Abortion bans have been characterized as cruel especially in not allowing exceptions for rape or incest. The article first examines one approach to morally justifying bans based on the Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) which distinguishes morally between killing or letting die intending death versus doing so only foreseeing death. It then presents some criticisms of the implications of the DDE but also argues that what the doctrine permits helps provide a ground for the permissibility of abortions (...) even if the fetus is a person. Whether there are limits on applying this argument is also considered. In conclusion, the article considers whether and why not permitting exceptions to bans for rape and incest is cruel and whether cruelty is a ground for opposition to bans. (shrink)

Abortion bans premised on fetal pain capacity are this decade's “partial‐birth abortion”: a medically suspect anti‐choice initiative that can be politically difficult to oppose. No one is “pro–fetal pain.” But rhetorically, the concept of “fetal pain” works to conflate the capacity for pain with the experience of pain. If pain justified banning medical procedures, all surgery would be illegal. Pain is a routine side effect of medical practice. What's unethical is unnecessary pain, and that's why the standard (...) medical response to pain is palliation. (shrink)

January 2018, the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology issued a position statement opposing the punishment of women for self‐induced abortion. To those unfamiliar with emerging trends in abortion in the United States and worldwide, the need for the declaration might not be apparent. Several studies suggest that self‐induced abortion is on the rise in the United States. Simultaneously, prosecutions of pregnant women for behavior thought to harm the fetus are increasing. The ACOG statement responds to both (...) trends by urging doctors to honor the integrity and confidentiality inherent in the doctor‐patient relationship. Seen in the context of the larger battle over legal abortion, the statement has far broader implications. By acknowledging the role doctors play in enforcing pregnancy‐related crimes, the ACOG position statement wisely anticipates the ways in which doctors will be implicated should access to legal abortion be further restricted. To understand the need for the ACOG directive, you must first understand that the story of what will happen if abortion becomes a crime in the United States is not to be found in history books; it is staring at us across our southern border. (shrink)

This article argues that state laws banning abortions for disability violate reproductive justice for parents with disabilities. These bans deprive people with disabilities of choices that may be important to their possibilities of becoming parents, including possibilities for abortion of pregnancies that have become risky to continue. Far from protecting disability civil rights, these state law bans restrict the abilities of people with disabilities to choose to have children and to parent.

Since the Supreme Court upheld the partial birth abortion ban in 2007, more U.S. abortion providers have begun performing intraamniotic digoxin injections prior to uterine dilation and evacuations. These injections can cause medical harm to abortion patients. Our objective is to perform an in-depth bioethical analysis of this procedure, which is performed mainly for the provider’s legal benefit despite potential medical consequences for the patient.

The experiences of working-class people and those from communities of color seeking abortions in the United States before and during COVID-19 call for feminist, relational pandemic ethics. Françoise Baylis and colleagues argue for public health ethics that emphasize relational personhood, relational autonomy, social justice, and solidarity. COVID-19 abortion bans in the United States require vigilance against powerful actors who abuse these values—particularly that of solidarity—to further their political, religious, and/or economic agendas in harmful ways. Thus, efforts to promote (...) solidarity during a pandemic must attend to social injustice and systemic oppression and provide resources to vulnerable people. (shrink)

Perhaps I am wrong to take this article personally, but when the authors refer to Cassandras “voicing concern about a post-Roe degradation of pregnant persons’ right to chart their own medical cour...

This article explores how abortion bans in states with large Black populations will exacerbate existing racial inequities in those states’ child welfare systems.

The loss of the federally protected constitutional right to an abortion is a threat to the already tenuous autonomy of pregnant people, and may augur future challenges to their right to refuse unwanted obstetric interventions. Even before Roe’s demise, pregnancy led to constraints on autonomy evidenced by clinician-led legal incursions against patients who refused obstetric interventions. In Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, the Supreme Court found that the right to liberty espoused in the Constitution does not extend to (...) a pregnant person’s right to an abortion. With Roe’s demise, the right to request specific types of care has been vitiated. The same argument underpinning that holding may now become ballast for attacks on the traditionally more robust right, the right to refuse. Here we discuss how the elevation of fetal and embryonic rights may lead to a cascade of medical intrusions and deprivations of liberty against pregnant persons, and offer an argument opposing these improprieties. (shrink)

In 2018, Irish citizens voted overwhelmingly to repeal the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution to allow for the introduction of a more liberal abortion law. In this article, I develop a retrospective reading of the stubborn persistence of the denial of reproductive rights to women in Ireland over the decades. I argue that the ban’s severity and longevity is rooted in deep-seated, affective attachments that formed part of processes of postcolonial nation-building and relied on shame and the construction of (...) the Irish nation as a particular, gendered place. The article develops the notion of ‘gendered displacement’ to conceptualise abortion travel in the context of the history of women’s coercive confinement, and provides an affective, feminist reading of the interlinkages between place and nationhood. It also draws on three cases—the X, Y and Z cases—to illustrate the centrality of place and women’s occupation of space to the analysis of Ireland’s abortion ban, which should be read in the wider context of the legacy of what I term the ‘affective politics of place’. (shrink)

