Epistemology orthodoxy is a purist one in the sense that it separates out the epistemic from the practical. What counts as evidence is independent of what we care about. Which beliefs count as justified and which count as knowledge are independent of our practical concerns. In recent years, many epistemologists have abandoned such purist views and embraced varying degrees of pragmatic encroachment on the epistemic. I survey a variety of these views and explore the main arguments that proponents of pragmatic (...) encroachment have offered in addition to the main criticisms of the pragmatic approach. (shrink)

Infallibilism leads to skepticism, and fallibilism is plagued by the threshold problem. Within this narrative, the pragmatic turn in epistemology has been marketed as a way for fallibilists to address the threshold problem. In contrast, pragmatic versions of infallibilism have been left unexplored. However, I propose that going pragmatic offers the infallibilist a way to address its main problem, the skeptical problem. Pragmatic infallibilism, however, is committed to a shifty view of epistemic certainty, where the strength of a subject’s epistemic (...) state can vary depending upon the practical context. Pragmatic views of epistemic strength are quite radical so the argumentative goal of my discussion is to argue for its plausibility, thereby arguing for the plausibility of pragmatic infallibilism. To do so, I discuss the role that the framing of decision problems and the construction of our deliberative attitudes have in our theories of rational choice. And I explore a way in which these necessary components of a normative theory of rationality can be used to motivate pragmatic views of evidential support. Finally, since the plausibility of our pragmatic account will depend upon the plausibility of a constructive account of rational choice, I conclude by comparing the adequacy of the constructive account with orthodox Bayesian and knowledge-based accounts. (shrink)

The authors examined cultural preferences for formal versus intuitive reasoning among East Asian (Chinese and Korean), Asian American, and European American university students. We investigated categorization (Studies 1 and 2), conceptual structure (Study 3), and deductive reasoning (Studies 3 and 4). In each study a cognitive conflict was activated between formal and intuitive strategies of reasoning. European Americans, more than Chinese and Koreans, set aside intuition in favor of formal reasoning. Conversely, Chinese and Koreans relied on intuitive strategies more than (...) European Americans. Asian Americans' reasoning was either identical to that of European Americans, or intermediate. Differences emerged against a background of similar reasoning tendencies across cultures in the absence of conflict between formal and intuitive strategies. (shrink)

Keith DeRose has argued that the two main problems facing subject-sensitive invariantism come from the appropriateness of certain third-person denials of knowledge and the inappropriateness of now you know it, now you don't claims. I argue that proponents of SSI can adequately address both problems. First, I argue that the debate between contextualism and SSI has failed to account for an important pragmatic feature of third-person denials of knowledge. Appealing to these pragmatic features, I show that straightforward third-person denials are (...) inappropriate in the relevant cases. And while there are certain denials that are appropriate, they pose no problems for SSI. Next, I offer an explanation, compatible with SSI, of the oddity of now you know it, now you don't claims. To conclude, I discuss the intuitiveness of purism, whose rejection is the source of many problems for SSI. I propose to explain away the intuitiveness of purism as a side-effect of the narrow focus of previous epistemological inquiries. (shrink)

We study Kim-independence over arbitrary sets. Assuming that forking satisfies existence, we establish Kim's lemma for Kim-dividing over arbitrary sets in an NSOP1 theory. We deduce symmetry of Kim-independence and the independence theorem for Lascar strong types.

