On appelle « Affaire Sokal » l’ensemble de controverses que suscitèrent la publication en 1996 d’une parodie écrite par un physicien américain, Alan Sokal, puis, en 1997, de l’ouvrage Impostures intellectuelles, qu’il co-signa avec un physicien belge, Jean Bricmont. Dans Retours sur l’Affaire Sokal¸ des historiens des sciences reviennent sur cette affaire. Ils montrent qu’elle recouvre différentes controverses et qu’il faut distinguer ces dernières non seulement selon la nature des écrits qui les ont occasionnées, (...) mais aussi en fonction des questions abordées, et peut-être surtout des manières de concevoir et pratiquer les échanges intellectuels. Les auteurs analysent en particulier ces controverses en France, aux États-Unis et au Royaume-Uni ; ils examinent aussi la façon dont ont été traités la relation entre le domaine scientifique et le domaine littéraire ou l’usage des métaphores en sciences. (shrink)

I did not write this work merely with the aim of setting the exegetical record straight. My larger target is those contemporaries who -- in repeated acts of wish-fulfillment -- have appropriated conclusions from the philosophy of science and put them to work in aid of a variety of social cum political causes for which those conclusions are ill adapted. Feminists, religious apologists (including ``creation scientists''), counterculturalists, neoconservatives, and a host of other curious fellow-travelers have claimed to find crucial grist (...) for their mills in, for instance, the avowed incommensurability and underdetermination of scientific theories. The displacement of the idea that facts and evidence matter by the idea that everything boils down to subjective interests and perspectives is -- second only to American political campaigns -- the most prominent and pernicious manifestation of anti-intellectualism in our time. (shrink)

Los límites entre las humanidades y las ciencias se han desplazado y traspasado en innumerables ocasiones en las últimas décadas. El uso de la ciencia en los estudios humanísticos y de la metáfora cultural en los científicos está abundantemente documentado. Fértiles en especial han sido, por ejemplo, las teorías de la termodinámica (entropía), de la topología, de las catástrofes y de los fractales. El físico y matemático Alan Sokal, sin embargo, denunció la instrumentalización abusiva de la ciencia por ciertos (...) teóricos de la literatura, filósofos y psicoanalistas, entre otros. El escándalo provocado por Sokal en 1996 oculta, no obstante, empleos legítimos de las ciencias por las humanidades, como el que Gaston Bachelard ilustró, tras despejar los obstáculos epistemológicos previos, con su creación de una poética de la materia. (shrink)

This affair has brought up an incredible number of issues, and I can't dream of addressing them all in 10 minutes, so let me start by circumscribing my talk. I don't want to belabor Social Text 's failings either before or after the publication of my parody: Social Text is not my enemy, nor is it my main intellectual target. I won't go here into the ethical issues related to the propriety of hoaxing. I won't address the obscurantist prose and (...) the uncritical celebrity-worship that have infected certain trendy sectors of the American academic humanities. I won't enter into technical issues of the philosophy of science. I won't discuss the social role of science and technology. Indeed, I want to emphasize that this affair is in my view not primarily about science -- though that was the excuse that I used in constructing my parody -- nor is it a disciplinary conflict between scientists and humanists, who are in fact represented on all sides of the debate. What I believe this debate. (shrink)

En 1996, la publication aux États-Unis du " vrai-faux " article du physicien américain Alan Sokal, visant à dénoncer sur le mode du canular les ravages intellectuels opérés, selon lui, par le " postmodernisme ", puis la parution en France en 1997 du livre rédigé avec Jean Bricmont (Impostures intellectuelles), ont défrayé la chronique. Pour ces auteurs, il était urgent de dénoncer les " extrapolations abusives des sciences exactes aux sciences humaines " d'intellectuels comme Jacques Lacan, Julia Kristeva, Jean (...) Baudrillard, Gilles Deleuze, Félix Guattari et Paul Virilio, et plus encore de critiquer le " relativisme " des chercheurs de la nouvelle école de sociologie des sciences, au premier rang desquels Bruno Latour. Apparemment frappée au coin du bon sens, cette attaque frontale a rencontré un très large écho. Et pourtant, les impostures ne sont pas du côté qu'on croit. Car le positivisme revendiqué par Sokal et Bricmont cache en fait une profonde incompréhension des auteurs qu'ils attaquent et une surprenante ignorance des enjeux politiques et philosophiques majeurs révélés par les travaux sur les " sciences dures " des chercheurs des " sciences douces " Il était donc indispensable de démonter les impostures et les malentendus de l'affaire "Sokal": tel est l'objectif de ce livre, qui réunit des contributions originales de chercheurs de divers horizons - physiciens, philosophes des sciences, anthropologues... Non sans humour, ils entendent faire partager au lecteur leur commune passion pour la science telle qu'elle se fait (beaucoup plus intéressante que la science mythique de certains scientifiques), et plaident pour une réconciliation entre philosophes et physiciens, pour en finir enfin avec la " guerre des sciences ". (shrink)

