Deception by researchers is necessary and not necessarily evil

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3):431-432 (2001)
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Abstract

Despite claims of pure pragmatism, Hertwig and Ortmann's negative perspective on deception suggests a selfish psychologist willing to sacrifice the reputation of the discipline in order to expedite the research. Although questions that appear to have correct answers may be investigated with complete openness, research that delves into personal secrets often requires deception as a tool to counter self-presentation bias.

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