A few decades from now, it might become possible to gestate fetuses in artificial wombs. Ectogestation as this is called, raises major legal and ethical issues, especially for abortion rights. In countries allowing abortion, regulation often revolves around the viability threshold—the point in fetal development after which the fetus can survive outside the womb. How should viability be understood—and abortion thus regulated—after ectogestation? Should we ban, allow or require the use of artificial wombs as an alternative to (...) standard abortions? Drawing on Cohen, I evaluate three possible positions for the post-ectogestative abortion laws: restrictive, conservative and liberal. While the restrictive position appears untenable, I argue that the liberal and conservative positions can be combined to form a legally and morally coherent basis for post-ectogestative abortion legislation, offering an improvement from the point of both prolife and prochoice positions. (shrink)

The legitimacy of the refusal of South Australian nurses to care for second trimester abortion patients on grounds of conscience is examined as a test case for a theory of permissible limits on the autonomy of health care professionals. In cases of health care professional (HCP) conscientious refusal, it is argued that a balance be struck between the HCPs' claims to autonomous action and the consequences to them of having their autonomous action restricted, and the entitlement of patients to (...) care and the consequences for them of being refused such care. Conscientious action that results in the disruption or termination of health care services, however, is always impermissible on two grounds. Firstly, because it is at this point that the action '... invades a patient's autonomy, puts a patient at serious risk ... [and] treats a patient unjustly' (1) Secondly, because the consequences of such refusals turn them into political acts--acts of civil disobedience. It is arguable that in order for acts of civil disobedience to be legitimate, certain obligations are required of the dissenter by the community. It is concluded that the actions of the South Australian nurses, which have over the last few years both terminated and disrupted second trimester services, are morally impermissible. (shrink)

About 6% of women in the world live in countries that ban all abortions, and 34% in countries that only allow abortion to preserve maternal life or health. In the USA, over the last decades—even before Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization overturned the federal right to abortion—various states have sought to restrict abortion access. Often times, this legislation has been advanced based on legislators’ personal moral values. At the bedside, in contrast, provision of abortion care (...) should adhere to the normative principles of medical ethics and reproductive justice, centreing patients and their individual reproductive intentions and desires. Abortion regulations, through their influence on patients and providers, may facilitate or impede such ethical care at the bedside. In this paper, we present a framework to model how abortion legislation should fit into the patient–provider relationship and to clarify the dynamics by which legislation may affect healthcare encounters. Our proposed framework serves as a tool to analyse the ethical impact of abortion regulations. We propose a model for assessing abortion policies based not on legislators’ or advocates’ individual moral claims, but on the shared, normative framework of clinical medical ethics. Through contrasting case studies, we demonstrate how a robust normative ethical framework can recentre patients and their reproductive needs. Our model is one way to account for—and safeguard—patients’ diverse viewpoints and needs in the development of abortion policy, and it can serve to ground narratives for advocacy by healthcare workers and their professional organisations. (shrink)

Sex selection in India and China is fostered by a limiting social structure that disallows women from performing the roles that men perform, and relegates women to a lower status level. Individual parents and individual families benefit concretely from having a son born into the family, while society, and girls and women as a group, are harmed by the widespread practice of sex selection. Sex selection reinforces oppression of women and girls. Sex selection is best addressed by ameliorating the situations (...) of women and girls, increasing their autonomy, and elevating their status in society. One might argue that restricting or prohibiting abortion, prohibiting sex selection, and prohibiting sex determination would eliminate sex selective abortion. But this decreases women's autonomy rather than increases it. Such practices will turn underground. Sex selective infanticide, and slower death by long term neglect, could increase. If abortion is restricted, the burden is placed on women seeking abortions to show that they have a legally acceptable or legitimate reason for a desired abortion, and this seriously limits women's autonomy. Instead of restricting abortion, banning sex selection, and sex determination, it is better to address the practice of sex selection by elevating the status of women and empowering women so that giving birth to a girl is a real and positive option, instead of a detriment to the parents and family as it is currently. But, if a ban on sex selective abortion or a ban on sex determination is indeed instituted, then wider social change promoting women's status in society should be instituted simultaneously. (shrink)

How do economists persuade their readers that one policy is superior to another? A glance at the literature on welfare economics quickly provides the answer to this question: Economists enter policy debates armed with mathematical models, evaluating options on the basis of their consequences. Economists typically classify a policy change as a welfare improvement with respect to the status quo if the gain realized by the winners exceeds the harm sustained by the losers. The best policy becomes the one that (...) generates the highest net benefit. (shrink)

Abortion is the deliberate termination of a pregnancy. In current practice, this involves the death of the foetus. Consequently, the debate on whether those experiencing an unwanted pregnancy have the right to abortion is usually dichotomized as a matter of pro-choice versus pro-life. Pro-choice advocates maintain that abortion is acceptable under various circumstances. The idea that we ought to respect pregnant people’s rights to choose what to do with their bodies – respect for bodily autonomy – is (...) cited as a major reason for granting them abortion rights. Pro-life advocates, on the other hand, claim that abortion is not acceptable under most circumstances. They argue, typically, that the foetus has a right to life. Recent events, such as Poland’s High Court decision in October 2020 to ban most abortions, and the huge protests and outcries this generated around the world, indicate that the abortion debate is far from resolved. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOn 28 October 2012, Savita Halappanavar, an Indian woman living in Ireland, died in hospital while under medical care for a miscarrying pregnancy. According to her husband, her repeated requests for an abortion were ignored because of the presence of a foetal heartbeat. Ms Halappanavar’s death was a critical event in the process leading to a referendum on 25 May 2018, when the Irish electorate voted to repeal the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, removing the constitutional ban on (...) class='Hi'>abortion. The name Savita has become indelibly linked to the changing course of abortion politics, so it is timely to reassess the role of the media in shaping the parameters of the debate about the impact of her death on the issue. This study presents a frame analysis of Irish newspapers in the weeks following her death, mapping the political, medical, legal and socio-ethical discourses, as well as the related contemporaneous events that set the agenda for the type of debate that was to follow. It identifies four media frames: Public Tragedy, Political Opportunity, Abortion Legacy and Maternal Health. Our central argument is that the overall effect of media framing provided much face-saving for politicians in the way that the legislative issue was viewed through a conservative party-political lens, despite public outrage. (shrink)

