This article presents Heidegger’s little-known theory of the organism developed in his 1929/30 lecture The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics and interprets it as an antithesis to Kant’s theory of the organism contained in his Critique of Judgement (1790 and 1792/3). Heidegger drops Kant’s transcendental caveats in favour of a robust ontological understanding of organismic teleology. Moreover, Heidegger’s alternative approach draws attention to the fact that Kant’s notion of a ‘natural end’ (Naturzweck), by being tied to the idea of intelligent design, (...) still places the organism too close to the machine, notwithstanding assumptions of a ‘formative force’ (bildende Kraft) and ‘productive organs’ (hervorbringende Organe). Heidegger, in contrast, analyses organismic purposiveness in terms of an instinctual capacity (triebhafte Fähigkeit) in which an organism’s organs are ontologically grounded as its products, and which explains the specificity of an organism’s wholeness, motility and relation to the world. (shrink)

This article considers interventionist arguments for downward causation and non-fundamental level causal explanation from the point of view of inferring causation from experiments. Several authors have utilised the interventionist theory of causal explanation to argue that the causal exclusion argument is moot and that higher-level as well as downward causation is real. I show that this argument can be made when levels are understood as levels of grain, leaving us with a choice between causal explanations pitched at different levels. Causal (...) proportionality has been suggested as a principle for choosing the correct level of description for causal explanations, but this suggestion has serious problems. I offer an alternative principle, based on the idea that explanations should track actual difference-makers. I then consider claims about systems causally influencing their own parts. Such claims risk conceptual confusion for the same reason as the exclusion argument, by conflating causal and constitutive dependencies. The distinction between causation and constitution is used to give criteria for the correct use of the idea of downward causation. (shrink)

In this paper, we advocate the idea that an adequate explanation of biological systems requires appealing to organizational closure as an emergent causal regime. We first develop a theoretical justification of emergence in terms of relatedness, by arguing that configurations, because of the relatedness among their constituents, possess ontologically irreducible properties, providing them with distinctive causal powers. We then focus on those emergent causal powers exerted as constraints, and we claim that biological systems crucially differ from other natural systems in (...) that they realize a closure of constraints, i.e. a second-order emergent regime of causation such that the constituents, each of them acting as a constraint, realize a mutual dependence among them, and are collectively able to self-maintain. Lastly, we claim that closure can be justifiably taken as an emergent regime of causation, without admitting that it inherently involves whole-parts causation, which would require to commit to stronger ontological and epistemological assumptions. (shrink)

The Anthropocene crisis is frequently described as the rarefaction of resources or resources per capita. However, both energy and minerals correspond to fundamentally conserved quantities from the perspective of physics. A specific concept is required to understand the rarefaction of available resources. This concept, entropy, pertains to energy and matter configurations and not just to their sheer amount. However, the physics concept of entropy is insufficient to understand biological and social organizations. Biological phenomena display both historicity and systemic properties. A (...) biological organization, the ability of a specific living being to last over time, results from history, expresses itself by systemic properties, and may require generating novelties The concept of anti-entropy stems from the combination of these features. We propose that Anthropocene changes disrupt biological organizations by randomizing them, that is, decreasing anti-entropy. Moreover, second-order disruptions correspond to the decline of the ability to produce functional novelties, that is, to produce anti-entropy. (shrink)

The Anthropocene crisis is frequently described as the rarefaction of resources or resources per capita. However, both energy and minerals correspond to fundamentally conserved quantities from the perspective of physics. A specific concept is required to understand the rarefaction of available resources. This concept, entropy, pertains to energy and matter configurations and not just to their sheer amount. However, the physics concept of entropy is insufficient to understand biological and social organizations. Biological phenomena display both historicity and systemic properties. A (...) biological organization, the ability of a specific living being to last over time, results from history, expresses itself by systemic properties, and may require generating novelties The concept of anti-entropy stems from the combination of these features. We propose that Anthropocene changes disrupt biological organizations by randomizing them, that is, decreasing anti-entropy. Moreover, second-order disruptions correspond to the decline of the ability to produce functional novelties, that is, to produce anti-entropy. (shrink)

