"We shall become more Scandinavian." This sentence was pronounced in 2013 by French President François Hollande's entourage.1 It was the starting point for new legislation, notably on transparency, along with a general attempt to diminish the gap between the ruling class and ordinary people. Hollande was seemingly trying to transform "French political culture, a Latin culture, into a Scandinavian culture."2Hollande was not alone in this attempt. During the 2017 presidential campaign, Emmanuel Macron stated that his political project was "exactly like (...) the Scandinavian model," adding that this Scandinavian model "works much better than ours."3 He also pointed out that he saw the "moralization" of public life as one... (shrink)

The Nordic countries have often been regarded as ideal states with respect to their organization of society, including, among other things, their democracy, public education systems, gender equality, and strong concern for nature. From the late twentieth century onward, an increasing interest in Nordic literature, film, and design—genres where social and environmental themes have been strongly highlighted—can be noted internationally.This discourse of the Nordic societies can be considered to contain both utopian and dystopian aspects. As Kjerstin Aukrust and Cecilie (...) Weiss-Andersen show in their article on French democracy, the Nordic, understood as a utopian motif, has been a long-standing topic in modern French... (shrink)

Without directly addressing the Demarcation Problem for logic—the problem of distinguishing logical vocabulary from others—we focus on distinctive aspects of logical vocabulary in pursuit of a second goal in the philosophy of logic, namely, proposing criteria for the justification of logical rules. Our preferred approach has three components. Two of these are effectively Belnap’s, but with a twist. We agree with Belnap’s response to Prior’s challenge to inferentialist characterisations of the meanings of logical constants. Belnap argued that for a logical (...) constant to exist, its rules must be conservative over a previously given consequence relation and guarantee the uniqueness of the constant. The twist is that we require logical vocabulary to be provably conservative, not over a previously given formal consequence relation, but over a previously given meaningful vocabulary of a language. Uniqueness is also a feature defined in terms of provability: if two syntactically distinguished expressions are governed by the same rules, then formulas with them as main operators are interderivable. Belnap’s criteria are not only those for the existence of a logical constant, but more: they are what distinguishes logical vocabulary from all other expressions. It is the defining mark of a logical constant that it is provably conservative over the fragment of the language which excludes it and that its rules guarantee its uniqueness. The third component is the topic neutrality of logic. The provable conservativeness of logic over a previously given vocabulary of a language is motivated, in part, by appeal to molecularism in the theory of meaning. Molecularity is a feature endorsed by the theory of meaning as a whole, so it does not distinguish logical constants from other expressions. The same is true for conservativeness. We argue that molecularity, and hence conservativeness, are implicit presuppositions of speakers’ use of language: the addition of new vocabulary to a language is presupposed to be conservative. But this presupposition is one that we should be able reflectively to endorse (such as when attempting a rational reconstruction of the use of the vocabulary). Thus, where conservativeness is found to fail, this defect should be remedied and the use of the vocabulary corrected (as in classical negation) or excised altogether (as in pejoratives). We go on to characterise a notion of topic neutrality, which we argue applies to logical vocabulary. We then note that reflective endorsement of the conservativeness of a topic neutral vocabulary requires a proof that the vocabulary is conservative relative to any base vocabulary. Thus we require that logical vocabulary be demonstrably conservative. Allying this requirement, distinctive of logic, to a general consideration about the commitments of assertion yields a mode of justification for logical constants akin to some conceptions of Harmony, i.e., to the idea that the consequences of assertion of a logical complex need to be warranted by the grounds and ought to be the strongest consequences warranted by the grounds. Intuitionistic logic acquires a somewhat familiar justification but emanating from a new motivation. (shrink)

This essay focuses on Husserl’s conception of the natural attitude, which, I argue, is one of his most important contributions to contemporary phenomenology. I offer a critical exploration of this concept’s productive explanatory potential for feminist theory, critical race theory, queer theory, and disability studies. In the process, I draw attention to the rich, multi-faceted, and ever-changing social world that can be brought to life through this particular phenomenological concept. One of the most striking features of the natural attitude, as (...) Husserl describes it, is that it is not natural at all, but rather, is a developmental phenomenon that is acquired through, and profoundly influenced by, specific socio-cultural practices. To de-naturalize the natural attitude, then, is to recognize that the natural attitude is not fixed or innate but relative to a particular time period and culture, and therefore always capable of being changed. (shrink)

Since McCall (1966), the heterodox principle of propositional logic that it is impossible for a proposition to be entailed by its own negation—in symbols, ¬(¬φ→φ)—has gone by the name of Aristotle’s thesis, since Aristotle apparently endorses it in Prior Analytics 2.4, 57b3–14. Scholars have contested whether Aristotle did endorse his eponymous thesis, whether he could do so consistently, and for what purpose he endorsed it if he did. In this article, I reconstruct Aristotle’s argument from this passage and show that (...) he accepts this thesis. Further, I show that the argument he gives is, making plausible assumptions, a correct proof in a consistent fragmentary nonclassical metalogic for a metatheorem he previously states concerning his assertoric syllogistic. In this way, Aristotle’s argument emerges as a fascinating case study in the use of a nonclassical metalogic to prove a result about a nonclassical object system. (shrink)

