortage of organs for transplantation in China, more so than in most Western countries. Confucianism has been commonly used as the cultural and ethical reason to explain the reluctance of Chinese and other East-Asian people to donate organs for medical purposes. It is asserted that the Confucian emphasis on xiao (filial piety) requires individuals to ensure body intactness at death. However, based on the original texts of classical Confucianism and other primary materials, we refute this (...) popular view. We base our position on the related Confucian norms of filial piety and ren (humaneness, humanity or benevolence), the tension between differentiated love and universal love, and belief in the goodness of human nature. In light of this, we argue that the Confucian ethical outlook actually calls for organ donation at an individual level, and supports an opt-out (presumed consent) system at the level of social policy. Furthermore, because the popular view is based on a number of dominant but misleading modes of thinking about cultural differences, our revisionist account of Confucian moral duties regarding organ donation has implications for developing a more adequate transcultural and global bioethics. These will be discussed and expanded upon. (shrink)

논문에서는 중국이슬람 학자인 마덕신(馬德新)의 유학의 생사관에 대한 입장과 이슬람의 후세 부활설을 논의하였다. 마덕신은 도덕적이고 자연적인 유학의 생사관은 인간의 죽음에 대한 근본적인 두려움과 공포심을 해소할 수 없다고 비판하면서, 유학의 부족한 점을 이슬람의 후세 부활설로 보완하고자 한다. 그는 유학의 죽음관은 영혼불멸을 인정하지 않는다고 비판하면서 이슬람의 부활설을 제시한다.BR 마덕신은 부활설을 통해서 현세와 후세를 연결하면서, 현세는 도덕적인 삶을 살아야 하는 공간으로, 후세는 자신의 선악을 재판하는 장소로 구분한다. 마덕신은 알라는 절대 공정한 존재이며, 어떠한 차별도 하지 않는다고 주장한다. 현세에는 악을 짓고도 벌을 받지 않거나 선을 행하고도 (...) 타인에게 굴욕을 당하는 경우가 있다. 하지만 후세에는 현세의 모든 행위가 소환되어서 공정한 상과 벌을 받게 된다고 본다.BR 마덕신은 이슬람의 천당과 지옥에 대한 입체적이고 구체적인 묘사를 통해서 사람들이 현세에서 도덕적인 삶을 살면서 죽음의 공포를 해소하도록 하고 폭도들의 만행을 경계하도록 하였다. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: The Problem of Definition Problems of Interpretation Nature and Convention Transcendence Death and the Afterlife Problems of Evil Fatalism and Free Will? Divine Command Theory Piety and Divine Simplicity Works cited.

The foundational texts of the classical period of Confucianism and Daoism contain virtually no discussion of post-death existence or the nature of the afterlife. At the same time, these traditions devote significant attention to the ways death and loss impact our lives. Confucian texts such as the Analects of Confucius and the Xunzi, as well as the distinctive, profoundly influential writings of the Daoist Zhuangzi, contain teachings and stories about people facing their own deaths and dealing with the (...) deaths of others. Both traditions offer guidance on living well in the face of mortality without recourse to notions of post-death existence. They do this by cultivating and sustaining connections and identification with larger realities beyond the individual. The Confucians emphasize human relationships, the realm of the familial, social, and political. Zhuangzi emphasizes the connection with the larger natural world, whereby we see the cycles of our own lives as part of the larger cycles of nature, and he points toward a path to losing one’s self through contemplative and skillful practices, ultimately leading to a sense of equanimity in the face of death. I argue that underlying the differences between Confucian and Daoist forms of connection and consolation is the contrast between the Confucian notion of a narratively constructed self, an achievement of memory and ritual, and Zhuangzi’s deconstruction of the narrative temporality that grounds Confucian notions of selfhood. (shrink)

Confucianism is a rather typical non-universalism, even though it does believe that its own doctrines are indeed the ultimate truth, and denies the validity of any higher, universalist meta-standard. Therefore, when facing the contemporary culture intercourse, Confucianism advocates genuine discourse: It rejects any cultural conflict to-the-death, refuses to engage in universalist competition and antagonism, and maintains a mutually-beneficial interaction with other cultures. However, it also adheres to a “free-to-terminate-relations” principle, which implies that any side is free to terminate, at (...) any time, all potential and actual interactions, whenever it feels that its original cultural vitality is threatened. In other words, cultural interactions must only occur when the cultural uniqueness and independence of all participating sides is guaranteed. (shrink)

The general circumstances in which Confucianism developed during the century between the death of Confucius and the rise of Mencius and Haün Tzu may be observed in the "Biographies of Confucians" in the Shih-chi [Historical Records] and in the chapter entitled "On Learning" in Han Fei Tzu.

This paper advances three claims. First, according to contemporary Western advocates of physician-assisted-suicide and voluntary euthanasia, "death with dignity" is understood negatively as bringing about death to avoid or prevent indignity, that is, to avoid a degrading existence. Second, there is a similar morally affirmative view on death with dignity in ancient China, in classical Confucianism in particular. Third, there is consonance as well as dissonance between these two ethics of death with dignity, such that the (...) Confucian perspective would regard the argument for physician-assisted-suicide and voluntary euthanasia as less than compelling because of the latter's impoverished vision of human life. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine the meaning and value of humanity implied by Zhu Xi’s viewpoint of the meaning of life and death. This is aimed to create an opportunity where we can find the answers ourselves from various angles to the essential questions such as what makes us human or what humans live by. As for the first process, I will briefly examine how the values and significance of advanced Confucianism views on life and (...) class='Hi'>death were passed on to Zhu Xi. Second, I would like to examine the characteristics of Zhu Xi's perspectives and human nature by connoting them into three areas: a way of realizing life and death, the public nature of life and death, and the humanity as the transcendence and completion of life and death. Through this investigation, I would like to suggest the meaning of humanity implied by Zhu Xi’s view of life and death as follows: First, human potential is not based on biological human lifespan, but rather on the realization of one's own nature by continuous humanistic practice based on publicity. Second, this process of practice is a means of fully perceiving the essence of life, and the value and significance of death. Third, death, like life, is a ge-wu [格物] doctrine to explore. After intense practice of the principle of life in everyday life, it would be possible to perceive the “no-disparity-in-birth-and-death” philosophy. Therefore, living everyday life faithfully results ultimately in dying well. Fourth, dying well does not originate from an emphasis on the fear of the phenomenon of death or the afterlife, but rather from deep reflection and practical completion in terms of humanity and values based on the condition of well-living and the value of commonality. Lastly, only when this philosophy is fully made aware of, will the fear derived from the gate of life and death be dispelled by itself as a reward in return. (shrink)

