The West has long had an ambivalent attitude toward the philosophical traditions of the East. Voltaire claimed that the East is the civilization "to which the West owes everything", yet C.S. Peirce was contemptuous of the "monstrous mysticism of the East". And despite the current trend toward globalizations, there is still a reluctance to take seriously the intellectual inheritance of South and East Asia. Oriental Enlightenment challenges this Eurocentric prejudice. J. J. Clarke examines the role played by the ideas of (...) Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Taoism in the intellectual life of the West and how these ideas, far more than exotic distractions, or even instruments of colonial domination, have been the means towards serious self-questioning and self-renewal, used to dispute and even to undermine Western orthodoxies. (shrink)

The problem of function statements in the Life Sciences may be stated as follows. Life Scientists make frequent and important use of statements of the form 'X is the function of Y', in explaining phenomena intimately connected with living organisms. The use of such statements, according to recent philosophical discussions suffers the defects of presupposing or committing the user to the existence of vital forces, purposive activity outside the realm of human action, or a special kind of ';causal' nexus, i.e. (...) final causality, or constitutes the basis for the irreducibility of the LIFE sciences to physics . ;Because scientists find such statements so useful they are not willing to throw these statements out altogether. Instead the philosopher embarks on a program to 'save' such statements by showing that upon analysis function statements do not really suffer the above-mentioned defects. This analysis of function statements into statements of efficient causality shows them to be causal in a way which does not commit one to vital forces, purposive activity outside the realm of human activity, or final causality, and does not provide ammunition for those who would resist the reduction of Biology to Physics. ;First I consider attempts which have been made in the philosophical literature to analyze function statements into regular causal statements. I provide in the course of these considerations a positive account of the legitimate use of function statements in the life sciences which is non-reductive yet does not involve any of the defects which motivate the standard philosophical analyses. This positive account sees function statements as compacted explanations which among other distinguishing uses and characteristics focus on a special class of consequences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Edited by Jean De Groot 7a Nature in American Philosophy. The Catholic University of America Press, 2004 κ-—ι and scientific thought in the mid-19 century and the significant role played ^ by Chauncey Wright. But it is not clear how this bears on the question of nature as a philosophical concept, unless one assumes that science itself bears some special relation to the knowledge of nature. This, however, would (...) be to beg the philosophical question. If, for example, nature is defined as that to which only natural science has access, then to discuss science and its development has an obvious point. But if we are to understand nature more broadly, for example as "whatever is in whatever way," to use Justus Buchler's expression, then to speak about the development of science is no more directly relevant to an unfolding understanding of nature than to speak about the development of poetry. The point is not that an examination of Wright's conception of science is not significant, but simply that it is not equivalent to a discussion of Wright's conception of nature. Despite these concerns, the book is a strong one, both because the idea of a collection of essays on the concept of nature in American thought is a good one, and because the essays themselves are aU interesting and instructive. Of particular interest are the essays that expand the usual scope of discussions of American philosophy, in particular Mansfield on Tocqueville and Rescher on art. Mansfield is interested in the way Tocqueville makes use of, or better resists, the prevalent conceptions of nature in his understanding of democracy. In short, political thinking of his time was likely to have recourse to nature either in the sense of the "state of nature" or in the sense of the inherent characteristics of things, as in the "nature of" something. Mansfield argues that Tocqueville rejected both of these conceptions of nature in his attempt to understand democracy, the first being too prone to chaos and the second being too deterministic. Tocqueville did not describe democracy as natural, but rather as a "providential fact." The bulk of this very interesting essay is an exploration of what Tocqueville may have meant by a "providential fact," and how he understood democracy in relation to nature and providence. In his piece on American art Rescher is interested in the ways in which the varying conceptions of nature have been expressed in the visual arts, primarily painting but also sculpture. The book includes several black and white reproductions that Rescher uses to illustrate his points. We see, for example, a painting from the Hudson River School in which the natural environment is an overwhelming presence by comparison with a small cabin in a field and a barely visible horse and rider. Other prints from other periods and schools illustrate a natural environment dominated by human artifice, for better or worse, or depict a more harmonious integration of nature and technology. We also see an example of the romantic sense of nature pervaded by value, in this case beauty, in one of James Audubon's paintings of hummingbirds. In works of more recent vintage we see expressions of g^7 ^0 human alienation from nature and nature as transfigured by social develop- ^ ment. Rescher's discussion and examples do not debate the relative merits of ^-, the various perceptions of nature and its relation to human being, though in ^ the end he does urge on us an "enlightened pragmatism" that will treat ^ nature not simply as the environing condition in which people act, but as a source of value and an ideal. In this respect Rescher ends the book at a point not dissimilar from where it began with Goodman's account of Emerson and Thoreau. Nature in American Philosophy is on the whole a book that rewards the reader's close attention. As an exploration of a central theme in American philosophy it is to be welcomed. There should be more like it. John Ryder The State University of New York, john[email protected] Translated, and with an introduction by Ramon Del Castillo La Opinion Publica y Sus Problemas (Spanish Translation of The Public and Its... (shrink)