The failure to consider the Sokal affair in light of other, related episodes has contributed to a wholesale misreading of its significance. The episode has often been offered as evidence for the bankruptcy of a broad and diverse collection offields, variously referred to as cultural studies of science, sociology of science, history of science, and science and technology studies. However, when viewed in context, the Sokal affair illustrates pre cisely why social scientific and humanistic studies of science are (...) necessary. To develop this argument, the author explicitly compares Alan Sokal's experiment with a similar experiment, performed by William M. Epstein and published in this very journal. Comparing the research questions, methods, ethics, and reception of these two experi ments not only reveals the limitations of Sokal's critique but also shows that Sokal has unwittingly endorsed one of the central lines of research in science and technology studies. (shrink)

El affaire Sokal muestra tener efectos importantes en las ciencias sociales. Sin embargo, estos mismos efectos pueden ser comprendidos adecuadamente por lo que puede ser inferido y lo que no puede serlo. Entre estos últimos podemos contar el fin de los estudios epistemológicos en las ciencias so..

Résumé Le texte qui suit s’efforce d’identifier l’origine de ce qu’il convient d’appeler « l’affaire Sokal ». Il appert que celle-ci reste problématique dans la mesure où elle n’est pas pensable sans engager, centralement, une duplicité. À « l’origine », le mouvement du canular sokalien est donc bien « productif et conflictuel et aucune identité, aucune unité, aucune simplicité originaire ne saurait [le] précéder », comme disait l’autre, mais il disséminait, paraît-il. C’est pourtant là la « force » (...) de la « forme » du canular sokalien. Achoppant sur la délicate question de l’origine (qui est probablement aussi celle de l’ironie), mais saluant sans cesse le travail du canular, à partir d’un extrait de La Barbarie à visage humain, cet article entend révéler les conséquences constructives de cette affaire. Il n’est pourtant pas sûr que son argumentation permette de distinguer la conséquence de l’origine : post hoc ergo propter hoc. Il s’agit d’un sophisme, rappelons-le. (shrink)

L’article « D’une Affaire aux autres » de Josquin Debaz et Sophie Roux, montre combien il est difficile de délimiter ce qu’on appelle « l’Affaire Sokal » et analyse, par un recensement aussi systématique que possible des articles de presse, la différence entre l’affaire américaine et l’affaire française.

The Sokal Affair created a huge debate in France in past years, about the social sciences, scientificity, and postmodernism. It was initiated with a “hoax article,” a false postmodern article published by Allan Sokal in the U.S. review Social Text, and a book copublished with Jean Bricmont, where the authors denounce the abusive borrowings of words and concepts from physics or biology by famous intellectuals such as Derrida, Kristeva, Virilio, Debray, and Latour. The debate presented a wide span (...) of positions, from methodological disagreement to approval. Finally, it poses important questions about the structure and the behavior of the scientific field. (shrink)

The following text seeks to identify the origins of what has come to be called the Sokal hoax. It appears that these origins remain problematic insofar as they cannot be thought without engaging into intrinsically duplicitous thinking. Thus, « originally », the gesture of the hoax is indeed « productive and conflictive, and no self-identity, no unity, and no inherent simplicity can possibly precede it », as « he » said, but « he » was disseminating, as we say. (...) But that is precisely the « strength » of the « form » of the Sokal hoax. With the delicate question of origins as its stumbling block—a stumbling block which may also be the question of irony—, the present text takes its cue from an passage from La Barbarie à visage humain and proposes to reveal the constructive consequences of the affair triggered by the hoax, while constantly paying tribute to its performance. Whether my argument will make it possible to distinguish the consequences from the origins remains moot : post hoc ergo propter hoc. One must remember that this is a sophism. (shrink)

Sophie Roux confronte la critique du « sokalisme » qu’on trouve dans La Querelle des imposteurs d’Yves Jeanneret et la manière dont Impostures intellectuelles dessine le partage entre « littéraires » et « scientifiques ».