The prospect of death, for Confucians, creates particular social and familial duties. Short of end‐of‐life issues, children, as a matter of general filial duty, certainly have a duty to provide care and comfort for parents as they experience the limitations of old age. Death is a major theme of Zhuangzi. At various points in the text, we are counseled to embrace the inevitable, to detach ourselves from the desire to preserve life beyond its natural bounds. When a loved (...) one dies, however he or she has died, feelings of loss and grief naturally arise in those closest to the deceased. Confucianism believes that these emotions are the deepest wellsprings of humanity, the most fundamental sentiments of human love. Instead of denying grief, Confucius and Mencius tell us to cultivate it, to bring it into the center of our daily lives through conscientious mourning. (shrink)

This book explores and elaborates three theories of public reason, drawn from Rawlsian political liberalism, natural law theory, and Confucianism. Drawing together academics from these separate approaches, the volume explores how the three theories critique each other, as well as how each one brings its theoretical arsenal to bear on the urgent contemporary debate of medical assistance in dying. The volume is structured in two parts: an exploration of the three traditions, followed by an in-depth overview of the conceptual and (...) historical background. In Part I, the three comprehensive opening chapters are supplemented by six dynamic chapters in dialogue with each other, each author responding to the other two traditions, and subsequently reflecting on the possible deficiencies of their own theories. The chapters in Part II cover a broad range of subjects, from an overview of the history of bioethics to the nature of autonomy and its status as a moral and political value. In its entirety, the volume provides a vibrant and exemplary collaborative resource to scholars interested in the role of public reason and its relevance in bioethical debate. (shrink)

LANGUAGE NOTE | Document text in Chinese; abstract also in English. 傳統意義下的臨終關懷，以全面的身心照料為中心，為瀕臨離世的病患及其家屬提供涵蓋生理、社會及心靈方面的支援及照護服務，使其消除焦慮和對死亡的恐懼，最終幫助病人有尊嚴地、舒緩平和地抵達人生盡頭，也慰藉患者 家屬走出失去至親的傷痛。然而，在「新冠」疫情的影響下，臨終關懷面臨著倫理困境，善終的意義也一度受到挑戰。本文以香港疫情下受限的探訪和殯葬安排為例，通過儒家思想中的以人文本、家庭主義和臨終禮儀，分析防疫 政策對臨終關懷和善終的影響並探究其倫理正當性，為今後突發公共衛生事件下臨終關懷必要性、執行過程和發展提供思考。 End-of-life care aims to provide supportive physical, social, mental, and spiritual care for terminally ill patients and their family members. Not only does it help patients approach the end of their lives with dignity and peace, but it also helps family members overcome the grief of losing a loved one. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, ethical dilemmas have emerged within the field of end-of-life care, and it (...) has been challenging to help people experience a good death. This article takes the example of the pandemic-related restrictions in Hong Kong that affected visiting and funeral arrangements. It analyzes the impact of anti-pandemic measures on end-of-life care and the provision of a good death. It examines the ethical justifications of these measures through the Confucian themes of human-orientedness, familism, and death rituals, and it outlines practical implications for end-of-life care under similar circumstances. (shrink)

Traditionally there has been a great divide between those practitioners of comparative religion who work on discrete and identifiably religious traditions (such as Confucianism, Judaism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, etc.) and those who work on identifying aspects of ‘religious’ life that often go unnoticed because they are less traditional and therefore less recognizable as religion. There has also long been a predisposition not to view Greek materials as religious, and thus to secularize one form of thriving polytheism about which we know (...) a great deal. Combining those two methodological insights in a study of contemporary North American religious life, Gary Laderman offers a fresh look at what I will call the ‘practical polytheism’ of modern US society, one that examines cultural arenas as diverse as sport, music, celebrity, sexuality and death in a riveting analysis of current spiritual trends in a more multicultural North America. (shrink)

The main contentions of this paper are twofold. First, there is a more than century‐old Japanese tradition of human rights based on a fusion of Western concepts of natural rights and a radical reinterpretation of Confucianism, the major proponent of which was the Japanese thinker Nakae Chomin. Secondly, this tradition, although a minority view, is crucial for remedying the serious defects in the present Japanese medical system. In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Nakae Chomin sought to reinterpret Chinese (...) tradition, especially Confucianism, by injecting the concepts of popular sovereignty and democratic equality, drawn from Western sources. The resulting view maintained the Confucian commitment to a moral nexus for society, but replaced hierarchy with egalitarianism. The pressing need for such an approach to patients' rights in present‐day Japan is illustrated by two recent cases: the photographing and commercial exploitation of patients' genitals without serious response by authorities, and the attempt by physicians to manipulate the time of death and, possibly, to improperly pressure family members in order to transplant organs from the brain‐dead victim of a criminal assault. Such problems stem from hierarchy and paternalism, which seem to be a legacy of the rapid, state‐sponsored introduction of Western medicine in the mid‐nineteenth century, and in particular from the government's adoption of and support for German military medicine as a model for Japan. (shrink)

This volume explores Confucian views regarding the human body, health, virtue, suffering, suicide, euthanasia, `human drugs,' human experimentation, and justice in health care distribution. These views are rooted in Confucian metaphysical, cosmological, and moral convictions, which stand in contrast to modern Western liberal perspectives in a number of important ways. In the contemporary world, a wide variety of different moral traditions flourish; there is real moral diversity. Given this circumstance, difficult and even painful ethical conflicts often occur between the East (...) and the West with regard to the issues of life, birth, reproduction, and death. The essays in this volume analyze the ways in which Confucian bioethics can clarify important moral concepts, provide arguments, and offer ethical guidance. The volume should be of interest to both general readers coming afresh to the study of bioethics, ethics, and Confucianism, as well as for philosophers, ethicists, and other scholars already familiar with the subject. (shrink)

