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Mark Alicke [7]Mark D. Alicke [4]
  1. Causation, Norm violation, and culpable control.Mark D. Alicke, David Rose & Dori Bloom - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (12):670-696.
    Causation is one of philosophy's most venerable and thoroughly-analyzed concepts. However, the study of how ordinary people make causal judgments is a much more recent addition to the philosophical arsenal. One of the most prominent views of causal explanation, especially in the realm of harmful or potentially harmful behavior, is that unusual or counternormative events are accorded privileged status in ordinary causal explanations. This is a fundamental assumption in psychological theories of counterfactual reasoning, and has been transported to philosophy by (...)
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  2. Blaming Badly.Mark Alicke - 2008 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 8 (1-2):179-186.
    Moral philosophers, legal theorists, and psychologists who study moral judgment are remarkably agreed in prescribing how to blame people. A blameworthy act occurs when an actor intentionally, negligently or recklessly causes foreseen, or foreseeable, harmful consequences without any compelling mitigating or extenuating circumstances. This simple formulation conveniently forestalls intricacies about how to construe concepts such as will, causation, foresight, and mitigation, but putting that aside for the moment, it seems fair to say that blame “professionals” share compatible conceptions of how (...)
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  3. Hypocrisy: What Counts?Mark Alicke, Ellen Gordon & David Rose - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology (5):1-29.
    Hypocrisy is a multi-faceted concept that has been studied empirically by psychologists and discussed logically by philosophers. In this study, we pose various behavioral scenarios to research participants and ask them to indicate whether the actor in the scenario behaved hypocritically. We assess many of the components that have been considered to be necessary for hypocrisy (e.g., the intent to deceive, self-deception), factors that may or may not be distinguished from hypocrisy (e.g., weakness of will), and factors that may moderate (...)
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  4. Culpable Control or Moral Concepts?Mark Alicke & David Rose - 2010 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):330-331.
    Knobe argues in his target article that asymmetries in intentionality judgments can be explained by the view that concepts such as intentionality are suffused with moral considerations. We believe that the “culpable control” model of blame can account both for Knobe's side effect findings and for findings that do not involve side effects.
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  5. Beyond prejudice: Are negative evaluations the problem and is getting us to like one another more the solution?John Dixon, Mark Levine, Steve Reicher, Kevin Durrheim, Dominic Abrams, Mark Alicke, Michal Bilewicz, Rupert Brown, Eric P. Charles & John Drury - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (6):411-425.
    For most of the history of prejudice research, negativity has been treated as its emotional and cognitive signature, a conception that continues to dominate work on the topic. By this definition, prejudice occurs when we dislike or derogate members of other groups. Recent research, however, has highlighted the need for a more nuanced and “inclusive” (Eagly 2004) perspective on the role of intergroup emotions and beliefs in sustaining discrimination. On the one hand, several independent lines of research have shown that (...)
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  6.  59
    Causal deviance and the ascription of intent and blame.Ross Rogers, Mark D. Alicke, Sarah G. Taylor, David Rose, Teresa L. Davis & Dori Bloom - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):404-427.
    Research indicates that actors who intentionally bring about harmful consequences are blamed more for their actions than those who do so unintentionally. However, in many instances of harmful behavior, intentions are ambiguous. The Culpable Control Model of Blame (CCM) predicts that the degree to which an actor is blamed for causing a harmful outcome is strongly influenced by information about the actor’s character, motives, or desires and that initial blame assessments impact important blame-related criteria such as judgements regarding the actor’s (...)
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  7. What is blame and why do we love it?Mark D. Alicke, Ross Rogers & Sarah Taylor - 2018 - In Kurt Gray & Jesse Graham (eds.), Atlas of Moral Psychology. Guilford. pp. 382.
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  8. Culpable Control and Deviant Causal Chains.Mark Alicke & David Rose - 2012 - Personality and Social Psychology Compass 6 (10):723-735.
    Actions that are intended to produce harmful consequences can fail to achieve their desired effects in numerous ways. We refer to action sequences in which harmful intentions are thwarted as deviant causal chains. The culpable control model of blame (CCM)is a useful tool for predicting and explaining the attributions that observers make of the actors whose harmful intentions go awry. In this paper, we describe six types of deviant causal chains; those in which: an actor’s attempt is obviated by the (...)
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  9. Philosophical Psychology would like to thank the following for contributing to the journal as reviewers this past year: Fred Adams Kenneth Aizawa.Joshua Alexander, Mark Alicke, Holly Andersen, Michael Anderson, Kristin Andrews, István Aranyosi, Nomy Arpaly, Robert Audi & Andrew R. Bailey - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):161-163.
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    It’s a Miracle: Separating the Miraculous from the Mundane.Michael R. Ransom & Mark D. Alicke - 2012 - Archive for the Psychology of Religion 34 (2):243-275.
    What aspects and features of events impel people to label them as miraculous? Three studies examined people's miracle conceptions and the factors that lead them to designate an event as a miracle. Study 1 identified the basic elements of laypersons’ miracle beliefs by instructing participants to define a miracle, to list five events that they considered miraculous, and to state what they believed to be the purpose of miracles. Results showed that individuals tend to view miracles as highly improbable and (...)
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    You say you want a revolution?Mark Alicke - 2012 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 35 (6):426-427.
    I argue that Dixon et al. fail to maintain a careful distinction between the negative evaluation definition of and the implications of this definition for correcting the social ills that prejudice engenders. I also argue that they adduce little evidence to suggest that if prejudice were diminished, commensurate reductions in discrimination would not follow.
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