We give definitions that distinguish between two notions of indiscernibility for a set {aη∣η∈ω>ω}\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$${\{a_{\eta} \mid \eta \in ^{\omega>}\omega\}}$$\end{document} that saw original use in Shelah [Classification theory and the number of non-isomorphic models. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1990], which we name s- and str−indiscernibility. Using these definitions and detailed proofs, we prove s- and str-modeling theorems and give applications of these theorems. In particular, we verify a step in the argument that TP is equivalent (...) to TP1 or TP2 that has not seen explication in the literature. In the Appendix, we exposit the proofs of Shelah [Classification theory and the number of non-isomorphic models. North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1990, App. 2.6, 2.7], expanding on the details. (shrink)

In the Nicomachean Ethics, one of Aristotle’s most frequent characterizations of the virtuous agent is that she acts for the sake of the fine (to kalon). In IX.8, this pursuit of the fine receives a more specific description; virtuous agents maximally assign the fine to themselves. In this paper, I answer the question of how we are to understand the fine as individually and maximally acquirable. I analyze Nicomachean Ethics IX.7, where Aristotle highlights virtuous activity (energeia) as central to the (...) fine, and argue that when virtuous agents pursue the fine, what they are pursuing is virtuous activity. I then address various problems, like how virtuous people can maximize virtuous activity yet sacrifice their lives, which would seem to amount to sacrificing future opportunities to virtuous activity and therefore not maximizing it. I also eliminate alternative interpretations that do not take virtuous activity as necessary to the fine, for example the common good interpretation, whereby virtuous agents pursuing the fine amounts to their pursuing the common good. (shrink)

According to philosophical lore, epistemological orthodoxy is a purist epistemology in which epistemic concepts such as belief, evidence, and knowledge are characterized to be pure and free from practical concerns. In recent years, the debate has focused narrowly on the concept of knowledge and a number of challenges have been posed against the orthodox, purist view of knowledge. While the debate about knowledge is still a lively one, the pragmatic exploration in epistemology has just begun. This collection takes on the (...) task of expanding this exploration into new areas. It discusses how the practical might encroach on all areas of our epistemic lives from the way we think about belief, confidence, probability, and evidence to our ideas about epistemic value and excellence. The contributors also delve into the ramifications of pragmatic views in epistemology for questions about the value of knowledge and its practical role. Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology will be of interest to a broad range of epistemologists, as well as scholars working on virtue theory and practical reason. (shrink)

Fraser highlights an unattractive feature of Mohist ethics: the Mohists, while criticizing their Confucian contemporaries, restrict one’s pursuits to the most basic sorts of goods. Fraser suggests that the Mohists assume the perpetuity of scarce resources, which leads to a commitment to austerity, which in turn leads them to deny a plausible third way between austerity and excess. In their defence, I argue that the Mohists do not assume perpetuity of scarce resources but rather the hedonic treadmill. And instead of (...) begging the question by assuming austerity and then denying a moderate alternative to excess, the Mohists take the hedonic treadmill to preclude a principled stopgap between austerity and excess, leaving austerity as the only acceptable option. Finally, these dynamics illuminate a feature that should make us wary of parallels to Millian utilitarianism: the maximization principle of the latter is absent from Mohism, and this goes hand-in-hand with austerity. (shrink)

This paper investigates whether corporate philanthropic decisions are associated with a firm’s listing status and business group affiliation. Analyzing a large sample of public and private firms in Korea, we find that public firms make more charitable contributions than private firms and business group-affiliated firms make more charitable contributions than non-affiliated firms. The results suggest that public firms, owing to greater public scrutiny, and business groups, owing to higher political costs, are encouraged to make more corporate charitable contributions. Further, we (...) find that greater corporate giving by public firms than private firms is more pronounced for business group-affiliated firms, compared with non-affiliated firms. The result is consistent with business groups’ strategic coordination of their affiliates’ philanthropic decisions to tunnel business group resources out to controlling shareholders who hold a larger portion of private affiliates than public affiliates. (shrink)

In this paper, we study the notions related to tree property 1 , or, equivalently, SOP2. Among others, we supply a type-counting criterion for TP1 and show the equivalence of TP1 and k- TP1. Then we introduce the notions of weak k- TP1 for k≥2, and also supply type-counting criteria for those. We do not know whether weak k- TP1 implies TP1, but at least we prove that each weak k- TP1 implies SOP1. Our generalization of the tree-indiscernibility results in (...) Džamonja and Shelah [5] is crucially used throughout the paper. (shrink)