Modern philosophical analyses of mysticism impoverish mysticism with a common understanding that the life and the language of the mystic is a separate category from that of the mystical experience. It is my contention, however, that such an understanding runs counter to what the mystics themselves attest to. ;William James's understanding of mysticism is that it serves as the means towards the circumvention of an individual's religious tradition. This view is contrary to the understanding of mysticism put forth by (...) the sixth century Christian mystic, Dionysius the Areopagite, who stressed the communal nature of the mystical life. Related to this is the analysis of the mystic's language suggested by W. T. Stace. For Stace, the mystic enters into a peculiar mystical state of consciousness, one that is characterized as inherently paradoxical. Because of this, the mystic is "embarrassed" by the language he or she employs. But in contrast, the 13th century Dominican, Meister Eckhart, employs a deliberate apophatic strategy in his use of the paradox. And finally, Steven T. Katz argues that the mystic's life and language "shapes" the mystical experience. But such a view, again, only separates the life and language of the mystic from that of the experience. St. John of the Cross taught that only through a life of love can one come to know God. This is not a contingent relationship for St. John. ;In contrast to these modern philosophical analyses of mysticism, Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical work can be seen to be in concert with much of what the mystics themselves attest to. Wittgenstein urges one to attend to the "grammar" of a language in order to understand its meaning. Therefore, with an examination and application of Wittgenstein's thought, the philosophical impositions cited above can be avoided. Such an approach is thus more promising to the study of mysticism for it pays attention to the life of the mystic in which the mystic's words ultimately have their meaning. (shrink)

Although fair trade has grown exponentially in the U.S. in recent years, we do not have a clear understanding of why small U.S. firms choose to participate in it. To answer this question, we use a qualitative case study approach and grounded theory analysis to explore the motivations of 35 small fair trade businesses. We find that shared values and the desire to help others, often triggered by a critical incident, lead social entrepreneurs to found and sustain fair trade businesses. (...) The relationship between shared values and engagement in fair trade and the relationship between altruism and engagement in fair trade are strengthened by four motivating factors: direct relationships with producers, support for social causes, the desire for the preservation of craftsmanship, and the desire to share aesthetic products. These links are strengthened by four facilitating factors : the acquisition of business knowledge, family member involvement in the firm, assistance from faith communities, and assistance from the fair trade community. Additional analysis reveals three types of fair trade social entrepreneurs: “ethics first” entrepreneurs, primarily motivated by human rights and social justice concerns; “faith first” fair traders, motivated primarily by their religious faith; and “business first” businesspeople, motivated by what they perceive to be an opportunity to build a successful business while simultaneously doing “good” and helping others. (shrink)

Jung was fascinated by the east. Through his commentaries on such texts as the I Ching and The Tibetan Book of the Dead, and through his essays on such topics as Zen, meditation and the symbolism of the mandala, Jung attempted to build a bridge of understanding between western psychology and the ancient ideas and practices of eastern religion. By doing so he hoped to relate traditional eastern thought to modern western concerns. John Clarke's latest book seeks to uncover (...) Jung's dialogue with the east. The book will appeal to all those who wish to broaden their understanding of Jung's thought as well as to those who value eastern ways of thinking and who believe that by engaging with it westerners have much to gain both intellectually and spiritually. (shrink)

In Search of Jung aims to rectify this state of affairs by showing that Jung is an important thinker in his own right and that his ideas play an important role at the heart of the intellectual debates of our age. The book first sets Jung's thought in the context of the great philosophical tradition stemming from Kant, showing the important connections between his thinking and that of influential philosophers such as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and William James, and movements such (...) as phenomenology and existentialism. Second, Clarke argues that, in terms of his method and his close affinity with the approaches and ideas of twentieth-century physics, he is very much a modern thinker and in no way a reactionary seeking to return to outworn creeds. (shrink)

Ranging from the ancient world to the recent past, and drawing on non-European traditions of thought, this study voices current concerns about the natural world and discusses the relationship of human beings to their environment.