The war on terrorism, say America's leaders, is a war of Good versus Evil. But in the minds of the perpetrators, the September 11 attacks on New York and Washington were presumably justified as ethically good acts against American evil. Is such polarization leading to a violent "clash of civilizations" or can differences between ethical systems be reconciled through rational dialogue? This book provides an extraordinary resource for thinking clearly about the diverse ways in which humans see good and evil. (...) In nine essays and responses, leading thinkers ask how ethical pluralism can be understood by classical liberalism, liberal-egalitarianism, critical theory, feminism, natural law, Confucianism, Islam, Judaism, and Christianity. Each essay addresses five questions: Is the ideal society ethically uniform or diverse? Should the state protect, ban, or otherwise intervene in ethically based differences? How should disagreements on the rights and duties of citizens be dealt with? Should the state regulate life-and-death decisions such as euthanasia? To what extent should conflicting views on sexual relationships be accommodated? This book shows that contentious questions can be discussed with both incisiveness and civility. The editors provide the introduction and Donald Moon, the conclusion. The contributors are Brian Barry, Joseph Boyle, Simone Chambers, Joseph Chan, Christine Di Stefano, Dale F. Eickelman, Menachem Fisch, William Galston, John Haldane, Chandran Kukathas, David Little, Muhammad Khalid Masud, Carole Pateman, William F. Scheuerman, Adam B. Seligman, James W. Skillen, James Tully, and Lee H. Yearley. (shrink)

This introduction to Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962), the critical successor of the "father of contemporary Japanese philosophy" Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), focuses on Hajime's central philosophical ideas and perspective on "self," "world," "knowledge," and the "purpose of philosophizing". Exploring his notable philosophical ideas including the logic of species, metanoetics, and philosophy of death, it addresses his life-long study of the history of Western philosophy. It sets out his belief that Western framework of thinking is incapable of giving sufficient answers to the (...) philosophical questions concerning the self and the world together and discusses the central ideas he developed while working in Eastern traditions such as Confucianism and Daoism. Featuring comprehensive further reading lists, discussion questions and teaching notes, this is an ideal introductory guide to Tanabe Hajime suitable for anyone interested in Japanese and World philosophy, as well as the development of the Kyoto School. (shrink)