In recent years, some epistemologists have argued that practical factors can make the difference between knowledge and mere true belief. While proponents of this pragmatic thesis have proposed necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge, it is striking that they have failed to address Gettier cases. As a result, the proposed analyses of knowledge are either lacking explanatory power or susceptible to counterexamples. Gettier cases are also worth reflecting on because they raise foundational questions for the pragmatist. Underlying these challenges is (...) the fact that pragmatic epistemologies not only rely upon normative theories of rational choice but also require externalist standards to rule out epistemic luck. Unfortunately, we lack adequate externalist theories of rational choice. In response, I address these foundational challenges by offering the outlines of an externalist decision theory. While this task is an ambitious one that I cannot hope to complete, I survey the outlines of a decision-theoretic framework on which a richer pragmatic epistemology can be developed. My hope is that this framework opens up new avenues of exploration for the pragmatic epistemologist. (shrink)

Discussions of diversity tend to paint a mixed picture of the practical and epistemic value of diversity. While there are expansive and detailed accounts of the value of cognitive diversity, explorations of identity diversity typically focus on its value as a source or cause of cognitive diversity. The resulting picture on which identity diversity only possesses a derivative practical and epistemic value is unsatisfactory and fails to account for some of its central epistemic benefits. In response, I propose that collective (...) virtue epistemology offers theoretical models that can further our understanding of the benefits of diversity. And I offer a case study to illustrate how this approach could be used to explore the logic of the identity diversity bonus. (shrink)

This study investigates whether and how the corporate social responsibility (CSR) profile of a company transfers to another company when an executive leaves a firm. We integrate upper echelon and institutional theories, and develop a novel measure of CSR profiles to explore this issue with a longitudinal data set of executive migrations over a 14-year period. We find that migrated executives assimilate elements of their old firms’ CSR profiles into their new firms (i.e., narrowing the distance between the two firms’ (...) CSR profiles), and this is true for both CSR and corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). This relationship is stronger when the migrating executive comes from a bigger firm with better social and financial performance than that of the new firm. We also find that the potential for improvement in CSR profiles in migration holds true for CSiR, but not CSR. Our findings have import for upper echelon theory and the managerial discretion afforded to executives regarding CSR decisions. (shrink)

The preface paradox can be motivated by appealing to a plausible inference from an author’s reasonable assertion that her book is bound to contain errors to the author’s rational belief that her book contains errors. By evaluating and undermining the validity of this inference, I offer a resolution of the paradox. Discussions of the preface paradox have surprisingly failed to note that expressions of fallibility made in prefaces typically employ terms such as surely, undoubtedly, and bound to be. After considering (...) what these terms mean, I show that the motivating inference is invalid. Moreover, I argue that a closer consideration of our expressions of fallibility suggest that epistemically responsible authors would not be rational to believe that their books contain errors. I conclude by considering alternative expressions of fallibility that employ terms such as possible and probable, and discuss the role that expressions of fallibility play in conversation. (shrink)

In this paper, we provide a Bayesian analysis of the well-known surprise exam paradox. Central to our analysis is a probabilistic account of what it means for the student to accept the teacher's announcement that he will receive a surprise exam. According to this account, the student can be said to have accepted the teacher's announcement provided he adopts a subjective probability distribution relative to which he expects to receive the exam on a day on which he expects not to (...) receive it. We show that as long as expectation is not equated with subjective certainty there will be contexts in which it is possible for the student to accept the teacher's announcement, in this sense. In addition, we show how a Bayesian modeling of the scenario can yield plausible explanations of the following three intuitive claims: (1) the teacher's announcement becomes easier to accept the more days there are in class; (2) a strict interpretation of the teacher's announcement does not provide the student with any categorical information as to the date of the exam; and (3) the teacher's announcement contains less information about the date of the exam the more days there are in class. To conclude, we show how the surprise exam paradox can be seen as one among the larger class of paradoxes of doxastic fallibilism, foremost among which is the paradox of the preface. (shrink)