In 1934, Karl N. Llewellyn published a lively essay trumpeting the dawn of legal realism, "On Philosophy in American Law." The charm of his defective little piece is its style and audacity. A philosopher might be seduced into reading Llewellyn’s essay by its title; but one soon learns that by "philosophy" Llewellyn only meant "atmosphere". His concerns were the "general approaches" taken by practitioners, who may not even be aware of having general approaches. Llewellyn paired an anemic concept of philosophy (...) with a pumped-up conception of law. Llewellyn’s "law" included anything that reflects the "ways of the law guild at large" - judges, legislators, regulators, and enforcers. Llewellyn argued that the legal philosophies implicit in American legal practice had been natural law, positivism and realism, each adopted in response to felt needs of a time. We must reckon with many other implicit "philosophies" to understand the workings of the law guild, not the least of which has been racism. Others, maternalism and paternalism, my foci here, persist in American law, despite women’s progress toward equality. Both maternalism and paternalism were strikingly present in a recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court, Gonzales v. Carhart, upholding the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 11.2 (2001) 205-209 [Access article in PDF] Bioethics Inside the Beltway Banning Human Cloning-Then What? Cynthia B. Cohen The public wonder and concern that accompanied the birth of Dolly, the cloned sheep, four years ago died down soon after her arrival. Little has been heard about human reproductive cloning since then in the public square. This silence was pierced recently when two groups each (...) announced its intention to clone a child from a human being within the next few years.The Raelians, a religious organization, disclosed in October 2000 that they had found a grieving American couple willing to pay $500,000 to clone their deceased child and that they would proceed with cloning in a secret laboratory within the United States. A few months later, an international consortium led by Pavos Zavos, Ph.D., a University of Kentucky emeritus professor of biology, and Severino Antinori, M.D., an Italian infertility specialist, declared that it intended to clone the first human within two years at an undisclosed location outside the United States. These announcements led Representative James Greenwood (R-PA), chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to convene a hearing on human cloning on 28 March 2001.Why did human reproductive cloning suddenly become of concern to the House of Representatives? What will the federal government do with regard to the development of human cloning at this point in time? And what should it do to address human cloning in the long-term? I will briefly highlight the major controversies that surfaced at the hearing and then consider the broader questions. Scientific Controversies The initial question of concern to the House subcommittee members was whether cloning science has now reached the point of application to humans. Scientists at the hearing offered widely diverging views about this. Zavos testified that only a small number of cloned animals has died after birth and declared that the key to avoiding impaired human clones is to engage in prenatal screening. Consequently, it is now safe to undertake human cloning, he maintained. He was supported in this view by Brigitte Boisselier, Ph.D., visiting assistant professor [End Page 205] of chemistry at Hamilton College and scientific director of the Raelians, who argued that human cloning would not give rise to the problems that have been encountered in nonhuman mammalian cloning.However, professor of veterinary medicine Mark Westhusin, Ph.D., of Texas A&M University, and Massachusetts Institute of Technology researcher Rudolf Jaenisch, Ph.D., maintained that the same sorts of problems that have appeared in nonhuman mammalian cloning would reappear in human cloning. Westhusin stated that mammals have incurred serious defects leading to spontaneous abortion and that mammalian newborns often display severe respiratory and circulatory problems. The most likely explanation for such abnormalities, Jaenisch hypothesized, is that in cloning, the genetic reprogramming that governs the way an organism develops must take place in a much shorter period of time than in coital or in vitro reproduction. This may result in faulty reprogramming leading to dysregulation of gene expression and consequent genetic defects in cloned animals. There is good reason to think that this also would occur in human cloning, Jaenisch maintained. Until reproductive cloning research has been carried out on several generations of primates and is better understood, he argued, human cloning should not be attempted. Even then, several generations of descendants of human clones would have to be observed before scientists could be sure that it would not have a destructive impact on humans. This process could take as long as a century. Ethical Controversy Bioethicists who testified focused on those aspects of the ethical controversy surrounding human cloning that are of particular interest to public policy makers. Thomas Murray, Ph.D., President of The Hastings Center and a member of NBAC, maintained that human cloning is still unsafe, as NBAC had predicted, and that, if carried out, would leave in its wake "damaged women, many dead fetuses, and children born with serious impairments." He expressed particular concern that couples suffering... (shrink)

At no time in recent decades has more attention been paid to ethical issues in pregnancy. Particularly riveting—and alarming, to many—was the passage of Senate Bill 8, a Texas law banning abortion...

