Eugene Marshall presents an original, systematic account of Spinoza's philosophy of mind, in which the mind is presented as an affective mechanism that, when rational, behaves as a spiritual automaton. He explores key themes in Spinoza's thought, and illuminates his philosophical and ethical project in a striking new way.

How could the kinds of grammars that linguists write actually be used in models of perceptual processing? This book relates grammars to cognitive architecture. It shows how incremental parsing works, step-by-step, and how specific learning rules might lead to frequency-sensitive preferences. Along the way, Hale reconsiders garden-pathing, the parallel/serial distinction and information-theoretical complexity metrics such as surprisal. A "must" for cognitive scientists of language. ".

A brief history of affective responses to AI.

It has been known for long time that the cosmic sound wave was there since the early epoch of the Universe. Signatures of its existence are abound. However, such a sound wave model of cosmology is rarely developed fully into a complete framework. This paper can be considered as our second attempt towards such a complete description of the Universe based on soliton wave solution of cosmological KdV equation. Then we advance further this KdV equation by virtue of Cellular (...) class='Hi'>Automaton method to solve the PDEs. We submit wholeheartedly Robert Kurucz’s hypothesis that Big Bang should be replaced with a finite cellular automaton universe with no expansion. Nonetheless, we are fully aware that our model is far from being complete, but it appears the proposed cellular automaton model of the Universe is very close in spirit to what Konrad Zuse envisaged long time ago. It is our hope that the new proposed method can be verified with observation data. But we admit that our model is still in its infancy, more researches are needed to fill all the missing details. (shrink)

We study the finitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma in which the players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by a machine with a bound on its complexity. One player has to use a finite automaton while the other player has to use a finite perceptron. Some examples illustrate that the sets of strategies which are induced by these two types of machines are different and not ordered by set inclusion. Repeated game payoffs are evaluated according to the limit (...) of means. The main result establishes that a cooperation at almost all stages of the game is an equilibrium outcome if the complexity of the machines the players may use is limited enough and if the length T of the repeated game is sufficiently large. This result persists when more than T states are allowed in the player’s automaton. We further consider a variant of the model in which the two players are restricted to choosing strategies which are implementable by perceptrons and prove that the players can cooperate at most of the stages provided that the complexity of their perceptrons is sufficiently reduced. (shrink)

This book presents the deterministic view of quantum mechanics developed by Nobel Laureate Gerard 't Hooft. Dissatisfied with the uncomfortable gaps in the way conventional quantum mechanics meshes with the classical world, 't Hooft has revived the old hidden variable ideas, but now in a much more systematic way than usual. In this, quantum mechanics is viewed as a tool rather than a theory. The book presents examples of models that are classical in essence, but can be analysed by the (...) use of quantum techniques, and argues that even the Standard Model, together with gravitational interactions, might be viewed as a quantum mechanical approach to analysing a system that could be classical at its core. He shows how this approach, even though it is based on hidden variables, can be plausibly reconciled with Bell's theorem, and how the usual objections voiced against the idea of 'superdeterminism' can be overcome, at least in principle. This framework elegantly explains - and automatically cures - the problems of the wave function collapse and the measurement problem. Even the existence of an "arrow of time" can perhaps be explained in a more elegant way than usual. As well as reviewing the author's earlier work in the field, the book also contains many new observations and calculations. It provides stimulating reading for all physicists working on the foundations of quantum theory. (shrink)

We present a sound and complete tableau calculus for the class of regular grammar logics. Our tableau rules use a special feature called automaton-labelled formulae, which are similar to formulae of automaton propositional dynamic logic. Our calculus is cut-free and has the analytic superformula property so it gives a decision procedure. We show that the known EXPTIME upper bound for regular grammar logics can be obtained using our tableau calculus. We also give an effective Craig interpolation lemma for (...) regular grammar logics using our calculus. (shrink)

We show that the fundamental legal structure of a well-written financial contract follows a state-transition logic that can be formalized mathematically as a finite-state machine (specifically, a deterministic finite automaton or DFA). The automaton defines the states that a financial relationship can be in, such as “default,” “delinquency,” “performing,” etc., and it defines an “alphabet” of events that can trigger state transitions, such as “payment arrives,” “due date passes,” etc. The core of a contract describes the rules by (...) which different sequences of events trigger particular sequences of state transitions in the relationship between the counterparties. By conceptualizing and representing the legal structure of a contract in this way, we expose it to a range of powerful tools and results from the theory of computation. These allow, for example, automated reasoning to determine whether a contract is internally coherent and whether it is complete relative to a particular event alphabet. We illustrate the process by representing a simple loan agreement as an automaton. (shrink)