Representational theorists identify experiences’ phenomenal properties with their representational properties. Qualia theorists reject this identity, insisting that experiences’ phenomenal properties can come apart from and completely outrun their representational properties. Qualia theorists account for phenomenal properties in terms of “qualia,” intrinsic mental properties they allege experiences to instantiate. The debate between representational theorists and qualia theorists has focused on whether phenomenal properties really can come apart from and completely outrun representational properties. As a result, qualia theorists have failed (1) to (...) explain how experiences owe their phenomenal properties to their instantiation of qualia and (2) to clarify the nature of subjects’ epistemic access to qualia. I survey qualia theorists’ options for dealing with each issue and find them all wanting. (shrink)

The qualia theory says that experiences’ phenomenal properties can come apart from and completely outrun their representational properties and that phenomenal properties are to be accounted for in terms of “qualia,” intrinsic nonrepresentational mental properties of experience. In Consciousness and Cognition Michael Thau argues that QT is incoherent. Thau’s argument fails. It rests on an illegitimate assimilation of phenomenal differences to differences in “the way things seem.” It begs the question by assuming that representational content can suffice for phenomenal character. (...) And it overlooks a crucial difference between two very different versions of QT. The upshot is that QT is much more plausible than representationalist critics like Thau have supposed. (shrink)

The qualia theory says that experiences’ phenomenal properties can come apart from and completely outrun their representational properties and that phenomenal properties are to be accounted for in terms of “qualia,” intrinsic nonrepresentational mental properties of experience. In Consciousness and Cognition Michael Thau argues that QT is incoherent. Thau’s argument fails. It rests on an illegitimate assimilation of phenomenal differences to differences in “the way things seem.” It begs the question by assuming that representational content can suffice for phenomenal character. (...) And it overlooks a crucial difference between two very different versions of QT. The upshot is that QT is much more plausible than representationalist critics like Thau have supposed. (shrink)

The following theses form an inconsistent triad. -/- REPRESENTATIONISM: The phenomenal properties of a perceptual experience are identical to (some of) the experience’s representational properties. -/- PHENOMENAL INTERNALISM: The phenomenal properties of a perceptual experience supervene on the intrinsic properties of the experience’s subject. STRONG EXTERNALISM: None of the representational properties of a perceptual experience is fixed by the intrinsic properties of the experience’s subject. -/- The fact that these three theses are jointly inconsistent is one of the emerging problems (...) in the recent literature on the philosophy of perception and consciousness. It’s a problem because the theses are all quite attractive. Our aim here is to make the problem explicit and survey the options for resolving it. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

G.E. Moore used to answer the question, 'What is philosophy?' by pointing to the books on his shelves & saying, 'Philosophy is what these books are about.' Philosophy of mind is what some of those books are about, & its enquiries frequently move into neighbouring areas, with logic, semantics, neurophysiology, literature, epistemology & metaphysics providing some obvious examples, as the papers in this collection reveal. Contents: The Connection Between Impressions & Ideas. Reid on Testimony & Perception. Searle on Programs & (...) Intentionality. Dennett, Functionalism & Introspection. Functionalism & the Argument from Conceivability. A Materialist's Misgivings about Eliminative Materialism. Sensation, Theory & Meaning. On the Speculative Nature of our Self Conception: A Reply to Some Criticisms. The Inward & the Outward: Fantasy, Reality & Satisfaction. Amnesia & Psychological Continuity. (shrink)

