In this paper, we recommend expanding infertility insurance mandates to people who may become infertile because of cancer treatments. Such an expansion would ensure cancer patients can receive fertility preservation technology (FPT) prior to commencing treatment. We base our proposal for extending coverage to cancer patients on the infertility mandate in Massachusetts because it is one of the most inclusive. While we use Massachusetts as a model, our arguments and analysis of possible routes to coverage can be applied to all (...) states' seeking inclusive coverage for infertility treatment. Furthermore, our proposal can also be applied to people with other diseases who may be rendered infertile by treatment. (shrink)

Melanie was 29-years-old, married, and hoping to start a family when she discovered a lump in her pelvis. She was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin lymphoma. But one of her biggest fears upon learning of her diagnosis was the possibility of loosing her ability to have children. When Melanie asked her oncologist and radiation oncologist about the risk cancer treatment posed to her fertility, they told her it was small, as only one ovary would be destroyed during the radiation. Deciding to ask (...) for another opinion, she sought out a reproductive endocrinologist, who told her, contrary to what her oncologists had said, that women like her typically did have problems conceiving after radiation treatment on their pelvis. One of the hardest parts of dealing with her dual diagnosis, Melanie later recalled, was the unknown: “I didn't know if my treatment would definitely render me infertile.”. (shrink)

Words can mean different things to different people. This can be problematic, mainly for those working together in a bureaucratic institution, such as the secret service. Shared, certified, explicit and codified definitions offer a counter to subjective, solitary and/or culturally dominant definitions. It’s true that codified secrecy terms for secret services can be seen to involve a number of political, cultural, subcultural “languages”, but if words come from unclassified or declassified files, memorandums and/or records, one needs a deep understanding of (...) the secret services. A remarkable feature of this bureaucratic language is the evolving nature of, certain “keywords” as important signifiers of historical transformation. Thus, the changes in the language of the secret services depends at least as much on the internal changes of the secret services as on the transformation in the external political-social environment. In spite of the confusion of Hungarian secret services in the revolutions of 1918–1919 and the disintegration of the Austrian-Hungarian Monarchy, in the early 1920’s became a stable system. Between the two World Wars, the Hungarian State Police directed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Military Intelligence and Counter-Espionage directed by the Ministry of Defence, and the Hungarian Royal Gendarmerie directed by both of the Ministries had their own operational service. This structure existed unchanged until 1945. Simultaneously with the forward advance of the soviet troops, government began to re-establish the former system of the secret services in the eastern part of the country. After WWII, in 1946, the “State-protection Department” as political police became independent from the police. However, from the beginning, they remained under the control of the Communist Party. After 1950, the State Security Authority provided special services for the MIA and the Military Political Directorate of the MoD. After quashing the revolution in 1956, in the spring of 1957, the MIA Political Investigation Department was established which—with slight modifications—kept the structure created during the “state protection era”. The MIA III. The State-Protection General Directorate was established in 1962. The reorganization was finalized in the middle of the 1960’s, which resulted in the new system, which—with the structure of Directorates—became the ultimate structure of the state secret police until the abolishment of the MIA General Directorate III in January 1990. These organizational transformations were largely the result of exogenous historical-political changes. Moreover, each new period had a major impact on the organizational communication, language use and vocabulary of the secret services. This study seeks to interpret these historical transformations. (shrink)

RésuméCet article examine diverses façons d'exploiter l'éthique aristotélicienne pour rendre compte philosophiquement de l'hypocrisie. Aristote lui-même n'apas dit grand chose d'explicite à ce sujet, mais nous nous employons à identifier et à scruter les passages qui sont les plus pertinents pour un traitement distinctif de l'hypocrisie, élucidant en cours de route un certain nombre de confusions à propos d'Aristote. Nous envisageons divers domaines d'émotion et d'action qui pourraient fournir un lieu propre au vice de l'hypocrisie, ceux en particulier de l'engagement (...) personnel, du souci à l'égard des opinions d'autrui, et de la sincérité. Nous concluons de cet examen que la doctrine du juste milieu ne fournit pas une explication satisfaisante de l'hypocrisie. Nous proposons alors que si un système moral comme celui d' Aristote doit rendre compte de la moralité dans son entièreté, il lui faut trouver place pour des phénomènes qui excèdent les limites de la doctrine du juste milieu. L'hypocrisie, selon nous, appartient précisément à cette famille de phénomènes. Finalement, nous esquissons une approche de l'hypocrisie qui fait usage d'éléments aristotéliciens, mais sans pour autant s'y confiner. (shrink)