Lattice-gas cellular automaton (LGCA) and lattice Boltzmann (LB) models are promising models for studying emergent behaviour of transport and interaction processes in biological systems. In this chapter, we will emphasise the use of LGCA/LB models and the derivation and analysis of LGCA models ranging from the classical example dynamics of fluid flow to clotting phenomena in cerebral aneurysms and the invasion of tumour cells.

In Stieglerian fashion, this paper is concerned with both the loss and the re-creation of knowledge in the field of architecture. The student of architecture must be the one who learns new tools and new forms of knowledge and this has profound implications and applicability for the philosophy of education as it is a question of the recuperation of architecture with negentropic tools. Why? In the realm of the digital, it is the case that architectural student is at risk of (...) dis-individuation, the loss of knowledge of such. Therefore, the paper concerns itself with questions of maturity, critical intelligence, trans-individuation, the crisis of noetic being, the artisanal mode of learning and finally the proletarianization of the faculties. It is concerned with the reclamation of noetic space and the search for negentropic tools. This paper is thus pertinent to the philosophy of education because it pertains to the act of creation, the question of imagination and to the loss of thinking as such. Focusing on the history of architecture it demonstrates the loss of knowledge in the history of architecture and shows this has clear implications for the philosophy of education, which is precisely concerned with the nurturing and maturing of the thinking subject. The crisis in the proletarianization of the faculties in architecture pinpoints the role of the artisan’s mode of learning and its crisis brought by the digitisation of architecture. The conclusion shows that Stiegler’s philosophy of the pharmakon is appropriate to understand this movement as it points to new and embraces new modes of learning in the present. (shrink)

Varela, Thompson, and Rosch illustrated their original presentation of the enactive theory of cognition with the example of a simple cellular automaton. Their theory was paradigmatically anti-computational, and yet automata similar to the one that they describe have typically been used to illustrate theories of computation, and are usually treated as abstract computational systems. Their use of this example is therefore puzzling, especially as they do not seem to acknowledge the discrepancy. The solution to this tension lies in recognizing (...) a hidden background assumption, shared by both Varela, Thompson, and Rosch and the computational theories of mind which they were responding to. This assumption is that computation requires representation, and that computational states must bear representational content. For Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, representational content is incompatible with cognition, and so from their perspective the automaton that they describe cannot, despite appearances, be computational. However, there now exist several accounts of computation that do not make this assumption, and do not characterize computation in terms of representational content. In light of these recent developments, we will argue that it is quite straightforward to characterize the enactive automaton as a non-representational computing mechanism, one that we do not think they should have any objections to. (shrink)

We define an automata-theoretic counterpart of grammars based on the Lambek-calculus L, a prominent formalism in computational linguistics. While the usual push-down automaton has the same weak generative power as the L-based grammars , there is no direct relationship between the computations of a PDA for some language L and the derivations of an L-based grammar for L. In the Lambek-automaton, on the other hand, there is a tight relation between automaton computations and grammar derivations. The (...) class='Hi'>automaton exhibits a novel mode of operation, using hypothetical steps, directly inspired by the hypothetical reasoning embodied by L. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam has argued that computational functionalism cannot serve as a foundation for the study of the mind, as every ordinary open physical system implements every finite-state automaton. I argue that Putnam's argument fails, but that it points out the need for a better understanding of the bridge between the theory of computation and the theory of physical systems: the relation of implementation. It also raises questions about the class of automata that can serve as a basis for understanding (...) the mind. I develop an account of implementation, linked to an appropriate class of automata, such that the requirement that a system implement a given automaton places a very strong constraint on the system. This clears the way for computation to play a central role in the analysis of mind. (shrink)