It has been not atypical for commentators to argue that Aristotelian friendship features disinterested concern for others, that is, concern for others that is completely independent of one's own happiness. Often, the relevant commentators point to some normative features of Aristotelian friendship, wishing goods for the other's sake and loving the other for herself, where these are assumed to be disinterested. While the disinterested interpretations may be correct overall, I argue that wishing goods for the other's sake and loving the (...) other for herself constitute a dubious foundation for disinterested interpretations. For wishing goods for the other's sake does not involve a reason for action on the other's behalf, and the primary point of loving the other for herself is the role of the other in facilitating one's own happiness, specifically conceived of by Aristotle in terms of one's own virtuous activity. (shrink)

Firstly, in this paper, we prove that the equivalence of simplicity and the symmetry of forking. Secondly, we attempt to recover definability part of stability theory to simplicity theory. In particular, using elimination of hyperimaginaries we prove that for any supersimple T, canonical base of an amalgamation class P is the union of names of ψ-definitions of P, ψ ranging over stationary L-formulas in P. Also, we prove that the same is true with stable formulas for an 1-based theory having (...) elimination of hyperimaginaries. For such a theory, the stable forking property holds, too. (shrink)

How does being a knower and possessing knowledge contribute to living well? Some have assumed that the eudaimonic value of knowledge is exhausted by its role as either a means or a final end. On this basis, it has been concluded that knowledge is not always valuable since its value will depend upon the ends that one has. I propose to expand our exploration by considering how knowledge might be valuable in virtue of being constitutive of certain eudaimonic goods. Using (...) achievement as an example of an eudaimonic good, I argue, by way of considering its relations to credit and luck, that knowledge is necessary for achievement. (shrink)

Under [Formula: see text]-amalgamation, we obtain the canonical hyperdefinable group from the group configuration.

Let T be a countable, small simple theory. In this paper, we prove that for such T, the notion of Lascar strong type coincides with the notion of strong type, over an arbitrary set.

§1. Introduction. In this report we wish to describe recent work on a class of first order theories first introduced by Shelah in [32], the simple theories. Major progress was made in the first author's doctoral thesis [17]. We will give a survey of this, as well as further works by the authors and others.The class of simple theories includes stable theories, but also many more, such as the theory of the random graph. Moreover, many of the theories of particular (...) algebraic structures which have been studied recently turn out to be simple. The interest is basically that a large amount of the machinery of stability theory, invented by Shelah, is valid in the broader class of simple theories. Stable theories will be defined formally in the next section. An exhaustive study of them is carried out in [33]. Without trying to read Shelah's mind, we feel comfortable in saying that the importance of stability for Shelah lay partly in the fact that an unstable theory T has 2λ many models in any cardinal λ ≥ ω1 + |T|. (shrink)

Infallibilism leads to skepticism and fallibilism is plagued by the threshold problem. In this narrative setting, the pragmatic turn in epistemology has been marketed as a way for fallibilists to address one of their central problems. While pragmatic versions of infallibilism have been left unexplored, I propose that going pragmatic also offers the infallibilist a way to address its main problem, the skeptical problem. Pragmatic infallibilism, however, is committed to a radical pragmatic view of epistemic certainty, where the strength of (...) a subject’s epistemic state can vary depending upon the practical context. To make room for the plausibility of such a view, I discuss the role that the framing of decision problems can play in the evaluation of choices and evidence. And based on this discussion, I offer some suggestions about how we might develop a pragmatic version of infallibilism. (shrink)