For the past few years in the United States, almost daily there’s a headline about new proposed abortions restrictions. Conservatives cheer, liberals despair. But who is right here? Should abortion be generally legal or should it be banned? Is it usually immoral or is it usually not wrong at all? These same questions, of course, are asked in other countries. To many people, answers to these questions seem obvious, and people with different or contrary answers are, well, just wrong. (...) But how can we know? In particular, could anyone know that abortion is not wrong and should be legal? If so, how? And how would anyone effectively, persuasively, communicate that knowledge? One important set of answers depends on this idea: critical thinking. Critical thinking can help people know, not merely believe or feel, that their perspectives on issues are true or correct, and it can help them persuade others to understand and accept that knowledge. We are philosophy professors who teach courses in critical thinking and its applications to ethical, political, scientific, and legal issues. In our 2019 open-access book, Thinking Critically About Abortion: Why Most Abortions Aren’t Wrong & Why All Abortions Should be Legal, we apply well-confirmed methods of critical thinking to the most discussed arguments about abortion. Critical thinking can be operationalized as skills. Three key critical thinking skills involve defining words, identifying the structures of arguments, and evaluating explanations. Understanding these and other critical thinking skills can only help improve conversations and advocacy about abortion. Let’s see them in action. (shrink)

An editorial / opinion piece on abortion: -/- "I’m a philosophy professor who specializes in medical ethics and I teach and write about the ethics of abortion. So I am very familiar with the medical, legal and – most importantly – ethical or moral issues related to HB 481, the so-called “heartbeat bill” that would effectively ban abortion in Georgia. At least hundreds of other philosophy, ethics and law professors in Georgia teach these ethical debates about (...) class='Hi'>abortion: they are also, to varying degrees, experts on the issues. -/- What is taught is the arguments about the ethics of abortion, that is, the reasons to think that abortion is wrong and the reasons to think that it’s not wrong. Evaluating these arguments requires understanding and skill. Much of these skills amount to consistently asking ‘What do you mean?’ and ‘Why think that?’ We need better arguments on these issues, and asking and answering these questions helps with that. . .". (shrink)

The scientific and political debate over whether a fetus can experience pain highlights a vital and controversial boundary for governance—the boundary of human life. I use the 2012 and 2013 US federal debates over twenty-week abortion bans to investigate how personhood is constructed in a society transformed by biomedical science and technology in the United States. Although those who support and oppose the bill take different stances on abortion regulation, each relies on biomedical knowledge and risk assessment (...) to substantiate claims. Through content analysis of congressional documents, I find that members of Congress strategically draw on biomedical discourse to manage the boundaries of bodies and construct a universal “at-risk” political subject in need of governmental protection. These findings bring scholarly debates about personhood into the era of biomedicalization by emphasizing the latent process of creating a hybridized subjectivity that I call cybernetic personhood. (shrink)

On April 13, 2010, Nebraska enacted a new state ban on abortion in the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act that ha caught the attention of many on both sides of the abortion debate, and has inspired other states to attempt similar measures. The statute requires the referring or abortion-providing physician to make a “determination of the probable postfertilization age of the unborn child” and makes it illegal to induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion (...) upon a woman when the “probable postfertilization age” of the fetus is “twenty or more weeks” unless the doctor determines in “reasonable medical judgment she has a condition which so complicates her medical condition as to necessitate the abortion of her pregnancy to avert her death or to avert serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function or it is necessary to preserve the life of an unborn child.”. (shrink)

Elected prosecutors have pledged not to enforce abortion laws, in response to state-level abortion bans. For their pledges to be meaningful, prosecutors must exercise their discretion in cases of individuals who face legal risk, including people who help others self-manage their abortions. With a harm-reduction approach to improving abortion access, prosecutors should aim to reduce abortion helpers’ involvement with the criminal justice system.

In this paper we will argue in favor of federal funding of elective abortion, more specifically in support of Medicaid funding. To do so, we will address the restrictions on public funding presently in place and demonstrate that the various justifications offered in their defense are in­adequate. We will then suggest that the ‘failure to enable’ represented by a ban on Federal funding is morally equivalent to an outright prohibition on abortion for the target population. Just as a (...) moral equivalence can be established between killing and letting die in symmetrical cases, like criteria for equivalence can be established that help to identify those failures to make possible that are morally indistinguishable from proscriptions. On this basis, it can be shown that restrictions on Federal funding in such contexts can be thought to carry the same moral liability as prohibitions. (shrink)

Abstract.Telling the tale about South Dakota's recent legislative ban on nearly all abortions gets messy, complicated, and dirty. There are no innocent subjects and no simple plot lines. The story reveals other stories underneath and over the top of the others. Stories counter stories, revealing who is in the know and who does the telling. To “tell the old, old story,” as the song goes, is not as simple as it may seem. Religion and medical science are caught in the (...) politics and cultural wars about abortion. (shrink)

Abortion has been legal in the United States since the Supreme Court's landmark 1973 ruling in Jane Roe, et al. v. Henry Wade, District Attorney of Dallas County. Over the past forty years, however, access to abortion has diminished as states have devised creative ways to regulate and restrict the abortion procedure. In the first half of 2011, state legislators introduced a record number of antiabortion bills. In 19 states alone, 80 laws ranging from mandatory counseling and (...) waiting periods to gestational laws and bans on insurance coverage were passed, a legislative testimony to the incremental successes of the antiabortion campaign. Since 2011, the rapid increase in restrictive... (shrink)

