Considerable evidence supports the sequential two-system model of moral judgement, as proposed by Greene and others. We tested whether judgement speed and/or personal/impersonal moral dilemmas can predict the kind of moral judgements subjects make for each dilemma, and whether personal dilemmas create difficulty in moral judgements. Our results showed that neither personal/impersonal conditions nor spontaneous/thoughtful-reflection conditions were reliable predictors of utilitarian or deontological moral judgements. Yet, we found support for an alternative view, in which, when the two types of responses (...) are in conflict; the resolution of this conflict depends on both the subject and the dilemma. While thinking about this conflict, subjects sometimes change their minds in both directions, as suggested by the data from a mouse-tracking task. (shrink)

The idea of family resemblance, when applied to science, can provide a powerful account of the nature of science (NOS). In this chapter we develop such an account by taking into consideration the consensus on NOS that emerged in the science education literature in the last decade or so. According to the family resemblance approach, the nature of science can be systematically and comprehensively characterised in terms of a number of science categories which exhibit strong similarities and overlaps amongst diverse (...) scientific disciplines. We then discuss the virtues of this approach and make some suggestions as to how one can go about teaching it in the classroom. (shrink)

This article develops an account of distributive epistemic justice in the production of scientific knowledge. We identify four requirements: (a) science should produce the knowledge citizens need in order to reason about the common good, their individual good and pursuit thereof; (b) science should produce the knowledge those serving the public need to pursue justice effectively; (c) science should be organized in such a way that it does not aid the wilful manufacturing of ignorance; and (d) when making decisions about (...) epistemic risks, scientists should make sure that there aren’t social groups or weighty interests that are neglected. After discussing these requirements, we examine the relationship between discriminatory and distributive epistemic injustice in science and argue that they often compound each other. (shrink)

We compare Carnap's and Kuhn's views on science. Although there are important differences between them, the similarities are striking. The basis for the latter is a pragmatically oriented semantic conventionalist picture of science, which suggests that the view that post-positivist philosophy of science constitutes a radical revolution which has no interesting affinities with logical positivism must be seriously mistaken.

Building, restoring and maintaining well-placed trust between scientists and the public is a difficult yet crucial social task requiring the successful cooperation of various social actors and institutions. Kitcher’s takes up this challenge in the context of liberal democratic societies by extending his ideal model of “well-ordered science” that he had originally formulated in his. However, Kitcher nowhere offers an explicit account of what it means for the public to invest epistemic trust in science. Yet in order to understand how (...) his extended model and its implementation in the actual world address the problem of trust as well as to evaluate it critically, an explicit account of epistemic public trust in science needs to be given first. In this article we first present such an account and then scrutinize his project of building public trust in science in light of it. We argue that even though Kitcher’s ideal model and his proposals for its implementation in the real world face a number of problems, they can be addressed with the resources of our account. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn's post-1980 writings have increasingly emphasized the role played by language in the characterization of scientific revolutions and incommensurability. We argue that Kuhn's `linguistic turn' can be understood best against the background of a Whorfian conception of language and certain neo-Kantian themes. While this enables Kuhn to refine and unify his earlier views, it also creates some difficulties.

As a recent addition to the editorial board for the journal of Philosophy in the Contemporary World, I wanted to revisit a practice from past editions of the journal—interviewing philosophers who engage philosophical practice that reflects the mission of PCW. In this interview, a model for what I hope will continue to be a regular feature, I have a dialogue with the philosopher Burcu Gurkan. Professor Gurkan currently lives and works in Turkey while I live in work in the (...) central US, so what follows is edited from an email exchange.—Taine Duncan. (shrink)

