Este artículo pretende dar a conocer un curso manuscrito inédito sobre el Arte de Llull que dictó Fray Agustín Núñez Delgadillo en la Universidad de Zaragoza en 1610. Por tales enseñanzas fue acusado ante el Tribunal de la Inquisición. El curso es una de las manifestaciones más claras del lulismo hispano del siglo XVII, que enlaza los comentarios tardomedievales y renacentistas al Arte de Llull con el lulismo lógicomnemotécnico posterior.

This article on the evolution of economic and monetary policy in Belgium, which turned the "sick man of Europe" into one of the stronger European economies and allowed it to enter into EMU, stresses the role of the monetary authorities as a stabilising force in Belgium. It gives a detailed analysis of how these changes have allowed Belgium to regain the confidence of both monetary authorities and international investors after the devaluation of 1982. The policy responses to the oil shock (...) at the beginning of the seventies broke with the policy mix which had until then been practised. Both the wage formation process andf iscal policy clearly spiralled out of control, the chiefresult of which was a drastic loss in international competitiveness. As a consequence, the current account showed a large deficit, the traditional level at which public deficit had stood rose dramatically, unemployment exploded and the financial structure of most corporations became fragile.A drastic realignment of economic policy started with the devaluation of the Belgian franc in 1982. This devaluation was accompanied by a series of measures aimed at preventing the inflationary pressures from triggering further devaluations, and hence at restoring credibility. These measures included restrictive fiscal policies and real wage cuts. By 1987 this recovery policy had successfully restored Belgian competitiveness, reduced the government deficit and restored the balance ofpayments equilibrium. Although public policies became less restrictive during the period 1988-1993, the central bank continued to gain international credibility. Significant stepsin this process were the abolition of the dual exchange rate system, the decision to peg the Belgian franc to the most stable currency in the ERM and the reform of the money markets in Belgium. The latter in particular helped to increase the central bank's independence, since this reform implied total control by the central bank over short term interest rates, it reduced significantly the automatic credit lines of the fiscal authorities with the central bank and it stipulated that revaluations of gold reserves should no langer be used to finance government budget deficits. By 1992 international credibility had been restored to such a degree that the Belgian franc became a strong currency during the 1992 crisis, obliging the central bank to come to the rescue of the weaker currencies under attack in September 1992 with a speculative inflow of capital of about 200 billion BEF. However this restored credibility continued to be fragile, as became evident during the 1993 exchange rate crisis when the Belgian franc was vigorously attacked by international speculation.The insufficient alignment of public and monetary policies proved to be at the heart of the financial problems of the 1993 crises. The Belgian government relaunched its policies of budgetary restriction and wage moderation, brought together in what was called the 'Global Plan'. This realignment of public policies to monetary policy swiftly restored the credibility of the Belgian franc, so that as early as January 1994 the Belgian franc converged to its central parity with an interest differential vis-à-vis the German mark of only about 2 %. This differential declined progressively. Indeed the global plan restored the confidence of the investors in Belgian economic policy. Financial markets now fully believed in the entry of Belgium into EMU and from then on no major difficulties were to arise. (shrink)

The objective of this article is to contribute to an understanding of Hannah Arendt’s special place in present-day political theory by means of a contrast between her Origins of Totalitarianism and four important political science studies of National Socialism and totalitarianism, three written by authors who shared the status of involuntary emigrant with Arendt, that are offered as constituting the original context of her work. A critical appreciation of the seminal works by Ernst Fraenkel, Franz L. Neumann, Sigmund Neumann, and (...) Carl Joachim Friedrich and Zbigniew Brezinski, with special emphasis on questions of method, opens the way to a reconsideration of the distinctly philosophical character of Arendt’s work, and its shocking challenges to the scientific orientations of political science. (shrink)

A good metaphysical account of logical form, must make clear why logical form is logical. However, this task has proved to be very elusive. Here, I analyze different attempts to meet this challenge and defend an inferential externalism where logical form is grounded on external logical relations as our most promising option.

What is an inference and when is an inference deductive rather than inductive, abductive, etc. The goal of this paper is precisely to determine what is that we, humans, do when we engage in deduction, i.e., whether there is something that satisfies both our pre-theoretical intuitions and theoretical presuppositions about deduction, as a cognitive process. The paper is structured in two parts: the first one deals with the issue of what is an inference. There, I will defend the hypothesis that (...) an inference is a causal process where an initial cognitive state causes another in such a way that the causal translation depends essentially on the content of the involved states. In other words, in an inference, a mental state A causes another B, partially because they have the content they have. Based on the conclusion from the first part, I will develop an account of deductive inference in the second part of the article. In order to achieve this, I will start by setting the stage and developing four constraints that an adequate account of deductive inference ought to satisfy. Then, I will present six different hypotheses that one might propose to characterize inferences of this kind. I have divided the proposals in two groups, the first one – which I will call the “logical proposals” – assume that whether an inference is a deduction or not depends exclusively on the content of the mental states involved in the inference, while the second – which I will call the “cognitive proposals” – reject the aforementioned assumption and instead recognize that extra cognitive information is required to determine whether an inference is a deduction or not. I will evaluate each proposal in turn, according to whether they satisfy the constraints introduced at the beginning of this second part. As a result of such evaluation, I will conclude that only one of the cognitive proposals actually satisfies the four constraints and therefore should be considered to give an adequate characterization of deductive inference. (shrink)

