Taking Aquinas's metaphysics of human nature as my point of departure and taking inspiration from Dante's concept of transhumanization, I sketch a metaphysics of the afterlife according to which a human person in the interim phase between death and resurrection is not a mere disembodied soul. I offer some theological reasons for thinking that our bodily human nature is essential to what we are and for thinking that we can survive the destruction of our bodies at death. I argue that (...) these claims are consistent, provided we hold that our bodily human nature, while essential to what we are, is not necessary to what we are. I argue for this distinction between essence and necessity. I then raise a mereological puzzle about the relation between a disembodied soul and the person whose soul it is, and argue that, if we are to avoid the Cartesian conclusion that this relation is identity, we must hold that a human person, even in the interim phase, is composed of a soul and something else. Drawing on Dante's concept of transhumanization, I argue that this something else is God himself or some specially created divine grace or energy. (shrink)

Considering the mutual benefits of blockchain and transhumanism, this essay proposes crypto cloudminds as a safe mechanism by which the human mind might transcend its unitary limitations by permissioning partial resources to join a multi-party mind in a cloud-based environment. Cloudminds could have diverse purposes including problem solving, learning, experience, exploration, innovation, artistic expression, and other personal development activities. Crypto cloudminds could be multicurrency, operating with payment remuneration, security, and ideas as the denominations of measure. For thriving in the future, (...) mind node peers could enter “Yes-and” Payment Channels with one another for collaborative idea development. For surviving in the future, good-player behavior could be game-theoretically enforced with the simultaneous privacy-transparency property of blockchains, together with the immutable peer-confirmed consensus algorithm and audit-log checks and balances system. Overall, blockchains might serve as an institutional technology that is the basis for treaties and progress in a multi-species society of human, algorithm, and machine, guiding the way to positive transhuman futures. (shrink)

Developments in genetics, cyber-technology, nanotechnology, biotechnology, artificial intelligence, and other areas hold the promise – and the peril – of redefining what it means to be human. In addition to hedonism or a desire for self-improvement, the possibilities of these technologies plus the rational concern of falling behind a potential adversary produce a classic security dilemma. These competitive pressures among states, firms, and emerging “super-empowered individuals” encourage the development and dissemination of these technologies, and already the possibilities are being explored (...) by actors in conflict. This security dilemma, plus the nature of the technologies themselves, makes it virtually certain that attempts at regulation will fail. Instead, we should expect “arms races” of quantity and quality of improvements, complicated by differing conceptions of what improvement means. This paper explores these pressures and outcomes, as well as general consequences of the potential modification of “human nature” for global and human security. It finds that whatever forms or enhancements we possess, in a transhuman or posthuman future politics will not be transcended. Critical problems of security will continue to challenge ourselves and our descendants. (shrink)

This paper examines transhuman technologies that seek to eradicate disability - primarily prostheses and implants. While most would agree that disability denies individuals the same quality of life as those deemed “abled,” this eradication ultimately relies upon secular humanist notions of the perfect human. Transhuman technologies hold obvious implications for the human body, however they also hold implications for what it means to be an acceptable body; ultimately these technologies aim to create the perfect human by eradicating the (...) disabled Other. This paper uses these notions to question concepts of “hierarchies of life,” at which disabled individuals are most commonly moved towards the bottom, or at the very least considered nonhuman. This article seeks to provide alternative theory to the eradication of disability, which states that these individuals may not have the same mode of existence, but that their mode/s are just as valid as those lived by “abled” individuals through an examination of Braille. (shrink)

Evolution is seen to be entering a bio-technological phase. Nietzsche's affirmation that "man is something that must be overcome" no longer has a rhetorical ring given the means at our disposal at the end of the twentieth century. Viroid Life boldly challenges existing explanations of these changes inherited from modernity, arguing that they have exhausted their usefulness and new models are needed to guide us in mapping through the future. Exploring and critically examining the new realities of artificial life that (...) confront us, Viroid Life brings together the tradition of Nietszchean thought with new work in exploratory biology and machinic thinking. Offering insights from Darwin to Gilles Deleuze and Guy Debord and the Situationist movement, Pearson provides a brave starting point for any inquiry on the future of the "human". (shrink)

