En esta ponencia presentaremos la traducción al catalán del libro Análisis Reflexivo, de Lester Embree, quien es probablemente el representante vivo más influyente y líder de la corriente fenomenológica que empezó con la New School For Social Research y cuya primera generación fue la de Dorion Cairns, Aaron Gurwitsch y Alfred Schutz. Esta tradición empieza con la publicación de Ideas de Husserl en 1913, por lo que la traducción de este libro no deja de ser un pequeño homenaje al libro (...) en el año de su centenario. Contaremos cómo surgió y por qué decidimos emprender la traducción del libro, para pasar a exponer luego algunas dificultades terminológicas que aparecieron a lo largo de la traducción, así como justificar algunos de los términos que usamos para su traducción. Nos centraremos en los términos que pertenecen estrictamente a la tradición de la New School, como son ‘intentivity’ and ‘intentive process’, acuñados por Cairns, para pasar a explicar luego el término que Lester prefiere para referirse a aquello a lo que se refieren estos conceptos: ‘encounterings’. Finalmente, acabaremos por comentar la traducción de los términos ingleses ‘experience’ y ‘objects as intended to’. En resumen, nuestra intención es presentar la traducción del libro Análisis Reflexivo al catalán y que esta presentación sea un humilde homenaje al autor.In this paper we are going to present the Catalan translation of the book Reflexive Analysis, by Lester Embree, who is probably the most influential living representative and leader of what once was the New School tendency in phenomenology headed by Dorion Cairns, Aron Gurswitch and Alfred Schutz. This tendency began with the publication of Husserl’s Ideas in 1913. In this way, the translation of this book is a small tribute to Ideas in the year of the celebration of its centenary. We will explain how and why we decided to translate Embree’s book, followed by an exposition of some of the terminological difficulties that came up during its translation, as well as the justification for some of our terminological decisions. We will focus on the terms that strictly belong to the tradition of the New School tendency, such as ‘intentiveness’ and ‘intentive process’, coined by Cairns, so as to proceed then to explain the term that Lester prefers to use to refer to what those terms refer to: ‘encounterings’. Finally, we will close this talk by commenting on the translation of the English words ‘experience’ and ‘objects as intended to’. Summarizing, our intention is to present the translation of the book Reflexive Analysis into Catalan and we expect this presentation to be a humble tribute to the author. (shrink)

In the educational sphere, the concept of democracy is used in many and varied ways, though the hegemonic school culture often starts from a concept of democracy that is taken for granted, and it is understood that the entire educational community shares a similar concept. As a result of the research project “Democracy, participation and inclusive education in schools” we realized that the above-mentioned concept is used without being accurately defined in the school setting. This observation is what has prompted (...) us to write this article, basically structured in two parts. In the first part, based on the theoretical debate occurring in the field of social sciences, we delimit the concept of democracy and structure it in four basic dimensions: governance, inhabitance, otherness and ethos. In the second part, we specify and examine in depth these four dimensions in the school setting in order to construct a broad and transversal, yet specific, definition, with which to be able to develop ambitious democratic projects and, in turn, contribute to scientific debate. (shrink)

Engineering ethics is usually focused on engineers’ ethics, engineers acting as individuals. Certainly, these professionals play a central role in the matter, but engineers are not a singularity inside engineering ; they exist and operate as a part of a complex network of mutual relationships between many other people, organizations and groups. When engineering ethics and engineers’ ethics are taken as one and the same thing the paradigm of the ethical engineer which prevails is that of the heroic engineer, a (...) certain model of the ideal engineer: someone both quite individualistic and strong enough to deal with all the moral challenges that could arise. We argue that this is not the best approach, at least today in our interrelated world. We have achieved a high degree of independence from nature by means of technology. In exchange for this autonomy we have become increasingly tied up with very complex systems to which we constantly delegate new tasks and powers. Concerns about safety keep growing everywhere due to the fact that now we have a sensitive awareness of the huge amount of power we are both consuming and deploying, thus, new forms of dialogue and consensus have to be incorporated at different levels, in different forums and at different times. Within these democratic channels of participation not just the needs and interests, but also the responsibilities and mutual commitments of all parties should be taken into account. (shrink)

