Recently there has been a resurgence of philosophical interest in love, resulting in a wide variety of accounts. Central to most accounts of love is the notion of caring about your beloved for his sake. Yet such a notion needs to be carefully articulated in the context of providing an account of love, for it is clear that the kind of caring involved in love must be carefully distinguished from impersonal modes of concern for particular others for their sakes, such (...) as moral concern or concern grounded in compassion. That is, we might say, the kind of caring that is central to love must be somehow distinctly intimate. The trouble is to cash out these firm intuitions in a satisfactory way. (shrink)

Health is a value-laden concept. The state of being that it designates is a fundamental human goal. As a value, the concept is normative, governing both clinical practice and the therapeutic treatment developed by medical research. Also, the promise of health plays a pivotal role in health-policy discourse. Almut Caspary considers philosophical and theological concepts of health in the context of its practical significance, both in the past and today. This conceptual analysis culminates in a preliminary sketch of a (...) concept of health; focusing on the stem-cell debate, it offers a discriminating approach to contemporary ethical problems in medicine. "Gesundheit" ist ein wertgeladener Begriff. Er bezeichnet einen grundsatzlich wunschenswerten Zustand menschlicher Existenz, der das arztliche Handeln im klinischen Alltag leitet. Daruber hinaus werden (gesundheits-)politische Debatten mit Verweis auf den Nutzen fur die Gesundheit entschieden. Vor diesem Hintergrund setzt sich Almut Caspary epochenubergreifend mit philosophischen und theologischen Uberlegungen zur Gesundheit auseinander. Die konzeptuelle Diskussion erlaubt die Skizzierung eines Gesundheitsverstandnisses, das - wie am Beispiel der Stammzelldebatte gezeigt wird - ein differenziertes Abwagen in medizinethischen Konfliktfallen zulasst. (shrink)

The strict distinction and separation of mind and body is a particularly modern Western point of view that is routinely also applied to other cultures. Arguing against this dichotomy, the following contribution builds upon research on "implicit knowledge" and "knowing how" that allow us to view body and mind in their interaction. The focus is on Simeon Stylites the Elder, the most prominent representative of the Syrian ascetic movement, who, in a spectacular way and after incessant exercise, was able to (...) act from a sphere of internalized body-knowledge. Selected texts on him dating from Late Antiquity will illustrate how the ascetic body was represented as a body of knowledge with which the idea of Christian perfection was to be fulfilled. (shrink)

Hermann Cohen’s essay on Maimonides’ ethics is one of the most fundamental texts of twentieth-century Jewish philosophy, correlating Platonic, prophetic, Maimonidean, and Kantian traditions. Almut Sh. Bruckstein provides the first English translation and her own extensive commentary on this landmark 1908 work, which inspired readings of medieval and rabbinic sources by Leo Strauss, Franz Rosenzweig, and Emmanuel Levinas. Cohen rejects the notion that we should try to understand texts of the past solely in the context of their own historical (...) era. Subverting the historical order, he interprets the ethical meanings of texts in the light of a future yet to be realized. He commits the entire Jewish tradition to a universal socialism prophetically inspired by ideals of humanity, peace, and universal justice. Through her own probing commentary on Cohen’s text, like the margin notes of a medieval treatise, Bruckstein performs the hermeneutical act that lies at the core of Cohen’s argument: she reads Jewish sources from a perspective that recognizes the interpretive act of commentary itself. (shrink)

The so-called quantum Zeno effect is essentially a consequence of the projection postulate for ideal measurements. To test the effect, Itanoet al. have performed an experiment on an ensemble of atoms where rapidly repeated level measurements were realized by means of short laser pulses. Using dynamical considerations, we give an explanation why the projection postulate can be applied in good approximation to such measurements. Corrections to ideal measurements are determined explicitly. This is used to discuss how far the experiment of (...) Itanoet al. can be considered as a test of the quantum Zeno effect. We also analyze a new possible experiment on a single atom where stochastic light and dark periods can be interpreted as manifestation of the quantum Zeno effect. We show that the measurement point of view gives a quick and intuitive understanding of experiments of the above type, although a finer analysis has to take the corrections into account. (shrink)

Druck der Zensur, nicht Aufhebung der Zielvorstellungen ist die richtige Begründung für das Vorherrschen der ober-flächlichen Assoziationen. Die oberflächlichen Assoziationen ersetzen in der Darstellung die tiefen, wenn die Zensur diese normalen Verbindungswege ungangbar macht. Es ist, wie wenn ein allgemeines Verkehrshindernis, z.B. eine Überschwemmung, im Gebirge die großen und breiten Straßen unwegsam werden läßt; der Verkehr wird dann auf unbequemen und steilen Fußpfaden aufrechterhalten, die sonst nur der Jäger begangen hat.