An embedded automaton is introduced to monitor the whole glycolysis process in pancreatic β-cell and it is a hybridization of both non-deterministic finite automaton and push-down automaton. The set of irreversible and reversible reactions in the glycolysis process are related to non-deterministic finite automaton and push-down automaton respectively. The embedded automaton is used to observe the glucose metabolism with the states of acceptance and rejection. The acceptance state of the embedded automaton depicts the (...) normal level of glycolysis and insulin secretion. The rejection state of this machine shows inhibition of glycolysis which obstructs the secretion of insulin. The subsequent low level of insulin leads to the high blood glucose level also known as hyperglycemia. In this study, the designed machine can be used to regulate the process of glycolysis through a group of regulatory glycolytic enzymes for the treatment of Diabetes mellitus at molecular level. (shrink)

Methods developed in a previous paper are employed to define an exact correspondence between the states of a deterministic cellular automaton in 1+1 dimensions and those of a bosonic quantum field theory. The result may be used to argue that quantum field theories may be much closer related to deterministic automata than what is usually thought possible.

(A chapter in the book edited by Ine Gevers, Robot Love: Can We Learn from Robots About Love?) Similarly to the method employed by Marx in his analysis of the capital and to de Saussure’s structuralist explanation of language, I suggest we conceive the categories in question as materially conditioned while resulting into full abstraction in the process of analysis. Thus, instead of theorising in terms of the anthropologically (and philosophically) conditioned phantasm of a “digital subjectivity” or a “cyborg self,” (...) let us radicalise and absolutise the concepts of the material and the ideal (or the mind understood in opposition to the material), arriving to physicality, regardless of whether organic or synthetic, and the automaton of signification as our main two categories of analysis. Therefore, let us also note that the category of “automaton” implies we are not dealing with a form of cognition but rather of language or signification. It is through operation with these categories that we shall postulate the sociopolitical and economic relevance of the cybernetic development for the post-human society and for the post-humanist self. The statement just made refers to a de facto political project, and it is impossible to arrive to results that would represent a fundamental change in relation to the humanist history of civilization/s without resorting to philosophical concepts. (shrink)

The crisis of confidence in the social sciences has many corollaries which impact our research practices. One of these is a push towards maximal and mechanical objectivity in quantitative research. This stance is reinforced by major journals and academic institutions that subtly yet certainly link objectivity with integrity and rigor. The converse implication of this may be an association between subjectivity and low quality. Subjectivity is one of qualitative methodology’s best assets, however. In qualitative methodology, that subjectivity is often given (...) voice through reflexivity. It is used to better understand our own role within the research process, and is a means through which the researcher may oversee how they influence their research. Given that the actions of researchers have led to the poor reproducibility characterising the crisis of confidence, it is worthwhile to consider whether reflexivity can help improve the validity of research findings in quantitative psychology. In this report, we describe a combination approach of research: the data of a series of interviews helps us elucidate the link between reflexive practice and quality of research, through the eyes of practicing academics. Through our exploration of the position of the researcher in their research, we shed light on how the reflections of the researcher can impact the quality of their research findings, in the context of the current crisis of confidence. The validity of these findings is tempered, however, by limitations to the sample, and we advise caution on the part of our audience in their reading of our conclusions. (shrink)

J.S. Mill has formulated a classical statement of the "argument from analogy� concerning knowledge of other minds: "I must either believe them [other human beings] to be alive, or to be automatons� (Mill 1872, 244). It is possible that Wittgenstein had this in mind when writing the following: "I believe he is suffering.�—Do I also believe that he isn"t an automaton? It would go against the grain to use the word in both connexions. (Or is it like this: I (...) believe he is suffering, but am certain the he is not an automaton? Nonsense!) Suppose I say of a friend: "He isn"t an automaton�.—What information is conveyed by this, and to whom would it be information? To a human being who meets him in ordinary circumstances? What information could it give him? (At the very most that this man always behaves like a human being, and not occasionally like a machine.) "I believe he is not an automaton�, just like that, so far makes no sense. My attitude towards him is an attitude towards a soul [eine Einstellung zur Seele]. I am not of the opinion that he has a soul. (PI p. 178) Here Wittgenstein contrasts opinion (Meinung) and attitude (Einstellung). How should this contrast be understood? On a view such as Mill"s, to regard someone as a conscious being is to hold certain beliefs about him, beliefs that can perhaps ultimately be grounded in a theory of some sort. To have an "attitude towards a soul� is, on the contrary, to see a person"s gestures and facial expressions as "filled with meaning�. We have an attitude towards a soul when confronted with a person, which means that we react to his presence and behaviour in a certain way. (shrink)