Longtermists have argued that humanity should significantly increase its efforts to prevent catastrophes like nuclear wars, pandemics, and AI disasters. But one prominent longtermist argument overshoots this conclusion: the argument also implies that humanity should reduce the risk of existential catastrophe even at extreme cost to the present generation. This overshoot means that democratic governments cannot use the longtermist argument to guide their catastrophe policy. In this paper, we show that the case for preventing catastrophe does not depend on longtermism. (...) Standard cost-benefit analysis implies that governments should spend much more on reducing catastrophic risk. We argue that a government catastrophe policy guided by cost-benefit analysis should be the goal of longtermists in the political sphere. This policy would be democratically acceptable, and it would reduce existential risk by almost as much as a strong longtermist policy. (shrink)

Escribir sobre ética —y en particular sobre ética médica— en los tiempos que corren comporta un cierto riesgo, no sólo por la posible incompetencia del autor, sino porque éste se encuentra algo desubicado en un entorno de crisis moral propiciada por el cientifismo como nueva religión laica y la voracidad de los mercados. La preocupación de los legos por la creciente dificultad en discernir aquello que es ético o bueno de lo que no lo es constituye en la actualidad un (...) dilema universal, al menos por cuanto respecta a nuestra civilización occidental. Dicha preocupación se encuentra plasmada en decenas de textos dedicados no ya a los aspectos más abstractos o filosóficos de la ética general, sino a las “éticas particulares” aplicables a las profesiones, las empresas o al ámbito político. Así, se habla de una ética periodística, del compliance industrial, de la investigación, de la banca, de las redes de sociales y, por supuesto de la medicina. (shrink)

Carl Craver investigates what we are doing when we sue neuroscience to explain what's going on in the brain.

In some developed nations, corporations are today legally regarded as “people”. But if that were literally true of the Weyland‐Yutani Corporation in the Alien franchise, the least it would deserve is a swift left‐hook to the jaw from Ripley and the few unfortunate persons who survive with her in each of the movies. The question of what constitutes good business practices is what business ethics is all about. In Alien, Carter Burke is the quintessential corporate weasel, and in many ways (...) it's almost as if Gordon Gekko was transported into science fiction. The problem of deferring accountability is unavoidable in any large company, and Weyland‐Yutani is no exception. There are two major approaches to ethics that can help us to understand the extent to which cost‐benefit reasoning is ethical. The first, defended and popularized by Immanuel Kant, is deontology. The second major approach to ethics is utilitarianism, whose most famous early proponent was John Stuart Mill. (shrink)

The notion of ‘omnipotence’ (potentia dei) runs through the history of medieval philosophy especially after the contribution of Augustine’s thought. Augustine thus traces ethical developments from the idea of God’s sovereignty to the construction of an order of things comparable with his power of creation. Augustine was the first Christian thinker to introduce and document the notion of potentia dei in an ethical context, proving at the same time that the ambivalence of God’s power results either from the activity of (...) ordering, or from the impossibility of God’s duplication, or from the incapacity to destroy the world in respect to a rational configuration of laws and events. (shrink)

Jung has never pursued the "psychology of religion" apart from general psychology. The unique importance of his work lies rather in his discovery and treatment of religious, or potentially religious, factors in his investigation into the unconscious as a whole and in his general therapeutic practice. In Answer to Job , first published in Zurich in 1952, Jung employs the familiar language of theological discourse. Such terms as "God," "wisdom," and "evil" are the touchstones of his argument. And yet, Answer (...) to Job , perhaps Jung's most controversial work, is not an essay in theology as much as it is an examination of the symbolic role that theological concepts play in a person's psychic life. (shrink)

Carl F. Craver investigates what we are doing when we use neuroscience to explain what's going on in the brain. When does an explanation succeed and when does it fail? Craver offers explicit standards for successful explanation of the workings of the brain, on the basis of a systematic view about what neuroscientific explanations are.

Discrimination, understood as differential treatment of individuals on the basis of their respective group memberships, is widely considered to be morally wrong. This moral judgment is backed in many jurisdictions with the passage of equality of opportunity legislation, which aims to ensure that racial, ethnic, religious, sexual, sexual-orientation, disability and other groups are not subjected to discrimination. This chapter explores the conceptual underpinnings of discrimination and equality of opportunity using the tools of analytical moral and political philosophy.