Neste artigo, relato os aspectos mais salientes do affair Sokal-Bricmont - uma paródia que evoluiu para uma crítica articulada dos excessos de um certo pensamento pós-modernista - e analiso algumas das reações que suscitou em artigos publicados na Folha de S. Paulo. Termino com algumas reflexões sobre a nefasta negligência para com as ciências exatas na educação em geral e, em particular, na formação dos profissionais das áreas de filosofia e ciências humanas.In this paper I summarize some of the (...) most relevant aspects of the so-called Sokal and Bricmont affair - a parody that evolved to a full-fledged criticism of the excesses of post-modernism - and analyze the reactions it elicited in some articles published in Folha de São Paulo. I close with a reflection on the unfortunate neglect of the exact sciences in education in general and, in particular, the education of philosophers and social scientists. (shrink)

La nouvelle sociologie des sciences réunit un ensemble d'études consacrées aux programmes de recherche dits " fort " et " constructiviste ". Ces programmes, véritables orthodoxies en sociologie des sciences, ont en commun de se focaliser sur le processus de la recherche et d'en donner une représentation singulière : " relativiste " pour le premier, " contingentiste " pour le second. Là où les ouvrages existants consacrés à ces programmes prennent essentiellement le parti de la description, il revendique celui de (...) l'analyse critique. Il propose une réflexion d'ensemble sur les limites de ces approches sociologiques et sur la représentation des sciences qui s'y rapportent : limites de la conception générale de l'explication sociologique et de ses applications, du caractère inédit de ses thèses et principes généraux, de la transposition de données et démarches venues de disciplines voisines, etc. L'ouvrage vient à la suite de l'affaire Sokal au cours de laquelle les représentants de la " nouvelle sociologie des sciences " ont été ouvertement pris à parti par une partie de la communauté scientifique. Il n'invite pas à l'abandon de l'analyse sociologique du processus de recherche mais à une redéfinition des modalités de cette analyse. (shrink)

The world around us has been shaped by science and man's relationship to it, and in recent years sociologists have been increasingly preoccupied with the latter. In Science in Society , Massimiano Bucchi provides a brief and approachable introduction to this sociological issue. Without assuming any scientific background, Bucchi provides clear summaries of all the major theoretical positions within the sociology of science, using many fascinating examples to illustrate them. Theories covered include Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific change, the sociology (...) of scientific knowledge, actor-network theory, and the social construction of technology. The second half of the book goes on to look at some recent public controversies over the role of science in the modern world including: · the Sokal affair, otherwise known as the science wars · debates over public understanding of science, such as global warming and genetically modified food · the implications of the human genomeproject. This highly readable text will be essential reading for all students studying the sociology of science. (shrink)

New York University mathematical physicist Alan Sokal published in the postmodern humanities journal Social Text a parody entitled Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity [1]. His point in doing so was to test whether the field of ``cultural studies of science'' was seriously lacking in ``intellectual standards.'' His article is nonsense from start to finish, but was still published. He revealed the hoax in another article in Lingua Franca [2]. The incident, and reactions to it, (...) now being called the Sokal Affair, have received wide coverage in The New York Times [3]. (shrink)

As I understand it, the Sokal affair is about affirmative action for ideas. Should arguments felt to be under-represented in the culture-at-large be admitted into prestigious haunts like Social Text even if they don't meet the standard intellectual tests? Alan Sokal got tired of what he saw as an excess of affirmative action in the ideas purveyed by cultural studies. So he devised a test in the form of a hoax: Could an author who deliberately met no standards (...) whatsoever make it into Social Text merely by parading past the judges their own sympathies, dressed up in a jargon they would recognize and citing these same judges as authoritative? The test came back positive. The issue, then, is what to make of the results. (shrink)