1 Introduction1 In the 1980s, hermeneutics was often incorporated into deconstructionism and literary theory. Rather than focus on authorial intentions, the nature of writing itself including codes used to construct meaning, socio-economic contexts and inequalities of power,2 Gadamer introduced a different perspective; the interplay between effects of history on a reader’s understanding and the tradition(s) handed down in writing. This interplay in which a reader’s prejudices are called into question and modified by the text in a fusion of understanding and (...) topic revitalized the study of the printed word. Gadamer’s turn to language for understanding the meaning of Being also appealed to the post-modern antipathy toward modernity and metaphysics.3 If the truth and validity of interpretations are limited to communities of language, then our mode of being in history cannot but be historical. This point of view rendered Gadamer’s phenomenological hermeneutics vulnerable to the critique of moral and epistemological relativism. However, Gadamer’s theory of interpretation also stems from re-examination of the beginning of knowledge in the Pre-Socratics and Plato, and on this basis, is receptive to another dimension of inquiry than that which was trending in North America. -/- At the East-West Center, University of Hawai’i at Manoa in 1982, Chung-ying Cheng for the first time introduced onto-hermeneutics to an audience of esteemed philosophers including Li Zehou, Ren Jiyu, Feng Youlan, and Zhang Liwen.4 In contrast to schools of deconstruction and literary theory that had disengaged the interpreter from trans-historical sources of meaning and truth, Cheng explained that interpreters exist within a cosmological order inextricable from responsibility to harmonize Heaven and Earth in creative acts of interpretation. By integrating Chinese cosmology into hermeneutics through ontology, he tacitly challenged philosophers in the West to re-examine assumptions about humanity’s place in nature and by implication, Gadamer’s recovery of the beginnings of knowledge in Western philosophy. -/- Cheng’s Neo-Confucianism is inspired by the method and goals of Thomé H. Fang. The following words by Fang seem to prefigure, although in an indistinct and bundled way, aspects of Cheng’s philosophy including a Mencian theory of human nature, comprehensive observation, and creativity: “In the very process of living in concord with creative Nature, Man is charged with an ideal to be fully realized in the light of the principle of comprehensive harmony.”5 Like Fang, Cheng reinvigorates Chinese culture and language, but not solely in order to vindicate the insights of Neo-Confucianism. He has studied Western thought, from pragmatism and the analytic school to German idealism and phenomenology, to unlock and clarify philosophical concepts within the Yijing tradition and thereby render them intelligible to Anglophones. The result has been an awakening of Western scholars to the moral and cultural consequences of decoupling their thought from metaphysical foundations that are neither dogmatic nor doctrinal. -/- Not unlike the dialectic of Gadamer’s dialogue form, onto-generative hermeneutics integrates contrary positions on the same topic in order to blend both sides into a world philosophy, or as Cheng says, a “totalizing or integrative theory,”6 not to be confused with a theoretical rewording of a theory. On the contrary, the universal scope and relevance of hermeneutics stems from personal experience. Just as Gadamer, in response to faction and strife, immersed himself in Plato during the war years, and developed a method with which to harmonize opposites, so too, according to On-cho Ng, was Cheng moved by faction, strife and political persecution to develop a path toward unity.7 Gadamer taught at McMaster University in Hamilton, Ontario, and Cheng at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa among other institutions in North America. They facilitated trans-continental educational and cultural ties. Similar experiences yield similar insights irrespective of differences of time and place. Hence, authors in this issue who reside in Europe, China and North America, delineate the differences between Gadamer and Cheng, yet also, in light of Cheng’s onto-generative method and cosmology, develop integrative theories. Due to the page-budget restriction of the publisher, certain articles of this special theme will be subsequently published in the next issue. -/- 2 Integrative Theory This special issue of The Journal of Chinese Philosophy confirms a dimension of hermeneutics that Cheng has both motivated and inspired. The contributors do not abide by the conviction that since thought is mediated by language, interpretations cannot transcend culture. On the contrary, their research exemplifies the fruits of trans-historical onto-dialogical hermeneutics within limits defined by their field inquiry, organized into Parts I and II, around three themes: language, the philosophy of history and ethics. -/- Andrew Fuyarchuk introduces the theme of ontology in relation to Gadamer’s turn to language. Fuyarchuk argues that Chung-ying Cheng’s criticism of Gadamer’s hermeneutics is informed by Heidegger’s concept of Dasein and thereby overlooks how Gadamer’s Platonic-Pythagorean problem of the division between the One and Many is harmonized in the event of language, which in turn positions Gadamer in proximity to the presupposed grounds of receptivity in Cheng’s onto-generative hermeneutics. Lauren Pfister’s contributing article addresses the year 2000 meeting between Cheng and Gadamer in Heidelberg and expands the transhistorical grounds of meaning in Gadamer to matters of theology. Pfister’s summary of the written Chinese record of their conversation indicates that Cheng does not address the role of Christian philosophy and hence, the role of the inner word in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. This is important not only for detecting changes in Cheng’s philosophical development, but also for modifying his hermeneutics along the lines of a living conversation, possibilities explored by Pfister in a sequel to the article submitted to this issue. Nevertheless, by raising the issue of how Gadamer’s turn to language for understanding the meaning of Being extends possibilities in Cheng’s thought, Pfister anticipates the article by Katarina Gajdosova. She returns to the roots of Chinese thought during the Warring States period and broadens the meaning of names in recently excavated texts. Contrary to the conventions about how to understand terms, she appeals to both Heidegger’s ontology and Cheng’s notion of receptivity and creativity to reinterpret naming in relation to cosmology. Along the same lines, insofar as the event of Being is lingual, Jay Goulding captures its emergent structure in an evolving community of scholars and scholarship. He recalls his philosophical journey toward Cheng’s philosophy that begins in conversations with Gadamer at McMaster University in Hamilton, leads to Heidegger and Asian thought, expands into turning points with teachers and colleagues from various backgrounds that by increments contributed to Goulding’s formulation of “Daoist phenomenology.” -/- Although differing traditions guide their inquiries and research, Cheng and Gadamer recall the wisdom of the past to ameliorate the fragmentation in contemporary life. This leads them to re-examine the origins of philosophy; historical roots and thus sources of creative re-interpretations East and West whose affinities are developed in contributions by Hyun Höchsmann and Friederike Assandri. Höchsmann assesses convergences and divergences in the origins of Chinese and Western philosophy (Confucius and Socrates, the Yijing and Pre-Socratics) that culminates in pairing Gadamer’s understanding of paideia in the context of Plato’s political cosmology in the Timaeus with moral and social cultivation in The Western Inscription. She delineates the limits of this comparison which in turn justifies introducing Vattimo’s notion of locality. Assandri’s comparative analysis moves between India and China, Buddhism and Tang Daoism. Based on Gadamer’s argument that writing detaches concepts from their cultural moorings, she defines and applies three levels of understanding in onto-generative hermeneutics to Buddhist terms that were assimilated into the Benji Jing and in so doing clarifies essential dimensions of Daoism. -/- Contributions by Stephen Palmquist and Nicholas Brasovan position Cheng in relation to Kant and Gadamer by way of Aristotle’s ethics respectively. On the one hand, Palmquist plots Cheng’s evolving criticism of Kant’s moral philosophy and draws on crucial dimensions of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to reposition that criticism in a constructive relation to Kant’s emphasis on the philosophical conditions of morality while also indicating how religious dimensions of his thought answer Cheng’s concerns for lived moral action. For Palmquist, Gadamer enables a constructive criticism of Cheng. On the other hand, Brasovan compares Cheng’s Yijing-based account of moral deliberation with Gadamer’s Aristotelian-based ethics and reasons that in contrast to Cheng, Gadamer’s hermeneutical consciousness is disengaged from practical knowledge. For Brasovan, Cheng is a constructive critic of Gadamer. Palmquist and Brasovan’s divergent angles on Gadamer and Cheng map onto a dialectic of contrast and complementarity that constitutes the inner logic of Cheng’s philosophy. In other words, Gadamer and Cheng ought to be read alongside one another for the sake of removing discrepancies and contradictions, which constitutes the organic structure of their thinking. -/- 3 Our Mode of Being in History Is Not Historical The conversations between Cheng and Gadamer in this issue of The Journal of Chinese Philosophy pivot on language, philosophy of history and ethics within a comparative framework of analysis, but also explore the grounds that make the comparisons possible. Those grounds are informed by Chinese cosmology, and function to wrest Gadamer from the shadow of Heideggerian facticity and reposition him within the range of Cheng’s ideas about our place in nature that is embedded in his question about how mind emerges from inorganic matter.8 -/- For Gadamer scholars of Heidegger, human finitude, our ownmost individuating death ensures that hermeneutics is always open to the other as other, always on the way toward understanding the meaning of Being. To arrest the process in a concept of “the Absolute” cannot but represent someone’s point of view, and thereby render hermeneutics indistinguishable from ideology. However, insofar as finitude is defined by them in terms of an onto-theological concept of immorality, finitude is a metaphysical concept consistent with epistemologies and confuse beings with the meaning of Being. As a result, the celebrated political value of hermeneutics to always be on the way toward an understanding of the meaning of Being admits subtle variations on the same worldview that are insufficiently self-critical. -/- Gadamer scholars of Heidegger are right. A transformation in ethos and opening to the meaning of Being depends on awareness of finitude. Yet this awareness does not yield openness to more of the same, i.e., discourse structurally incapable of coming to unity but instead, for both Gadamer and Cheng, openness to a distinctly different ontological dimension of reality. As Sandra Wawrytko and So-Seong Park indicate,9 this ontological dimension is prefigured in the experience of being-as-a-whole or the totality of all possible relations in both Chinese totemic shamanistic rituals,10 and Greek Dionysian festivals.11 Through these religious experiences human ethos and therefore consciousness is expanded and elevated from being centered on one’s ownmost concerns toward an affinity with all sentient beings from insects and plants to animals. The channel for this affinity is an auditory disposition and hence, the emotions, compassion, and feeling response. -/- The capacity for an auditory disposition, or as Gadamer calls it, listening consciousness to respond to the inter-relationality and therefore inherent balance of nature is developed through music, song and dance of the religious rituals and festivals. They facilitate the unity of mind with nature. This use of music, that transforms ordinary consciousness, explains Cheng’s emphasis on the receptivity of feeling response in comprehensive observation, and Gadamer’s emphasis on openness to the other in attunement. However, an auditory disposition characteristic of pre-literate oral cultures that reveals the “All” need not rely on religion. As theorists about the evolution of language have explained,12 modern languages preserve their pre-historical past in music or prosody. That is to say, the song and dance that revealed the totality of inter-related beings to an ethos of comprehensive observation and attunement toward beings in classical civilizations is retained in the back-and-forth movement or rhythm of the dialogue form. Our mode of being in history is a mode of being in nature – through the music of language. -/- While alerting the reader to the limits of a nominalist interpretation, Gadamer expresses the inner law of the nature as follows: “in perishing there is always becoming, and in becoming there is always perishing.”13 Considered in process, opposites generate and blend into each other. This law of nature applies to everything.14 Hence, in a manner comparable to Pfister’s concluding insights, onto-dialogical hermeneutics is not only open to discrete events of otherness but moreover, to the moving structure of reality expressed, as Gajdosova suggests, in the existential moment of naming. Considered as interplay of tension and resolution with a life of its own, the dialectic of a dialogue is self-similar to the way in which an organism grows (by instinct). There is, therefore, a sense in which the art of interpretation extends the human mind into the eternal cycles of nature such that we participate in the articulation of the inner telos/homeostasis toward which all beings strive and importantly for Gadamer scholars of Heidegger, within the material limits of energy to which our embodied minds are self-evidently subject. In mortality there is always immortality. (shrink)