In this systematic introduction to the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce, the author focuses on four of Peirce's fundamental conceptions: pragmatism and Peirce's development of it into what he called 'pragmaticism'; his theory of signs; his phenomenology; and his theory that continuity is of prime importance for philosophy. He argues that at the centre of Peirce's philosophical project is a unique form of metaphysical realism, whereby continuity and evolutionary change are both necessary for our understanding of experience. In his final (...) chapter Professor Hausman applies this version of realism to contemporary controversies between anti-realists and anti-idealists. Peirce's views are compared to those of such contemporary figures as Davidson, Putnam, and Rorty. The book will be of particular interest to philosophers concerned with American philosophy and current debates on realism as well as linguists working in semiotics. (shrink)

Written three years before his death, The Undiscovered Self combines acuity with concision in masterly fashion and is Jung at his very best. Offering clear and crisp insights into some of his major theories, such as the duality of human nature, the unconscious, human instinct and spirituality, Jung warns against the threats of totalitarianism and political and social propaganda to the free-thinking individual. As timely now as when it was first written, Jung's vision is a salutary reminder of why we (...) should not become passive members of the herd. With a new foreword by Sonu Shamdasani. (shrink)

Under what conditions are people responsible for their choices and the outcomes of those choices? How could such conditions be fostered by liberal societies? Should what people are due as a matter of justice depend on what they are responsible for? For example, how far should healthcare provision depend on patients' past choices? What values would be realized and which hampered by making justice sensitive to responsibility? Would it give people what they deserve? Would it advance or hinder equality? The (...) explosion of philosophical interest in such questions has been fuelled by increased focus on individual responsibility in political debates. Political philosophers, especially egalitarians, have responded to such developments by attempting to map out the proper place for responsibility in theories of justice. This book both reflects on these recent developments in normative political theory and moves the debate forwards. (shrink)

One of the most significant political philosophers of the twentieth century, Carl Schmitt is a deeply controversial figure who has been labeled both Nazi sympathizer and modern-day Thomas Hobbes. First published in 1938, The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes used the Enlightenment philosopher’s enduring symbol of the protective Leviathan to address the nature of modern statehood. A work that predicted the demise of the Third Reich and that still holds relevance in today’s security-obsessed society, this volume will (...) be essential reading for students and scholars of political science. “Carl Schmitt is surely the most controversial German political and legal philosopher of this century. . . . We deal with Schmitt, against all odds, because history stubbornly persists in proving many of his tenets right.”— Perspectives on Political Science “[A] significant contribution. . . . The relation between Hobbes and Schmitt is one of the most important questions surrounding Schmitt: it includes a distinct, though occasionally vacillating, personal identification as well as an association of ideas.”— Telos. (shrink)

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the recent debate about responsibility and distributive justice. It traces the recent philosophical focus on distributive justice to John Rawls and examines two arguments in his work which might be taken to contain the seeds of the focus on responsibility in later theories of distributive justice. It examines Ronald Dworkin's ‘equality of resources’, the ‘luck egalitarianism’ of Richard Arneson and G. A. Cohen, as well as the criticisms of their work put forward by (...) Elizabeth Anderson, Marc Fleurbaey, Susan Hurley, and Jonathan Wolff. Key concepts such as responsibility (individual and collective), luck (thin and thick; brute and option), control, desert, and equality of opportunity are delineated, and the implementation of responsibility-sensitive accounts of justice is considered. The chapters of this book are positioned in relation to the wider literature on responsibility and distributive justice, and a brief outline of the chapters is provided. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against one variety of contextualism about aesthetic predicates such as “beautiful.” Contextualist analyses of these and other predicates have been subject to several challenges surrounding disagreement. Focusing on one kind of contextualism— individualized indexical contextualism —I unpack these various challenges and consider the responses available to the contextualist. The three responses I consider are as follows: giving an alternative analysis of the concept of disagreement ; claiming that speakers suffer from semantic blindness; and claiming that (...) attributions of beauty carry presuppositions of commonality. I will argue that none of the available strategies gives a response which both satisfactorily explains all of the disagreement -data and is plausible independent of significant evidence in favor of contextualism. I conclude that individualized indexical contextualism about the aesthetic is untenable, although this does not rule out alternative contextualist approaches to the aesthetic. (shrink)

Traces the development of the integral and the differential calculus and related theories since ancient times.

This chapter identifies three contrasts between responsibility-sensitive justice and desert-sensitive justice. First, while responsibility may be appraised on prudential or moral grounds, it is argued that desert is necessarily moral. As moral appraisal is much more plausible, responsibility-sensitive justice is only attractive in one of its two formulations. Second, strict responsibility sensitivity does not compensate for all forms of bad brute luck, and forms of responsibility-sensitive justice like luck egalitarianism that provide such compensation do so by appealing to independent moral (...) concerns such as equality. Desert-sensitive justice can deliver the appropriate compensation without relying on external moral resources. Finally, while responsibility-sensitive justice harshly refuses to provide for those whose basic needs are unsatisfied due to their own negligent actions, this result can be averted by desert-sensitive justice as it can take into account responsibility-independent considerations. In sum, desert-sensitive justice appears to offer a tighter fit with considered judgments about justice. (shrink)

With a characteristically broad and provocative treatment, Dahlhaus examines a single music-aesthetical idea from various historical and philosophical viewpoints. "Essential reading for anyone interested in the larger intellectual framework in which Romantic music found its place, a framework that to a remarkable degree has continued to shape our image of music."--Robert P. Morgan, Yale University Carl Dahlhaus (1928-1989) is the author of a highly influential body of works on the foundations of music history and aesthetics.

