Mental rotation of emotional and neutral stimuli The main aim of the study was to create and validate emotional version of mental rotation task. As all previously conducted experiments utilized neutral material only, such an attempt seemed necessary to confirm the generality of mental rotation effect and its properties. Emotional MRT was constructed using photos of negative facial expressions; a compatible neutral MRT was also created, for detailed comparisons. 2- and 3-dimensional figures and hexagrams served as affect-free stimuli. In three (...) experiments, emotional MRT version was proven to be valid, whereas only hexagram-based neutral MRT version yielded the expected results. A number of differences between the two versions emerged, concerning response times, accuracy and difficulty of trials. The neutral/emotional MRT procedure, although needing more research, seems to give stable results, making the study of content-bound imagery possible. (shrink)

In consideration of the spatial structures of sensory experiences, an ‘Externality Thesis’ is commonly proposed, according to which awareness of sensory boundaries is also an awareness of the presence of a space beyond these boundaries. The paper evaluates the Externality Thesis in the context of vision and touch. More specifically, relying on mereotopological theories, it is shown that the notion of spatial boundaries is ambiguous as it encompasses various distinct ways in which entities may be connected by a boundary. It (...) is argued that only some of these ways are able to support the Externality Thesis. In particular, it is claimed that while bodily boundaries of which one is aware in tactile sensations are such that the awareness of them provides support for the Externality Thesis, the analogous claim is not true about the boundaries of the visual field. (shrink)

For many years there has been a debate in truthmaking theory between proponents of the substantive and deflationary approaches. Substantivists about truthmaking maintain that we need entities called truthmakers, while deflationists of truthmaking argue that the asymmetric form of the T-schema is sufficient. In contrast to incompatibilists, who argue that one should adopt only one of these approaches, I propose a compatibilist theory of truthmaking in which the two approaches complement each other through the distribution of different functions of truthmaking. (...) I find that this helps to solve the problem of truthmaking of certain contentious truths, such as negative truths. (shrink)

Grzegorz Musiał’s late work is exemplary of the Modernist coupling of desire and death, which German Ritz linked to the way that homosexual sensibility has been encoded in Polish literary Modernism. This reading of Musiał is paradoxical at heart, as the writer’s literary output must also be ridden with tensions, because his clinging to a bygone aesthetic in order to render homosexual desire seems quaint in an era in which the idea of gay emancipation is widespread. Musiał’s literary alter ego, (...) who is realized as a fictional character and as the speaker in his poems, is a hybrid of an erudite homosexual male equipped with the classical sensibility and a devout Catholic, whose appreciation and outright enjoyment of church ritual is almost camp. Musiał attempts to pit this literary dummy against the usually younger homosexual men who, like a mob of the living dead, populate the underground world of night clubs and anonymous sex. (shrink)

Philosophers of perception often claim that usual perceptual experiences not only present particulars but also phenomenally present them as particulars. Nevertheless, despite the initial plausibility of this thesis, it is not clear what exactly it means to say that particularity is phenomenally presented. The paper aims to provide a deeper analysis of the claim that perceptual experiences phenomenally present objects as particulars. In doing so, I distinguish two theses regarding phenomenally presented particularity: Generic Particularity and Specific Particularity. According to the (...) first thesis, vision phenomenally presents particularity of objects, understood as a general characteristic that may be shared by many entities. The second thesis states that vision phenomenally presents particularity of objects, understood as an individual characteristic unique to each particular. I argue that, relying on knowledge concerning the functioning of perceptual mechanisms, vision does not phenomenally present generic particularity but it has certain abilities for presenting specific particularity. (shrink)

The main aim of this paper is to try to answer the question of the nature of Kantian project of the transcendental philosophy. Is it, in real, as Kant by himself says, that his philosophy, as the critic of the pure theoretical reason presupposes, is merely the preparation the ground under the metaphysics, and merely asks the question of the possibility of metaphysics at all, or rather Kant's system of the theoretical philosophy called by Kant as formal or transcendental idealism (...) can be classified as one of the main ontological systems: ontological realism or idealism, in the classical sense. I think the crucial notion, which can help to solve this problem, is the notion of reality used by Kant in several meanings and contexts which I am going to examine in this article. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to describe and evaluate fair trade – a form of development assistance and trading partnership, based on dialogue, transparency and respect, that seeks greater equity in international trade. Fair trade contributes to sustainable development by offering better trading conditions to and securing the rights of marginalized producers and workers – especially in the South. Fair trade focuses in particular on commodities or products which are typically exported from developing countries to developed countries such as (...) coffee, cocoa, sugar, tea, bananas, honey, cotton, wine, fresh fruit or flowers. The genesis of fair trade, its main assumptions and controversies related to the implementation of the system are presented. (shrink)