Love, Friendship, and the Self presents a reexamination of our common understanding of ourselves as persons in light of the phenomena of love and friendship. It argues that the individualism that is implicit in that understanding cannot be sustained if we are to understand the kind of distinctively personal intimacy that love and friendship essentially involve. For love is a matter of identifying with someone: sharing for his sake the concerns and values that make up his identity as the person (...) he is. Moreover, in friendship the friends share not only a concern for each other but also their activity, their lives, and even potentially their selves. By providing a detailed analysis of these notions, Bennett Helm argues for an understanding of persons as essentially social. (shrink)

Philosophical accounts of freedom typically fail to capture an important kind of freedom—freedom to change what one cares about—that is central to our understanding of what it is to be a person. This paper articulates this kind of freedom more clearly, distinguishing it from freedom of action and freedom of the will, and gives an account of how it is possible. Central to this account is an understanding of the role of emotions in determining what we value, thus motivating a (...) rethinking of the importance of emotions in the mental lives of persons. (shrink)

It is somewhat striking that two interrelated elements of Hume's account of causation have received so little attention in the secondary literature on the subject. The first is the distinction of causation into the natural and the philosophical relations: Although many have tried to give accounts of why Hume presents two definitions of causality, it is often not clear in these accounts that the one definition is of causality as a natural relation and the other is of causality as a (...) philosophical relation, where to make the contrast between these two kinds of relations we need to give a naturalistic account of natural relations and a normative account of philosophical relations. (That Hume intends this to be the contrast will be defended in more detail below.) The second element is that, in many cases of our inferences from cause to effect, "we must follow our taste and sentiment" (A Treatise of Human Nature [T], 103), where the appeal to taste here, as in morality and aesthetics, is not to be understood as up to the individual. Rather, Hume makes it clear both in Book 3 of the Treatise and in "Of the Standard of Taste" that there are standards to which our individual judgments (in morality, aesthetics, or causality) must conform. My purpose in this paper is to attempt to provide an interpretation of Hume's account of causality that brings these two elements explicitly into the foreground. This interpretation is, to a greater extent than usual, a reconstruction of Hume's account of our causal inferences, drawing, as I have indicated above, from a range of texts not normally associated with Hume's discussion of causality. As such, this interpretation should be considered as exploratory in nature, perhaps focussing too single-mindedly on these two elements in an attempt to make out as strong a case as possible for their relevance in understanding Hume's account of causal inference. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Paragrana Jahrgang: 25 Heft: 1 Seiten: 13-19.

The adoption of the French Duty of Vigilance law has been celebrated as a milestone for advancing the transnational business and human rights regime. The law can contribute to harden corporate accountability by challenging the “separation principle” of transnational companies and by obligating companies to report on their duty of vigilance. However, the question of whether the law actually contributes to human rights and environmental protection along global supply chains requires empirically grounded research that connects processes in home and host (...) state countries. This paper contributes to such a new research agenda by linking political ecology literature and empirical insights from the Global South to research on due diligence regulations. With reference to field research data on contestations between the oil and gas company Total E&P and indigenous communities in Bolivia, I argue that the burden of proof and contestations over valid knowledge represent major obstacles when trying to establish legal liability. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Paragrana Jahrgang: 23 Heft: 2 Seiten: 48-62.

To identify oneself with something is for it to be a source of meaning and worth in one's life. Normally such identification is constituted by a certain holistic rational pattern both in one's judgments and will and in one's emotions and desires. However, one's identity can be fragmented into conflicting sources of meaning when the pattern in one's judgments becomes disconnected from that in one's emotions. By analyzing these kinds of fragmentation, I articulate some of the rational connections there are (...) between emotional attitudes and evaluative judgments and so ultimately the kinds of accord or integrity that are possible for persons. (shrink)

Authenticity, it is plausible to suppose, is a feature of one's identity as a person---of one's sense of the kind of life worth living. Most attempts to explicate this notion of a person's identity do so in terms of an antecedent understanding of what it is for a person to value something. This is, I argue, a mistake: a concern is not intelligible as a value apart from the place it has within a larger identity that the value serves in (...) turn to constitute; to assume otherwise is to risk leaving out the very person whose identity these values allegedly constitute. By contrast, I offer an account of values as always already a part of one's identity. I do so by providing an analysis of values in terms of what I call 'person-focused emotions,' emotions like pride and shame. Such emotions, I argue, involve a commitment to the import of a person primarily and, only secondarily, to things valued, and in this way enable us to understand what it is to value these things *for the sake of* the person. The upshot is a more satisfying account of a person's identity and values, an account that can provide the necessary background for a more thorough investigation of authenticity. (shrink)