This book guides readers through ten classic works of Asian philosophy. Several major schools of Eastern thought are discussed, including Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism/Taoism, and Chan/Zen. The author connects the ideas of these schools to those of Western philosophy, thereby making the material accessible to people who are unfamiliar with the cultures and intellectual traditions of Asia. A wide range of important topics are addressed: reality, time, self, knowledge, ethics, human nature, enlightenment, and death.

Ki Jeong-jin is the one of the most famous Neo-Confucian theorists of the late Joseon Dynasty, and he is well known as a proposer of the theory of statements that there is only one Principle although the phenomena vary. He particularly emphasizes the role and authority of Principle. His arguments related to the theory were mainly raised in the work of Napryangsaeui. He, in this work, explicitly reveals the intention to resolve the issues of the nature of humans and things (...) in the Ho-hak debate. But he has never directly participated in the debate. Instead, after his death, some debates over Napryangsaeui arose between his students and Jeon Woo. This paper aims to analyze Ki Jeong-jin’s theory by comparison with the view of Han Wonjin who represents the theory of nature of humans and things in the Ho-hak school, and with the issues of debate between Ki Jeong-jin’s students and Jeon Woo. Particularly, we focused on the matter of relation between ‘completeness and incompleteness’ and ‘original nature’. Through this analysis, we could expand the understanding of the aspects discussed in the theory on the similarities and differences in nature of humans and things, and the significance of Ki Jeong-jin’s theory. Furthermore, in the history of Neo-Confucianism in the Joseon Dynasty, we could shed light on the reconstruction process of the philosophical statements that there is only one Principle but the phenomena vary. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Morality in Flux: Medical Ethics Dilemmas in the People's Republic of ChinaRen-Zong Qiu (bio)IntroductionModern China is undergoing a fundamental change from a monolithic society to a rather pluralistic one. It is a long and winding road. Marxism is facing various challenges as the influence of Western culture increases. Confucianism is still deeply entrenched in the Chinese mind but various religions, including Buddhism, Islam, and Christianity are experiencing a revival. (...) Almost fifty minorities coexist in the country in addition to the majority Han people. Tension and conflict are inevitable as diverse—and sometimes incompatible—values come to the fore at this historic juncture. Many fields, including medicine, face new challenges, and in this environment the field of bioethics is flourishing.Like many countries, China is groping with the effects of new medical technology and skyrocketing health care costs. But in the context of the Chinese sociocultural environment, some unique—as well as more familiar—issues arise. None of the classic texts provide ready-made answers to these dilemmas; we must find the answers ourselves. The only reasonable way to resolve the conflicts between opposing values is through dialogue, consultation, and negotiation among the various social and cultural groups.The bioethical dilemmas receiving the most attention in China now relate to the two ends of life: birth and death. On one end are issues relating to reproductive technology, especially birth control and family planning; at the other end is euthanasia.Dilemmas Surrounding Reproductive TechnologyAccording to traditional Chinese belief, not having a child results from not having virtue. In fact, the most serious violation of the Confucian [End Page 16]principle of filial piety is to be without offspring. A Chinese man without a child experiences heavy psychological pressure, and the burden is especially onerous for women because infertility is always blamed on the wife. Wives who do not bear a child are stigmatized and mistreated—even abused—in families that stick to traditional values.In China today, this widely held belief is colliding with another reality: an apparent increase in infertility among newly-married couples. The rate may be about 5 percent. These couples turn to doctors for help.Artificial insemination by donor (AID) and by husband is now widely practiced. Eleven provinces have established sperm banks, and private doctors are performing AID for considerable fees. But procedures to address legal and ethical problems associated with the procedure have lagged behind. With the exception of a few centers in large cities, AID is undertaken without established procedures or policies relating to the selection of donors and recipients, records about those involved, or clarification of the status of the child. The legal status of the child remains unresolved.The status of the child within the community is also unresolved as traditional values clash with the application of modern technology to childbearing. The case of "The Child Who Did Not Belong" (see box), illustrates how an AID child is not accepted by the family that embraces traditional values because he is not the husband's biological child.In vitro fertilization (IVF) is another alternative. Two IVF centers are in operation, one in Beijing and the other in Changsha, and both have succeeded in producing live births. This technology has received considerable media attention and is generally accepted even among those with traditional views.But much of this medical technology is not widely accessible—especially in rural areas—and so some infertile couples resort to surrogate motherhood to ensure an heir. An infertile couple enters into a contract with a woman who has intercourse with the husband in order to bear a child for the couple. This practice is called "borrowing a wife." In some villages, the "borrowed wife" receives as much as 10,000 yuan (five times a professor's monthly salary or about $250) for a girl and double that for a boy.But the more common and thorny problems involved with the beginning of life relate to birth control, family planning, and the "one couple, one child" policy that the Chinese government instituted to curb overpopulation. The goal of that policy is to prevent China's population from exceeding 1.2 billion in the year 2000... (shrink)

This highly original work introduces the ideas and arguments of the ancient Chinese philosophies of Confucianism and Daoism to some of the most intractable social issues of modern American life, including abortion, gay marriage, and assisted suicide. Introduces the precepts of ancient Chinese philosophers to issues they could not have anticipated Relates Daoist and Confucian ideas to problems across the arc of modern human life, from birth to death Provides general readers with a fascinating introduction to Chinese philosophy, and (...) its continued relevance Offers a fresh perspective on highly controversial American debates, including abortion, stem cell research, and assisted suicide. (shrink)