Peter Sloterdijk presented a reading of Heidegger's Letter on Humanism at a conference held at Elmau in 1999. Reinterpreting the meaning of humanism in the light of Heidegger's Letter, Sloterdijk focused his presentation on the need to redefine education as a form of genetic ‘taming’ and proposed what seemed to be support for positive eugenics. Although Sloterdijk claimed that he only wanted to open a debate on the issue, he could not have been surprised at the level of opposition this (...) suggestion aroused. In the weeks following, he blamed Habermas for raising this opposition and for refusing to engage with him openly. Although Luis Arenas has chronicled the aftermath of Sloterdijk's paper, it may be of interest to educators to examine how Heidegger's text is presented. What is this new humanism? If Heidegger's new humanism was based on a mystical attitude towards Being, so Sloterdijk's new humanism was to be based on the materialist principles of a biotechnological age. Unlike Heidegger who rejected technology as yet one further example of the forgetfulness of Being, Sloterdijk seems to embrace technology and the enhancement of the human body and mind as the next great step forward in educational theory. Could he possibly be right? Is education in these times a partner or an opponent of the technological enhancement of the human being? This article tries to identify Sloterdijk's disagreements with Heidegger on the question of the human. (shrink)

Technoscience is increasingly present in our daily lives, establishing new social rules and patterns of communication and interaction in a physical space, which implements electronic devices and telematic systems in its design. In the race for scientific progress, the goal is making man a God, like Nietzsche’s Superman, without determining how the new human morphology will be fitted. This paradigm is treated by artists who warn of the possible fate of humanity while the technoscientific, as if he or she was (...) Prometheus, dares to defy the laws of nature. Art exposes the actual course of science, and some artists complain that the false promises of scientific discourse, which is dominated by male vision, fail to be aware of the impossibility that technology is going to improve the moral dimension of human being. Some artists say that the science sermon does not deal with humanity and that the building of our future is merely phallocentric, an excessive anthropocentric vision. (shrink)

The essay examines the function of visualizations and practices in the formation of the reflex concept from Thomas Willis to Marshall Hall. It focuses on the specific form of reflex knowledge that images and practices can contain. In addition, the essay argues that it is through visual representations and experimental practices that technical knowledge is transferred to the field of human reflex physiology. When using technical metaphors in human physiology authors often seem to feel obliged to draw distinctions between humans, (...) machines and animals. On closer scrutiny, these distinctions sometimes fail to establish firm borders between the human and the technical. (shrink)

Peter Sloterdijk presented a reading of Heidegger's Letter on Humanism at a conference held at Elmau in 1999. Reinterpreting the meaning of humanism in the light of Heidegger's Letter, Sloterdijk focused his presentation on the need to redefine education as a form of genetic ‘taming’ and proposed what seemed to be support for positive eugenics. Although Sloterdijk claimed that he only wanted to open a debate on the issue, he could not have been surprised at the level of opposition this (...) suggestion aroused. In the weeks following, he blamed Habermas for raising this opposition and for refusing to engage with him openly. Although Luis Arenas has chronicled the aftermath of Sloterdijk's paper, it may be of interest to educators to examine how Heidegger's text is presented. What is this new humanism? If Heidegger's new humanism was based on a mystical attitude towards Being, so Sloterdijk's new humanism was to be based on the materialist principles of a biotechnological age. Unlike Heidegger who rejected technology as yet one further example of the forgetfulness of Being, Sloterdijk seems to embrace technology and the enhancement of the human body and mind as the next great step forward in educational theory. Could he possibly be right? Is education in these times a partner or an opponent of the technological enhancement of the human being? This article tries to identify Sloterdijk's disagreements with Heidegger on the question of the human. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: The Fall of Baltar The Transhuman Temptation… Really! The First and Last Temptations of Baltar “There Must Be Some Way Out of Here” Notes.

This paper explores the consequences of transhumanism on free will based on the metaphysical aspect of the Botho perspective. Botho is an indigenous philosophy, prominent in Botswana, that expresses the essence of being a person. A human person from the Botho metaphysical point of view embodies material and immaterial aspects. This study seeks to answer the question: “Would certain transhuman changes to the material body affect the human person’s ability to judge and choose and hence the capacity for free (...) will?” According to the Botho perspective, determinism and free will would be compatible in unenhanced human beings. From this viewpoint, human beings are free insofar as they can act in accordance with reason, which is a determined process. This framework will be applied to hypothetically enhanced human beings and argue that transhumanism does not necessarily undermine free will. This study will also show that some forms of biotechnological enhancement could in fact improve free will, while other forms could limit free will without eliminating it. New knowledge will be gained by applying a prominent metaphysical orientation in the Botho worldview, particularly its discussion of determinism and free will, to the debate about enhancements. It will be demonstrated that most Africans, including Batswana, are soft determinists who embrace both determinism and free will so that they are not incompatible and can co-exist. (shrink)

This work promotes the thesis that humans are naturally transhuman. In order to achieve this, we present in the first two sections some examples of technological devices assembled to human beings, and we critically review the assumptions and dichotomies on which the idea of human enhancement is based according to the ordinary transhumanist vision. Thirdly, we present the thesis of the Extended Mind to support our intuition. Fourthly, we dismantle the most relevant philosophical dichotomies that structure the transhumanist position. (...) Finally, we recapitulate the reasons why we should wake up from the transhumanist dream. (shrink)