Rationality is the constitutive ideal of the mental. Therefore it is important to understand the sort of rationality at issue here. It is often assumed that rationality just is instrumental rationality, but this leaves us with too thin a notion of desire: Desires centrally involve the notion of things mattering or being significant, for their objects must normally be worth pursuing to the subject. Such significance is simply unintelligible in terms of instrumental rationality. Consequently, understanding significance and its rational connections (...) to desire and action is essential to understanding rationality as a constitutive ideal. In particular, it is a crucial step in vindicating the idea of animal thought. ;I argue that significance, as well as desire, must be understood in part in terms of the emotions. Many prominent theories of emotions illegitimately conceive of significance as conceptually prior to the capacity for having emotions, in that things can be significant to a creature that does not have any emotions at all. In contrast, I argue first that a creature must have the capacity for emotions in order to be a subject of significance because to be significant is in part to be a suitable object of emotions generally. Second, emotions are essentially feelings not because they "involve" bodily sensations but because they are a distinctive kind of awareness of the significance of the world to the subject; particular occurrent emotions therefore presuppose that things are already significant to the subject. Consequently, emotions and significance form a conceptual package, with neither being prior to the other: Significance and the emotions emerge together in a pattern of instrumental and non-instrumental rationality that can be articulated in terms of their interconnected explanatory roles. ;Being a subject of beliefs and desires therefore requires more than simply rationally mediated goal-directedness, as Dennett believes. Rather, it requires being open, through the emotions, to the significance of the world and to the reasons that significance provides for action. This conclusion is shown to have important ramifications for our understanding both of a minimal sense of agency and of what it is to be a person. (shrink)

The speech of Gregory Thaumaturgus to the Christian scholar and theologian Origen is a historical document of unusual importance, both in terms of its content, depicting the master-student relationship of the time from the perspective of the student, and in terms of form, providing an actual implementation of the theory of rhetoric that was a cornerstone of higher education. Yet disagreement persists to this day in the scholarly literature over the generic classification of this first example of Christian epideictic oratory. (...) It is most frequently found categorized as a speech of thanksgiving, of praise, or of farewell. This paper discusses the grounds for the various definitions, examines the text itself in search of such grounds, and shows, in reference to two treatises on epideictic attributed to Menander Rhetor, why the most plausible classification is as a logos syntaktikos – a farewell speech, in which a traveler, by means of portraying and arousing emotion, laments the necessary parting and praises the person or people of whom leave is taken. (shrink)

Abstract„Erleuchtung“ ist einer der prominentesten Begriffe, mit dem in der europäischen Kultur- und Religionsgeschichte Ideen der Vervollkommnung des Menschen zum Ausdruck gebracht worden sind. Anhand ausgewählter Beispiele umreißt das vorliegende Papier seine Entwicklung von einer Metapher in der griechischen Philosophie hin zu einem transkonfessionellen Sammelbegriff, der im Zuge der Pluralisierung von Religionen seit den 1960er Jahren eine Konjunktur in neuen, durch Markt und Medien allgemein zugänglichen Sinnstiftungsangeboten der „populären Religion“ (Knoblauch) erfahren hat. In einer Tour d’horizon, die bei Platon einsetzt (...) und über Clemens von Alexandrien und Ps.-Dionysios Areopagita ins 18. Jahrhundert sowie in die Gegenwart führt, wird gezeigt, wie sich Vorstellungen von Licht und Erleuchtung und die Rede hierüber zu einem religiösen Begriff verdichtet haben, der über lange Zeit einen Ort im Christentum hatte, bevor er, begünstigt durch die Aufklärung, zu einer populären Kategorie wurde, die vor allem mit asiatischen, oder zumindest asiatisch inspirierten, Praktiken zur Erlangung von Heil in Verbindung gebracht wird. Der Beitrag rückt bei der Darstellung dieser Entwicklung in der Moderne Auswirkungen der Aufklärung in den Blick sowie asiatisch-euroamerikanische Beziehungsdynamiken der europäischen Kolonialzeit, die zur Entdeckung des Buddhismus als Religion führten. Haben diese doch maßgeblich dazu beigetragen, dass Erleuchtung im gegenwärtigen populären Verständnis, wie es sich beispielhaft in der sog. Satsang-Bewegung und populär-religiöser Erzähl- und Ratgeberliteratur findet, nicht mehr, wie in der neoplatonischchristlichen Prägung des Begriffs, als Zwischenstufe auf einem Weg zur Vervollkommnung gilt, sondern als Ziel und bleibender Besitz, der mit Vollendung assoziiert wird. (shrink)