Ireneusz Ziemiński twierdzi, że idolatria należy do istoty religii i z tego powodu nieidolatryczna religia jest niemożliwa. Wobec tego poglądu formułuję trzy zarzuty: zarzut z „religii zero”, zarzut z przypadkowego aktu czci oraz zarzut z nierelewantności dystansu ontycznego. Zarzut z „religii zero” odnosi się do możliwości istnienia religii indywidualnej i niezinstytucjonalizowanej, a więc pozbawionej składowych typowych religii, które są stale zagrożone idolatrią. Zarzut z przypadkowego aktu czci sugeruje, że możliwa jest sytuacja, w której ktoś myli przedmiot własnego aktu czci i (...) nieświadomie czci Boga, nie popełniając przy tym idolatrii. Zarzut z nierelewantności dystansu ontycznego wskazuje, że transcendencja Boga nie jest przeszkodą w oddawaniu czci, ale jej koniecznym warunkiem. (shrink)

Podstawowym celem artykułu jest przybliżenie dyskursu wokół możliwości regulacji gospodarki współdzielenia (ang. sharing economy) oraz omówienie potencjalnych instrumentów polityki publicznej, które mogą służyć do ograniczenia negatywnych skutków rozwoju tego systemu gospodarczego. Artykuł w pierwszej kolejności przybliża rozumienie koncepcji regulacji i régulation oraz omawia związki gospodarki współdzielenia z koncepcją współzarządzania cyfrowego. Następnie po przybliżeniu wybranych pozytywnych i negatywnych efektów gospodarki współdzielenia wskazane zostają wybrane instrumenty regulacyjne. W podsumowaniu wskazano na możliwe kierunki dalszych badań.

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse approaches to the sharing economy from the perspective of public policy science. In the first part of the text, attention is paid to perceiving the development of the emerging sharing economy not only as phenomenon with positive economic effects but also as a set of public problems (e.g., on the labour market and for existing economic structures) that require intervention at the level of national governments as well as at international level. Subsequent (...) sections identify possible actions for regulating the development of the sharing economy. The role of soft law, stakeholders’ networks, self-regulation and standardisation are discussed in the chapter. The summary includes potential directions for further research. (shrink)

Being as Event: Hegel’s Philosophy in the Interpretation of Jean-Luc Nancy This paper examines Jean-Luc Nancy’s interpretation of Hegel, focusing in particular on the category of an event. For Nancy, the closure of metaphysics means among other things the dislocation of the foundationalist of the being and to start thinking about the event as the surprise. The event is characterized by a structural unexpectedness because of its disturbing and surprising nature. That’s why being is in conflict with the present, with (...) being’s substantial, founding essentiality. (shrink)

Grzegorz Musiał’s late work is exemplary of the Modernist coupling of desire and death, which German Ritz linked to the way that homosexual sensibility has been encoded in Polish literary Modernism. This reading of Musiał is paradoxical at heart, as the writer’s literary output must also be ridden with tensions, because his clinging to a bygone aesthetic in order to render homosexual desire seems quaint in an era in which the idea of gay emancipation is widespread. Musiał’s literary alter ego, (...) who is realized as a fictional character and as the speaker in his poems, is a hybrid of an erudite homosexual male equipped with the classical sensibility and a devout Catholic, whose appreciation and outright enjoyment of church ritual is almost camp. Musiał attempts to pit this literary dummy against the usually younger homosexual men who, like a mob of the living dead, populate the underground world of night clubs and anonymous sex. (shrink)

W artykule analizuję sposób, w jaki psychologiczne i neuronaukowe teorie percepcji wzrokowej posługują się pojęciem przedmiotu. Skupię się na dwóch koncepcjach, które wychodząc z odmiennych perspektyw badawczych, starają się rozwiązać tzw. problem scalania (binding problem) w percepcji. W analizie wykorzystuję pojęcia używane na gruncie analitycznej metafizyki, wskazując, że teoretyczna odmienność rozważanych koncepcji przekłada się na różnice w zakładanej przez nie charakterystyce przedmiotu. W metodologicznej części tekstu staram się odpowiedzieć na pytanie, jak za pomocą kategorii zaczerpniętych ze współczesnej metafizyki można zanalizować (...) używane w teoriach problemu scalania pojęcie przedmiotu. W części drugiej prezentuję wyniki analizy w odniesieniu do psychologicznej teorii FIT (Feature Integration Theory, np. Treisman 1999) oraz modelu neuronalnej synchronizacji Schillena i Königa (1994, dalej model SK). (shrink)