Recent studies on probabilistic causation and statistical explanation (Cartwright 1979; Salmon 1984), I believe, have opened up the possibility of a genuine unification between philosophical approaches and causal modeling (CM) in the social, behavioral and biological sciences (Wright 1934; Blalock 1964; Asher 1976). This unification rests on the statistical tools employed, the principle of common cause, the irreducibility of causation to probability or statistics, and the idea of causal process as a suitable framework for understanding causal relationships. The aim of (...) this paper is to draw attention to these four areas of contact by focusing on the relevant aspects of CM.Causal analysis in the social sciences is based on two fundamental notions: model and method. A causal model is an idealized picture of the causal relationships in the world. Method, on the other hand, refers to certain statistical techniques that are used to evaluate and test a causal model using data which consist of joint observations on the model variables. (shrink)

Recent philosophical studies of probabilistic causation and statistical explanation have opened up the possibility of unifying philosophical approaches with causal modeling as practiced in the social and biological sciences. This unification rests upon the statistical tools employed, the principle of common cause, the irreducibility of causation to statistics, and the idea of causal process as a suitable framework for understanding causal relationships. These four areas of contact are discussed with emphasis on the relevant aspects of causal modeling.

In this article we develop an account of justice in the distribution of knowledge. We first argue that knowledge is a fundamental interest that grounds claims of justice due to its role in individuals’ deliberations about the common good, their personal good and the pursuit thereof. Second, we identify the epistemic basic structure of a society, namely, the institutions that determine individuals’ opportunities for acquiring knowledge and discuss what justice requires of them. Our main contention is that a systematic lack (...) of opportunity to acquire knowledge one needs as an individual and a citizen because of the way the epistemic basic structure of a society is organized is an injustice. Finally, we discuss how our account relates to John Rawls’s influential theory of justice. (shrink)

This paper argues against Papineau's claim that causal relations can be reduced to correlations and defends Cartwright's thesis that they can be nevertheless boot-strapped from them, given sufficiently rich causal background knowledge.

Causal modeling methods such as path analysis, used in the social and natural sciences, are also highly relevant to philosophical problems of probabilistic causation and statistical explanation. We show how these methods can be effectively used (1) to improve and extend Salmon's S-R basis for statistical explanation, and (2) to repair Cartwright's resolution of Simpson's paradox, clarifying the relationship between statistical and causal claims.

This article examines how algorithmic accountability is translated into action at the municipal level in the United States. Based on a review of task forces, ordinances, and policy toolkits from New York City and Seattle, I demonstrate the ways municipalities and local publics operationalize abstract notions of accountability. Municipal interventions often prioritize revealing computational tools (transparency) and their effects on people (impact assessments). While these two forms of accountability are crucial, they may neglect to examine institutions—and how they change—as they (...) incorporate automated decision systems. I thus propose a political-economic approach that recognizes algorithmic systems as part of municipal institutions and focuses on their role in intensifying data collection and commodification between public agencies and markets. I argue that algorithmic accountability, especially in public agencies, needs to focus on incompetence and asymmetries of power within a network of governments, tech companies, community groups, and technologies. With a mix of transparency, impact assessments, and political economic review, the paper proposes a more comprehensive assessment of automated decision systems through their development, procurement, use, impact, and decommissioning. (shrink)

