The five chapters in this volume were originally delivered in lecture form at the University of Genoa and have previously appeared in French, German, and English translations. An appendix, "What the Philosopher May Learn from the Study of Law," has also appeared before in English. The book is basically a digest, with some modifications, of Perelman's earlier work Justice et Raison. The chief modification involves a supposed shift away from positivism toward a greater emphasis on the cognitive status of primary (...) values. Through the mediation of his consideration of the nature of practical reason in the Traité de l'Argumentation, Perelman now wishes to argue that values are subject to dialectical justification. The analysis of justice, thus, need not be restricted to merely formal specifications such as the rule of justice or to such inherently nonuniversalizable and nonanalyzable principles as that of equity. Dialectical justification falls short of demonstration, but only someone still under the spell of Cartesianism would wish to maintain that rationality is adequately summarized in the model provided by mathematics and science. Jurisprudence, therefore deals with judgments that have cognitive and not arbitrary or merely historical value. So much for the scheme of Perelman's argument. What about its execution? It must be said that its substance is slight and the base of discussion extraordinarily narrow. Thus, Perelman says he wishes to avoid the Scylla of nominalism and the Charybdis of realism; but his own analysis winds up squarely in a conventionalism that is only minutely distinguishable from the nominalism he presumably attacks: e.g., "the idea of [practical] reason must not be linked to that of truth", "reason is but an attempt to convince the members of [the universal] audience--whom common sense would define as well-informed and reasonable men". The only defense offered by Perelman for the first statement is a flaunting of the bogey of dogmatism. The vicious circle in the second statement is barred from rising to the level of the fruitful Aristotelian paradox by a peremptory dismissal of natural law: "The theorists of natural law... have not convinced the majority of those philosophers of law who are endowed with critical minds." This kind of "you-don't-belong-to-the-club" argument makes the book practically worthless from a truly dialectical point of view. The only critical sparks generated are in Perelman's discussion of Rawls' theory of "justice as fair play." His points here are well taken. But, as this is the only saving grace in the book--the rest being merely a statement of Perelman's own doxa about justice--it would have been better to leave the whole interred in the journals where it had already been published.--E. A. R. (shrink)

The five chapters in this volume were originally delivered in lecture form at the University of Genoa and have previously appeared in French, German, and English translations. An appendix, "What the Philosopher May Learn from the Study of Law," has also appeared before in English. The book is basically a digest, with some modifications, of Perelman's earlier work Justice et Raison. The chief modification involves a supposed shift away from positivism toward a greater emphasis on the cognitive status of primary (...) values. Through the mediation of his consideration of the nature of practical reason in the Traité de l'Argumentation, Perelman now wishes to argue that values are subject to dialectical justification. The analysis of justice, thus, need not be restricted to merely formal specifications such as the rule of justice or to such inherently nonuniversalizable and nonanalyzable principles as that of equity. Dialectical justification falls short of demonstration, but only someone still under the spell of Cartesianism would wish to maintain that rationality is adequately summarized in the model provided by mathematics and science. Jurisprudence, therefore deals with judgments that have cognitive and not arbitrary or merely historical value. So much for the scheme of Perelman's argument. What about its execution? It must be said that its substance is slight and the base of discussion extraordinarily narrow. Thus, Perelman says he wishes to avoid the Scylla of nominalism and the Charybdis of realism; but his own analysis winds up squarely in a conventionalism that is only minutely distinguishable from the nominalism he presumably attacks: e.g., "the idea of [practical] reason must not be linked to that of truth", "reason is but an attempt to convince the members of [the universal] audience--whom common sense would define as well-informed and reasonable men". The only defense offered by Perelman for the first statement is a flaunting of the bogey of dogmatism. The vicious circle in the second statement is barred from rising to the level of the fruitful Aristotelian paradox by a peremptory dismissal of natural law: "The theorists of natural law... have not convinced the majority of those philosophers of law who are endowed with critical minds." This kind of "you-don't-belong-to-the-club" argument makes the book practically worthless from a truly dialectical point of view. The only critical sparks generated are in Perelman's discussion of Rawls' theory of "justice as fair play." His points here are well taken. But, as this is the only saving grace in the book--the rest being merely a statement of Perelman's own doxa about justice--it would have been better to leave the whole interred in the journals where it had already been published.--E. A. R. (shrink)

Securitization of Islam: A Vicious Circle: Counter-Terrorism and Freedom of Religion in Central Asia By Lenz-RaymannKathrin, 324 pp. Price PB €39.99. EAN 978–3837629040.

This article sets up a graph-theoretical framework for argumentation-analysis (dialectical analysis) which expands classical argument-analysis. Within this framework, a main theorem on the existence of inconsistencies in debates is stated and proved: the vicious circle theorem. Subsequently, two corollaries which generalize the main theorem are derived. Finally, a brief outlook is given on further expansions and possible applications of the developed framework.

Epitome V (1621), and consisted of matching an element of area to an element of time, where each was mathematically determined. His treatment of the area depended solely on the geometry of Euclid's Elements, involving only straight-line and circle propositions – so we have to account for his deliberate avoidance of the sophisticated conic-geometry associated with Apollonius. We show also how his proof could have been made watertight according to modern standards, using methods that lay entirely within his power. (...) The greatest innovation, however, occurred in Kepler's fresh formulation of the measure of time. We trace this concept in relation to early astronomy and conclude that Kepler's treatment unexpectedly entailed the assumption that time varied nonuniformly; meanwhile, a geometrical measure provided the independent variable. Even more surprisingly, this approach turns out to be entirely sound when assessed in present-day terms. Kepler himself attributed the cause of the motion of a single planet around the Sun to a set of `physical' suppositions which represented his religious as well as his Copernican convictions; and we have pared to a minimum – down to four – the number he actually required to achieve this. In the Appendix we use modern mathematics to emphasize the simplicity, both geometrical and kinematical, that objectively characterizes the Sun-focused ellipse as an orbit. Meanwhile we highlight the subjective simplicity of Kepler's own techniques (most of them extremely traditional, some newly created). These two approaches complement each other to account for his success. (shrink)

"'There is only one thing that is certain, namely that we can have nothing certain; and therefore it is not certain that we can have nothing certain,' Samuel Butler once said, expressing in that mindbloggler all the elements required to form a classical paradox. Throughout the ages wise men and jesters alike have been intrigued by such mental twists and riddles which defy common sense and yet appear to be true." -- Dust jacket.