Using a multidisciplinary framework, this article examines the Office of Refugee Resettlement’s (ORR) policy decision to prohibit teens in federal immigration custody from obtaining abortions. As we argue, this appropriation of decisional authority over their reproductive bodies discursively cast them as doubly subversive for first breaching the southern border of the United States and then insisting upon the right to ‘abortion on demand’. Mapping these twinned agendas onto their bodies, these teens were configured as a threat to the racialised (...) national order during the Trump era. Centring our analysis on the much publicised constitutional challenge to ORR’s abortion ban in Garza v. Hargan, we interrogate this policy as a powerful expression of legal duplicity, the spatial and bodily containment of those deemed other, and the privileging of the citizen-foetus over their undocumented mothers. (shrink)

Background The Constitutional Court of South Korea declared that an abortion ban was unconstitutional on April 11, 2019. The National Health Care System will provide abortion care across the country as a formal medical service. Conscientious objection is an issue raised during the construction of legal reforms. Methods One hundred sixty-seven perioperative nurses responded to the survey questionnaire. Nurses’ perception about conscientious objection, support of legislation regarding conscientious objection, and intention to object were measured. Logistic regression was used (...) to explore the factors associated with support of the legislation and the intention to conscientiously object. Results Only 28.8% of the responding nurses were aware of health care professionals’ conscientious objection. The majority felt that patients’ rights should be prioritized over health care professionals’ conscientious objection. On the other hand, 45.8% supported the legislation on conscientious objection to abortion, and 42.5% indicated a willingness to refuse to participate in an abortion case if conscientious objection was permitted. Religion, awareness of conscientious objection, and prioritizing of nurses’ right to conscientious objection were significantly associated with supporting the legislation. Moreover, religion and prioritizing nurses' rights were significantly associated with the intention to conscientiously object. Conclusions This study provides information necessary for further discussion of nurses’ conscientious objection. Nursing leaders, researchers, and educators should appeal to nurses and involve them in making policies that balance a women's right to non-discrimination and to receiving appropriate care with nurses' rights to maintain their moral integrity without compromising their professional obligation. (shrink)

After the US Supreme Court’s reversal of Roe v. Wade, a number of states have immediately banned abortion. Pro-choice activists are responding by promoting medication abortions – a do-it-yourself form of abortion. Women can take pills at home to induce an abortion in the first few weeks of pregnancy. -/- The Biden Administration [1] has backed the abortion pill, too. Attorney-General Merrick B. Garland and Health and Human Services Secretary Xavier Becerra both issued statements endorsing it. (...) -/- “We stand ready to work with other arms of the federal government that seek to use their lawful authorities to protect and preserve access to reproductive care,” said the Attorney-General. “In particular, the F.D.A. has approved the use of the medication mifepristone. States may not ban mifepristone based on disagreement with the F.D.A.’s expert judgment about its safety and efficacy.” -/- As the New York Times [1] has noted, this sets the scene for legal battles. The obvious one is: will anti-abortion states prosecute medication abortions? -/- But – based on experience in the United Kingdom - the use of the abortion pill could give pro-life doctors headaches as well. -/- In the past year, UK has witnessed the saga of two Catholic doctors who have been brought in front of the professional regulator, the General Medical Council, after accusations of professional misconduct. Their crime? They had supplied abortion pill reversal (APR) treatment to women. Accusations of this misconduct have been brought forward by pro-choice organisations [2]. -/- The problem is that some women might panic when they discover that they are pregnant or are pressured to make a rash decision. They obtain abortion pills, often without seeing a doctor faceto- face, and soon after taking the first pill, they regret their decision. -/- Is it too late for them to save their pregnancy? Not necessarily. -/- A treatment developed in the US works about half the time. It involves the woman taking progesterone after the first abortion pill to counteract the abortifacient action of the drug. -/- Seventy-three women in the UK are reported to have taken a full APR course, of whom, 38 – more than half — successfully remained pregnant. Admittedly, the procedure is controversial [3], with pro-choice writers denouncing it as unproven, unscientific, and unethical. This has triggered some healthcare practitioners and scholars to analyse the commitments of the pro-choice movement to APR. In a recently published paper in The New Bioethics [4], two colleagues, Dominic Whitehouse and Steven Bow, and I argue that those espousing a pro-choice worldview should actually support abortion pill reversal and that the current evidence indicates that they should actually be doing it. -/- While some pro-choice activists might be happy simply to expand women’s reproductive choices, some might also want to ensure that these choices are safe and effective at achieving the desired outcome, which in principle includes maintaining a pregnancy. -/- We then review the scientific evidence with respect to the ability of APR to halt an abortion, look at the potential impact of APR on mental health, as well as its procedural safety. While highlighting that gold-standard evidence is lacking, we note that APR is associated with about two times higher rate of embryo survival compared to not completing the full early medical abortion course, that there is large agreement in the literature that women who are ambiguous about abortion are at risk of poorer mental health outcomes after abortion (and argue that women who request APR fall into this category), and highlight that there is no evidence that APR is more dangerous than abandoning an initiated early medical abortion. -/- The latter fact is important, as the results of the only randomised-controlled trial of APR have been at times misrepresented in the media [5.6], creating the impression that APR is not safe while most of the adverse effects occurred in the study group that did not receive APR. As our paper argues, with respect to APR the two UK doctors were “champions of women’s choice and should be congratulated, not condemned, by pro-choice advocates”. -/- While the cases against the two doctors have now been dropped (and there have even been accusations against a member of one of these pro-choice organisations that they pressurised a patient into complaining about one of the doctors and twisted the patient’s experience of the treatment [7]), we argue that it is important to set-up systems to facilitate the future provision of APR to protect both patients and healthcare staff. -/- Our conclusion is that, while being open to any change in evidence, those espousing a pro-choice outlook should “support calls for an APR framework that will protect women and the healthcare professionals caring for them” “and certainly not oppose” APR. -/- The debate over abortion pill reversal will be heading to the United States soon. It is quite possible that it will be denounced as dangerous misinformation. It’s not. But pro-life defenders should be prepared to defend their ground. -/- This article was first published by Mercatornet. (shrink)