This study explored pre-service teachers’ (N = 37) perceptions about teaching controversial global and local topics. Additionally, it examined participants’ level of preparedness, motivation and perceived hindrances to teaching controversial issues. To do so, the study used a interpretive phenomenological approach (IPA). Data from written reflections and semi-structured interviews showed 80 percent of participants lacked exposure to college work that examined controversial issues prior to taking Social Studies Methods course. However, after taking the course, participants were able to identify controversial (...) topics, but they still displayed limited critical awareness and conceptualization of teaching controversial issues. Other findings pointed to the benefits of teaching controversial topics in a planned and intentional manner. (shrink)

We are sceptical of concerns over the opacity of algorithmic decision tools. While transparency and explainability are certainly important desiderata in algorithmic governance, we worry that automated decision-making is being held to an unrealistically high standard, possibly owing to an unrealistically high estimate of the degree of transparency attainable from human decision-makers. In this paper, we review evidence demonstrating that much human decision-making is fraught with transparency problems, show in what respects AI fares little worse or better and argue that (...) at least some regulatory proposals for explainable AI could end up setting the bar higher than is necessary or indeed helpful. The demands of practical reason require the justification of action to be pitched at the level of practical reason. Decision tools that support or supplant practical reasoning should not be expected to aim higher than this. We cast this desideratum in terms of Daniel Dennett’s theory of the “intentional stance” and argue that since the justification of action for human purposes takes the form of intentional stance explanation, the justification of algorithmic decisions should take the same form. In practice, this means that the sorts of explanations for algorithmic decisions that are analogous to intentional stance explanations should be preferred over ones that aim at the architectural innards of a decision tool. (shrink)

Protection against bacterial and viral pathogens by antibodies has always been thought to end at the cell surface. Once inside the cell, a pathogen was understood to be safe from humoral immunity. However, it has now been found that antibodies can routinely enter cells attached to viral particles and mediate an intracellular immune response. Antibody‐coated virions are detected inside the cell by means of an intracellular antibody receptor, TRIM21, which directs their degradation by recruitment of the ubiquitin‐proteasome system. In this (...) article we assess how this discovery alters our view of the way in which antibodies neutralise viral infection. We also consider the antiviral function of TRIM21 in the context of its other reported roles in immune signalling and autoimmunity. Finally, we discuss the conceptual implications of intracellular antibody immunity and how it alters our view of the discrete separation of extracellular and intracellular environments. (shrink)

The danger of human operators devolving responsibility to machines and failing to detect cases where they fail has been recognised for many years by industrial psychologists and engineers studying the human operators of complex machines. We call it “the control problem”, understood as the tendency of the human within a human–machine control loop to become complacent, over-reliant or unduly diffident when faced with the outputs of a reliable autonomous system. While the control problem has been investigated for some time, up (...) to this point its manifestation in machine learning contexts has not received serious attention. This paper aims to fill that gap. We argue that, except in certain special circumstances, algorithmic decision tools should not be used in high-stakes or safety-critical decisions unless the systems concerned are significantly “better than human” in the relevant domain or subdomain of decision-making. More concretely, we recommend three strategies to address the control problem, the most promising of which involves a complementary coupling between highly proficient algorithmic tools and human agents working alongside one another. We also identify six key principles which all such human–machine systems should reflect in their design. These can serve as a framework both for assessing the viability of any such human–machine system as well as guiding the design and implementation of such systems generally. (shrink)

John Locke's subtle and influential defense of religious toleration as argued in his seminal _Letter Concerning Toleration_ appears in this edition as introduced by one of our most distinguished political theorists and historians of political thought.

As John Henry Newman reflected on 'The Idea of a University' more than a century and a half ago, Bradley C. S. Watson brings together some of the nation's most eminent thinkers on higher education to reflect on the nature and purposes of the American university today. Their mordant reflections paint a picture of the American university in crisis. This book is essential reading for thoughtful citizens, scholars, and educational policymakers.

This book is a collection of secondary essays on America's most important philosophic thinkers—statesmen, judges, writers, educators, and activists—from the colonial period to the present. Each essay is a comprehensive introduction to the thought of a noted American on the fundamental meaning of the American regime.