The dominant position in Philosophy of Science contends that downward causation is an illusion. Instead, we argue that downward causation doesn’t introduce vicious circles either in physics or in biology. We also question the metaphysical claim that “physical facts fix all the facts.” Downward causation does not imply any contradiction if we reject the assumption of the completeness and the causal closure of the physical world that this assertion contains. We provide an argument for rejecting this assumption. Furthermore, this (...) allows us to reconsider the concept of diachronic emergence. (shrink)

I am a 40-year-old woman with lived experience of mental ill health and experience of the services and support available for patients. I accessed support from my teenage years until the present day...

In this journal (Studia Logica), D. Rizza [2010: 176] expounded a solution of what he called “the indiscernibility problem for ante rem structuralism”, which is the problem to make sense of the presence, in structures, of objects that are indiscernible yet distinct, by only appealing to what that structure provides. We argue that Rizza’s solution is circular and expound a different solution that not only solves the problem for completely extensive structures, treated by Rizza, but for nearly (but not) all (...) mathematical structures. (shrink)

To investigate the phenomenon of patient–physician mistrust in China, a qualitative study involving 107 physicians, nurses and health officials in Guangdong Province, southern China, was conducted through semi-structured interviews and focus groups. In this paper we report the key findings of the empirical study and argue for the essential role of medical professionalism in rebuilding patient-physician trust. Health professionals are trapped in a vicious circle of mistrust. Mistrust leads to increased levels of fear and self-protection by doctors which (...) exacerbate difficulties in communication; in turn, this increases physician workloads, adding to a strong sense of injustice and victimization. These factors produce poorer healthcare outcomes and increasingly discontented and angry patients, escalate conflicts and disputes, and result in negative media coverage, all these ultimately contributing to even greater levels of mistrust. The vicious circle indicates not only the crisis of patient-physician relationship but the crisis of medicine as a profession and institution. Underlying the circle is the inherent conflict of interest in the healthcare system by which health professionals and hospitals have become profit-driven. This institutional conflict of interest seriously compromises the fundamental principle of medical professionalism—the primacy of patient welfare—as well as the traditional Chinese ideal of “medicine as the art of humanity”. Patient trust can be restored through rectifying this institutional conflict of interest and promoting medical professionalism via a series of recommended practical measures. (shrink)

The latest book of Buchler is certainly in continuity with his previous work on philosophical method and on judgment, which commands serious attention outside the circle of those having close affinities with his thought. This work deals with the problem of the one and the many from various refreshing angles. The purpose of the study is to outline a fundamental ontology through the deduction of categories all referent to complexes. Such are: integrity and scope, prevalence and alescence [[sic]], ordinality (...) and relation, possibility and actuality. The method followed to define the categories is that of description followed by comparison with various concepts occupying a parallel position in other philosophical systems. While the principal characteristic of a category is its recurrence, it remains unclear whether the deduction is transcendental or only transreferential. In any event, the method lends itself to a transference of sense from the clear and distinct traits where analysis stops to the main categories to be defined. Under these conditions it is difficult at times to decide whether the clear and distinct notions need further clarification, or whether circularity has been thoroughly avoided in the transference of sense. Such difficulties are offset by Buchler's tenacious hewing of determinateness. And the admirable part of it is that his categories manage to perfectly carve the statue without ever having to crack the marble. One finds himself with solid gains in the clarification of the meaning of these categories, with a certainty that the framework used is not going to introduce a bias, and with a suspicion that the author has stood quite at ease "on the shoulders of giants."—A. M. (shrink)

The attempt to formulate a viable empiricist and non-foundationalist epistemology of science faces four problems here confronted. The first is an apparent loss of objectivity in science, in the conditions of use of models in applied science. The second derives from the theory-infection of scientific language, with an apparent loss of objective conditions of truth and reference. The third, often cited as objection to The Scientific Image, is the apparent theory-dependence of the distinction between what is and is not observable. (...) The fourth and last is the loss of the possibility of objective evaluation of rationality in scientific methodology. It is argued that each of these problems is illusory. (shrink)

[full article, abstract in English; abstract in Lithuanian] Modern revolution as the beginning of founding a new political order has to confront the vicious circle inhered in all beginnings: in so far as it is the beginning, where does its principle come from? Or, if there is no principle, how could the beginning establish one? Set in the context of modern political experience, the aporia is equal to the problem of how modern politics to be self-grounded or how (...) to reestablish political authority in modernity? By an exploration into the relevant writings of Hannah Arendt, the article tries to investigate the vicious circle of beginning and principle in the political realm, and to point out that Arendt has told a story about the mutual generating of beginning and principle, turning the so-called vicious circle into a hermeneutic circle, in which those implicit principles become explicit through the performance of founding actions. (shrink)

At the centre of Adorno’s critical theory of society lies the problem of Bann or Bannkreis: why do individuals systematically act in ways that reinforce conditions that are obviously incompatible with their freedom and pursuit of happiness? Despite criticism of Dewey’s experimentalism by several Frankfurt School critical theorists claiming that the American pragmatist fails to account for systematic blockages to critique, Dewey does in fact formulate his approach to social critique as a response to the problem that social life might (...) be made immune to transformative claims. In Human Nature and Conduct, thirty years prior to Adorno’s Bannkreis, he conceptualizes a ‘vicious circle’ in which attempts to transform social life seem to be caught and points to a way out. This article shows that Adorno and Dewey share in a project at the heart of critical theory, the project of a disclosing critique of society. In different and mutually completing ways, the Frankfurt School critical theorist and the American pragmatist point out the extent to which their contemporary societies are caught in antagonistic and painful vicious circles and thereby point to the objective possibility of another form of social life. The article is historical, but it is animated by the intent to brush a fruitful path for disclosing critique today. From Adorno, this critical practice gains the idea that theory of society can be a disclosing gesture, which presents an important corrective to Dewey’s failure to trace the eclipse of the public. From Dewey, it gets a reminder that these theories must find ways to continue into ordinary life experience through group action for their disclosure to come full circle. (shrink)