This article attempts a critical conversation between Kafka's _Der Prozess_ (posthumously published in 1925, translated into English as _The Trial_ in 1937) and two novels from the Mediterranean Basin. The Turkish author Bilge Karasu's _Gece_ (1985, translated into English as _Night_ by Güneli Gün in 1994) responds to the national conflicts intensified by the military coup in Türkiye (Turkey) in the 1980s with its dark portrayal of political conspiracies and unhinged violence. Almost thirty years later, Aziz conveys a similar sense (...) of social chaos and political disillusionment: her novel _Al-Ṭābūr_ (2013, translated into English as _The Queue_ Elisabeth Jaquette in 2016) addresses the aftermath of the 2011 Egypt uprising. In addition to the social critique that shapes the dystopian allegories of the novels, Kayı_ş_cı Akkoyun examines the discursive conflicts and gaps through which Kafka, Karasu, and Aziz expose the constructed nature of oppressive structures and the arbitrariness of authority. She argues that the disjointed dystopian narratives of Kafka, Karasu, and Aziz not only portray the horrors witnessed at a particular place and time but also share a common utopian vision that extends to the future through the authors' imaginative struggle against totalizing forces of uneven modernization. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Critical Forum Introduction:Cultural Encounters and Textual Speculations in the MediterraneanBurcu Kayışcı Akkoyun, Emrah Atasoy, and Merve TaburThis issue's Critical Forum takes its point of departure from two paradigm shifts. The first one has already occurred in utopian studies, as attested by the increasingly evident interest in non-Western conceptions of utopianism and representations of speculative fiction. Scholars of utopian studies such as Lyman Tower Sargent and Jacqueline Dutton have been (...) writing on utopias from other cultural traditions. The 2013 special issue of Utopian Studies (vol. 24, no. 1), which was introduced by Sargent and Dutton, included articles that reflected Iranian, Chinese, and Korean narratives and perspectives. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, monographs1 and journal special issues2 began examining literary and visual cultures of the Global South and transcultural expressions of the utopian imagination alongside a surge of speculative fiction from the Global South. A rising number of symposiums, anthologies, and critical works on Afrofuturism and Latinx and Arabic speculative fiction also contributed to today's widening discussions.3 This special section in Utopian Studies advocates shifting from Western-centric approaches to more nuanced modes of interpretation with a specific focus [End Page 127] on the Mediterranean, which has itself been a contested discursive site in Mediterranean studies, demanding the formation of new critical paradigms.According to Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell, "It hardly needs stating that the Mediterranean, as an area seldom clearly defined but often subconsciously reduced to Italy and Greece, has been the perceived center of European civilization since the Renaissance, and in many respects since classical antiquity."4 Our set of articles challenges such reductionist views by exploring speculative configurations in the Mediterranean through literary representations of cultural encounters, social conflicts, and environmental crises. Offering analyses of various narratives that present dystopian articulations of the past and figurations of the present along with utopian aspirations for the future, the five contributions in this special section aim to expand the predominantly Eurocentric/Anglophone understanding of the Mediterranean by bringing together scholars and texts from diverse countries: Türkiye, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia. They demonstrate the cultural interactions between different traditions, conventions, styles, and narratives, all within the broad domain of "speculative" visioning. As Franco Cassano points out, the Mediterranean "becomes the root that we need to rediscover today," but one that is "constitutionally plural. … The Mediterranean that emerges is not a monolithic identity, but a multiverse that trains the mind to grasp the complexities of the world: hybridity, crossroads, and identities that do not love purity and cleanliness, but have been mixed for a long time."5 Cassano's emphasis on plurality as much as rootedness is relevant to the scope and purposes of our contributions as well.The articles here refrain from creating new hierarchies by simply inverting the East-West dichotomy, or by consolidating the center-margin debate within the context of the Mediterranean. While using familiar Western hermeneutical tools to understand utopian and/or dystopian narratives produced in the Mediterranean, this special section underscores historical, political, social, and literary particularities, engaging with various manifestations of power on both textual and contextual grounds. Gabriele Proglio's introduction to Decolonising the Mediterranean (2016) informs the critical orientation of our approach. Decolonizing the Mediterranean "means deconstructing the power relations at play," he writes, "viewing the Mediterranean as an excess space of signification in order to reconsider the past and present stories and subjectivities erased by Eurocentric, nationalist historical discourse."6 Such reconsiderations are essential to imagining future utopian possibilities not [End Page 128] only for fictional narratives but also for the many types of discursive practices shaping the material world.Following Proglio's lead, Ceyhun Arslan examines utopian possibilities that the Mediterranean, whether taken as a context or as a framework, generates for artists and scholars. He argues for the utopian potential of the Mediterranean's longue-durée history, underlining the importance of identifying and resisting discriminatory notions and practices of Western imperialism throughout that history. Drawing on recent approaches to Mediterranean studies, he envisions what he calls a "disciplinary utopia," wherein critics, scholars, and artists carefully attend to linguistic and historical differences in... (shrink)