In analyzing evidence indicating that K'ung-ts'ung-tzu was a forgery, Yoav Ariel questions current views of the Confucian school in the time between the Sage's death in the fifth century B.C. and the emergence in the eleventh century of Neo-Confucianism. The text, traditionally ascribed to a descendant of Confucius, K'ung Fu, provides a setting for a series of philosophical debates between K'ung family members and representatives of such non-Confucian schools as Legalism, Mohism, and the School of Names. However, finding that (...) this text was probably fabricated by the controversial Confucian master, Wang Su, Ariel explains how it sheds light on the third-century philosophical milieu: Confucianism then is seen to have been not only Taoistically metaphysical, individualistic, and escapist, but also aggressive in advocating early Confucian values. The first part of Ariel's book deals with the general characteristics, history, dating, authenticity, and authorship of the text. The second part is a fully annotated and analyzed translation of the first of the two traditional volumes that constitute the K'ung-ts'ung-tzu. Originally published in 1989. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

Ethics Introduced: Readings in Moral Philosophy in an anthology that provides students with foundational knowledge in moral philosophy by exposing them to a variety of classical and contemporary readings in ethical theory and application. The anthology is divided into four parts. In Part 1, students learn about meta-ethics and question the status of moral truths through selections by Nietzsche, Ruth Benedict, and Smith. In Part 2, the question of what we should value most is addressed through readings on hedonism, Aristotelian (...) Virtue Ethics, Confucianism, and Buddhism. Part 3 focuses on normative ethics, diving into theories such as egoism, divine command theory, utilitarianism, Kantianism, care ethics, and more. Part 4 rounds out the anthology by helping students think through moral problems and contemporary controversies. Readings in this section address death and dying, abortion, war, treatment of animals and the environment, and the nature of moral obligations to people in need. Throughout the text, each reading is supported by an introduction, study questions, and suggestions for further reading and exploration to inspire critical thinking and additional analysis. Ethics Introduced is ideal for introductory ethics courses and can also be used in comparative religion, philosophy, and humanities courses. Dennis Arjo earned his B.A. in philosophy from the University of California, Santa Cruz, M.A. in philosophy from University of Colorado, and Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of California, Santa Barbara. He is a professor of philosophy at Johnson County Community College, where he teaches introduction to philosophy, ethics, ancient philosophy, and Asian philosophy. Omar Conrad earned his B.A. in sociology, his M.A. in sociology, and his M.A. in philosophy from the University of Kansas. He is a professor of philosophy at Johnson County Community College, where he teaches introduction to philosophy, ethics, logic and critical thinking, and philosophy of religion. Dawn Gale earned her B.A. in philosophy and psychology from the University of Wisconsin, Madison, her graduate certificate in women and gender studies, and her M.A. in philosophy from the University of Kansas. She is a professor of philosophy at Johnson County Community College, where she teaches introduction to philosophy, ethics, environmental ethics, and logic and critical thinking. (shrink)

In the dissertation I have presented a historical, comparative, and systematic study on the issue of the relation between aesthetic subjects and ethical subjects by focusing on the philosophers Lao-zi, Zhuang-zi, Mencius, Tu Wei-ming, Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault, and Levinas. By "aesthetic" I mean "amoral" in the Kierkegaardian sense, and by "ethical" I mean care and compassion for others in the Levinasian sense. The dissertation is correspondingly divided into two parts: "Part : Aesthetic Subjects," and "Part : Ethical Subjects." In Part (...) I, I argue that in Lao-zi and Zhuang-zi there is a tranquil poetic-religious-aesthetic subject, in Heidegger a heroic-existential-aesthetic subject and a poetic-aesthetic subject , and in Confucianism a metaphysical-moral-aesthetic subject. In Part II, one can see that in Derrida there is an ethical-religious subject, in Foucault, an ethical-political subject, and in Levinas, a pious religious-ethical subject. ;By investigating, interpreting and comparing three kinds of ethics, metaphysical moral theory, originary ethics, and postmodern ethics, I try to provide an answer to the question asked by contemporary philosophers "Who comes after the subject?" The subject, as I understand it, means the subject of representation, the metaphysical subject. This subject is essentially aesthetic. The end of the subject is my starting point. The central theme of my present study is that an ethical subject is possible only on the condition that it is first a situated subject. However, this does not mean that a situated subject is necessarily an ethical one. After the death of the subject there are at least two possibilities of being a situated subject, the aesthetic one and the ethical one: for example, the Nietzschean subject in early Derrida and the Levinasian subject in later Derrida respectively. ;My conclusion is that if the subject in "Who comes after the subject?" is a knowing subject, then in postmodern ethics, the subjectivity of the subject is constituted in its ethical responsibilities. (shrink)

In his own lifetime Confucius never attained real power and he died feeling that his life had been a failure; yet his teaching came to dominate the political and ritual life of China for thousands of years and to inspire many thinkers in the outside world. Howard Smith describes China in the sixth century B.C. and shows how its history of internal conflict, together with the cult of ancestor worship, gave rise to Confucius' central doctrines of order and 'piety'. He (...) relates how a few disciples kept this teaching alive after Confucius' death and how it came finally to be accepted throughout the huge Chinese empire as the basis for political, educational and ceremonial life. He describes also how Confucianism was slowly changed by the rival philosophies and religions with which it had to compete. This book is therefore not only a history of one of the world's greatest systems of belief but also a study of how such a system both creates and is created by the society in which it exists. -- From publisher's description. (shrink)

Various passages in the Laozi and the Zhuangzi, the two most important texts of “philosophical Daoism,” critically mock Confucian sacrificial rites. Perhaps the best known of these criticisms refers to a practice involving straw dogs (Laozi 5, Zhuangzi 14). This article will attempt to expose the philosophical dimensions of these passages that show, in my reading, how Daoist philosophy looks at such sacrificial rituals as a sort of evidence of the Confucian misconceptions of time, of death and life, and (...) of cosmic and social order. (shrink)