At the centre of Adorno’s critical theory of society lies the problem of Bann or Bannkreis: why do individuals systematically act in ways that reinforce conditions that are obviously incompatible with their freedom and pursuit of happiness? Despite criticism of Dewey’s experimentalism by several Frankfurt School critical theorists claiming that the American pragmatist fails to account for systematic blockages to critique, Dewey does in fact formulate his approach to social critique as a response to the problem that social life might (...) be made immune to transformative claims. In Human Nature and Conduct, thirty years prior to Adorno’s Bannkreis, he conceptualizes a ‘vicious circle’ in which attempts to transform social life seem to be caught and points to a way out. This article shows that Adorno and Dewey share in a project at the heart of critical theory, the project of a disclosing critique of society. In different and mutually completing ways, the Frankfurt School critical theorist and the American pragmatist point out the extent to which their contemporary societies are caught in antagonistic and painful vicious circles and thereby point to the objective possibility of another form of social life. The article is historical, but it is animated by the intent to brush a fruitful path for disclosing critique today. From Adorno, this critical practice gains the idea that theory of society can be a disclosing gesture, which presents an important corrective to Dewey’s failure to trace the eclipse of the public. From Dewey, it gets a reminder that these theories must find ways to continue into ordinary life experience through group action for their disclosure to come full circle. (shrink)

Vicious Circles traces the history of development of public education and the near simultaneous advent of educational reform from its very beginning. Drawing on history, politics, law, sociology, and educational research, all aspects of public schooling are brought to light using a non-partisan analytical approach. Critically examining areas such as institutional racism, sexism, ableism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia, as well as the corporatization and privatization of public schooling, Shyman extracts the fundamental problems that have ever plagued, and continue to plague, (...) successful education reform. (shrink)

How do promissory obligations get created? Some have thought that the answer to this question must make reference to our social practice of promising. Recently, however, T.M. Scanlon has argued (in his book What We Owe to Each Other) for a pure ‘expectation view’ of promising, according to which promissory obligations arise as a result of our producing certain expectations in others. He formulates a principle of fidelity (Principle F) that tells us when one has gained an obligation due to (...) producing expectations in another, and he maintains that breaking one's promise is merely a special instance of violation against Principle F. Though initially compelling, Scanlon’s account is ultimately unsatisfactory because it is subject to a vicious circularity. In order to get out of the circle, we are forced to resort back to elements of a social practice view of promising. Thus we arrive at a hybrid view of promissory obligation, which weds parts of Scanlon’s expectation view with parts of a social practice view. After briefly examining and rejecting Scanlon’s pure expectation view, I consider the hybrid view of Niko Kolodny and R. Jay Wallace. I present a serious objection to the hybrid view as they formulate it and go on to construct a modified hybrid view. Finally, I defend my modified hybrid view from certain pressing objections. (shrink)

Recognized as a masterpiece of Nietzsche scholarship, NIETZSCHE AND THE VICIOUS CIRCLE is available here for the first time in English. Author Pierre Klossowski suggests that Nietzsche's ideas and beliefs did not stem from his personal pathology, but rather were applied in a pathological manner. Thereby Nietzsche's beliefs resonated dynamically and intellectually with his alternating lucidity and delirium.

Prompted by Poincaré, Russell put forward his celebrated vicious-circle principle (vcp) as the solution to the modern paradoxes. Ramsey, Gödel, and Quine, among others, have raised two salient objections against Russell's vcp. First, Gödel has claimed that Russell's various renderings of the vcp really express distinct principles and thus, distinct solutions to the paradoxes, a claim that gainsays one of Russell's positions on the nature of the solution to the paradoxes, namely, that such a solution be uniform. Secondly, (...) Ramsey, Gödel, and Quine have protested that the vcp's proscription against impredicative specification is incompatible with a realistic conception of the domain of quantification, a conception that Russell certainly held. I examine Russell's vcp and defend it against these objections. (shrink)

In an almost forgotten passage of the Postenor Analytics (Bk I, ch. III) Aristotle argues against 'another school', according to which it is possible to proof things 'by each other and in a circle'. His logical refutation of this opinion became so dominant in the Western philosophical tradition, that the 'vicious circle' has always deemed a crime since. A scientific demonstration has to be built on firm premisses in order to deduce conclusions from them in a straight, (...) ongoing proces, in which one does not have to return to the premisses for a reconsideration of them on the basis of their implications. Although Aristotle does not mention names, he in fact reacts against Plato and the mainstream of Greek thought, which stresses the essential circularity of human argumentation. In the first, the historical part of the treatise the roots of this circular logic are unearthed in the work of Heraclitus and Parmenides, who both defended a ring structure of their metaphysical explication of nature. Truth is described as well-rounded, because you can follow it in a circle, passing through each of its links in turn, back to your startingpoint. The association of circular motion with thought is fully present in the work of Plato, who speeks many times about the 'periforas tès dianoias' and the essential interdependance of our ideas. Not the theory of an anonymous alternative school but Aristotle's own rectilinear formal logic was the exceptional, untraditional standpoint, which, moreover, was in conflict with his explication of divine thinking as 'noèsis noèseôs'. In modern times Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger were the main representatives of an anti-Aristotelian attitude. All three reject the logical prohibition of the circular argument, because it is inadequate to the life of concrete scientific thinking. The path of science always turns around towards its origins and results in a correction of its fundamental hypotheses on a higher level. Circularity is considered as a hallmark of sound logical procedure, as a characteristic of excellence in human understanding. The famous 'hermeneutic circle' is interpreted as the modern equivalent of the Hegelian 'Kreislauf and the Greek ' to par'allèlôn'. In the second, the more systematic part of the text the circular nature of our cognitive and scientific behaviour is demonstrated along three different lines. Reflection on the natural language with its finite stock of words, whose meanings are structurally connected, leads us to the so called semiotical circularity. Natural language is a complex network in which circular argumentation is not only unavoidable, but even the only means of explication. We have to work with the material contained in our dictionary, in which the items are defined by each other. The second reason is constituted by the system-orientation of science. In science we try to systematize our knowledge by means of formalisations and abstractions. The development of science can be characterised as a succession of systems, in which every element gets its meaning from the whole organisation. If we accept systematicity as the arbiter of truth, our logic is anti-fundamentalistic and the path of our thought is in fact circular (or better : spiralistic). The third adstruction of our theory is afforded by the coupling, that is realised in a rational proof. We draw conclusions from the coherence of our perceptions, from the reciprocal implications of our ideas. Never any of our ideas is without the repercussions of the movements elsewhere in the field. When we proof something, we also disproof and correct our startingpoints at the same time. The tradition of the circular nature of human thinking is very old, but not antiquated. The accusation of committing a fallacy in the case of circularity in normal and in scientific thinking is unfouded. It is now the formal logicians turn to defend his claim. (shrink)