The aim of paper is to consider some similarities and differences between Fichte’s doctrine of idealism and Dummett’s conception of semantic antirealism. While Fichte built his idealistic view in the classical way as a metaphysical doctrine, Dummet sought to ground the fundamental distinction between realistic and antirealistic theories in alternative semantic conceptions of truth conditions. The main question of the paper is whether it is possible to interpret Fichte’s metaphysical doctrine as an anti-realist one according to the criteria proposed by (...) Dummett. To order to answer such a question one has to consider a set of interrelated issues; among them is Fichte’s doctrine based upon an assumption of a reality determining the truth values of sentences; does it accept facts the cognition of which exceeds the epistemic abilities of the subject; does it allow for the existence of facts which are ontologically unrelated to subject. In Fichte’s view a subject consist of elements such as “the I”, “the Absolute I”, “the Non-I”, “the empirical I” which are related to each other in a complex way. Within the analytical philosophy the concept of the subject is much simpler and its meaning is usually confined to the meaning of the “empirical I” in Fichte’s terminology. Key words FICHTE, DUMMET, IDEALISM, ANTYREALISM. (shrink)

It seems plausible that visual experiences of darkness have perceptual phenomenal content that clearly differentiates them from absences of visual experiences. I argue, relying on psychological results concerning auditory attention, that the analogous claim is true about auditory experiences of silence. More specifically, I propose that experiences of silence present empty spatial directions like ‘right’ or ‘left’, and so have egocentric spatial content. Furthermore, I claim that such content is genuinely auditory and phenomenal in the sense that one can, in (...) principle, recognize that one is experiencing silence. This position is far from obvious, as the majority of theories concerning silence perception do not ascribe perceptual phenomenal content to experiences of silence. (shrink)

Od opublikowania tekstu Maxa Blacka The Identity of Indiscernibles (1952) — stanowiącego locus classicus analitycznych dyskusji dotyczących obowiązywania zasady identyczności przedmiotów nieodróżnialnych — minęło już blisko 60 lat. W rozlicznych tekstach napisanych od tego czasu niejednokrotnie zwracano uwagę, że rozwiązanie problemu w dużej mierze determinowane jest przez przyjęte założenia, np. odnośnie zaakceptowanej wersji zasady identyczności przedmiotów nieodróżnialnych (np. Adams 1979) lub natury przestrzeni (np. O’Connor 1976). W poniższym tekście postaram się pokazać, w jaki sposób zmiany w przyjętych założeniach wpływają na (...) wnioski dotyczące obowiązywania zasady identyczności przedmiotów nieodróżnialnych. Dodatkowo wskażętakże na pewne związki pomiędzy koncepcjami indywidualności a rozstrzygnięciami dotyczącymi odróżnialności. (shrink)

Jacek Wojtysiak twierdzi, że powołując się na zachodzenie wielkiego faktu wiary, można wykazać przewagę teizmu nad ateizmem. Wobec tego poglądu formułuję trzy zarzuty: zarzut z rocznika statystycznego, zarzut z najmniejszego faktu wiary oraz zarzut z niempirycznych racji. Zarzut z rocznika statystycznego zwraca uwagę na fakt, że wielkość faktu wiary jest zawsze zrelatywizowana do momentu w czasie, w którym jest on stwierdzany. A to rodzi pytanie, na który fakt powinien powołać się teista. Zarzut z niewielkiego faktu wiary sugeruje, że w sporze (...) między teizmem a ateizmem nie ma znaczenia, czy fakt wiary podlega pluralizacji, a więc jak wielu podmiotów dotyczy. Zarzut z nieempirycznych racji promuje pogląd, w myśl którego ustalenie empirycznych okoliczności funkcjonowania określonych religii nie zbliża teisty i ateisty do rozstrzygnięcia prowadzonego przez nich sporu. (shrink)