Who was Max Weber? How did he live? What were his dreams, desires and designs? What relationship existed between his life, his illness and his work? Why are his studies of capitalism and China still so important today? This book throws light on a problem-riddled Weber, a man lacerated by tragic contradictions, a great intellectual, nationalistic yet cosmopolitan. This investigation of his private life reveals a tender, impassioned man, who, at a time of overwhelming conflict, sought true life in love. (...) Whether Confucianism impeded the birth of modern capitalism in China remains a controversial issue. Equally problematic is the theory of the Calvinistic origins of European capitalism. Weber, however, answers both questions in an original manner, while also providing a lesson in methodology which remains unparalleled to date. A century after his death, Max Weber remains a controversial figure of political and social sciences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ritual and Reverence in Ancient China and TodayStephen C. AngleReverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue. By Paul Woodruff. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. 248.It is a sad commonplace that works in moral philosophy rarely do much to make their readers more moral. Unusually gifted classroom teachers can sometimes make a difference in students' lives, though, and now and again there appears a piece of philosophical writing (...) that makes a similar impact. Paul Woodruff has written an extraordinary book that has a chance of joining this select company. Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue wears its scholarship and philosophy lightly; in addition to lucid exposition and argument, it employs anecdotes, readings of a range of poems, and in one chapter a question-and-answer format in order to engage readers in the very real, very contemporary concerns that motivate the book. Woodruff believes that we have largely forgotten how to talk about reverence, even though its practice has not disappeared, so his sources for the theory of reverence are largely ancient-both Greek (his specialty) and Chinese. He weaves together classical text and contemporary issue in masterful fashion, producing a book that is both philosophically challenging and potentially transformative. I will comment mainly on its philosophical themes, but I urge one and all to experience the book's power.Reverence, says Woodruff, is a virtue: indeed, one of the most important of virtues. It is the "well-developed capacity to have the feelings of awe, respect, and shame when these are the right feelings to have" (p. 8). He characterizes the "belief in human imperfection" as the "central belief of reverence" (p. 199), and this makes sense, even though reverence is not primarily about beliefs. The idea that we are limited or imperfect informs each of the three feelings through which reverence is expressed. It is easy to see how this works with awe, but respect and shame are more complicated, requiring further discussion below. Woodruff offers the following initial formulation of the interrelationship among the three:Reverence begins in a deep understanding of human limitations; from this grows the capacity to be in awe of whatever we believe to be outside our control—God, truth, justice, nature, even death. The capacity for awe, as it grows, brings with it the capacity for respecting human beings, flaws and all. This in turn fosters the ability to be ashamed when we show moral flaws exceeding the normal human allotment,(p. 3)He continues by saying that this syndrome was recognized by the Greeks before Plato, and that "the immediate followers of Confucius thought much the same." [End Page 471]Woodruff's tying of reverence to specific thinkers immediately makes one wonder what word or words he is translating as reverence, if it was known in Greece and China. Comparative philosophers will also ponder the words "much the same": is there really a single virtue called "reverence" that, without our previously realizing it, can be found in both the Greek and Chinese traditions? Or are there two, more loosely related, ideas?Woodruff's answer is that there is a single virtue, but that it is realized and theorized somewhat differently in different contexts. Indeed, he does not insist that the concept of reverence that he finds in ancient Confucianism is the only Confucian concept of reverence. He relies only on the Analects and Mencius as sources, and readily acknowledges that his picture is partial and simplified (p. 230). He makes similar qualifications with respect to his Greek sources. His "reverence," then, is in the first instance a rational reconstruction built upon the ideas/terms of different traditions as well as his own philosophical reasoning. In the Greek case, he says that the concept he is exploring is "named both by hosiotēs and its near synonym eusebia, which is frequently translated as 'piety'" (pp. 225-226). Once we know this, it is easy to see that his topic was discussed in Greek texts and to ask how these texts fit the awe-respect-shame schema he has identified.Rather than pursue this topic—on which see particularly Woodruff's chapter 5—I am going to spend some time... (shrink)