A difficult task for politicians who want to fight injustice without doing wrong themselves is identifying where it is permissible to vote for and/or promote so-called “imperfect laws” which somewhat improve existing unjust legal situations but leave closely related injustices intact. One approach is to seek a “selective ban” on some injustices which are politically preventable. This approach is acceptable at least in principle, unlike the approach of “regulation”—i.e., permitting or instructing others to do, or prepare to do, the unjust (...) act in specified ways. The latter necessarily involves us in formal cooperation with evil: wrongly intending that others choose wrongly; for example, that abortion doctors deliberately prepare for abortion, albeit in ways that make an abortion less risky or less likely. In relation to parental consent or parental notification, and to pregnancy counselling and provision of information to pregnant women, while there may be ways of requiring these without complicity in others’ wrongful choices, this is at least more difficult than is often recognised. There can also be problems of principle in seeking consensus with fellow-legislators who may positively intend and even promote the continuation of remaining injustices even as they collaborate with more consistent reformers in passing laws which mitigate injustice overall. (shrink)

Currently, abortion can be lawfully performed in China at any gestational stage for a wide range of social and medical reasons. I critically explore the Chinese regulatory model of abortion in order to examine its practical effects on women. Although I focus on the post-Maoist abortion law, I also analyse the imperial Confucianism-dominated regulation and the Maoist ban on abortion in order to scrutinise the emergence of the notion of ‘glorious motherhood’. By examining how ‘glorious motherhood’ (...) is constructed and reinforced in the Chinese family planning context, I argue that the post-Maoist government intentionally made abortion ‘law in the books’ unrestrictive in order to impose its control over female fertility. As a result of this, women are persuaded and even forced to lead a ‘glorious’ maternal life, which means sacrificing themselves for the purpose of achieving the state’s Malthusian and eugenic demographic goals. Furthermore, I argue that, in addition to exacerbating gender oppression, abortion law’s embrace of the idea of ‘glorious motherhood’ also produces ‘group oppression’ of unmarried women and working-class women. (shrink)

When widespread use of sex‐selective abortion and sex selection through assisted reproduction lead to severe harms to third parties and perpetuate discrimination, should these practices be banned? In this paper I focus on India and show why a common argument for a ban on sex selection fails even in these circumstances. I set aside a common objection to the argument, namely that women have a right to procreative autonomy that trumps the state's interest in protecting other parties from harm, (...) and argue against the ban on consequentialist grounds. I perform a pairwise comparative analysis of sex selection and its plausible alternatives and argue that that the ban fails to improve the state of affairs relative to a scenario without a ban. The ban makes the situation worse, especially for mothers and their daughters. India should therefore repeal its ban on sex selection. (shrink)

Insurance coverage of abortion varies widely across the United States and is an extensively debated issue. Medicaid coverage of abortion is particularly relevant because the majority of abortion patients are poor or low‐income and are thus often covered by Medicaid. Since the Hyde Amendment was first passed in 1976, federal Medicaid funds have been banned from covering the costs of elective abortion. Although states are allowed to use their own funds to cover abortions for their Medicaid (...) recipients, only 17 states currently do so. Of these 17 states, only five cover abortion costs voluntarily; the others do so pursuant to court order. The medical literature includes few ethical analyses of the Hyde Amendment’s ban on Medicaid funding of elective abortions. To fill this gap, we perform an ethical analysis of federal policy to fund elective abortions using a consequentialist approach focused on consequences for pregnant women and their children. (shrink)

In a 2018 referendum, the Irish electorate voted in favour of repealing Ireland's quasi-total legal ban on abortion. The referendum campaign saw important public discussions regarding gender roles in twenty-first century Ireland. While the constitutional ban on abortion was condemned by abortion rights advocates for marginalising women's agency, the legislation which replaced it has not escaped criticism either. Therefore, questions surrounding the conceptualisation of women's agency in the 2018 referendum are still relevant today. Adopting a multimodal critical (...) discourse analysis approach, this paper analyses signage from the weeks before the vote to examine the discursive construction of women's agency in the linguistic landscape of the referendum campaign. I argue that many mainstream campaign organisations – including those arguing for liberalisation of abortion laws – were complicit in the discursive diminishment of women's agency, suggesting that the campaign did not necessarily challenge prevailing ideologies of gender and agency. (shrink)