Teizm probabilistyczny Dariusza Łukasiewicza to teizm, który nobilituje pojęcie przypadku i wyjaśnia rolę, jaką ono odgrywa w kontekście opatrzności Bożej. Epistemolog może jednak zainteresować się kwestią o wiele bardziej podstawową i zapytać, czy nasze przekonania dotyczące przypadku można określić mianem wiedzy? Artykuł podzielony jest na trzy części. W pierwszej omawiam wybrane sposoby uzasadniania wiedzy o przypadku: uzasadnienie zdroworozsądkowe, pragmatyczne, empiryczne i aprioryczne, i konkluduję, że posiadamy wiedzę tychiczną w odniesieniu do przypadku nieintencjonalnego, epistemicznego, probabilistycznego i kauzalnego. W części drugiej podejmuję (...) problem sceptycyzmu w kwestii przypadku i sugeruję, że znaczącą rolę w dyskusji ze sceptycyzmem tychicznym odgrywają standardy racjonalności. W części trzeciej odnoszę się do dyskutowanego przez Łukasiewicza pojęcia przypadku kompozytywnego i twierdzę, że: nie dysponujemy wiedzą na temat tak rozumianego przypadku; oraz, że nie należy tego faktu traktować jako racji na rzecz sceptycyzmu tychicznego. (shrink)

It seems that there are important differences concerning the way in which space itself is presented in visual and tactile modalities. In the case of vision, it is usually accepted that visual objects are experienced as located in a visual field. However, it is controversial whether similar field-like characteristics can be attributed to the space in which tactile entities are experienced to be located. The paper investigates whether postulating the presence of a tactile field is justified. I argue that the (...) answer is both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ due to the dual nature of touch: touch is both an interoceptive modality that presents states of one’s body and an exteroceptive modality that presents external entities. More specifically, the interoceptive tactile space has a character of a spatial field. On the other hand, the exteroceptive tactile space does not have characteristics necessary for ascribing the field-status. (shrink)

In the contemporary discussions concerning unconscious perception it is not uncommon to postulate that content and phenomenal character are ‘orthogonal’, i.e., there is no type of content which is essentially conscious, but instead, every representational content can be either conscious or not. Furthermore, this is not merely treated as a thesis justified by theoretical investigations, but as supported by empirical considerations concerning the actual functioning of the human cognition. In this paper, I address unconscious color perception and argue for a (...) negative thesis—that the main experimental paradigms used in studying unconscious color perception do not provide support for the position that conscious and unconscious color representations have the same type of content. More specifically, I claim that there is no significant support for the claim that unconscious vision categorically represents surface colors. (shrink)

The usual visual experiences possess a perspectival phenomenology as they seem to present objects from a certain perspective. Nevertheless, it is not obvious how to characterise experiential content determining such phenomenology. In particular, while there are many works investigating perspectival properties of experienced objects, a question regarding how subject is represented in visual perspectival experiences attracted less attention. In order to address this problem, I consider four popular phenomenal intuitions regarding perspectival experiences and argue that the major theories of perspectival (...) experiences do not account for all of them. Relying on these observations, I show how a theory which accommodates all these intuitions can be developed by (a) recognising that visual perspectival experiences are, in fact, multimodal visuo-bodily experiences and (b) distinguishing between egocentric and structural contents. (shrink)

While philosophers of perception develop representational theories of olfactory experiences, there are doubts regarding whether features of olfactory perception can be accommodated within the representationalist framework. In particular, it is argued that the function of olfaction is not to represent stimuli but rather to evaluate it. The paper claims that the major representational accounts of olfaction have problems in accommodating the evaluative aspects of olfactory phenomenology. However, an alternative position, named “olfactory evaluativism,” is proposed which is free of these problems (...) and may serve as a foundation for further developments of representational approach to olfactory experiences. (shrink)

Philosophers often state that the persistence of objects in vision is experienced differently than the persistence of sounds in audition. This difference is expressed by using metaphors from the metaphysical endurantism/perdurantism debate. For instance, it is claimed that only sounds are perceived as “temporally extended”. The paper investigates whether it is justified to characterize visually experienced objects and auditorily experienced sounds as different types of entities: endurants and perdurants respectively. This issue is analyzed from the perspective of major specifications of (...) the endurance/perdurance distinction connected, inter alia, with the notions of temporal parts and temporal localization. It is argued that it is unjustified to characterize visually experienced objects and auditorily experienced sounds as different types of entities in respect of how they persist. On the other hand, the apparent difference in the way of persisting can be explained by the presence of contingent differences between typical visual and auditory experiences. (shrink)

While there is a growing philosophical interest in analysing olfactory experiences, the mereological structure of odours considered in respect of how they are perceptually experienced has not yet been extensively investigated. The paper argues that odours are perceptually experienced as having a mereological structure, but this structure is significantly different from the spatial mereological structure of visually experienced objects. Most importantly, in the case of the olfactory part-structure, the classical weak supplementation principle is not satisfied. This thesis is justified by (...) referring to empirical results in olfactory science concerning the human ability to identify components in complex olfactory stimuli. Further, it is shown how differences between olfactory and visual mereologies may arise from the way in which these modalities represent space. (shrink)