One of the most interesting aspects of Leibniz's philosophy is the distinction between "art" and "nature"; the core of this matter is the possibility (or even the impossibility) of distinguishing as clearly as possible between two ontological domains: on one hand the products of technique (such as "artificial machines"), on the other hand all the beings that can be defined as natural ("natural machines"). The question raised in this paper is if it is possibile to build ontological criteria which can (...) be clear enough to distinguish between the products of nature and those of technique in the field of the "res" that they are. (shrink)

The young Spinoza and the mature Leibniz both characterize the soul as a self-moving spiritual automaton. Though it is unclear if Leibniz’s use of the term was suggested to him from his reading of Spinoza, Leibniz was aware of its presence in Spinoza’s Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect. Considering Leibniz’s staunch opposition to Spinozism, the question arises as to why he was willing to adopt this term. I propose an answer to this question by comparing the spiritual (...) automaton in both philosophers. For Spinoza, the soul acts as a spiritual automaton when it overcomes imaginative ideas and produces true ideas. For Leibniz, the soul acts as a spiritual automaton when it spontaneously produces its perceptions according to the universal harmony preestablished by God. Thus, for Leibniz contra Spinoza, the spiritual automaton is a means to render intelligible a providential order in which everything happens for the best. (shrink)

The infrastructure is becoming a network of computerized machines regulated by societies of self-directing software agents. Complexity encourages the emergence of novel values in software agent societies. Interdependent human and software political orders cohabitate and coevolve in a symbiosis of freedoms.

This article compares repetition in Zhuangzi and Jacques Lacan from three perspectives: repetition as a mechanism, a revelation, and a solution. First, repetition enables us to detect underlying structures. Zhuangzi loses himself in observing the intricate animal relationships (the mantis, cicada, magpie) without any knowledge of being watched over by a garden-keeper. Lacan rewrites these positions into three stages of human development. Repetition also serves as a revelation. The four repetitions of the magus’ diagnoses reveal the shift from the transparent (...) subject to the opaque subject. Lacan absorbs this mysterious Daoist concept and rewrites repetition as “an encounter with the real.” Finally, to restore the symbiotic coexistence with things, Zhuangzi resorts to repetition. Like Zhuangzi, Lacan acknowledges the capacity for repetition to enable our encounter with the Real; unlike Zhuangzi, Lacan holds that the primary function of repetition is to “haul” the subject from collapsing into the Real. (shrink)

(A chapter in a book edited by Rocco Gangle and Julius Greve, titled Superpositions: Laruelle and the Humanities) The human-in-human is nonhuman or “inhuman” (Haraway), monstrous along with the animal, the machine and the darkness of the out-there insofar as it remains a radical hybridity or one that is philosophically unmediated. The real precedes signification and occupies the position of mere materiality (either physicality or machinic materiality) unilaterally situated vis-à-vis a signifying agency. This dual unilaterality is placed within a dyadic (...) structure. The human radical constructedness grounded in—although not reducible to—the binary of technology and the organic (or “nature”) does not make it more rational, more “intelligent,” and less physical, less animal. Quite to the contrary, the kernel of hybridity does not contain a purely technological purpose and is not reducible to the philosophical fetish of rationalism —it is as unruly, as meaningless, as “merely material” as the animal. (shrink)

Through the World Health Organization’s definition of midwifery, midwives are frequently heard to describe themselves as autonomous practitioners. In this article this notion is refuted. An overview of individual and collective autonomy is first presented to contextualize the subsequent discussion. Then the notion of autonomy in relation to midwifery practice in Scotland and New Zealand is critiqued through tracing the history of midwives and midwifery in these two countries. Issues relating to midwifery registration, medicalization of birth and consumerism are discussed. (...) Each of these categories is suggested as limiting to autonomous practice within midwifery. (shrink)