In both ancient tradition and modern research Pythagoreanism has been understood as a religious sect or as a philosophical and scientific community. Numerous attempts have been made to reconcile these pictures as well as to analyze them separately. The most recent scholarship compartmentalizes different facets of Pythagorean knowledge, but this offers no context for exploring their origins, development, and interdependence. This collection aims to reverse this trend, addressing connections between the different fields of Pythagorean knowledge, such as eschatology, metempsychosis, metaphysics, (...) epistemology, arithmology and numerology, music, dietetics and medicine as well as politics. In particular, the contributions discuss how the Pythagorean way of life related to more doctrinal aspects of knowledge, such as Pythagorean religion and science. The volume explores the effects of this interdependence between different kinds of knowledge both within the Pythagorean corpus and in its later reception. Chapters cover historical periods from the Archaic Period (6th century BC) to Neoplatonism, Early Christianity, the European and Arabic Middle Ages, and the Renaissance through to the Early Modern Period (17th century AD). (shrink)

Thema des Sammelbands ist der Zusammenhang von ubung und Wissen in religiosen und philosophischen Kontexten der Vormoderne. AN einzelnen regional und sozial differenzierten Fallbeispielen aus dem euro-asiatischen Raum werden ubungspraktiken, durch die Wissen hergestellt, vermittelt und bestatigt, aber auch hinterfragt und modifiziert wurde, klassifiziert und erortert. UNtersucht werden Materialien, Medien und Darstellungsweisen aus griechisch-romischer Philosophie, Christentum, Judentum und Islam, Hinduismus und Buddhismus, die von der wechselseitigen Verwiesenheit von ubung und Wissen zeugen. uBerlegungen zum Thema im Kontext globaler Austauschbeziehungen, wie sie (...) z.B. Den modernen Yoga pragen, runden den Band ab. (shrink)

It is widely held that Locke propounded a theory of personal identity in terms of consciousness and memory. By ‘theory’ here is meant a set of necessary and sufficient conditions indicating what personal identity consists in. It is also held that this theory is open to obvious and damaging objections, so much so that it has to be supplemented in terms of bodily continuity, either because memory alone is not sufficient, or because the concept of memory is itself dependent upon (...) considerations of bodily continuity. Alternatively it has been suggested that Locke's theory could be modified by allowing that for the purposes of personal identity ‘remember’ should be regarded as a transitive relation. So if A remembers the experiences of B but not those of C, and B remembers the experiences of C, then A, B and C can be regarded as belonging to the same unit of consciousness. (shrink)

Drawing from Goffman’s original observations on stigma and the consequences of interactions between the stigmatized and supportive or stigmatizing audiences, we conduct a 20-year review of the diverse literature on stigma to revisit the collective nature of stigmatization processes. We find that studies on stigma’s origins, responses, processes, and outcomes have diverged from Goffman’s relational view of stigma as they have overlooked important relational mechanisms explaining the processes of (de)stigmatization. We draw from those conclusions to justify the need to study (...) stigma as a collective phenomenon. We develop a relational perspective on stigma based on understanding how attributes are stigmatized (or not) by audiences in their interactions. We argue that to advance stigma research, it is necessary to build on Goffman’s theory to include the stigmatizers (i.e., the normal) and supporters (i.e., the wise); how they create, sustain, or remove stigma; and how they relate to the stigmatized (i.e., the targets). Accordingly, we provide a research agenda on stigma as a collective phenomenon that theorizes a relational perspective, proposes a typology of how audiences relate to stigmatization, and identifies patterns of relations between audiences. We thus offer a missing piece to existing accounts of stigma by focusing on the key role of audiences (i.e., stigmatizers or supporters of the stigmatized) rather than on the targets of stigma (i.e., the own). (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Zeitschrift für Religionswissenschaft Jahrgang: 25 Heft: 1 Seiten: 1-5.

‘Actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not from some cause in the characters and disposition of the person, who perform'd them, they infix not themselves upon him, and can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor infamy, if evil. The action itself may be blameable; it may be contrary to all the rules of morality and religion: But the person is not responsible for it; and as it proceeded from nothing in him, (...) that is durable or constant, and leaves nothing of that nature behind it, 'tis impossible he can, upon its account, become the object of punishment or vengeance.'. (shrink)

My aim is to understand at least some of the non-instrumental reasons we can have for action in a way that can provide a satisfying non-egoist account of 'social actions' - actions undertaken for the sake of others. I do this in part by presenting, in terms of a discussion of the rationality of emotions, an account of what it is for something to have import to an agent . I then extend this account to include our caring about others (...) as agents, in part by revealing the way in which one's emotional and desiderative responsiveness to another agent one cares about must be sensitive to her cares, so that one comes to share her cares. The upshot is substantial revision in our understanding of agency, both in terms of our understanding of the role emotions play in our agency and in terms of a careful extension of the scope of practical rationality to include what I call a 'rationality of import'. (shrink)