Saul Kripke denies that the reference of a proper name is mediated through a sense (an intension, a concept), and claims that it has to be immediate for „rigidity“ of a proper name to be saved. On the other hand, the version of the Identity Theory of predication according to which predication is characterised as intentional identification of the conceptual content of the predicate with the object represented by the subject-concept requires that there be a concept (sense of the term) (...) at the places both of the subject and of the predicate. This paper is an attempt to propose a conception that purports to maintain the Identity Theory of predication with its demand for proper names to have senses and respond to Kripkean arguments while retaining the rigidity of proper names. Two main theses are defended: 1) Whether a term refers rigidly or non-rigidly does not depend on the nature of the term (i. e. whether it is a name or a description), but on the intention of the speaker/writer. Consequently, both names and descriptions can be used both rigidly and non-rigidly. 2) There is a „minimal sense“ to any proper name which can generaly be described as follows: „the person who has been given the name so-and-so“. The expression „has been given the name“ describes a „relation of reason“, which must be strictly distinguished from the relation of reference of the name, in order to avoid a vicious circle in reference determination, something against which Kripke warned. (shrink)

Let g E(m, n)=o mean that n is the Gödel-number of the shortest derivation from E of an equation of the form (m)=k. Hao Wang suggests that the condition for general recursiveness mn(g E(m, n)=o) can be proved constructively if one can find a speedfunction s s, with s(m) bounding the number of steps for getting a value of (m), such that mn s(m) s.t. g E(m, n)=o. This idea, he thinks, yields a constructivist notion of an effectively computable function, (...) one that doesn't get us into a vicious circle since we intuitively know, to begin with, that certain proofs are constructive and certain functions effectively computable. This paper gives a broad possibility proof for the existence of such classes of effectively computable functions, with Wang's idea of effective computability generalized along a number of dimensions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Self-Predication and the "Third Man" Argument ROGER A. SHINER 1.1. IN COMMPm'mO on the 'Third Man' Argument (TMA), Proclus z produces the following line of thought. He argues that. if the relation of resemblance between Form and particular were symmetrical, the argument in question would be valid; the relation is not, however, symmetrical. Where a Form and particular are both alike, have the quality of likeness, the likeness of (...) that which is derived is not the same as the likeness of that from which it is derived, just because of the former's derivatory nature. Consequently, ~k tt~v ala01]x~ bttotoi3c0at ~re[vot~ (sc. xo~ ~Semv), abx~ 8~ xo6~ot~ oSr~xt, 'the sensible particulars resemble the Forms, but they are not in the same relation of resemblance to the particulars' (ibid., 913.29-30). That is to say, the bare relation of similarity may be symmetrical, but the relation of a similar copy to a similar original is not; the copy is 'a copy of' the original, but the original/s not 'a copy of' the copy. This way of defending the Theory of Forms against the TMA I shall for purposes of identification call the 'Ontological Defence'. It lays stress on the ontological difference between Form and particular in order to avoid the fatal implication that the relation between them is symmetrical. If we use the language of predication, the point is as follows: the TMA is valid, if the Forms have a given term predicated of them severally in exactly the same sense as it is predicated of their respective dependent particulars. This, however, is not the case, for the quality in virtue of which a given term is predicated of a given Form differs in ontological status from the quality in virtue of which that term is predicated of that Form's dependent particulars. Thus we see that underlying the Ontological x I am grateful for helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper to Professor Gilbert Ryle, Professor John F. Malcolm and two anonymous readers for this Journal. Since this paper went to press, the following relevant articles have appeared: G. Vlastos, "'Self Predication' in Plato's Later Period," Philosophical Review, LXXVIII (1969), 74-78, and "Plato's 'Third Man' Argument (Parm. 132al-b2): Text and Logic," Philosophical Quarterly, XIX (1969), 289-301; K. W. Rankin, "The Duplicity of Plato's Third Man," Mind, LXXVIII (1969), 178-197; T. O. Smith, "'The Theory of Forms, Relations and Infinite Regress," Dialogue, VIII (1969), 116-123. 2 Proelus, In Platonis Parmenidem, ed. V. Cousin, Paris, 1864; 912.27 ft. [3711 372 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Defence is the following assumption--the fact that the Forms are self-predicating only causes problems for the Theory of Forms, if a given Form F and its corresponding particulars, a set of f things, have 'F' predicated of them univocally, are F in precisely the same sense. My thesis in this paper is that this latter assumption is false, it is, rather, quite sufficient for the Self-Predication Assumption (SPA) to be vicious, if 'F' is predicated of both Form and particular not equivocally. This is not the same as 'univocally', and furthermore it is not possible that Plato could have thought of the predication of a term of both Form and particular as equivocal, the only alternative left to him to escape the TMA. The SPA, therefore, is required for the Theory of Forms to make sense, and leads to an ineradicable defect in that Theory. 1.2. One minor terminological point must be noted before we proceed. There are two versions of the TMA in the Parmenides; the first runs from 131eS-132b2, and the second from 132c11-133a7. The second of these explicitly employs the language of copy-resemblance, 7mpdS~tytm ('paradigm'), 6lxoio)tta ('likeness'), ~tKao0~vat ('resemble') as an explication of ~t~0e~tq ('participation'): the first employs the lan~.,uage of cttx6 ~ xai3xa.., eIvat ('that by which things are...'), which, as Plato has already indicated (Phaedo 100d6-8), is deliberatety noncommittal as to the relation between Forms and particulars. I shall refer to the first argument as TMA(1) and the second... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Diacritics 29.4 (1999) 116-127 [Access article in PDF] Authority, Solidarity, and the Political Economy of Identity: The Case of the United States David A. Hollinger Theorists of nationalism tend to circle around the United States like boy scouts who have spotted a clump of poison oak. The nationalism of the United States has figured small in the robust and wide-ranging discourse about nationalism that has involved sociologists, historians, (...) political scientists, philosophers, and literary scholars during the past two decades. Although there are significant exceptions to this pattern of avoidance--David Miller and Liah Greenfeld are convenient examples--several prominent cases illustrate the pattern. The United States is mentioned in only a single footnote in Ernest Gellner's Nations and Nationalism. The United States is given short shrift in three of the most important collections of the 1990s: Homi Bhabha's Nation and Narration, John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith's Nationalism, and Geoff Eley and Ronald G. Suny's Becoming National. Montserrat Guibernau mentions the United States only twice, and in passing, in her Nationalisms: The Nation-State and Nationalism in the Twentieth Century. The United States gets less attention than Canada and the Ukraine in John A. Hall's rich, state-of-the-art collection of 1998, The State of the Nation. Ronald Beiner's Theorizing Nationalism has much more to tell us about Quebec than about the United States, which is alluded to even in passing by only half the contributors to this valuable anthology of 1999. That "nationalism is unknown" in the United States is claimed by Elie Kedouri, even in the fourth edition of his classic text Nationalism [143]. But the most interesting case of all is that of nationalism's most creative and influential theorist, Benedict Anderson.Anderson provides only episodic treatment of the United States while discussing "creole nationalism" in his influential book Imagined Communities. To be sure, Anderson's demonstration of the similarities between a large number of similarly situated, comparably developing national projects among creole populations in the New World is no cause for complaint. It is a signal contribution, and still insufficiently absorbed by a persistently Europe-centered discourse about nationalism. Anderson's recent book, The Spectre of Comparisons, also deals episodically with the United States, which Anderson now tells us explicitly has proved "too sui generis for ready-to-hand" [336] comparisons with other national projects in the Western Hemisphere. Most of Spectre of Comparisons is about Southeast Asia, just as the preponderance of Imagined Communities is about Latin America. Fair enough. [End Page 116]My point is not to find fault with Anderson for being an Area Studies specialist in so many areas of the world outside the United States. Nor do I have any significant quarrel with what little Anderson does say about the United States. What is worth remarking upon is simply that even the least Eurocentric of our era's leading theorists of nationalism in general has emerged not from the study of the United States, but from the study of Southeast Asia and Latin America. This is less a comment about Anderson than about the class of theorists of which he is a member. The scholars whose careers focus on the United States are "area studies specialists" of a kind, but few of them have intervened tellingly in the cross-disciplinary discussion of nationalism. One who did was the historian David Potter, whose still-powerful article "Historian's Use of Nationalism and Vice Versa" was published nearly forty years ago but is rarely cited today.The poison oak effect among theorists of nationalism would not be worthy of notice were it not for one fact that might be expected to attract rather than repel these theorists: the United States is the most successful nationalist project in all of modern history. What makes it "successful" is its longevity, its absorption of a variety of peoples, and its sheer power. Two-and-one-quarter centuries after its founding and 135 years after its Civil War, it is by far the most powerful nation-state... (shrink)