When we ask a decision maker to express her preferences, it is typically assumed that we are eliciting a pre-existing set of preferences. However, empirical research has suggested that our preferences are often constructed on the fly for the decision problem at hand. This paper explores the ramifications of this empirical research for our understanding of instrumental rationality. First, I argue that these results pose serious challenges for the traditional decision-theoretic view of instrumental rationality, which demands global coherence amongst all (...) of one's beliefs and desires. To address these challenges, I first develop a minimal notion of instrumental rationality that issues in localized, goal-relative demands of coherence. This minimal conception of instrumental rationality is then used to offer a more sophisticated account of the global aspects of instrumental rationality. The resulting view abandons all-or-nothing assessments of rationality and allows us to evaluate decision makers as being rational to varying degrees. My aim is to propose a theory that is both psychologically and normatively plausible. (shrink)

In Nicomachean Ethics ix 9, Aristotle answers the question of why the happy person needs friends. I argue that interpretatively, we must understand ix 9 in instrumental terms. I begin with ix 9’s opening sections, arguing that Aristotle understands the question of why the happy person needs friends, and his answer, in instrumental terms. Aristotle’s first major argument suggests that the instrumental role friends play has to do with one’s own activity, specifically self-contemplation. This argument, however, does not clearly show (...) why friends over and above just any other people are needed. To address this, I attend to NE’s longest sustained argument and show that it makes headway on this question, and in a way that again presents an instrumental account for why the happy person needs friends: facilitation of one’s own activity. (shrink)

This article resolves some difficulties with Aristotle's discussion of the choice-worthy (haireton). Nicomachean Ethics I posits goods that are choice-worthy for themselves and for something else, but Nicomachean Ethics X appears to present being choice-worthy for itself as mutually exclusive with being choice-worthy for something else; moreover, Nicomachean Ethics X seems to claim that action is choice-worthy for itself and, therefore, not choice-worthy for something else but also seems to claim that action is choice-worthy for something else and, therefore, not (...) choice-worthy for itself. As for the latter problem internal to Nicomachean Ethics X, I argue that Aristotle is ultimately committed to the idea that action is choice-worthy for something else. As for the problem between Nicomachean Ethics I and X, I argue that Nicomachean Ethics X only claims something admitted by Nicomachean Ethics I: being choice-worthy for something else is mutually exclusive with being choice-worthy only for itself. (shrink)

“Benefit to the world” and “Heaven’s intent” are not, as is often assumed, separate criteria for action in Mozi’s 墨子 ethics; they are the same in extension but not intension. When Mozi speaks in terms of “Heaven’s intent,” it is to highlight the criterion’s retrospective orientation and its scope; taking a cue from Heaven’s reactions to past deeds, agents specify the scope of “the world” by reference to the past performance of persons regarding benefit to the world. This diverges from (...) a principle that is often attributed to Mozi, of considering the benefit of all equally without regard for past performance. (shrink)

We show that in a stable first-order theory, the failure of higher dimensional type amalgamation can always be witnessed by algebraic structures that we call n-ary polygroupoids. This generalizes a result of Hrushovski in [16] that failures of 4-amalgamation are witnessed by definable groupoids. The n-ary polygroupoids are definable in a mild expansion of the language.

We study generalized amalgamation properties in simple theories. We formulate a notion of generalized amalgamation in such a way so that the properties are preserved when we pass from T to Teq or Theq; we provide several equivalent ways of formulating the notion of generalized amalgamation.We define two distinct hierarchies of simple theories characterized by their amalgamation properties; examples are given to show the difference between the hierarchies.

Proponents of pragmatic encroachment in epistemology claim that a variety of epistemic matters, such as knowledge and epistemic virtue, are sensitive to practical factors, and so the pragmatic encroaches on the epistemic. After surveying pragmatist views that have been presented in the literature, we find that while these pragmatist views are superficially relativistic, they reject a central tenet of epistemic relativism,that competing epistemic frameworks are incommensurable and cannot be compared from a neutral standpoint. Thus, I conclude the discussion by exploring (...) a novel pragmatist view about measures of epistemic strength and propose that this radical position may be attractive to both anti-skeptical infallibists and epistemic relativists. (shrink)

This paper presents an example of a supersimple nonlow theory and characterizes its independence relation.