The article juxtaposes modern skepticism stating lack of the criterion of true beliefs about transcendent reality with respect to their contents, but accepting the assumption about existence and cognoscibility of those contents on the one hand, and — after M. F. Burnyeat — ancient skepticism understood as one that questions this assumption on the other. The doubt as to existence of beliefs — resp. propositions as contents of beliefs — is a link joining ancient skeptics with Wittgenstein. Their skepticism is (...) not - as modern skepticism - an epistemological position, but an ontological one — nominalism — questioning existence of universals that are the conditions of meaning and hence the conditions of truth of propositions. This is why the ancient dispute concerning the truth was in fact a dispute over the problem of universals, i.e. over existence of constant rules deciding which ways of connecting the subject and the predicate in a proposition are right and which are not. Realists referred to such rules, sophists denied their existence, and skeptics stated that without having such a rule at their disposal they do not ha-.: a basis for deciding the dispute between realists and sophists. This does not have much to do either with so-called correspondence concept of the truth or with the modern understanding of conceptual realism talking about \"ideal paradigms\" or \"common properties\" of things. Today\'s typologies of philosophical positions do not fit antiquity. Ch. S. Peirce\'s and D. Armstrong\'s arguments lead to the conclusion that Plato was a... nominalist in the modern meaning of the world. P. T. Geach\'s and N. Wolterstorff s analyses allow stating the same about St Thomas Aquinas. This places under the question mark the statement that the latter could be an advocate of the generally ascribed to him correspondence theory of truth, which also cannot be derived from Aristotle\'s philosophy without any doubts. (shrink)

The article is an analysis of various versions of the correspondence theory of truth and shows that this theory - in all of its versions - rests on two irreconcilable assumptions. First, according to the theory, the relation between the truth bearer and the truth maker - i.e. the portion of reality which makes the bearer true - is a grounded relation, which means that it holds whenever the elements grounding the relation exist, and that each of the elements may (...) exist independently of the other. Secondly, the correspondence theory of truth explicitly or implicitly presupposes that the truth maker always - i.e. necessarily - makes the truth bearer true. The first assumption implies that truth as a feature of convictions, assertions, judgments, etc. is either impossible or by nature unrecognizable. The second assumption is fulfilled only when the alleged "grounded" relation is replaced by an internal relation of identity between the truth bearer and its truth maker. The thesis that the so-called relation of correspondence between thought and reality is essentially their identity follows - contrary to what is commonly believed - from every version of the correspondence theory of truth that does not lead to either nihilism or scepticism. The author illustrates this fact by means of an analysis of the theories of G. E. Moore, B. Russell, H. Field, B. Smith and A. Newman. All of this paves the way for the identity theory of truth, which nevertheless faces its own difficulties in providing a satisfactory explanation of the existence of falsity. (shrink)

Philosophical considerations regarding experiential spatial content have focused on exteroceptive sensations presenting external entities, and not on interoceptive experiences that present states of our own body. A notable example is studies on interoceptive touch, in which it is argued that interoceptive tactile experiences have rich spatial content such that tactile sensations are experienced as located in a spatial field. This paper investigates whether a similarly rich spatial content can be attributed to experiences of acute, cutaneous pain. It is argued that (...) such experiences of pain do not have field-like content, as they do not present distance relations between painful sensations. (shrink)

The paper presents a new philosophical theory of blurred vision according to which visual experiences have two types of content: exteroceptive content, characterizing external entities, and interoceptive content, characterizing the state of the visual system. In particular, it is claimed that blurriness-related phenomenology interoceptively presents acuity of vision in relation to eye focus. The proposed theory is consistent with the representationalist thesis that phenomenal character supervenes on representational content and with the strong transparency thesis formulated in terms of mind-independentness. Furthermore, (...) the interoceptive approach is free from controversial assumptions adopted by other philosophical theories of blurred experiences and is able to account for the epistemic and motivational role of visual blur, i.e. that blurred experiences provide a prima facie justification for beliefs regarding our vision and motivate actions directed toward our eyes. (shrink)

Introduction to the topical collection "The Structure of Perceptual Objects"—with contributions by Mohan Matthen, EJ Green, Alisa Mandrigin, Blazej Skrzypulec, and Anna Drożdżowicz.