Currently, there are almost as many conceptions of emergence as authors who address the issue. Most literature on the matter focuses either on discussing, evaluating and comparing particular contributions or accounts of emergence, or on assessing a particular case study. Our aim in this paper is rather different. We here set out to introduce a distinction that has not been sufficiently taken into account in previous discussions on this topic: the distinction between inter-domain emergence—a relation between items belonging to different (...) ontic domains—and intra-domain emergence—a relation between items belonging to a same ontic domain. Our final purpose is not to assume and defend a definite stance on emergence, but to stress the relevance of such distinction when attempting to argue for or against emergence, in the first place. We will also address the connections between emergence so distinguished and more general philosophical perspectives, suggesting where would reductionists and pluralists stand with respect to intra- and inter-domain emergence. (shrink)

Evolution exploits the physics of non‐neural bioelectricity to implement anatomical homeostasis: a process in which embryonic patterning, remodeling, and regeneration achieve invariant anatomical outcomes despite external interventions. Linear “developmental pathways” are often inadequate explanations for dynamic large‐scale pattern regulation, even when they accurately capture relationships between molecular components. Biophysical and computational aspects of collective cell activity toward a target morphology reveal interesting aspects of causation in biology. This is critical not only for unraveling evolutionary and developmental events, but also for (...) the design of effective strategies for biomedical intervention. Bioelectrical controls of growth and form, including stochastic behavior in such circuits, highlight the need for the formulation of nuanced views of pathways, drivers of system‐level outcomes, and modularity, borrowing from concepts in related disciplines such as cybernetics, control theory, computational neuroscience, and information theory. This approach has numerous practical implications for basic research and for applications in regenerative medicine and synthetic bioengineering. (shrink)

Currently, there are almost as many conceptions of emergence as authors who address the issue. Most literature on the matter focuses either on discussing, evaluating and comparing particular contributions or accounts of emergence, or on assessing a particular case study. Our aim in this paper is rather different. We here set out to introduce a distinction that has not been sufficiently taken into account in previous discussions on this topic: the distinction between inter-domain emergence—a relation between items belonging to different (...) ontic domains—and intra-domain emergence—a relation between items belonging to a same ontic domain. Our final purpose is not to assume and defend a definite stance on emergence, but to stress the relevance of such distinction when attempting to argue for or against emergence, in the first place. We will also address the connections between emergence so distinguished and more general philosophical perspectives, suggesting where would reductionists and pluralists stand with respect to intra- and inter-domain emergence. (shrink)

The Somatic Mutation Theory has been challenged on its fundamentals by the Tissue Organization Field Theory of Carcinogenesis. However, a recent publication has questioned whether TOFT could be a valid alternative theory of carcinogenesis to that presented by SMT. Herein we critically review arguments supporting the irreducible opposition between the two theoretical approaches by highlighting differences regarding the philosophical, methodological and experimental approaches on which they respectively rely. We conclude that SMT has not explained carcinogenesis due to severe epistemological and (...) empirical shortcomings, while TOFT is gaining momentum. The main issue is actually to submit SMT to rigorous testing. This concern includes the imperatives to seek evidence for disproving one’s hypothesis, and to consider the whole, and not just selective evidence. (shrink)

In this contribution, I comment on Raffaella Campaner’s defense of explanatory pluralism in psychiatry (in this volume). In her paper, Campaner focuses primarily on explanatory pluralism in contrast to explanatory reductionism. Furthermore, she distinguishes between pluralists who consider pluralism to be a temporary state on the one hand and pluralists who consider it to be a persisting state on the other hand. I suggest that it would be helpful to distinguish more than those two versions of pluralism – different understandings (...) of explanatory pluralism both within philosophy of science and psychiatry – namely moderate/temporary pluralism, anything goes pluralism, isolationist pluralism, integrative pluralism and interactive pluralism. Next, I discuss the pros and cons of these different understandings of explanatory pluralism. Finally, I raise the question of how to implement or operationalize explanatory pluralism in scientific practice; how to structure the “genuine dialogue” or shape “the pluralistic attitude” Campaner is referring to. As tentative answers, I explore a question-based framework for explanatory pluralism as well as social-epistemological procedures for interaction among competing approaches and explanations. (shrink)