Long recognized as a masterpiece of Nietzsche scholarship, _Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle_ is made available here for the first time in English. Taking a structuralist approach to the relation between Nietzsche's thought and his life, Klossowski emphasizes the centrality of the notion of Eternal Return for understanding Nietzsche's propensities for self-denial, self-reputation, and self-consumption. Nietzsche's ideas did not stem from personal pathology, according to Klossowski. Rather, he made a pathological use of his best ideas, anchoring them in his (...) own fluctuating bodily and mental conditions. Thus Nietzsche's belief that questions of truth and morality are at base questions of power and fitness resonates dynamically and intellectually with his alternating lucidity and delirium. (shrink)

SummaryP. Vardy asserts the thesis that the vicious circle principle has the same structure as Russell's paradox. But structure is not the thing itself. It is the thing objectivated from the wiewpoint of a mathematician. So this structure can be expressed in a mathematical formalism, e. g. the Λ‐calculus. Russell's paradox is understood as a result of the error of taking purely logical concepts, like negation, as lkiewise formalisable without change of meaning. The illusion of meaning in the (...) liar's proposition: Yl'am telling a lie can also be explained be the formalisable self‐referential structure of this proposition. Yet it remains an illusion because the logical intention cannot follow the structure.ResumeLe « Principe du cercle vicieux » a la même structure que le paradoxe de Russel: c'est une thèse de P. Várdy. Mais la structure n'est pas la chose même. Elle est la chose objectivée du point de vue du mathématicien et peut done être exprimée dans un formalisme mathématique, p. ex. le Λ‐calcul. L'erreur qui conduit au paradoxe de Russel, c'est de juger des concepts purement logique, p. ex. la négation, comme étant également exprimable dans un formalisme sans que leur sens ne change.L'illusion de sens que donne l'énoncé«je mens» dans le paradoxe du menteur peut aussi être expliquée par la structure formalisable d'autoréférence de cette proposition. Mais l'illusion persiste, parce que l'intention logique ne peut pas suivre la structure.ZusammenfassungRussells «Vicious circle principle» hat dieselbe Struktur wie die Russellsche Antinamie. So lautet die These P. Várdys. Aber die Struktur ist nicht die Sache selbst, sondern nur die vom mathematischen Standpunkte aus objektivierte Sache, die in einem Formalis‐onus ausgedrückt werden kann. Die Antinomie Russells wird Als Folge der irrigen Auffassung verstanden, rein logische Begriffe, wie z. B. die Negation, konnten formalisiert werden, ohne dass dabei ihr Sinn verwandelt würde. Die Sinnillusion des Satzes «Ich lüge» kann dann auch aus der selbstbezüglichen formalen Struktur des Satzes erklärt werden. Doch bleibt dies blosse Illusion, weil die logische Intention der Struktur nicht gerecht werden kann. (shrink)

Chapter 1 begins with the paradox of the origin of speech. He asks: “Does the tight mutual embrace of call and response, through which what responds calls and what calls responds, imply a vicious circle, or does it reveal that there is no difference between affirming speech to spring from being called and affirming that every first utterance is really a response[?]”. In defending the latter position he draws on the Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition of understanding beauty as (...) a call. The second part of chapter 1 focuses on St. Paul’s utterance in Romans 4:17 that God “calls into being what is not.”. (shrink)

