What is a hypocrite? What role does hypocrisy play in our lives? Why is it thought to be such an ugly vice? Is it ever acceptable? What do we lose in our indifference to it? Hypocrisy: Ethical Investigations seeks to illuminate the concept of hypocrisy by exploring its multiple roles in our moral and political lives and struggles. The authors provide a critical examination of a wide range of perspectives on the nature, varieties, and significance of hypocrisy, arguing that it (...) is a key concept in the investigation of the field of morality in general, including its moralizing excesses. (shrink)

Traditional theism teaches that God engages in a relentless form of observation for every human being. If, as is widely supposed, humans have a right to privacy, then it seems that God constantly violates this right. In this paper we argue that there is both a defensible philosophical excuse and justification for this infringement. We also argue that this defense is extensible to human social and political contexts; it provides the vital elements of a theory of just privacy infringement. This (...) theory is broadly compatible both with major forms of political theory and with the main conceptions of privacy defended in recent philosophical and jurisprudential literature. (shrink)

Observation by nonstandard observers has different implications for privacy than observation by ordinary human beings. This seemingly trivial point yields important insights about privacy. Searching for the characteristic that explains this difference reveals that privacy is importantly related to our interest in how others see us, and the derivative interest in controlling the information upon which others’ perceptions are based. This also casts light on the important relationships between privacy, autonomy, and the development of public personae.

RésuméCet article examine diverses façons d'exploiter l'éthique aristotélicienne pour rendre compte philosophiquement de l'hypocrisie. Aristote lui-même n'apas dit grand chose d'explicite à ce sujet, mais nous nous employons à identifier et à scruter les passages qui sont les plus pertinents pour un traitement distinctif de l'hypocrisie, élucidant en cours de route un certain nombre de confusions à propos d'Aristote. Nous envisageons divers domaines d'émotion et d'action qui pourraient fournir un lieu propre au vice de l'hypocrisie, ceux en particulier de l'engagement (...) personnel, du souci à l'égard des opinions d'autrui, et de la sincérité. Nous concluons de cet examen que la doctrine du juste milieu ne fournit pas une explication satisfaisante de l'hypocrisie. Nous proposons alors que si un système moral comme celui d' Aristote doit rendre compte de la moralité dans son entièreté, il lui faut trouver place pour des phénomènes qui excèdent les limites de la doctrine du juste milieu. L'hypocrisie, selon nous, appartient précisément à cette famille de phénomènes. Finalement, nous esquissons une approche de l'hypocrisie qui fait usage d'éléments aristotéliciens, mais sans pour autant s'y confiner. (shrink)

What are the differences between hypocrisy, change of mind, and weakness of will? Each typically involves a gap between word and deed, yet they do not seem morally equivalent. Moreover, they are intuitively different concepts, even though the conceptual boundaries between them are fuzzy. This paper explores diverse examples, attempting to identify elements which may be distinctive of each concept, with special attention to hypocrisy. It also provides a discussion of the appropriateness of such use of examples in moral philosophy.

Consequentialism has trouble explaining why hypocrisy is a term of moral condem-nation, largely because hypocrites often try to deceive others about their own selfishness through the useof words or deeds which themselves have good consequences. We argue that consequentialist attempts to deal with the problem by separating the evaluation of agent and action, or by the directevaluation of dispositions, or by focusing on long-term consequences such as reliability and erosion of trust, all prove inadequate to the challenge. We go on (...) to argue, however, that a version of consequentialism which values the fulfilment of desires, rather than mental states, is able to explain why hypocrisy is generally wrong, and indeed can do so better than its Kantian rivals. (shrink)

Eldon Soifer’s highly respected anthology on Canadian ethical issues has been substantially revised in this third edition. The text introduces students to many central ethical issues, including animal rights, abortion, assisted reproduction, euthanasia, censorship, pornography, the environment, multiculturalism, aboriginal rights, terrorism, and war. Recent legal documents and non-philosophical works complement the writings of professional philosophers to provide students with the broadest possible introduction to the issues. Brief introductions and discussion questions are provided for each reading.