Metaphysics relies on the presupposition of the non-being of the world: since the world has once not existed it is necessary to postulate a cause for its existence, i.e. an extrinsic principle to explain the absolute beginning of the causal series of all things that constitute the world. After the critique of theologizing metaphysics by authors like Kant, Hegel and Nietzsche, the notion of an absolute beginning still persists though in a field in which it often goes as such unnoticed, (...) while it factually enjoys wide acceptance, namely in epistemology. It sounds as a truism that knowledge begins: personal inexistence (birth-death cycle) and the phenomenon of unconsciousness (sleep-wake cycle) seem to endorse the obviousness of that statement. Now, to link the beginning of the phenomenal series of subjective acts of knowledge with the existence of an external world that causes the specific content of our temporary cognitive acts relies, however, on two presuppositions, namely on the thesis of a complete non-being or nothingness of knowledge and, intrinsically related to this first presupposition, on the thesis of an absolute beginning of cognitive activity. If knowledge begins from its own nothingness, there must be a cause that is external to the totality of acts of knowledge, a cause that it doesn´t belong to the series of cognitive acts and, therefore, that it is not caused by any of them: this uncaused cause of contentful knowledge is supposed to be the real world external to the knowing subject. In my paper I make explicit the relation between realist-empiricist approachs to epistemology and the double presupposition of the nothingness and absolute beginning of knowledge, I explain the difficulties implied by these two presuppositions and, finally, I propose as a plausible solution to those difficulties some key theoretical claims of absolute idealism. (shrink)

Like many other scientists, I was amused by news of the prank played by the NYU mathematical physicist Alan Sokal. Late in 1994 he submitted a sham article to the cultural studies journal Social Text, in which he reviewed some current topics in physics and mathematics, and with tongue in cheek drew various cultural, philosophical and political morals that he felt would appeal to fashionable academic commentators on science who question the claims of science to objectivity.

When I was a boy, I was friendly with a lad who lived a few doors away. We used to take bicycle rides together and have gunfights on the waste land and light fires and play scratch cricket. Our ways parted as our interests evolved in different directions. There were no hard feelings and, indeed, much residual good will. Roger (this is not his true name, which I shall withhold for the sake of his family) did not share any of (...) my own developing intellectual interests and I felt none of his love for sailing. I was surprised, therefore, when one evening my mother came across an interview with Roger in the Liverpool Echo in which he declared that his real passion was `cybernetics'. I felt that I had misjudged him and wondered whether, after all, we did have more in common than I had thought. The next time I ran into Roger, I asked him about his interest in cybernetics; more particularly, I asked him what `cybernetics' was. My ignorance was genuine, rather than assumed. To our embarrassment, we both discovered that Roger, too, was ignorant about the nature of cybernetics. For him, it was just a word. It had something to do with science and technology and the future and seemed rather glamorous and was much talked-about then. It was clearly just the thing to impress the readers of a provincial newspaper. I didn't pursue the matter and we saw little of each other subsequently. The last I heard of him, he was doing well as an estate agent. Poor Roger could not have expected that his comments about `cybernetics' would have been taken up (`interrogated', `problematised') by a reader of the Liverpool Echo. This was hard luck. Even more unjustly, he was not awarded a tenure-track post in humanities on the strength of his allusion to cybernetics, or a Chair in the Systems of Thought at the University of Paris. (shrink)

I extract, and then analyse critically, the epistemological ideas that are implicit in Robin DiAngelo's best-selling book White Fragility and her other writings. On what grounds, according to DiAngelo, can people know what they claim to know? And on what grounds does DiAngelo know what she claims to know?

In 1996, Alan Sokal, a Professor of Physics at New York University, wrote a paper for the cultural-studies journal Social Text, entitled: 'Transgressing the Boundaries: Towards a transformative hermeneutics of quantum gravity'. It was reviewed, accepted and published. Sokal immediately confessed that the whole article was a hoax - a cunningly worded paper designed to expose and parody the style of extreme postmodernist criticism of science. The story became front-page news around the world and triggered fierce and wide-ranging (...) controversy. -/- Sokal is one of the most powerful voices in the continuing debate about the status of evidence-based knowledge. In Beyond the Hoax he turns his attention to a new set of targets - pseudo-science, religion, and misinformation in public life. 'Whether my targets are the postmodernists of the left, the fundamentalists of the right, or the muddle-headed of all political and apolitical stripes, the bottom line is that clear thinking, combined with a respect for evidence, are of the utmost importance to the survival of the human race in the twenty-first century.' The book also includes a hugely illuminating annotated text of the Hoax itself, and a reflection on the furore it provoked. (shrink)

When it was published in France, this book shocked the philosophers of the Left Bank with its plain-speaking attack on some of France's greatest minds.

Biographical Information: The author is a Professor of Physics at New York University. He has lectured widely in Europe and Latin America, including at the Università di Roma ``La Sapienza'' and, during the Sandinista government, at the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Nicaragua. He is co-author with Roberto Fernández and Jürg Fröhlich of Random Walks, Critical Phenomena, and Triviality in Quantum Field Theory (Springer, 1992).