Traditional hardcopy publishing brought about a division of labor between producers and disseminators of information. Online publishing makes it feasible for authors to disseminate their work much more widely without any investment in equipment beyond the ubiquitous laptop, without labor costs and without any special technical expertise. As a consequence, the division of labor is no longer important and is, in a range of cases, inefficient. For some scholarly works and teaching materials in particular, traditional hardcopy publishing rather than rather (...) than facilitating the dissemination of creative works not only restricts access to these materials but also undermines their production. Arguably, hardcopy journals and textbook anthologies, are inefficient and only persist because of institutional inertia and what has become the vicious circle of academic publishing. (shrink)

SummaryP. Vardy asserts the thesis that the vicious circle principle has the same structure as Russell's paradox. But structure is not the thing itself. It is the thing objectivated from the wiewpoint of a mathematician. So this structure can be expressed in a mathematical formalism, e. g. the Λ‐calculus. Russell's paradox is understood as a result of the error of taking purely logical concepts, like negation, as lkiewise formalisable without change of meaning. The illusion of meaning in the (...) liar's proposition: Yl'am telling a lie can also be explained be the formalisable self‐referential structure of this proposition. Yet it remains an illusion because the logical intention cannot follow the structure.ResumeLe « Principe du cercle vicieux » a la même structure que le paradoxe de Russel: c'est une thèse de P. Várdy. Mais la structure n'est pas la chose même. Elle est la chose objectivée du point de vue du mathématicien et peut done être exprimée dans un formalisme mathématique, p. ex. le Λ‐calcul. L'erreur qui conduit au paradoxe de Russel, c'est de juger des concepts purement logique, p. ex. la négation, comme étant également exprimable dans un formalisme sans que leur sens ne change.L'illusion de sens que donne l'énoncé«je mens» dans le paradoxe du menteur peut aussi être expliquée par la structure formalisable d'autoréférence de cette proposition. Mais l'illusion persiste, parce que l'intention logique ne peut pas suivre la structure.ZusammenfassungRussells «Vicious circle principle» hat dieselbe Struktur wie die Russellsche Antinamie. So lautet die These P. Várdys. Aber die Struktur ist nicht die Sache selbst, sondern nur die vom mathematischen Standpunkte aus objektivierte Sache, die in einem Formalis‐onus ausgedrückt werden kann. Die Antinomie Russells wird Als Folge der irrigen Auffassung verstanden, rein logische Begriffe, wie z. B. die Negation, konnten formalisiert werden, ohne dass dabei ihr Sinn verwandelt würde. Die Sinnillusion des Satzes «Ich lüge» kann dann auch aus der selbstbezüglichen formalen Struktur des Satzes erklärt werden. Doch bleibt dies blosse Illusion, weil die logische Intention der Struktur nicht gerecht werden kann. (shrink)

The classical paradox of the stone, namely, whether an omnipotent being can create a stone that the being itself cannot lift is traditionally circumvented by a response propounded by Thomas Aquinas, that even omnipotent beings cannot accomplish the logically impossible. However, in their paper “The New Paradox of the Stone,” Alfred R. Mele and M.P. Smith attempt to reinstate the paradox without falling foul of the Thomistic logical constraint. According to Mele and Smith, instead of interpreting the paradox as posing (...) a competition between a pair of omnipotent beings—represented by God at two different times—the paradox can be reformulated as posing a question about simultaneous competition between a pair of omnipotent beings. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to probe the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two omnipotent beings in view of the theological arguments for the “unicity of the omnipotent.”. (shrink)

The classical paradox of the stone, namely, whether an omnipotent being can create a stone that the being itself cannot lift is traditionally circumvented by a response propounded by Thomas Aquinas, that even omnipotent beings cannot accomplish the logically impossible. However, in their paper “The New Paradox of the Stone,” Alfred R. Mele and M.P. Smith attempt to reinstate the paradox without falling foul of the Thomistic logical constraint. According to Mele and Smith, instead of interpreting the paradox as posing (...) a competition between a pair of omnipotent beings—represented by God at two different times—the paradox can be reformulated as posing a question about simultaneous competition between a pair of omnipotent beings. The purpose of this paper is, therefore, to probe the possibility of the simultaneous existence of two omnipotent beings in view of the theological arguments for the “unicity of the omnipotent.”. (shrink)

Here we give a semantical account of propositional quantification that is intended to formally represent Russell’s view that one cannot express a proposition about "all" propositions. According to the account the authors give, Russell’s view bears an interesting relation to the view that there are no sets which are members of themselves.

This is a review of Vicious Circles: On the Mathematics of Non-Wellfounded Phenomena, written by Jon Barwise and Lawrence Moss and published by CSLI Publications in 1996.

In a definition (∀ x )(( x є r )↔D[ x ]) of the set r, the definiens D[ x ] must not depend on the definiendum r . This implies that all quantifiers in D[ x ] are independent of r and of (∀ x ). This cannot be implemented in the traditional first-order logic, but can be expressed in IF logic. Violations of such independence requirements are what created the typical paradoxes of set theory. Poincaré’s Vicious (...) class='Hi'>Circle Principle was intended to bar such violations. Russell nevertheless misunderstood the principle; for him a set a can depend on another set b only if ( b є a ) or ( b ⊆ a ). Likewise, the truth of an ordinary first-order sentence with the Gödel number of r is undefinable in Tarki’s sense because the quantifiers of the definiens depend unavoidably on r. (shrink)

'The greatest book of philosophy I have ever read, on a par with Nietzsche himself.' Michel Foucault.