Self-knowledge is the cognitive ability of the agent to know his or her own mental states. There are several types of mental states, and there is a method for the knowledge of each type. The focus of this dissertation is on the knowledge of one‘s own beliefs. With this goal in mind, we present the empiricist and the rationalist approaches to the knowledge of one‘s own beliefs. Empiricist theories of self-knowledge proposes introspection as the method for the knowledge of one‘s (...) own beliefs. However, there are issues related to the phenomenology of belief – what it is like to believe that p? The best rationalist theories of self-knowledge proposes that an agent ―look outwards to constitute her own mind and her own belief. Our final question is about the relationship between knowledge of one‘s beliefs and rationality. Burge (2013) requires that, in order to be rational, one must have self-knowledge. We argue that the kind of rationality specified by Burge is too demanding. As agents in the realm of common life, we have incomplete understanding of our own doxastic mental states, but that is not a problem for the knowledge of our own beliefs as dispositions, since they does not come from rational deliberation; nevertheless, we are responsible and our beliefs as commitments. Both kinds of belief can be known by the transparency method. We conclude claiming that the transparency method is enough for the self-knowledge of doxastic mental state and ensuring the rationality of the agent. (shrink)

To discuss under this tide the early writings of authors, who a few years later would be numbered among the members of the exiled Institute for Social Research, is a kind of provocation. The political culture of the Weimar Republic was initially re-appraised in West Germany primarily in light of totalitarian theoretical principles. Later this picture changed to the extent that research abandoned the right-left equation. Should this progress, in view of a new wave of nostalgia, be undone? Can anything (...) other than a scandal result if one considers the fact that prominent representatives of the leftist intelligentsia — the jurist Fritz Neumann, the political scientist Otto Kirchheimer, and the philosopher Herbert Marcuse — had been students of even more well-known representatives of the academic right? (shrink)

En este texto retomo una pregunta importante que había quedado abierta al final del segundo capítulo de mi (2019): ¿cuáles son los límites del análisis? Sabemos que por obvias limitaciones materiales, todo análisis siempre será incompleto y por lo tanto, limitado. A estos límites les hemos llamado “metodológicos”, para distinguirlos de los metafísicos. Si el análisis tiene límites en este segundo sentido, aun si termináramos de analizar por completo un concepto, no podremos estar seguros de conocer todas sus propiedades esenciales (...) (ya que hay propiedades de este tipo que no las capta ningún análisis) o de ser capaces de distinguirlo de todos los conceptos (pues lo que lo distingue de otros conceptos puede ser inanalizable). Comúnmente se dice que el análisis no nos da todo el contenido de los conceptos, sino sólo su forma lógica o estructura semántica. Por lo tanto, otra manera de reformular la pregunta por los límites del análisis es ¿cuál es la relación entre forma y contenido? (shrink)

After the publication of Marshall’s theorem (2009), it has been widely accepted that the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction cannot be analyzed in broadly logical terms, but instead requires appealing to more robust metaphysical notions like grounding, naturalness or duplication. However, in this article I will defend that this is not so. Instead of showing the limitations of Marshall’s undoubtedly impressive result, I will present here a broadly logical definition of the intrinsic/extrinsic distinction, and show that it is extensional adequate regardless of our (...) preferred conception of property identity. (shrink)

Este breve ensayo se inscribe en la tradición de buscar similitudes entre los epítetos y otros fenómenos lingüísticos, tanto inofensivos como discriminatorios. En particular, trataré de motivar la introducción de una distinción entre el blanco de un epíteto y su extensión y mostraré cómo esta distinción nos sirve para ver similitudes entre el comportamiento de este tipo de expresiones y el del complemento “de verdad” en expresiones como “tacos de verdad”. De paso, trataré también de explorar si estas teorías, desarrolladas (...) en su mayor parte en los Estados Unidos de América, sirven de herramienta teórica para dar cuenta de como ciertas expresiones contribuyen a la exclusión y discriminación de grupos minoritarios en nuestro contexto, es decir, en el castellano de México. (shrink)

Resumen La metáfora de la "descomposición" domina aún nuestra manera usual de pensar el análisis conceptual. Se trata de una herramienta muy útil para pensar este proceso tan abstracto, pero tiene limitaciones importantes. Por ejemplo, nos hace pensar que los componentes de un concepto deben estar en algún sentido contenidos en él o que la única manera en que dos conceptos pueden estar relacionados es que uno contenga al otro. Estas limitaciones no nos permiten dar cuenta de conceptos complejos cuya (...) estructura no es tan simple, como los de color o de medida. Por ello es tiempo de superar esta metáfora y pensar al análisis conceptual no sólo como descomposición, sino también como la asignación de diferentes funciones a los componentes de un concepto.Our customary way of thinking about conceptual analysis remains dominated by the metaphor of 'containment', which has certainly been very useful, but which also has important limitations. For example, it makes us think that the components of a concept must be, in some sense, contained in it or that the only way that two concepts can be related is if one contains the other. These limitations have not allowed us to account for concepts whose structure is not so simple, such as the concepts of color or measurement, among others. It is time, therefore, to overcome this metaphor and think of conceptual analysis not only as decomposition but also as the assignment of different functions to the components of a concept. (shrink)

Betrifft die Handschrift Cod. 579 der Burgerbibliothek Bern.

What exactly is it to be a social constructivist in Metaphysics? In this brief note I try to introduce a few acclamatory distinctions that I have identified as having generated a lot of confusion in recent literature as well as serving to better frame current debates within metaphysical social constructivism. I also illustrate it with an example from the ontology of disability/.