Fine (2007) argues that Frege’s puzzle and its relatives demonstrate a need for a basic reorientation of the field of semantics. According to this reorientation, the domain of semantic facts would be closed not under the classical consequence relation but only under a stronger relation Fine calls “manifest consequence.” I examine Fine’s informally sketched analyses of manifest consequence, showing that each can be amended to determine a class of strong consequence relations. A best candidate relation emerges from each of the (...) two classes, and I prove that the two candidates extensionally coincide. The resulting consequence relation is of independent interest, for it might be held to constitute a cogent standard of reasoning that proceeds under a deficient grasp on the identity of objects. (shrink)

I show that the lattice of the positive integers ordered by division is characteristic for Urquhart’s positive semilattice relevance logic; that is, a formula is valid in positive semilattice relevance logic if and only if it is valid in all models over the positive integers ordered by division. I show that the same frame is characteristic for positive intuitionistic logic, where the class of models over it is restricted to those satisfying a heredity condition. The results of this article highlight (...) deep connections between intuitionistic and semilattice relevance logic. (shrink)

In this article, I present a semantically natural conservative extension of Urquhart’s positive semilattice logic with a sort of constructive negation. A subscripted sequent calculus is given for this logic and proofs of its soundness and completeness are sketched. It is shown that the logic lacks the finite model property. I discuss certain questions Urquhart has raised concerning the decision problem for the positive semilattice logic in the context of this logic and pose some problems for further research.

A number of philosophers deny that contradictions can be believed. Are they correct? In this note, I show that even in quite weak logics, on pain of inconsistency, if there are false beliefs, either there are propositions which are true but unbelievable or contradictions are believable. Since the antecedent clearly holds, I offer some considerations in favor of the latter disjunct. Objections and variants of the main argument are considered.

We propose a descriptive version of the classical multi-attribute utility model; to that end, we add a new parameter, momentary salience, to the customary formulation. The addition of this parameter allows the theory to accommodate changes in the decision maker’s mood and circumstances, as the saliencies of anticipated consequences are driven by concerns of the moment. By allowing for the number of consequences given attention at the moment of decision to vary, the new model mutes the criticism that SEU models (...) call for an omniscient decision maker. Use of the model is illustrated with a large-scale longitudinal study showing that adolescent smokers have higher utility for smoking than nonsmokers. We also propose to use the model hierarchically to describe everyday decisions that people deal with repeatedly. Big decisions, which set policy, guide a host of nested little decisions, which in turn lead to action. For a little decision, one of the options will be consistent with the policy, and will inherit its high utility. Accordingly, most little decisions will be made quickly and will follow the policy. However, people do sometimes decide to violate their own policies, and we describe how these lapses can lead to collapse of the policy. (shrink)

Most of the surveys that were undertaken in the 19th century, particularly in France, among workers, were conducted essentially from viewpoints of social legislation, philanthropy, or were even animated by a bias against the labor movement. Marx, however, in the survey that he initiated in 1880, not only wanted to deliver information on working and living conditions of the workers to the public, but tried to clarify by the questionnaires the thoughts of the workers themselves on their own situation and (...) its social causes. The questionnaire containing about one hundred different questions utilizes, therefore, in adapting itself to the labor movement of the time and the character of the workers' education, the relevant categories of the Marxian theory of society.As an appendix, the essay contains a german translation of the questionnaire itself.Les enquêtes sur la situation sociale des ouvriers organisées dans le cours du xixe siècle en Angleterre et surtout en France, étaient entreprises avec des intentions de politique sociale ou de philanthropie ou même d’hostilité contre le mouvement ouvrier. Elles n’avaient souvent qu’un intérêt déterminé, limité à la mise au jour de l’état des choses réeL Au contraire, lorsque Marx organise en 1880 une enquête par questionnaires,, il ne veut pas seulement donner à l’opinion publique des informations précises sur les conditions de travail et de vie des ouvriers français ; le questionnaire qui, pour la première fois, s’adresse exclusivement aux ouvriers, eux-mêmes doit aussi servir à éclairer la classe ouvrière elle-même sur sa situation réelle et les causes sociales de sa misère. Aussi le questionnaire détaillé, qui comprend 100 questions, utilise-t-il les catégories essentielles de la théorie marxiste de la société de manière adaptée à l’état du mouvement ouvrier et à l’éducation de la classe ouvrière à cette époque.On a reproduit, en appendice de l’article, une traduction allemande du questionnaire. (shrink)

This chapter offers a brief historical overview of the gendered mind/body dualism associated with the rationalist tradition, according to which women’s bodies have been viewed as a threat to reason and to ethics. Taking up critiques of this model offered by Beauvoir and Fanon, I maintain that the body of the Other makes an ethical claim upon us in the form of “bodily imperatives.” I conclude with a critical analysis of contemporary feminist ethics that seeks to move beyond the false (...) dichotomies of mind/body, reason/emotions, transcendence/immanence, and male/female dualisms. Assuming as their starting point the universality of human dependency and the debilitating reality of embodied oppression, contemporary feminist ethicists seek to overturn the sexist, racist, and ableist effects of a philosophical tradition that has always privileged some minds and bodies over others. (shrink)