SummaryRussell's vicious‐circle principle is an endeavour to express a general principle of mathematics which, as the author feels, is fundamental for mathematics. This principle, in a sense warranty of formal consistency, interdicts in some form or other the selfapplication of mathematical entities. It is shown that the VCP is a vicious‐circle fallacy; that, although it can't be given an expression which is simultaneously formal and generally valid, it is generally presupposed by mathematics as far as a (...) consistent formalism is concerned; that this paradoxical situation refers to an essentially informal and non‐mathematical domain which forms a necessary condition for mathematics, but can't exhaustively be expressed in any mathematical formalism. Finally the distinction between semantical and syntactical import and the character of negation are restated in view of these results.RésuméLe principe du cercle vicieux de Russell a, selon l'auteur, une portée générale et fondamentale en mathématiques: il interdit, sous quelque forme que ce soit, lapos;application dapos;entités mathématiques à elles‐mêmes. Ce principe est équivalent au paradoxe de Russell; on ne peut pas le formaliser sous peine de compromettre sa validite universelle, et pourtant il constitue une présupposition de tout formalisme qui veut éviter la contradiction. Cette situation paradoxale nous renvoie à un domaine essentiellement in‐formel et non‐mathématique, qui embrasse le formalisme mathématique, en constitue une condition nécessaire, mais ne peut être exprimé dans aucun formalisme dapos;une manière exhaustive. Finalement le problème logique de la négation et celui de la distinction entre les rapports sémantiques et syntactiques sont repris à la lumière de ces résultats.ZusammenfassungRussells Zirkelprinzip ist der Versuch, ein allgemeingültiges Prinzip der Mathematik auszudrücken, das, wie der Verfasser meint, von grundsätzlicher Bedeutung ist. Dieses Prinzip, das in einem gewissen Sinne die formale Widerspruchsfreiheit verbürgt, verbietet die Selbstbezüglichkeit mathematischer Entitäten. Der Artikel zeigt, dass es mit Russells Paradox äquivalent ist, und dass es eine allgemeine Voraussetzung der Mathematik als eines konsistenten Formalismus darstellt, obwohl man ihm selbst keinen zugleich allgemeingültigen und formellen Ausdruck geben kann; es wird des weiteren gezeigt, dass diese paradoxale Situation auf ein wesentlich informelles und nicht‐mathematisches Gebiet verweist, das eine notwendige Bedingung für die Mathematik darstellt, jedoch selber nicht erschöpfend im Formalismus dargestellt werden kann. Schliesslich werden a) die Unterscheidung zwischen semantischen und syntakti‐schen Beziehungen und b) die Negation im Lichte dieser Ergebnisse neu überdacht. (shrink)

Societies with a higher level of income inequality tend to have lower levels of intergenerational income mobility. Known as the Great Gatsby Curve, this negative relationship in part derives from greater intergenerational economic heritance among the poor. Societies with higher rates of relative poverty will have a higher level of income inequality, but they will also tend to have lower intergenerational mobility due to the reduced capacity of low-income persons to become upwardly mobile. Reviewing relevant research in psychology, we describe (...) how poverty is associated with decreased psychological resources that compromise the competitiveness of low-income persons for superior attainment in the educational system and for greater productivity in the labor market. Economic deprivation in itself thus leads to a “vicious circle” of disadvantage that diminishes intergenerational mobility even without the existence of any culture of poverty or monopolistic institutions in the economy. (shrink)

Metaphysicians of a certain stripe are almost unanimously of the view that grounding is necessarily irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, and well-founded. They deny the possibility of circles of ground and, therewith, the possibility of species of metaphysical coherentism. But what's so bad about circles of ground? One problem for coherentism might be that it ushers in anti-foundationalism: grounding loops give rise to infinite regresses. And this is bad because infinite grounding regresses are vicious. This article argues that circles of ground (...) do not necessarily give rise to infinite regresses, and where they do, those regresses are not necessarily vicious. (shrink)

Scholars are divided over the question of whether managerial aspirational talk that contradicts current business practices can contribute to corporate social responsibility (CSR). In this conceptual article, we explore the rhetorical dynamics of aspirational talk that either impede or foster CSR. We argue that self-persuasive CSR rhetoric, as one enactment of aspirational talk, can attract attention and scrutiny from organizational members. Continued adherence to this rhetoric, however, creates and perpetuates tensions that lead to a vicious circle of disengagement. (...) A virtuous circle, by contrast, requires a shift toward an agonistic rhetoric that transcends tensions by rearticulating aspirations in concurrence with situated understandings of responsible corporate practice. Our arguments contribute to a better understanding of how communication becomes constitutive of CSR and address the debate on decoupling between talk and action. (shrink)

I approach the philosophical analyses of the phenomenon of trust vis-à-vis online communication beginning with an overview from within the framework of computer-mediated communication (CMC) of concerns and paradigmatic failures of trust in the history of online communication. I turn to the more directly philosophical analyses of trust online by first offering an introductory taxonomy of diverse accounts of trust that have emerged over the past decade or so. In the face of important objections to the possibility of establishing and (...) fostering trust in online environments—objections that emerge especially from the perspective of virtue ethics and phenomenological approaches to how we know and navigate the world as _embodied_ beings—I then take up three major arguments in recent work in favor of the possibilities of trust online, followed by three _vicious circles_ that run counter to more optimistic views. I close with a summary of some additional reasons for optimism regarding trust online, followed by a final question that emerges out of recent CMC research on social networking sites that poses, I argue, fundamental challenges indeed to how we understand and may foster and experience trust online. (shrink)

Saul Kripke denies that the reference of a proper name is mediated through a sense (an intension, a concept), and claims that it has to be immediate for „rigidity“ of a proper name to be saved. On the other hand, the version of the Identity Theory of predication according to which predication is characterised as intentional identification of the conceptual content of the predicate with the object represented by the subject-concept requires that there be a concept (sense of the term) (...) at the places both of the subject and of the predicate. This paper is an attempt to propose a conception that purports to maintain the Identity Theory of predication with its demand for proper names to have senses and respond to Kripkean arguments while retaining the rigidity of proper names. Two main theses are defended: 1) Whether a term refers rigidly or non-rigidly does not depend on the nature of the term (i. e. whether it is a name or a description), but on the intention of the speaker/writer. Consequently, both names and descriptions can be used both rigidly and non-rigidly. 2) There is a „minimal sense“ to any proper name which can generaly be described as follows: „the person who has been given the name so-and-so“. The expression „has been given the name“ describes a „relation of reason“, which must be strictly distinguished from the relation of reference of the name, in order to avoid a vicious circle in reference determination, something against which Kripke warned. (shrink)

By comparing Pierre Klossowski’s works on Nietzsche and the Marquis de Sade, the paper attempts to clarify his understanding of the part played by the ‘bodily remainder’ in recruiting a following of readers to their texts. Klossowski’s designation of the ‘simulacrum’ of eternal return in Nietzsche’s philosophy is compared with his account of the role played by sodomy in Sade’s writings. Klossowski contends that, through these figures, a bodily contagion, is communicated to the reader, but esoterically: that is, only to (...) a select few, whose bodies can replicate the impulses that the text conceals. Ultimately, what Klossowski’s interpretations of Nietzsche and Sade achieve, however, is the dissimulation of identity, as well as of a decisive difference between the reader and the philosopher whom she reads. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialtheorie und Philosophie Jahrgang: 4 Heft: 1-2 Seiten: 209-240.