In this paper, I explore how the ideal rationality-based account of propositional justification impacts our understanding of the relation between propositional and doxastic justification. The ideal rationality-based account sits uncomfortably with the widely accepted claim that propositional justification is necessary for doxastic justification. In particular, the combination of the necessity claim and the ideal rationality-based account of propositional justification entails that some plausible doxastic attitudes are doxastically unjustified and thereby severs epistemic justification from connections with epistemic responsibility and the competent (...) formation of beliefs. Thus, those who endorse both the necessity claim and the ideal rationality-based account of propositional justification will be forced to give up either their account of propositional justification or the necessity claim. I argue that there is good reason to give up the ideal rationality-based account of propositional justification instead of the necessity claim. This result indicates that an adequate account of propositional justification should be sensitive to the agent’s cognitive capacities. If propositional justification should be understood in this way, then the widely accepted explanation of doxastic justification in terms of propositional justification is not promising either. This is because an agent’s cognitive capacities and limitations play a prominent role in understanding propositional justification. Instead, I argue that, at the explanatory level, propositional justification relies on doxastic justification. (shrink)

For many, striving to attain first place in an athletic competition is explicable. Less explicable is striving to attain first place in a virtue (aretē) competition. Yet this latter dynamic appears in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. There is 4.3’s magnanimity, the crown of the virtues, which seemingly manifests itself in outdoing one’s peers in virtue. Such one-upmanship also seems operant with 9.8’s praiseworthy self-lover, who seeks to get as much of the fine (to kalon) as possible for herself. Contrary to many (...) interpreters, this paper argues that praiseworthy self-love and magnanimity involve one-upmanship. The relevant exemplars are not simply striving to be the best that they can be in respect to virtue (in virtuous activity), but to be better than others. The paper argues that Aristotle’s axiology, which sets activity (energeia) above state (hexis) and potentiality (dunamis), engenders one-upmanship. For only the level of activity substantially differentiates individuals, settling for inferiority is obviously objectionable, and equal achievement for Aristotle is not static but involves matching and surpassing the achievements of others. The paper concludes that modern discomfort with these dynamics is due to an axiology Nietzsche attributes to Christianity, one that bases human value fundamentally on non-differentiating potentiality. (shrink)

This study investigated the characteristics of neural oscillation and functional connectivity in college students engaging in binge drinking using resting-state electroencephalography. Also, the associations of visual memory, evaluated by the Rey-Osterrieth Complex Figure Test, and neural oscillation with FC during the resting state were investigated. The BD and non-BD groups were selected based on scores of the Korean version of the Alcohol use disorders Identification Test and the Alcohol Use Questionnaire. EEG was performed for 6 min while the participants rested (...) with eyes closed. The theta, lower-alpha, and upper alpha powers did not differ between the BD and non-BD groups. Concerning FC, the BD group exhibited stronger theta coherence than that of the non-BD group, and in the lower and upper alpha bands, the BD group showed stronger coherence in some areas but weaker coherence in others compared with the non-BD group. However, these significant results were not observed after Bonferroni correction. The BD group showed significantly lower delayed recall scores on the RCFT than did the non-BD group. A positive correlation between the left prefrontal-parietal-occipital midline connection and performance on the delayed recall of the RCFT was observed in the BD group. The present results could suggest that binge drinkers have alterations in brain FC, which may be related to their visual memory deficits. (shrink)

This paper presents a summary and discussion of an assignment that asked students about the impact of Large Language Models on their college education. Our analysis summarizes students’ perception of GPT-3, categorizes their proposals for modifying college courses, and identifies their stated values about their college education. Furthermore, this analysis provides a baseline for tracking students’ attitudes toward LLMs and contributes to the conversation on student perceptions of the relationship between writing and philosophy.