Neuroethics applies cognitive neuroscience for prescribing alterations to conceptions of self and society, and for prescriptively judging the ethical applications of neurotechnologies. Plentiful normative premises are available to ground such prescriptivity, however prescriptive neuroethics may remain fragmented by social conventions, cultural ideologies, and ethical theories. Herein we offer that an objectively principled neuroethics for international relevance requires a new meta-ethics: understanding how morality works, and how humans manage and improve morality, as objectively based on the brain and social sciences. This (...) new meta-ethics will simultaneously equip neuroethics for evaluating and revising older cultural ideologies and ethical theories, and direct neuroethics towards scientifically valid views of encultured humans intelligently managing moralities. Bypassing absolutism, cultural essentialisms, and unrealistic ethical philosophies, neuroethics arrives at a small set of principles about proper human flourishing that are more culturally inclusive and cosmopolitan in spirit. This cosmopolitanism in turn suggests augmentations to traditional medical ethics in the form of four principled guidelines for international consideration: empowerment, non-obsolescence, self-creativity, and citizenship. (shrink)

Do people have free will, or this universal belief an illusion? If free will is more than an illusion, what kind of free will do people have? How can free will influence behavior? Can free will be studied, verified, and understood scientifically? How and why might a sense of free will have evolved? These are a few of the questions this book attempts to answer. People generally act as though they believe in their own free will: they don't feel like (...) automatons, and they don't treat one another as they might treat robots. While acknowledging many constraints and influences on behavior, people nonetheless act as if they (and their neighbors) are largely in control of many if not most of the decisions they make. Belief in free will also underpins the sense that people are responsible for their actions. Psychological explanations of behavior rarely mention free will as a factor, however. Can psychological science find room for free will? How do leading psychologists conceptualize free will, and what role do they believe free will plays in shaping behavior? In recent years a number of psychologists have tried to solve one or more of the puzzles surrounding free will. This book looks both at recent experimental and theoretical work directly related to free will and at ways leading psychologists from all branches of psychology deal with the philosophical problems long associated with the question of free will, such as the relationship between determinism and free will and the importance of consciousness in free will. It also includes commentaries by leading philosophers on what psychologists can contribute to long-running philosophical struggles with this most distinctly human belief. These essays should be of interest not only to social scientists, but to intelligent and thoughtful readers everywhere. (shrink)

Collaborators generally coordinate their activities through communication, during which they readily negotiate a shared lexicon for activity-related objects. This social-pragmatic activity both recruits and affects cognitive and social-cognitive processes ranging from selective attention to perspective taking. We ask whether negotiating reference also facilitates category learning or might private verbalization yield comparable facilitation? Participants in three referential conditions learned to classify imaginary creatures according to combinations of functional features—nutritive and destructive—that implicitly defined four categories. Remote partners communicated in the Dialogue condition. (...) In the Monologue condition, participants recorded audio descriptions for their own later use. Controls worked silently. Dialogue yielded better category learning, with wider distribution of attention. Monologue offered no benefits over working silently. We conclude that negotiating reference compels collaborators to find communicable structure in their shared activity; this social-pragmatic constraint accelerates category learning and likely provides much of the benefit recently ascribed to learning labeled categories. (shrink)

Bernard Williams is one of the most influential figures in ethical theory, where he has set a considerable part of the current agenda. In this collection a distinguished international team of philosophers who have been stimulated by Williams's work give responses to it. The topics covered include equality; consistency; comparisons between science and ethics; integrity; moral reasons; the moral system; and moral knowledge. Williams himself provides a substantial reply, which shows both the directions of his own thought and also his (...) present view of earlier work of his which has been extensively discussed for twenty years. This volume will be indispensable reading for all those interested in ethical theory. (shrink)

The complex-systems approach to cognitive science seeks to move beyond the formalism of information exchange and to situate cognition within the broader formalism of energy flow. Changes in cognitive performance exhibit a fractal (i.e., power-law) relationship between size and time scale. These fractal fluctuations reflect the flow of energy at all scales governing cognition. Information transfer, as traditionally understood in the cognitive sciences, may be a subset of this multiscale energy flow. The cognitive system exhibits not just a single power-law (...) relationship between fluctuation size and time scale but actually exhibits many power-law relationships, whether over time or space. This change in fractal scaling, that is, multifractality, provides new insights into changes in energy flow through the cognitive system. We survey recent findings demonstrating the role of multifractality in (a) understanding atypical developmental outcomes, and (b) predicting cognitive change. We propose that multifractality provides insights into energy flows driving the emergence of cognitive structure. (shrink)