Any general account of successful selection explanations must specify how they avoid being ad hoc or vacuous, hazards that arise from their recursive form.

These comments claim that a shift has occurred between early discussions of online trust, where the focus was on the possibility of such trust and later ones, such as Ess’s, where the concern is more with the influence of the new communication technologies on trust in general. The comments, then, focus on _affordance_ as examined by Ess, arguing that it is, indeed, a central issue in new communications and trust.

I offer an overview of Alessandra Tanesini’s discussion of how best to educate for intellectual virtue in the final chapter of her book The Mismeasure of the Self. I identify the unifying theme behind most of her objections to existing approaches, namely that they fail to instil the proper motivations for intellectual virtue, and I raise an issue about whether Tanesini’s preferred approach, self-affirmation, avoids this worry. I argue that it is not clear that it does; in particular, it’s left (...) unclear how self-affirmative interventions are meant to encourage a person’s evaluations of their own intellectual achievements and capacities to be motivated by accuracy or knowledge, as Tanesini requires them to be if they are to be intellectually virtuous rather than vicious. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 37.3 (2003) 112-118 [Access article in PDF] Hong Kong Art: Culture and Decolonization, by David Clarke. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2002, 240 pp. Paper. The issue of identity is a "vicious" circle in relation to Hong Kong's return to China in 1997. The more one talks about it, the more it is to be talked about as if it is (...) a phenomenon at a very special moment. But isn't not talking about Hong Kong identity in a certain period of time also a "vicious" circle, in which the lack of noise invites further silence?David Clarke's Hong Kong Art is, in a sense, an initiation of Hong Kong art as a "vicious" circle. In this sense, a concrete affinity between a text and its subject matter is significantly established. This is one of the ideals, potentials, and powers of all books written for the sake of being read and having actual effect. In this respect, this "vicious" circle is not vicious in a negative sense. It is through such interactivities that a book establishes a positive link with its subject matter.Hong Kong Art investigates "a particular historical moment in which HongKong art came into its own" (p. 10) and dwells upon the "local-ness of recent Hong Kong art" (p. 8). Nevertheless, Clarke deliberately avoids introducing a chronological survey of "Hong Kong art history as a whole" (p. 10). His solid research draws on the colloquial meanings of Hong Kong art in connection with the dynamics among different languages (Cantonese, Mandarin, and English), local receptions of art as reflected in local media, as well as backgrounds of artists, artworks, and political and cultural developments, among others. All this is necessary for a book that examines theemergence of Hong Kong identity. This is the case especiallyas "[n]o adequate survey exists of Hong Kong art as a whole," albeit surveying Hong Kong art as a whole is not the book's objective. Clarke's meta-survey about surveys on Hong Kong art is given in an endnote, which I also quote here in a note for the reader's reference. "The present author's Art and Place: Essays on Art from a Hong KongPerspective (Hong Kong, 1996) attempts to give a picture of the Hong Kong art world in the period immediately prior to the one covered by this text, and includes [End Page 112] some discussion of art from earlier periods as well. Petra Hinterthür'sModern Art in Hong Kong (Hong Kong, 1985) attempts a brief survey, but is of course unable to throw light on more recent developments. A chronology of Hong Kong art development from 1922 to 1994 is given in Hong Kong Artists. Volume 1 (Hong Kong, 1995), pp. 21-32. A rather patchy and sometimes imprecise chronology of Hong Kong artistic events from 1967 to 1998 isgiven in Gao Minglu, ed., Inside Out: New Chinese Art (Berkeley, 1998), pp. 207-11. The latter chronology also covers political and other broader historical events of the period. A valuable resource (in Chinese) for research on the early period of Hong Kong art is provided by Edwin Lai and Jack Lee, 'A Chronology of Visual Arts Activities in Hong Kong, 1900-1930,' in Besides: A Journal of Art History and Criticism 1 (1997): 135-230" (p. 211).With regard to the book's "ideal" link with its subject matter, I will now discuss the book's actualization of what it sets out to examine. The inadequacy of surveys on Hong Kong art (whether or not as a whole) manifests the relative tranquility in acknowledging that Hong Kong art is distinct. In view of this, the book itself is an intervention that (further) actualizes what it talks about. This is the case particularly in light of its predecessors' "vicious" circle of "silence," let alone those simplifications reducing Hong Kong art to either a Westernized product or a Chinese branch.The "Introduction" of Hong Kong Art begins with a critique of Western art history practices such as Gardner's... (shrink)

In Part 2, drawing on the results of Part 1, I will present my own interpretation of Leibniz’s philosophy of space and time. As regards Leibniz’s theory of geometry and space, De Risi’s excellent work appeared in 2007, so I will depend on this work. However, he does not deal with Leibniz’s view on time, and moreover, he seems to misunderstand the essential part of Leibniz’s view on time. Therefore I will begin with Richard Arthur’s paper, and J. A. Cover’s (...) improvement. Despite some valuable insights contained in their papers, I have to conclude their attempts fail in one way or another, because they disregard the order of state-transition of a monad, which is, on my view, one of the essential features of the monads. By reexamining Leibniz’s important text Initia Rerum, I arrived at the following interpretation. Since the realm of monads is timeless, the order of state-transition of a monad provides only the basis of time in phenomena. What Leibniz calls “simultaneity” should be understood as a unique 1- to-1 correspondence of the states of different monads. With this understanding, whatever is correct in Arthur’s and Cover’s interpretation can be reproduced in my interpretation. On this basis, we can introduce a metric of time based on congruence of duration. Leibniz connected time with space in Initia Rerum by means of motion, and introduced the notion of path of a moving point; thus the congruence of duration can be reduced to congruence of distance. Then, I can show both classical metric and relativistic metric can be reconstructed on the same basis, depending on the coding for phenomena. The relativistic metric can be combined with Leibniz’s idea of internal living force, suggesting a relation of mass with energy. However, since Leibniz has never shown the ground of constant speed of an inertial motion, there may be a vicious circle. In order to avoid this, we can extend the notion of path to whole situation, thus yielding a trajectory of the whole phenomenal world. Then, by applying optimality to possible paths, we may arrive at the law of motion, without vicious circle. A comparison of Leibniz’s dynamics with Barbour’s concludes Part 2. (shrink)