The Mohists may have been the first consequentialists on earth. Their most important principles are that right action is what benefits the world and that the underlying outlook for benefiting the world is inclusive care, whereby each person receives equal consideration. The early Mohists are clearly objective-list consequentialists, whereby benefiting the world amounts to promoting the most basic goods. Stephens argues that the later Mohists shift to a preference-satisfaction consequentialism whereby benefiting the world amounts to promoting what happens to please (...) individual people. Stephens argues that while the direct texts are ambiguous between an objective-list interpretation and a preference-satisfaction interpretation, the latter better explains later Mohist engagement with opponents. I argue that the direct texts actually preclude Stephens’ preference-satisfaction interpretation, which moreover has the later Mohists concede an implausible amount to their opponents. (shrink)

An up-to-date account of the current techniques and results in Simplicity Theory, which has been a focus of research in model theory for the last decade. Suitable for logicians, mathematicians and graduate students working on model theory.

In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle claims that friendship and justice are the same, apparently flouting the not uncommon contrast between friendship and justice. I start by assessing Aristotle’s principle of equality: friends of equal standing engage in exact reciprocity in goods and friends of unequal standing engage in proportional reciprocity. In a number of ways that have gone unnoticed, the equalization principle is a requirement for understanding the sameness of friendship and justice. Just relations and friendship share the same domain, (...) that is, the same relationship of a corresponding community. Moreover, asking how to be just to someone is the same as asking how to be a friend to that person, indicating that the virtue of justice and the virtue of friendship are also the same. (shrink)

In this article, we prove that if a countable non-${\aleph _0}$-categorical NSOP1 theory with nonforking existence has finitely many countable models, then there is a finite tuple whose own preweight is ω. This result is an extension of a theorem of the author on any supersimple theory.

This article explores the scientific fraud case of the South Korean stem cell scientist Woo-Suk Hwang, which represents a struggle over political identity. The South Korean state supported Hwang’s research hoping to establish Korean scientific-technological leadership in biotechnology, but it combined this globalization strategy with an identity politics built around the Korean people. The emerging bionationalism exceeded traditional ethnic nationalism insofar as the traditional ethnicity marker of ‘‘blood’’ was displaced by biologically scientifically grounded notions such as the stem cell or (...) the oocyte. These new biological markers defined national identity and embedded the transformative potential of modern biomedicine to be put into the service of Korean bodies and the nation’s economic future. Bionationalistic mobilization became hegemonic in South Korea in 2000 and undermined the democratic process, giving rise to violations against core principles of good governance. This bionationalistic narrative was challenged by an attempt to define political identity through the ideas of political citizenship, liberal democracy, and participation. The South Korean government has terminated its bionationalistic mobilization, but the struggles over Hwang and Korean identity linger. (shrink)

Epistemologists have become increasingly interested in the practical role of knowledge. One prominent principle, which I call PREMISE, states that if you know that p, then you are justified in using p as a premise in your reasoning. In response, a number of critics have proposed a variety of counter-examples. In order to evaluate these problem cases, we need to consider the broader context in which this principle is situated by specifying in greater detail the types of activity that the (...) principle governs. I argue that if PREMISE is interpreted as governing deductive reasoning, then the examples lose their force. In addition, I consider the cases, discussed by Keith DeRose, where the subject is in more than one practical context at the same time. In order to account for these latter cases, we need to further specify the scope of PREMISE. I distinguish two ways of understanding PREMISE, as a knowledge-action principle and as a knowledge-deliberation principle. I conclude by arguing for the knowledge-deliberation version of the principle and by exploring what this principle says about the practical role of knowledge. (shrink)

We define social innovation as strategic decision making to improve social conditions and facilitate social changes in a desirable direction by dealing with crucial issues and solving fundamental societal problems. This paper proposes a framework that enables the decision maker to implement social innovation effectively. The framework consists of three influential theories or ways of thinking, that is, design thinking, systems thinking, and learning organization. This paper shows how these three approaches can be integrated to tackle a critical social problem (...) and develop a sustainable solution. We present a case study on an actual social issue to demonstrate its practical application. (shrink)