Jesudason and Weitz's article examines two public policy debates in California, where both sides of the debate used similar language that had the potential to be detrimental to women. Specifically, they show how anti-abortion crusaders in California used similar language to describe why women's rights should be curtailed as pro-choice advocates use when fighting for more choice and privacy for women's reproductive decisions. This commentary builds upon their article by demonstrating the harm that such co-opting causes to women's rights (...) using the example of sex selective abortion. By examining the legislative history of state and national bills to ban sex-selective abortion, this commentary demonstrates how the anti-abortion lobby has adopted the language of pro-choice advocates quite effectively. Although the framing of this issue as being “woman-protective” is strategic and insincere, such political framing is powerful, as Jesudason and Weitz have noted. Anti-abortion activists have convinced lawmakers in many states that sex-selective abortion is a dire issue in their state and that they must restrict it in order to protect women. In fact, there is no evidence that sex selective abortion is a problem in the United States, yet these frames have been very effective in weakening women's privacy rights. Whenever woman-protective framings are invoked for self-serving purposes, women's rights advocates must work hard to uncover the truth behind these discourses to prevent successful legislative efforts that curtail women's reproductive freedom. (shrink)

Many people, communities and countries are in favour of abortion as a healthcare right, arguing that women have a right to receive an abortion upon request. Some contexts place ethical constraints on this right, typically based on the age of the preborn child, the mother’s safety, or the circumstances of the mother (and her conceiving of her child) more generally. At the same time, intersex pediatric surgery (IPS) is being increasingly ethically challenged with many countries banning healthcare facilities (...) from performing IPS. At first, there appears to be no relation between these two ethical issues. However, modern biotechnology such as the assistive reproductive technology (ART), preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), makes it possible to screen for intersex conditions in utero, opening the possibility of intersex-selective abortion (ISA), a sub-set or instance of sex-selective abortion (SSA). What emerges is the realization that if IPS is wrong because, as its critics have argued, it wrongfully discriminates against and harms intersex lives, then ISA is much more wrong because instead of misvaluing intersex lives, it devalues intersex lives altogether. In other words, IPS might, as some have argued, discriminate by implying that an intersex child is better off being male or female but not intersex, but ISA discriminates by implying that an intersex child is better off not existing at all. Some have recognized this connection and have vainly tried to maintain both their pro-abortion commitments and their anti-IPS commitments. This has proved at best duplicitous, and at worst conceptually impossible. While it is known that a strong stance against IPS results in an inability to morally condemn ISA, with one notable exception in moral theology, this connection has not been generally appreciated. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:538 Feminist Studies 41, no. 3. © 2015 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Doreen J. Mattingly The Limited Power of Female Appointments: Abortion and Domestic Violence Policy in the Carter Administration In 1977 in the United States, Second Wave feminists were poised to make a meaningful impact on federal policy. Jimmy Carter’s successful 1976 presidential campaign had included an open wooing of feminist support : he had created a (...) “51.3 Percent” committee to address women’s issues and he had told feminist audiences that he “wanted to be known as the President who achieved equal rights for women, just as President Johnson had won civil rights legislation for blacks.”1 Once elected, Carter appointed an unprecedented number of feminist women to high office, many of whom were committed to addressing the concerns of marginalized women and advancing policy on issues such as sexual violence and reproductive rights. These appointees were linked to a dense feminist organizational presence in Washington that was unprecedented in its size and diversity. Not surprisingly, many feminists had high expectations for the new administration. 1. Cynthia Harrison, “Creating a National Feminist Agenda: Coalition Building in the 1970s,” in Feminist Coalitions: Historical Perspectives on Second-Wave Feminism in the United States, ed. Stephanie Gilmore (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 30. See also John Dumbrell, The Carter Presidency: A Re-evaluation (New York: Manchester University Press, 1993); and Sara Evans, Tidal Wave: How Women Changed America at Century’s End (New York: Free Press, 2003). Doreen J. Mattingly 539 Despite these promising conditions, feminists made little headway on policy during the Carter administration (1977–1981). Federal funding for abortion was eliminated; no permanent offices that would have advocated for women’s issues were created; and bills supporting domestic violence shelters, support for “displaced homemakers,” and quotas for female-owned businesses were defeated or extremely diluted. In addition, no additional states ratified the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) and several states rescinded earlier ratification votes. Some of these failures can be attributed to the general loss of feminist momentum and the emergence of a conservative backlash in the late 1970s. Anti-ERA organizing fueled the rise of a conservative “family values” movement that would shape social policies for more than a generation, and neoliberal economic conservatives were challenging the welfare-state programs that feminists sought to expand. But in Washington, there was an addition challenge —the unreliable support of Carter himself. Despite his promises, Carter felt that by appointing women he had met his commitment to feminists and did little to support feminist policy goals that went beyond eliminating discrimination. This paper makes an important contribution to the history of feminist action by looking in detail at the efforts of Jimmy Carter’s feminist appointees to influence policy. In particular, it discusses the actions of the most visible feminist in the White House, Margaret “Midge” Costanza. Carter named Costanza director of the Office of Public Liaison, a department that was created to manage relations between the White House and citizens’ groups. Her position as the first woman to serve as Assistant to the President, in concert with her gregarious nature and strong support for women’s issues, made Costanza a very visible symbol of affirmative action for Carter. Yet Costanza, like many other high-level feminist appointees, met opposition within the White House when she tried to advance women’s issues. Her persistent advocacy contributed to her marginalization within the White House. Just twenty months into the administration she resigned in frustration.2 This paper begins with a discussion of the unique circumstances surrounding Carter’s feminist appointees, followed by a detailed exploration 2. For Costanza’s complete story, see Doreen J. Mattingly, A Feminist in the White House: Midge Costanza, the Carter Years, and America’s Culture Wars (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016). 540 Doreen J. Mattingly oftwomeetingsheldbyCostanzainJuly1977.Thefirstwasanimpromptu meeting of roughly forty prochoice Carter appointees, all deeply troubled by a statement made by Carter in support of the Hyde Amendment banning federal funds for abortion. The same month, Costanza hosted a groundbreaking White House meeting about battered women, in which high-level bureaucrats heard testimonials from domestic violence victims and shelter advocates. While both meetings broke new... (shrink)