This chapter examines military building activity in the region in the light of Ottoman sources preserved in the Prime Ministry Ottoman Archive in Istanbul and memoirs written by the senior bureaucrats of the Empire. It aims to assess whether the military building programme of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries continued in later periods in the same spirit as in the earlier time of conquests and expansion, or if the empire only supported repairs of existing strongholds. The issue was noted by (...) numerous Ottoman writers as early as the Koçi Bey Risalesi in the seventeenth century. This chapter examines four frontier areas of the Ottoman Empire: the Hapsburg borderland in Croatia; the frontier between Montenegro and southern Herzegovina; the fortress line on the banks of the Danube in Wallachia; and the Danube Delta region near the Black Sea. (shrink)

Cognitive Science, Volume 46, Issue 2, February 2022.

Drawing on the recent revisionary scholarship regarding logical positivism and its relation to the early post-positivism, I display and question the standard historical understanding of the analytical philosophy of science from the late 1920s to the mid-1970s. I then propose an alternative account based on the internal-external distinction. I conclude by showing some advantages of my alternative narrative that does more justice to the logical positivism than the standard understanding and suggest some further lines of research that it opens up.

We provide an analysis of the public's having warranted epistemic trust in science, that is, the conditions under which the public may be said to have well-placed trust in the scientists as providers of information. We distinguish between basic and enhanced epistemic trust in science and provide necessary conditions for both. We then present the controversy regarding the connection between autism and measles–mumps–rubella vaccination as a case study to illustrate our analysis. The realization of warranted epistemic public trust in science (...) requires various societal conditions, which we briefly introduce in the concluding section. (shrink)

Humean accounts of law are at the same time accounts of causation. Accordingly, since laws of nature are nothing but contingent cosmic regularities, to be a cause is just to be an instance of such a law. It follows from this view that it is logically impossible that there be causally related events which are not law-governed. Any particular cause-effect pair instantiates some law of nature, where the law is understood as a regularity. The regularity itself may be understood phenomenalistically, (...) that is, as holding between sense impressions, or realistically, that is, as holding between objective events or event-types. These days even empiricists are realists to some extent, so I will eschew the radically empiricist version and assume that when a Humean talks about regularities, he is referring to objective events, states or processes in nature, not to his subjective experiences. (shrink)

This Introduction to the Special Issue on “Responsible Research and Innovation” outlines features of the philosophical debate about the concepts involved and summarizes the papers assembled in this issue. The topic of RRI is widely discussed in science studies and has made its way into science policy. This SI is intended to make the contributions of philosophers of science more visible. The philosophically relevant parts of the field concern, among others, the processes of public participation in science and their impact (...) on the knowledge produced, the notion of justified public trust in science, and the idea of research pursued for the common good. Such topics bring social procedures together with epistemic and ethical considerations and thus raise philosophical challenges. RRI is subject to the tension between committing research to creating knowledge in harmony with public expectations, on the one hand, while not complying with public wishful thinking, on the other. RRI embodies a friction between serving people’s aspirations and correcting people’s expectations. This special issue is intended to explore the narrow pathway left between these conflicting demands. (shrink)

Humean accounts of law are at the same time accounts of causation. Accordingly, since laws are nothing but contingent cosmic regularities, to be a cause is just to be an instance of such a law. Every particular cause-effect pair, according to these accounts, instantiates some law of nature. I argue that this claim is false. Singular causation without being governed by any law is logically and physically possible. Separating causes from laws enables us to see the distinct role each plays (...) in science, especially in matters related to prediction and explanation. (shrink)

Although there is universal consensus both in the science education literature and in the science standards documents to the effect that students should learn not only the content of science but also its nature, there is little agreement about what that nature is. This led many science educators to adopt what is sometimes called “the consensus view” about the nature of science (NOS), whose goal is to teach students only those characteristics of science on which there is wide consensus. This (...) is an attractive view, but it has some shortcomings and weaknesses. In this article we present and defend an alternative approach based on the notion of family resemblance. We argue that the family resemblance approach is superior to the consensus view in several ways, which we discuss in some detail. (shrink)