The displacement of the idea that facts and evidence matter by the idea that everything boils down to subjective interests and perspectives is -- second only to American political campaigns -- the most prominent and pernicious manifestation of anti-intellectualism in our time.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Transgressing the Boundaries: An Afterword*Alan D. SokalAlas, the truth is out: my article, “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity,” which appeared in the spring/summer 1996 issue of the cultural-studies journal Social Text, is a parody. 1 Clearly I owe the editors and readers of Social Text, as well as the wider intellectual community, a non-parodic explanation of my motives and my true views. One of (...) my goals here is to make a small contribution toward a dialogue on the Left between humanists and natural scientists—“two cultures” which, contrary to some optimistic pronouncements (mostly by the former group), are probably farther apart in mentality than at any time in the past fifty years.Like the genre it is meant to satirize—myriad exemplars of which can be found in its reference list—my article is a mélange of truths, half-truths, quarter-truths, falsehoods, non sequiturs, and syntactically correct sentences that have no meaning whatsoever. (Sadly, there are only a handful of the latter: I tried hard to produce them, but I found that, save for rare bursts of inspiration, I just didn’t have the knack.) I also employed some other strategies that are well-established (albeit sometimes inadvertently) in the genre: appeals to authority in lieu of logic; speculative theories passed off as established science; strained and even absurd analogies; rhetoric that sounds good but whose meaning is [End Page 338] ambiguous; and confusion between the technical and everyday senses of English words (for example: linear, nonlinear, local, global, multidimensional, relative, frame of reference, field, anomaly, chaos, catastrophe, logic, irrational, imaginary, complex, real, equality, choice).I should emphasize that all works cited in my article are real, and all quotations are rigorously accurate; none are invented. Indeed, the most hilarious passages in my article were not written by me: they are direct quotes from the Masters.But why did I do it? I confess that I’m an unabashed Old Leftist who never quite understood how deconstruction was supposed to help the working class. And I’m a stodgy old scientist who believes, naively, that there exists an external world, that there exist objective truths about that world, and that my job is to discover some of them. (If science were merely a negotiation of social conventions about what is agreed to be “true,” why would I bother devoting a large fraction of my all-too-short life to it? I don’t aspire to be the Emily Post of quantum field theory.)But my main concern isn’t to defend science from the barbarian hordes of lit crit. Rather, my concern is explicitly political: to combat a currently fashionable postmodernist/poststructuralist/social-constructivist discourse—and more generally a penchant for subjectivism—which is, I believe, inimical to the values and future of the Left. 2 Alan Ryan said it well:It is, for instance, pretty suicidal for embattled minorities to embrace Michel Foucault, let alone Jacques Derrida. The minority view was always that power could be undermined by truth.... Once you read Foucault as saying that truth is simply an effect of power, you’ve had it.... But American departments of literature, history and sociology contain large numbers of self-described leftists who have confused radical doubts about objectivity with political radicalism, and are in a mess. 3Likewise, Eric Hobsbawm has decriedthe rise of “postmodernist” intellectual fashions in Western universities, particularly in departments of literature and anthropology, which imply that all “facts” claiming objective existence are simply intellectual constructions. In short, that there is no clear difference between fact and fiction. But there is, and for historians, even for the most militantly antipositivist ones among us, the ability to distinguish between the two is absolutely fundamental. 4 [End Page 339](Hobsbawm goes on to show how rigorous historical scholarship can refute the fictions propounded by reactionary nationalists in India, Israel, the Balkans and elsewhere.) And as the acerbic sociologist Stanislav Andreski noted long ago,So long as authority inspires awe, confusion and absurdity enhance conservative tendencies in society. Firstly, because clear and logical thinking leads to a cumulation of knowledge (of which the progress of... (shrink)

Sokal and Bricmont in their exposé of allegedly meaningless statements about science by recent French philosophers take errors of particular applications of philosophical ideas to science as refutations of the whole general framework utilized. They also seem to think that taking snippets out of context is sufficient to expose the "fashionable nonsense." In the early twentieth century, British analytic philosophers such as Bertrand Russell and A. N. Whitehead did the same with Hegel on mathematics. After deciding not to bother (...) to read Hegel because of distaste for what he wrote about mathematics, Whitehead was later surprised to learn that his own relational process philosophy resembled that of Hegel in various respects. (shrink)