What are the differences between hypocrisy, change of mind, and weakness of will? Each typically involves a gap between word and deed, yet they do not seem morally equivalent. Moreover, they are intuitively different concepts, even though the conceptual boundaries between them are fuzzy. This paper explores diverse examples, attempting to identify elements which may be distinctive of each concept, with special attention to hypocrisy. It also provides a discussion of the appropriateness of such use of examples in moral philosophy.

"While engaging with the current political-educational climate of England, this book offers a timely contribution to debates around questions of knowledge in relation to education and school-level English by drawing together theories of individual and disciplinary knowledge. The book provides a philosophical conception of knowledge - as fundamentally embodied at the level of the individual, and a matter of cultural form at the level of shared or "common" knowledge - and an analysis of the implications of this for schooled English. (...) The research draws from various related fields including literary criticism, philosophy, and phenomenology. The book rethinks general notions of knowledge and lays out the problems that exist within knowledge and language systems in education, especially secondary and university levels. This highly relevant and informative book offers an insightful resource for academics, researchers, and post-graduate students in the fields of education studies, educational policy and politics, philosophy of education, and literature studies"--. (shrink)

What is a hypocrite? What role does hypocrisy play in our lives? Why is it thought to be such an ugly vice? Is it ever acceptable? What do we lose in our indifference to it? Hypocrisy: Ethical Investigations seeks to illuminate the concept of hypocrisy by exploring its multiple roles in our moral and political lives and struggles. The authors provide a critical examination of a wide range of perspectives on the nature, varieties, and significance of hypocrisy, arguing that it (...) is a key concept in the investigation of the field of morality in general, including its moralizing excesses. (shrink)

Rousseau is often seen as the quintessential representative of Swiss republicanism. But to most of his Swiss contemporaries Rousseau's brand of republicanism and his self-professed Protestantism remained deeply suspect. They found his thinking, and especially his discussion of the natural origins of morality, far too sceptical and thus ultimately unsuited for their own attempt to forge a theory of republican reform. The article focuses on the reply by Rousseau's most sympathetic yet also most persistent critics, the Basle secretary of state (...) and author of the famous ‘History of Mankind’. (shrink)

U opsežnoj literaturi o globalizaciji postalo je uobičajeno tvrditi da su se koncepti ‘prostor’, ‘vrijeme’ i ‘sebstvo’ drastično promijenili posljednjih desetljeća tijekom procesa globalizacije. Moj tekst nudi analizu nekoliko tema za raspravu, koristeći navedene riječi metaforički. Analiza se prvo usmjerava na slavne termine Manuela Castellsa ‘prostor protoka’ i ‘bezvremeno vrijeme’ te na više klasičan termin Hannah Arendt ‘gubitak sebe’. Kroz analizu njihova korištenja u radovima spomenutih autora i njihovih sljedbenika, nastojat ću prikazati: navedeni termini su previše nejasni da bi se (...) koristili kao ogledni koncepti te su prihvatljivi samo u pukom metaforičkom smislu; ti su termini utemeljeni u dobro poznatom diskursu literature klasičnog moderniteta i time nisu specifični termini globalizacije. Posljednji autor kojeg analiziram u tekstu je škotski profesor iz 19. stoljeća Andrew Ure. On je, vokabularom koji koristi za opisivanje svoga svijeta, a koji je sličan ranije spomenutim terminima M. Castellsa i H. Arendt, dio diskursa klasičnog moderniteta sa radikalno drugačijom evaluacijom. (shrink)

This book paints a portrait of Ludwig Wittgenstein that is very different from conventional portraits that narrowly depict him as a philosopher's philosopher silent about social, ethical and cultural questions.