Through the World Health Organization’s definition of midwifery, midwives are frequently heard to describe themselves as autonomous practitioners. In this article this notion is refuted. An overview of individual and collective autonomy is first presented to contextualize the subsequent discussion. Then the notion of autonomy in relation to midwifery practice in Scotland and New Zealand is critiqued through tracing the history of midwives and midwifery in these two countries. Issues relating to midwifery registration, medicalization of birth and consumerism are discussed. (...) Each of these categories is suggested as limiting to autonomous practice within midwifery. (shrink)

My response is divided into four sections: (1) is devoted to a potpourri of commentaries that are essentially in agreement with the substance of my target article (with one exception); in (2) I address, in response to one of the commentaries, several issues relating to the use of candidate gene association studies in behavior genetics (in particular those proposing a specific G×E interaction); in (3) I provide a detailed response to several defenses of the twin study methodology; and in (4) (...) I conclude with several reflections on that methodology and the conception of human nature it has fostered. (shrink)

Galatea, or the Future of Darwinism W Russell Brain Originally published in 1927 "A brilliant exposition…of the evolutionary hypothesis." The Guardian "Should prove invaluable…" Literary Guide This non-technical but closely-reasoned book is a challenge to the orthodox teaching on evolution known as Neo-Darwinism. The author claims that although Neo-Darwinian theories can possibly account for the evolution of forms, they are quite inadequate to explain the evolution of functions. 88pp ************** Daedalus or Science and the Future J B S Haldane Originally (...) published in 1924. "The essay is brilliant. Sparkling with wit and bristling with challenges." British Medical Journal "Predicts the most startling changes." Morning Post This volume examines the future of scientific research from religious, philosophical social and economic standpoints. 94pp Automaton, or the Future of Mechanical Man H Stafford Hatfield Originally published in 1928 "It is impossible to do justice to his volume in a brief review…"Daily Herald At the time of original publication mankind’s chief inventions had been extensions of his senses or limbs. This work prophesies the dawn of an era in which substitutes will gradually be found even for the human brain. 96pp Gallio or the Tyranny of Science J W N Sullivan Originally published in 1927 "So packed with ideas it is not possible to give any adequate résumé of its contents." Times Literary Supplement "Remarkable monograph…devastating summary of materialism…" Spectator An attack on the values which science is so successfully imposing upon civilization. 90pp. (shrink)

This paper analyzes Leibniz’s use of analogies in both natural philosophical and metaphysical contexts. Through an examination of Leibniz’s notes on scientific methodology, I show that Leibniz explicitly recognizes the utility of analogies as heuristic tools that aid us in conceiving unfamiliar theoretical domains. I further argue that Leibniz uses the notion of a self-moving machine or automaton to help capture the activities of the immaterial soul. My account helps resist the conventional image of Leibniz as an arch-rationalist unconcerned (...) with methods of empirical discovery and contributes to ongoing discussions on the nature of immaterial substance and mind in Leibniz. (shrink)

I examine a passage from Heidegger’s 1922 overview of a proposed book on Aristotle wherein he addresses the importance of Aristotle’s treatment of accidental (sumbebēkos) causes in the Physics II.4-6. My analysis shows that this passage plays a key role within the account of Aristotle’s ontology presented in the overview insofar as it allows Heidegger to open up a new way of reading Aristotle, one that both diagnoses and pushes through the inheritance of being understood as technē in order to (...) retrieve originary insights about the movement of factical human life, world, and care. Rather than subordinate tuchē and automaton (chance) to the four ‘real’ causes they would remain merely incidental to or derivative of, Heidegger asks that we recognize the priority of praxis, whose archē unfolds as care toward and within a world of accidents. (shrink)

This essay discusses Stanley Cavell’s remarkable interpretation of Emmanuel Levinas’s thought against the background of his own ongoing engagement with Wittgenstein, Austin, and the problem of other minds. This unlikely debate, the only extensive discussion of Levinas by Cavell in his long philosophical career sofar, focuses on their different reception of Descartes’s idea of the infinite. The essay proposes to read both thinkers against the background of Wittgenstein’s model of philosophical meditation and raises the question as to whether Cavell and (...) Levinas do not indirectly shed light on the early modern motif of the spiritual automaton. (shrink)