This collection of articles and associated discussion papers focuses on a problem that has attracted increasing attention from linguists and psychologists throughout the world during the past several years. Reduced to essentials, the problem is that of discovering the character of the mental capacities that make it possible for human beings to attain knowledge of their language on the basis of fragmentary and haphazard early linguistic experience. A fundamental assumption running through all of these contributions is that people possess strong (...) innate predispositions that are critical for success in this task. (shrink)

According to one large family of views, scientific explanations explain a phenomenon (such as an event or a regularity) by subsuming it under a general representation, model, prototype, or schema (see Bechtel, W., & Abrahamsen, A. (2005). Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36(2), 421–441; Churchland, P. M. (1989). A neurocomputational perspective: The nature of mind and the structure of science. Cambridge: MIT Press; Darden (2006); Hempel, C. G. (1965). Aspects of scientific (...) explanation. In C. G. Hempel (Ed.), Aspects of scientific explanation (pp. 331–496). New York: Free Press; Kitcher (1989); Machamer, P., Darden, L., & Craver, C. F. (2000). Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 67(1), 1–25). My concern is with the minimal suggestion that an adequate philosophical theory of scientific explanation can limit its attention to the format or structure with which theories are represented. The representational subsumption view is a plausible hypothesis about the psychology of understanding. It is also a plausible claim about how scientists present their knowledge to the world. However, one cannot address the central questions for a philosophical theory of scientific explanation without turning one’s attention from the structure of representations to the basic commitments about the worldly structures that plausibly count as explanatory. A philosophical theory of scientific explanation should achieve two goals. The first is explanatory demarcation. It should show how explanation relates with other scientific achievements, such as control, description, measurement, prediction, and taxonomy. The second is explanatory normativity. It should say when putative explanations succeed and fail. One cannot achieve these goals without undertaking commitments about the kinds of ontic structures that plausibly count as explanatory. Representations convey explanatory information about a phenomenon when and only when they describe the ontic explanations for those phenomena. (shrink)

In a well-known tradition, basically marked by the influence of Augustinian thought, the notion of divine omnipotence fixes the conceptual space of theology in the XI century, especially in accordance with the primacy of logical subjects. Among others, Anselm of Canterbury gives to XII century the opportunity to settle this conceptual reference, disclosing and organizing many argumentative solutions of the late scholastic period.

This response raises two critical questions about Nico Stehr's article 'Knowledge, Markets and Biotechnology.' First, it examines his claim that in a 'knowledge society' consumers now base their decisions about purchases on more intangible criteria than a product's utility. We demonstrate that this is not unique to a 'knowledge society.' For more than a century Western consumers have been enmeshed in markets where advertisers aim to fashion consumer desires for products by employing strategies that appeal to anything but a product's (...) 'use value.' Second, we address Stehr's claim that in a market undergoing a process of 'moralization,' decisions about consumption occur in a context of epistemological uncertainty caused by proliferating and contradictory information. We propose that such a situation of radical uncertainty in decision-making is not unique to the marketplace, but reflects how most individuals must now relate to almost all scientific claims. The propagation of contested knowledges about any number of scientific truths - which are themselves largely unverifiable by laypeople - means that most individuals must rely on assorted social and cultural considerations when aligning themselves with any scientific knowledge. (shrink)

Supuestos y conceptos fundamentales del pensamiento juridico de san Agustin.--La idea del estado en san Agustin.

A core, constitutive norm of science is to remove or remedy the artefacts in one’s data. Here, we consider examples of artefacts from many fields of science (for example, astronomy, economics, electrophysiology, psychology, and systems neuroscience) and discuss their contribution to a more general evidential selection problem at the heart of the epistemology of evidence. Synthesizing and building on previously disparate discussions in many areas of the philosophy of science, we provide a novel, causal–pragmatic account that fits the examples and (...) clarifies the practices by which artefacts are discovered and remedied. (shrink)