Excerpt from Man's Freedom Human originals act in unusual ways at anticipatable times. Their lives are no less surely delimited, ordered, rhythmic than are our own. Unreliable, they nevertheless are never outside the reach of reasonable expectation and control. They behave in regular ways in a recognizable area which happens to be wider than that in which the rest live. The lives of iconoclasts and rebels, of eccentrics and of some men of genius seem to be unordered from the standpoint (...) of the groups to which they normally belong. Their lives, though, are no less ordered than those of ordinary men. Even from the standpoint of their own societies, they can be understood as men who are stable in ways differ ent from the usual - as men whose unconventionalities are only the usual conventionalities modified, defied, or unappreciated - and that predictably. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

As a philosophic work should, it attempts to articulate a vision of the whole of things. This means that it must run counter to the temper not only of ...

The paper examines Wright’s attempt to inflate deflationism about truth. It accepts the details of Wright’s argument but contends that it should best be seen as posing a dilemma for the deflationist: either truth is independent of norms of warranted assertibility—in which case it is substantial—or it is not—in which case epistemicism about truth is a consequence. Some concerns about epistemicism are raised in avoiding the second horn. The first is avoided by distinguishing between independence and substantiality and arguing that (...) only the first applies to truth and only the second is worrisome to deflationism. So, despite its sub-title, the following is not a diatribe against Home Rule but a modest defence of deflationism. (shrink)

This essay explores classical rabbinic literature's understanding of the prohibition of bloodshed alongside its understanding that "the image of God" corresponds to the physically embodied individual. This conception generates radical implications so that, apart from the narrow instance of a direct aggressor with intent to kill or rape, it is never legitimate to cause the death of any person, even in pursuit of a supposed "greater good." While notions of war and execution are retained in principle, the requirement of direct (...) divine sanction for such actions neutralizes them in practice, removing them from the domain of human judgment and justification. (shrink)

The shadowy Roman god Sēmō and the plural group Sēmōnēs have long been associated with sēmen ‘seed.’ But the evidence that Sēmō or the Sēmōnēs have anything to do with seeds is lacking. The Sēmōnēs first appear in the Carmen Arvale: here they constitute Mars's retinue. The Sabellic evidence also puts Semo firmly in the Martial sphere. The form Semo appears, in addition, as part of the Semo Sancus Dius Fidius complex. These divinities are connected with the sanctity of treaties (...) and oaths. In “Dumézilian” terms Semo is a god of the first and second function, but not a god of the third function, precisely the opposite of what the standard etymology predicts. New evidence from Oscan allows us to reject conclusively the connection between sēmen and Sēmō. In an inscription from Pietrabbondante the god's name is spelled seemuneí and this spelling with ee is not the expected one. If the Oscan form were a derivative of the root seen in sēmen, the spelling would have to have been †síímuneí. The spelling ee shows that the Oscan form, and its Latin cognate, must have a different origin. The only plausible source is *seγVmōn-. A form that matches reconstructed *seγVmōn- exactly is Gaulish Segomoni and Ogham Irish SEGAMANAS. The Gaulish god is identified with Mars. The Celtic and Italic forms continue a Proto-Italo-Celtic *seĝhomōn- ‘strong one,’ ‘strongman,’ which is a derivative of a noun *seĝhom ‘strength.’ The root *seĝh- had the original meaning ‘hold firmly’ and this developed to ‘be strong,’ ‘conquer’ in Indo-Iranian and Western Indo-European. The god *seĝhomōn- is the sole example of a divine name that perhaps can be considered a unique and innovative feature of the ancient Proto-Italo-Celtic speech community. (shrink)

An instrument is any object which makes possible the attainment of desired ends. It is not essential to the being of the instrument that it be inanimate, worked over, or its mode of operation understood. A pigeon can carry a message; a stone as well as a hammer can be employed to break a glass; a child can start an automobile. The instrument need not function in the interests of men, be set into operation by living beings, or even be (...) used at all. Leaves serve some insects as umbrellas do men; the rays of the sun may turn a screw; a new knife has not yet had a chance to cut. A cow is an instrument for the production of milk, a hen for the production of eggs, though neither is inanimate, worked over, nor its operation understood; they can serve the interests of other animals, are able to initiate their own movements, and may not yet have had occasion to produce the desired results. But they are instruments because they are acknowledged means for the production of the desired milk and eggs. (shrink)

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 89, Issue 4, Page 754-755, December 2011.

Despite claims of pure pragmatism, Hertwig and Ortmann's negative perspective on deception suggests a selfish psychologist willing to sacrifice the reputation of the discipline in order to expedite the research. Although questions that appear to have correct answers may be investigated with complete openness, research that delves into personal secrets often requires deception as a tool to counter self-presentation bias.

The authors argue that, while all historical situations are in some sense unique, Sudan is not so idiosyncratic that the lessons and the precedents cannot be replicated elsewhere to protect civilians caught between warring sides in civil wars.