O presente estudo constitui um ensaio crítico de reflexão sobre a questão dos limites da linguagem em Wittgenstein. A perspectiva deste estudo observa, numa primeira parte, o próprio procedimento do método wittgen-steiniano e segue um modelo de discurso plural, a partir de várias perspectivas que, não só permitem desconstruir a aparente unidade da razão, como indagar interiormente do próprio limite da análise wittgensteiniana. Retomando a caracterização da linguagem e do pensamento nos seus traços fundamentais, desde o "Tractatus" até às "Investigações (...) Filosóficas", chama-se a atenção para os pontos de dificuldade, da indefinição e da cons-trutividade do modelo de Wittgenstein. A plena lição do "autómaton" da linguagem face a uma possível diferenciação dos signos e aprofundamento lógico, constitui uma parte desta reflexão que se complementa pela referência aos horizontes de resíduo do não-linguístico, ou até do indizível, numa dupla maneira de estabelecer os limites da linguagem. Enfim, e a título conclusivo, apontam-se, não apenas os contornos do que se entende como uma moral retórica da linguagem em Wittgenstein, mas para perspectivas originais de um reaprofundamento em termos etioló-gicos de diferenciação de escala da lógica e da linguagem, e de recuperação de uma intencionalidade psico-lógico-linguística superando aquela indiferen-ciação do dizer no automático da fala estatuída na "ordinary language". /// La présente étude constitue un essai critique qui réfléchie sur la question des limites du langage dans la philosophie de Wittgenstein. Dans une première partie la perspective de cette réflexion analise les procédés que Wittgenstein lui-même utilise dans sa méthode, et pour cela se sert d'un modèle de discours pluriel, lequel permet non seulement la déconstruction de l'apparente unité de la raison, mais aussi faire une enquête au dedans des limites de l'analyse wittgensteinienne. Reprenant la caractérisation du langage et de la pensée dans ses traits principaux, dès le "Tractatus" jusqu'aux "Investigations Philosophiques", on remarque les points de difficulté, d'indéfînition et de constructivité du modèle de Wittgenstein. La leçon de l'"autômaton" du langage face à une possible diférenciation des signes et l'approfondissement logique, constitue une partie de cette réflexion, qui se complémente par la référence aux horizons résiduels du non-linguistique, ou de l'indicible même, dans une double manière d'établir les limites du langage. Finalement, et comme une conclusion, on remarque, non seulement les contours de ce qu'on considère une morale réthorique du langage chez Witt- genstein, mais aussi pour les perspectives originelles qui permettent reprendre profondément, en termes étiologiques les différences d'échelles logique et linguistique, et récuperer une intentionalité psycho-logico-linguistique. Ainsi on réussit à supérer cette indifférenciation du dire dans l'authomatique de la parole qui s'etablie dans l'"ordinary language". /// The present study is a critical essay on the question of language's limits in Wittgenstein's thought. First of all, the view of this study observes how Wittgensteinian method proceeds. This investigation adopts a pluralistic model of speach, from several points of view, which not only allow to desconstruct the pseudo-unity of reason, but also, make possible to investigate about the inner limits of Wittgenstein's analysis. The Author remarks the difficulties of the non-definition and the construed vity of the Wittgensteinian model of thought, remembering the characteristic relationship language and thought, from Tractatus, to Philosophical Investigations. In order to a possible differenciation of signs and deeper logical analysis, the "automaton" of languages gives us a lesson which is another important part of this reflexion. This point is completed by the reference on the residual boundaries of non-linguistic, or even, non sayable, in a double way of establishing the limits of language. At last, and as a conclusion, the author points out, not only the outlines of the so called "rethoric moral" of language in Wittgenstein philosophy, but also to original views. These views allow a new deeper understanding, in ethiological terms. Different logical and linguistical scales are pointed as a mean, to recover a psycho-logico-linguistic intentionality, overcoming the indifferenciation of authomatic speech as established in "ordinary language". (shrink)

This essay discusses Stanley Cavell’s remarkable interpretation of Emmanuel Levinas’s thought against the background of his own ongoing engagement with Wittgenstein, Austin, and the problem of other minds. This unlikely debate, the only extensive discussion of Levinas by Cavell in his long philosophical career sofar, focuses on their different reception of Descartes’s idea of the infinite. The essay proposes to read both thinkers against the background of Wittgenstein’s model of philosophical meditation and raises the question as to whether Cavell and (...) Levinas do not indirectly shed light on the early modern motif of the spiritual automaton. (shrink)