This book provides the first in-depth exploration of the importance of music for Ludwig Wittgenstein’s life and work. Wittgenstein’s remarks on music are essential for understanding his philosophy: they are on the nature of musical understanding, the relation of music to language, the concepts of representation and expression, on melody, irony and aspect-perception, and, on the great composers belonging to the Austrian-German tradition. Biography and philosophy, this work suggests that Wittgenstein was a composer of philosophy who used the musical form (...) as a blueprint for his own writing and thought. For Wittgenstein music is not alone, but connects and resonates with our cultural forms of life. His relation to composers, especially to Richard Wagner and Gustav Mahler, enables Wittgenstein to address the question of how to do philosophy and compose music in the breakdown of tradition. Unlike his conservative musical sensibility, Wittgenstein’s philosophy is open to musical experiments. Reflecting on his remarks on music makes it possible to compare the therapeutic aim of his philosophical activity with that of music, and thus notice affinities between Wittgenstein and John Cage. Béla Szabados has a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Calgary and is professor of philosophy at the University of Regina. His publications include Wittgenstein Reads Weininger (2004), Wittgenstein at the Movies (2011) and Wittgenstein on Race, Gender, and Cultural Identity: Philosophy as a Personal Endeavour (2010). (shrink)

Es wird ausgegangen von den in den empirischen Wissenschaften vorkommenden Satzarten. Die Abhängigkeit der Kennzeichnungen "vollständig" bzw. "hinreichend verifiziert" von den Kriterien der benützten Überprüfungsverfahren wird untersucht. Die irrigen Voraussetzungen extremer Verallgemeinerungen, wie der "Verifikations-these" Wittgensteins und der "asymmetrischen Falsifikationstheorie" Poppers, werden aufgezeigt. Die methodologische Symmetrie von Verifikation und Falsifikation wird durch den Hinweis auf die gleicherweise unerläßliche Bedeutung der induktiven Schritte und des kontrollierenden Aufsuchens von Unverträglichkeiten für den wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt begründet. Unter Berücksichtigung dieser Kriterien werden empirische Allsätze als (...) die Beschreibung der realen Ordnung empirischer Phänomene gedeutet. (shrink)

This article offers a detailed reading Gascoigne and Thornton’s book Tacit Knowledge, which aims to account for the tacitness of tacit knowledge while preserving its status as knowledge proper. I take issue with their characterization and rejection of the existential-phenomenological Background—which they presuppose even as they dismiss—and their claim that TK can be articulated “from within”—which betrays a residual Cartesianism, the result of their elision of conceptuality and propositionality. Knowledgeable acts instantiate capacities which we might know we have and of (...) which we can be aware, but which are not propositionally structured at their “core”. Nevertheless, propositionality is necessary to what Robert Brandom calls, in Making It Explicit and Articulating Reasons, “explicitation”, which notion also presupposes a tacit dimension, which is, simply, the embodied person, without which no conception of knowledge can get any purchase. On my view, there is no knowledgeable act that can be understood as such separately from the notion of skilled corporeal performance. The account I offer cannot make sense of so-called “knowledge-based” education, as opposed to systems and styles which supposedly privilege “contentless” skills over and above “knowledge”, because on the phenomenological and inferentialist lines I endorse, neither the concepts “knowledge” nor “skill” has any purchase or meaning without the other. (shrink)

L’objectif de cet article est de mettre en lumière quelques éléments tirés des écrits politiques de John Milton et de John Locke, en fonction de leur attitude à l’égard des différents médias. Dans son argumentation contre la censure, John Milton doit démontrer que toutes les anciennes instances de censure, citées souvent à son époque, peuvent être interprétées comme des exemples d’un autre phénomène. Cependant, John Milton reconnaît, en analysant les lieux communs dans la République de Platon ainsi que dans certains (...) textes bibliques, la portée et la signification des formes nonconceptuelles, nonimprimées, nonverbales de communication ; il les décrit comme des signes d’un comportement enfantin, féminin ou inculte, comme des phénomènes sans importance d’un point de vue de liberté politique incarnée dans la liberté de la presse. La position de John Locke est la même. Je montrerai l’enchaînement des idées, similiaire à celui de Milton, dans ses ouvrages Deux traités du gouvernement et Lettre sur la tolérance, en focalisant mon analyse sur le concept d’adiaphora. (shrink)