This work by an accomplished and respected comparative philosopher criticizes the Western ideology of individualism from the perspective of a Confucian morality of the family. Individualism is a name for the Enlightenment era ideology of the autonomous individual. The philosophical pillars of this ideology are Locke and especially Kant, and it runs through practically all modern moral philosophy. It is the moral psychology of classical liberalism, no less than of its libertarian and communitarian critics. They are different politically, but ontologically (...) of a piece. Individual selves—rational, calculating, selfish, autonomous—are what we are. Rosemont thinks this ideology is philosophically wrong, morally, politically, and ecologically destructive, but also optional. We sometimes feel painted into a corner where the only alternatives seem to be unrestrained freedom or totalitarian dictatorship. Moral philosophy still awaits the end of the Cold War. It would be good for people to understand that there are more options. Rosemont thinks Confucianism is one of them—a Confucianism for post-modern or even post-Western Westerners, with an ideology of the family that Rosemont thinks is more amenable than indigenous alternatives to our moral and ecological crises. “The vision of classical Confucianism can be reclaimed today with its integrity basically intact.” Rosemont advances two points. First, Confucian moral psychology conceives of the person as the bearer of roles. We are our roles as the onion is its leaves, without a an essential core self. Placing roles at the center of moral psychology eliminates the value of impersonal rules or universal principles. There are many ways to be a good father, teacher, friend, or son. Moral decency acquires an almost aesthetic quality, as our approach to roles (our own and those of others) expresses such qualities as zest, grace, or tenderness. His second point is that the moral center of Confucian philosophy is the family. The family is largely ignored in Western ethical tradition. Plato wanted to eliminate family life for his guardians. Kant, Bentham, and Mill have nothing useful to say about the family. For Rosemont the family is the first and best school for morality. It is there, if at all, that we learn to love, trust, cooperate, and obey. Rosemont’s best pages describe the important Confucian concept of family reverence (xiao). The gist is unswerving loyalty to parents, obligations extending even beyond death. It is easy for Western people to misunderstand that. Confucian tradition has a carefully worked out idea of filial reverence, and it should not be dismissed with a label (paternalistic, dogmatic, Asiatic). Obedience is expected, but not servility. In the inter-generational family, the child obeys the parents, but also sees parents obeying grandparents. Remonstrance is expected when appropriate. Deference motivated by gratitude can be genuinely appreciative without fawning, and dissent can remain respectful and polite. Rosemont believes that filial reverence is a way of life as open to anyone today as it was to Chinese two thousand years ago. Confucianism is a relentlessly secular philosophy. It entails practically no theological or metaphysical commitments, and contains little if anything to offend modern scientific sensibilities. This moral philosophy is at once remote (from individualism) and close, familiar, a fairly straightforward account of how we actually live our lives. Rosemont carefully argues that Confucian ideas of family are flexible enough to accommodate progressive ideals, and may even be our best hope against sexism, racism, homophobia, and other anti-humanistic altitudes and behaviors. He urges this version of Confucianism as a human-centered spirituality for a global civilization suspicious of discredited universalism. All cultures are made of families. How alien can they be? Respect for and accommodation with diversity begins in the family, when people learn from infancy to enjoy contributing to the well-being of others. While it would be wrong to expect Western people to abandon their Greek or Abrahamic heritage, those values might be reordered in light of Confucian thought, which deserves to be better understood in the West. A traditional Confucian might be baffled and dismayed by things that pass for normal in modern families, but our families could be better at what they have to be anyway by absorbing Confucian wisdom. There is a growing body of literature on Confucianism and virtue ethics. It is worth noting that Rosemont’s thought is probably the leading alternative to this paradigm in comparative moral philosophy. He takes an uncompromisingly critical attitude toward this particular effort to build a bridge from West to East by attributing to the Confucians a Western virtue ethics, which is, he thinks, objectionably individualistic in all its usual forms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transformations of the Confucian Way, and: Histoire de la pensáe chinoiseMichael NylanTransformations of the Confucian Way. By John H. Berthrong. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998. Pp. xiv + 250.Histoire de la pensáe chinoise. By Anne Cheng. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1997. Pp. 650.Reviewing bad books, W. H. Auden once observed, is bad for the character. On the assumption that the reverse must also be true, I am delighted (...) to review not one, but two good books: John H. Berthrong's Transformations of the Confucian Way and Anne Cheng's Histoire de la pensáe chinoise. Each contributes significantly—though differently—to our appreciation of the long history of classical learning in China. [End Page 632]Berthrong, in seven chapters and 250 pages, neatly summarizes the main developments of what he calls the "Confucian Way." As a teaching tool for undergraduates and nonspecialists, the book's strong appeal is based on three factors: (1) the coherence of its narrative (no mean feat for a book covering over 2,500 years of the Way); (2) the respectful approach that it brings to intellectual traditions and the controversies they have engendered over time; and (3) the case that it urges for the relevance of the Confucian Way today to life outside the classroom and outside China. To achieve such coherence, Berthrong divides his story into seven manageable units spanned by "six paradigmatic historical transformations of the Confucian Tradition" (p. 6): (1) the rise of the Confucian tradition in Zhou China; (2) the canonization of the Confucian Classics in Han times; (3) "the defense of the [Confucian] faith" during the third through the tenth centuries; (4) the Neo-Confucian Revival in the Song; (5) reactions to Song Neo-Confucianism in "the turn toward the mind," epitomized by Wang Yangming (1472-1529); (6) the late empires of Qing China, Tokugawa Japan, and Yi/Chosŏn Korea; and (7) Confucianism in the modern world.Berthrong has chosen a sensible approach to his sprawling history, whose scope would leave most scholars cowering. He judiciously draws upon the best scholarship available on each of the transformations (giving full credit where it is due), with the result that even beginning students can quickly gain a sense not only of the important debates in the long history of classical learning but also of prominent scholars working in the field today. As a master of the declarative sentence, Berthrong has no trouble writing the bridging paragraphs required to situate his thinkers neatly within the broader historical trends that Confucian morality has shaped, reflected, or been changed by. His afterword devoted to "Further Readings and Contentious Issues" then leads readers responsibly outside the book to larger worlds, broaching difficult topics with sensibility and grace. Without hesitation, then, I would recommend that this book be assigned in all manner of undergraduate courses, in "rice paddies" as well as in courses on comparative thought and Chinese history— though I would have my own students think of it as an intellectual history of East Asia, not as a history of the Confucian Way (a point to which I return below).To communicate his respect, Berthrong seeks to illustrate "the complexity of the vision, life, conduct, meditation, conflict, compromise, and creativity that is hidden by the generalization of the word 'Confucianism'" (p. 7). To Berthrong's way of thinking, the death of "scriptural Confucianism" (Mark Elvin's phrase) notwithstanding, a tradition so protean in its transformations and so compelling in its advocacy of full humanity (ren) should find a way to renew itself in the near future—especially when his set of thinkers have at least as much light to shed on the philosophical problems encountered by humans as their counterparts among the philosophical masters of Europe and America. Berthrong is therefore at his very best when discussing xing (human nature), li (principle), and xin (heart/mind), comparing and contrasting the epistemology of Shao Yong (1011-1077), the cosmological speculations of Zhou Dunyi (1017-1073), the Cheng brothers on mind and principle (li), or the ruminations on sagehood by Wang Yangming (1472-1529).While such discussions richly convey to even the beginning student of Chinese [End Page 633] thought... (shrink)

This essay argues that Japan's resistance to the practice of transplanting organs from persons deemed “brain dead” may not be the result, as some claim, of that society's religions being not yet sufficiently expressive of love and altruism. The violence to the body necessary for the excision of transplantable organs seems to have been made acceptable to American Christians at a unique historical “window of opportunity” for acceptance of that new form of medical technology. Traditional reserve about corpse mutilation had (...) weakened and, especially as presented by the theologian Joseph Fletcher, organ donation was touted as both expressive of agape and a way of “updating” Christianity via the ethics of Utilitarianism. Many Japanese, largely Buddhist and Confucian in their orientation, view these changed valorizations as neither necessary nor patently more ethical than those of their own traditions. (shrink)

This essay elaborates on my essay, “Confucius’ Complaints and the Analects’ Account of the Good Life,” responding to issues and criticisms raised by Michael Ing and Manyul Im. Ing’s and Im’s critiques most invite reflection on regret, both as it might situate in Confucius’ own life and as it could feature more broadly in developed moral maturity. I consider two modes of regret: regret concerning compromises of conscience and end-of-life regret. The latter can naturally include elements of the former, but (...) may nonetheless have special features not exhausted by it. I argue that the model of Confucius is consistent with versions of both of these forms of regret while also acknowledging that where the Analects is concerned, much of what we might say about regret will inevitably be somewhat speculative. The essay thus dwells in some of the ambiguities suggested by the Analects. (shrink)

The aim of this book, by providing a set of conceptual tools drawn from critical theory, is to open up questions and new problems and new research agendas for the study of environmental politics.