The Confucian doctrine of _tianxia_ outlines a unitary worldview that cherishes global justice and transcends social, geographic, and political divides. For contemporary scholars, it has held myriad meanings, from the articulation of a cultural imaginary and political strategy to a moralistic commitment and a cosmological vision. The contributors to _Chinese Visions of World Order_ examine the evolution of tianxia's meaning and practice in the Han dynasty and its mutations in modern times. They attend to its varied interpretations, its relation to (...) realpolitik, and its revival in twenty-first-century China. They also investigate tianxia's birth in antiquity and its role in empire building, invoke its cultural universalism as a new global imagination for the contemporary world, analyze its resonance and affinity with cosmopolitanism in East-West cultural relations, discover its persistence in China's socialist internationalism and third world agenda, and critique its deployment as an official state ideology. In so doing, they demonstrate how China draws on its past to further its own alternative vision of the current international system. Contributors. Daniel A. Bell, Chishen Chang, Kuan-Hsing Chen, Prasenjit Duara, Hsieh Mei-yu, Haiyan Lee, Mark Edward Lewis, Lin Chun, Viren Murthy, Lisa Rofel, Ban Wang, Wang Hui, Yiqun Zhou. (shrink)

Is it coherent to be personally opposed to abortion but to accept others’ decisions to terminate their pregnancy? This might appear to be the case if one appeals to the different situations and attitudes of pregnant women. To the contrary, only those people whose personal opposition to abortion is restricted to situations in which the pregnancy and its consequences are not very burdensome can consistently hold their IPOB position and espouse an objective ethics. The vast majority of people (...) claiming to be merely personally opposed cannot coherently sustain that position. To be logically coherent, the latter not only must be committed to condemning the abortions of others and have the moral standing to do so, but more importantly and controversially, must be committed to call for a legal ban on abortion rather than restrict themselves to being merely personally opposed to abortion. (shrink)

Background In August 2017, Chile lifted its complete ban on abortion by permitting abortion in three limited circumstances: 1) to save a woman’s life, 2) lethal fetal anomaly, and 3) rape. The new law allows regulated use of conscientious objection in abortion care, including allowing institutions to register as objectors. This study assesses medical and midwifery students’ support for CO, following legal reform. Methods From October 2017 to May 2018, we surveyed medical and midwifery students from seven (...) universities located in Santiago, Chile. Universities included 4 secular and 3 private religiously-affiliated universities; all offering medical degrees with a specialization in obstetrics and gynecology and five offering midwifery degrees. We used generalized estimating equations to identify characteristics associated with student support for CO, intentions to use CO to refuse to care for someone seeking abortion, and support for CO at the institutional level. Results 333 of the 413 eligible students who opened the survey, completed the questions on conscientious objection; 26% were seeking medical degrees with an ob-gyn specialty, 25% were seeking midwifery degrees, and 49% were seeking medical degrees and had not yet decided their specialty. While nearly all endorse requirements for conscientious objecting clinicians to inform and refer abortion-seeking patients, a minority would personally use conscientious objection to avoid caring for a patient seeking abortion. About half of religious-university students and one-fifth of secular-university students support objections at the institutional level. Conclusions Most students support the regulated use of CO which preserves patients’ access to abortion care. Religious-university student views on the use of conscientious objection in abortion care are discordant with those of their institutions which currently support institutional-level objections. (shrink)

In Mao’s era, China’s policy makers and intellectuals viewed aesthetic experience and thought as handmaidens in the service of the political order. As China opened up and engaged more intensely with modern traditions of the West, aesthetic thinkers such as Li Zehou critiqued the subordinated role of aesthetics and reasserted notions of aesthetic autonomy and liberal humanism, calling for the separation of arts and literature from political, social, and moral concerns. This truncated aesthetic view stems from a modernist version of (...) Western aesthetics that favors sense and sensibility as the sole sources of aesthetic value—a view that considerably diminishes the horizon of concerns inherent in traditional and modern Chinese aesthetic thoughts. This article seeks to recapture a repoliticized aesthetics by considering the ways early twentieth-century Chinese thinkers linked aesthetic thoughts to moral and political considerations in the reconstruction of China as a modern nation-state. Instead of transcendent, pure aesthetics over and above political processes and social experience, prominent aesthetic thinkers like Wang Guowei, Cai Yuanpei, and Lu Xun invoked traditional Chinese aesthetic legacies and reconsidered intimate and necessary ties between aesthetic categories and broader concerns about cultural crises, moral reform, and nation building. (shrink)