People do, quite naturally and not uncommonly, speak of other people as deceiving themselves, as being their own dupes. A man's child is ill and growing constantly worse. The father keeps talking optimistically about the future, keeps explaining away the evidence, and keeps pointing to what he insists are signs of improvement. We can easily imagine ourselves deciding that he has deceived himself about his son's condition. Nor is it the case that talk of self-deception is appropriate only in connection (...) with other people. We can easily imagine the father admitting, say, after the son's death, that he has deceived himself about the child's condition. Thus the notion of self-deception obviously has application. Furthermore, ordinarily talk of self-deception is not thought to be puzzling. (shrink)

Is self-deception always immoral? That it is always immoral to deceive oneself seems to have been the ‘received’ view amongst philosophers. Such a view was vigorously supported by Bishop Butler in the eighteenth century. Recently, Herbert Fingarette has argued for a similar position. In this paper I wish to examine Butler's and Fingarette's arguments and contend that no morally sensitive and reasonable person can possibly accept them without thereby ceasing to be morally sensitive and reasonable.

Vattel's Mélanges de littérature, de morale et de politique (Thoughts on literature, morals and politics) was published at Neuchâtel by the Editeurs du Journal Helvétique in 1760 and this is the first English translation. It was republished under the title, Amusemens de littérature, de morale et de politique in 1765. Vattel's text provides evidence of his response to the issues facing Europe's states in the 1750s, and in doing so provides another perspective on his best known work, Le droit des (...) gens (Law of Nations) of 1757. Vattel emerges as a reformer steeped in debates about the future of the European state system, and particularly Europe's small states and republics like Switzerland. ☆ The text of the ‘Mélanges’ was translated by Kenneth Goodwin and Edwin Carpenter. Vattel's ‘Dialogue between the Prince of *** & his Confidant, about certain essential elements of Public Administration’ has been published in Vattel, The Law of Nations. Ed. B. Kapossy and R. Whatmore. (Liberty Fund: Indianapolis, IN, 2008) and is reproduced here by kind consent of The Liberty Fund. (shrink)

What is it to be a hypocrite? Gilbert Ryle's answer is the by now commonly held one: to be hypocritical is to “try to appear activated by a motive other than one's real motive”; again, it is “deliberately to refrain from saying what comes to one's lips, while pretending to say frankly things one does not mean.” Can this be the right answer? My aim is to show that it cannot. In doing this I hope to gesture towards a richer (...) understanding of our notion of hypocrisy. (shrink)

This paper argues, first, that one can render Protagoras’s view on the teach ability of political virtue coherent by distinguishing between the affect required for achieving it and the capacity for developing these affect into fully fledged virtues. Second, the paper argues that by focusing on Books II - III of the Republic one might see an affinity between between Protagoras’s suggestion that virtuous citizens might give advice, without ruling it, in the affairs of the city and Plato’s conservative practical (...) political theory. (shrink)

This paper has two aims: to show the affinities between Schopenhauer’s and Spinoza’s ethics and ontology, and to show that Spinoza’s position, where it is in conflict with it, is superior to Schopenhauer’s. The main focus is on Schopenhauer’s attacks on the affirmation of the will-to-live. It is argued that these attacks are not even convincing in terms of what he says about “better knowledge”, namely, that they are valid only against vulgar forms of affirmations of the Will. Also, it (...) is argued that Schopenhauer’s attacks on Spinoza do not carry much weight. For, they are either the result of misunderstandings or, when they are not, they are based on assumptions rejected by Spinoza himself. In conclusion, it is claimed that Schopenhauer’s synthesis of Plato’s, Kant’s and Hindu philosophy into a “single thought” is neither as original nor as convincing as he took it to be. (shrink)