_Ethical Issues: Perspectives for Canadians_ is a collection of readings designed to introduce students to a number of important ethical topics, including obligations toward the environment, the treatment of non-human animals, abortion, assisted reproduction, euthanasia, freedom of expression, pornography, multiculturalism, terrorism, and war. Readings have been carefully selected to represent a broad array of perspectives and arguments. Relevant legislation, court cases, and other non-philosophical works complement the writings of professional philosophers to provide students with multiple approaches to the issues. Brief (...) introductions and discussion questions are provided for each reading, and a general introduction to the basic ethical theories is included. (shrink)

For the second edition this popular collection on contemporary ethical issues has been expanded to nine sections. Abortion and euthanasia are now given expanded coverage, and there are new sections as well on assisted reproduction and commodification, and on ethics and the use of violence. The book is primarily composed of pieces by philosophers, chosen both for their intrinsic value and for their accessibility to students. But where relevant the collection also includes legal documents and non-philosophical writings that help to (...) set issues in context for Canadian students. In all, Ethical Issues now includes sixty-six selections, thirty-nine of which are new to this edition. The editor has also provided extensive introductory material and questions for discussion. (shrink)

Hypocrisy and privacy are commonly thought to be completely different, yet it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to distinguish them. We consider various ways in which they might be differentiated, especially the attempt to do so on the basis of their moral standing. We argue, by case and through discussion, that there is more moral ambiguity about each concept than generally acknowledged. Finally, we offer some additional speculations about the similarities and differences between the two, with a view to (...) aid moral discernment. (shrink)

Hypocrisy and privacy are commonly thought to be completely different, yet it turns out to be surprisingly difficult to distinguish them. We consider various ways in which they might be differentiated, especially the attempt to do so on the basis of their moral standing. We argue, by case and through discussion, that there is more moral ambiguity about each concept than generally acknowledged. Finally, we offer some additional speculations about the similarities and differences between the two, with a view to (...) aid moral discernment. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;In this thesis, I begin with some of the key assumptions of utilitarianism and argue that even in its own terms utilitarianism is in need of considerable revision. This is largely because its two central tenets come into conflict with each other in some cases. I argue that utilitarianism is in need of a fuller account of equality than it has traditionally employed, and that such an improved conception (...) of equality will lead the would-be utilitarian to drop the claim that all well-being must count morally. In particular, I argue that the fundamental step of morality might best be understood in terms of a right to equal consideration. However, a proper understanding of what this right entails leads one to a theory very much like utilitarianism. ;In Chapter II I attempt to put my utilitarian target in its most favourable light by considering which account of well-being is the most plausible as a thing which one might want to maximize as the basis of morality. Then, in Chapter III, I proceed to consider the possibility of a right-based moral theory. I examine the relationship between interests and rights, and argue that even if it is a necessary condition for the existence of rights that there be interests which they must protect, it is possible to have a right-based moral theory. This is made possible by the nature of the relationship between prudential value and moral value. I also argue that rights are particularly well suited to describe the importance of choice and autonomy in morality. Furthermore, I suggest that moral standing itself might best be seen in terms of possession of a waivable right. ;In Chapters IV and V, I set out the main argument that not all well-being can be allowed to count morally. In particular, I argue that enjoyment-producing preferences whose content is that others not be counted equally must be counted by utilitarianism but undermine that theory if it does try to count them. In the course of this criticism, I develop the sketch of an alternative but related theory which I call "right-based utilitarianism". In Chapter VI, I expand the description of this theory, and in Chapter VII I consider some of its implications and possible extensions, compared with standard forms of utilitarianism. Such a "right-based utilitarianism" is able to show utilitarianism the way out of at least some of its dilemmas while preserving that which gives utilitarianism its appeal. (shrink)

“When is it good to be a little bad? And particularly, when and why is it necessary, when being a little bad, to maintain the appearance of goodness?”. These are among the provocative questions Ruth Grant raises in this book, which contributes to the growing body of literature on hypocrisy and integrity, particularly as they apply to politics. Grant focuses to a large degree on Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s conception of integrity and its relevance to contemporary politics, but she also tries to (...) identify different types of hypocrisy and to argue that hypocrisy is both inevitable and desirable in the political realm. As a work on interpreting Rousseau, Grant’s book is thorough and interesting. As an attempt at understanding hypocrisy and integrity and their moral status, this book is not as rigorous as one might like, but it does contain a number of worthwhile insights and arguments. (shrink)

This book builds on Mele’s many earlier publications dealing with self-deception, but is more “systematic” and defends a “more comprehensive” position. It is well written, including many lively examples. The book also draws on the relevant psychological literature in a way that could serve as a model of how philosophy can make use of empirical research.