Cancer—and scientific research on cancer—raises a variety of compelling philosophical questions. This entry will focus on four topics, which philosophers of science have begun to explore and debate. First, scientific classifications of cancer have as yet failed to yield a unified taxonomy. There is a diversity of classificatory schemes for cancer, and while some are hierarchical, others appear to be “cross-cutting,” or non-nested. This literature thus raises a variety of questions about the nature of the disease and disease classification. Second, (...) philosophers of science have historically taken the aim of science to be arriving at true theories. However, scientists studying cancer come from a variety of disciplines, with different scientific as well as practical aims. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that historians and philosophers of science do not seem to agree on how best to characterize the aim and structure of cancer research; it is far from clear whether the appropriate characterization of the aim is arriving at true theories, or even whether the proper units of analysis are “theories”, or instead, “models”, “explanatory frameworks”, “research programs”, “paradigms”, or perhaps, “experimental traditions”. With the rise of “big data” science—such as the Cancer Genome Atlas Project (or TCGA)—and “systems” approaches to the study of disease, both philosophers and historians of science are rethinking how best to describe and explain these distinctive kinds of scientific inquiry. -/- Third, cancer is in part a byproduct of our developmental and life history, as well as our evolutionary history. Cancer progression can be compared to a reversion of development, or, to the evolution of multicellularity. Thus, cancer raises intriguing questions about how we conceive of “functions”, “development”, and the role of our evolutionary history and particularly, selective trade-offs, in vulnerability to disease. -/- Last but not least, cancer research provides a case study for consideration of the roles of values at the science-policy interface. Epidemiological and toxicological research on cancer’s causes informs toxics law and regulatory policy, which raises a variety of questions about the nature of evidence and inductive risk in such contexts. (shrink)

In the last decade, Systems Biology has emerged as a conceptual and explanatory alternative to reductionist-based approaches in molecular biology. However, the foundations of this new discipline need to be fleshed out more carefully. In this paper, we claim that a relational ontology is a necessary tool to ground both the conceptual and explanatory aspects of Systems Biology. A relational ontology holds that relations are prior—both conceptually and explanatory—to entities, and that in the biological realm entities are defined primarily by (...) the context they are embedded within—and hence by the web of relations they are part of. (shrink)

Introduction 1) Une épistémologie non fondationnelle § 1. Concernant l?usage philosophique de l?adjectif « vital », on s?attend à voir surgir une distinction entre le vivant et le vécu, comme si d?emblée nous pouvions et devions accepter que le vital soit aussi quelque chose d?éprouvé par la conscience, par opposition au vivant qui serait simplement observé et expliqué par la science. Pourquoi, dès lors, faudrait-il rechercher dans ou chez les êtres vivants quelque chose de vital ? Cela ne reviendrait-il pas (...) à multiplier les entités et à transformer subrepticement le prédicat « vivant » en être ? Cela ne nous engagerait-t-il pas vers une substantialisation de la vie érigée ainsi en réalité métaphysique ? N?est-ce pas justement le défaut des vitalistes comme Bergson (1907) ou Driesch, de créer un tel processus de surdétermination (Mayr, 1961 ; Kim, 1993, 1998) par et à travers lequel, à un phénomène inconnu X devrait correspondre en même temps des causes observables X?, X?? et une force vitale inobservable Y ? Ce processus introduirait ainsi une entité supra­naturelle dans le cours des événements naturels et rendrait impossible toute forme de stabilité et de généralité pour la relation associant X à X?, X?? et X???. § 2. Nous allons pourtant partir d?une position épistémologique in­édite. Il n?est pas question pour nous d?imposer d?emblée aux biologistes l?existence. (shrink)