Irish legislative engagement with abortion law reform has never been framed by recognition of the rights of pregnant women, girls and other people. Rather, where it has taken place at all, it has always been foetocentric and punitive, exceptionalising abortion and conceptualising law as a means of discouraging it. In important ways, the post-repeal landscape has failed to break decisively with this orientation. While in 2018 there was certainly more discussion of women’s entitlement not to be exiled from the country (...) in order to make decisions about reproduction, the framing that dominated legislative and government discourses of abortion law reform was one in which the ‘problem’ being addressed was such that unsafe medication, exclusion from formal medical systems, and the undeserved punishment of people who had received diagnoses of fatal foetal conditions in the course of their ‘much wanted pregnancies’ were the focus. There was little or no engagement in legislative politics with the right to choose, reproductive agency, reproductive justice or the moral standing of pregnant people as ethical decision makers when it came to their pregnancies. As a result, post-repeal abortion law reform was more about managing risk than maximising agency. I will argue that this underpins and partly explains the shortcomings of the new law: the Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 (‘HRTPA 2018’). Within that new legal regime, I argue, pregnant people continue to lack decisional security when it comes to their reproductive lives and are exposed to significant constitutional and dignitary harms as a result. (shrink)

James Baldwin wrote: "People who shut their eyes to reality simply invite their own destruction, and anyone who insists on remaining in a state of innocence long after that innocence is dead turns himself into a monster." When people impute meanings to events--such as the 2020 killing of George Floyd, the shooting of Jacob Blake, and subsequent upheavals--they do so with ideas that already make sense to them. And what makes most sense to people is typically due to others with (...) whom they share identities and experiences, and from whom they’ve inherited their basic intellectual scaffolding. But making sense of an event isn’t enough. We’re driven to mobilize action by convincing ourselves that our cause is morally or politically in the right. So people build on their stable-yet-evolving intellectual scaffolding and explanatory schemes to rationalize, justify, and sanctify their conduct. The easiest part of becoming what Baldwin called a moral monster is to build up these self-justifying rationalizations. The more complicated part is to construct a justifying consciousness that insures we’ll arrive safely at foregone conclusions with little risk of confronting others’ experiences in a way that might unsettle our equilibrium or sap our vehemence. In this way, people avoid facing realities that might upend their pretenses, so they are now ideally positioned to be, in Dewey’s words, “profoundly moral even in their immoralities.". (shrink)