Nietzsche's vision of the 'overman' continues to haunt the postmodern imagination. His call that 'man is something that must be overcome' can no longer be seen as simple rhetoric. Our experiences of the hybrid realities of artificial life have made the 'transhuman' a figure that looks over us all. Inspired by this vision, Keith Ansell Pearson sets out to examine if evolution is 'out of control' and machines are taking over. In a series of six fascinating perspectives, he links (...) Nietzsche's thought with the issues at stake in contemporary conceptions of evolution from the biological to the technological. _Viroid Life; Perspectives on Nietzsche and the Transhuman Condition_ considers the hybrid, 'inhuman' character of our future with the aid of Nietzsche's philosophy. Keith Ansell Pearson contrasts Nietzsche and Darwin before introducing the more recent figures such as Giles Deleuze and Guy Debord to sketch a new thinking of technics and machines and stress the ambiguous character of our 'machine enslavement'. (shrink)

To what extent can Nietzsche's idea of the Overman be used in connection with transhumanist notions of highly advanced humans and even posthumans?

While drawing from the philosophy of Bernard Stiegler throughout the paper, I commence by highlighting Zoltan Istvan’s representation of transhumanism in the light of its role in politics. I continue by elaborating on the notion of the promise of eternal life. After that I differentiate between subjects that are proper for philosophy (such as the mind or whether life is worth living) and science (measurable and replicable). The arguments mostly concern mind-uploading and at the same time I elaborate on a (...) simple critique of mind-body dualism, which is one of the key imagined orders exploitable by technologies in the narratives of transhumanism present in popular culture. This is reframed as a problem of action. The focus of this article is on the claim that certain transhumanisms are dangerous forms of Neo-Darwinism. It comes from a critical assessment of capital and the exploitation of bodies through market forces. Entropy is a process of growing disorder, while neganthropy is an anthropological struggle against exploitation, not only of bodies, but of all ecosystems of the Earth. The arguments of Stiegler from a collection of lectures are recapitulated, and his claims are presented through the prism of transhuman narrative, with a particular focus on Christian Salmon's position in the book Storytelling: Bewitching the Modern Mind. (shrink)

Stefan Sorgner (2009) says that on becoming familiar with transhumanism, he “immediately thought that there were many fundamental similarities between transhumanism and Nietzsche’s philosophy, especially concerning the concept of the posthuman and that of Nietzsche’s overhuman.” In contrast to Bostrom (2005), Sorgner sees significant and fundamental similarities between the posthuman and the overhuman. (I will adopt his use of “overhuman” in place of “overman” or Übermensch.) This overall view seems to me highly plausible. I agree with most of Sorgner’s comments (...) in this respect. My intent is to give further support to the conceptual parallels. In addition, I argue that these are not merely parallels: transhumanist ideas were directly influenced by Nietzsche. (shrink)

This study explores the transhuman from an East Asian perspective. In terms of cognitive science, mathematics, and theology, we define the transhuman system as characterized by transcendence, extension by compactification, and samtaegeuk. Compactification is conceptualized here in mathematical terms, as adding one or more elements so that a system becomes more complete—as one might join both ends of a line, and thereby create a circle. We assert that the East Asian transhuman could be defined as a three-point (...) compactification: as an extension of biophysical objects and events such as robots, cyborgs, and environments ; as an extension of culture, science, and art ; and as an extension of the interaction between the human and Cosmic Absolute such as in religions. Such a notion of the Transhuman might be associated with God, but any description of God, the Absolute Infinite, will apply to something less than God. (shrink)

Video games and virtual worlds play substantial roles in contemporary transhumanism. Many transhumanists appreciate the freedom and power that accompany these digital landscapes and recognize that they can promote transhumanist ways of thinking beyond the borders of explicitly transhumanist groups. Video games and virtual worlds enable transcendence through their design and contribute to transhumanism through the options they enable and the influence they have. Because of their significant place in transhumanism, video games and virtual worlds are thus important to the (...) study of religion and science in the twenty‐first century. (shrink)

In thinking the passage from the “all-human cerebrum” to what one might call the contemporary “all-too-human” cerebrum in neo-liberal societies and beyond to the “all-too-transhuman” cerebrum in the cybernetic society, in contrasting Wells’s idea of a new world order with the dystopia of the disordering un-world, in considering the prospects of a “world brain” faced with the realities of the “global mnemotechnical system”, in highlighting the differences between the global and authoritarian instrument of “control” in Wells and the descriptions (...) of the control society by Deleuze, and finally, in critiquing the “unifying of the general intelligence services of the world” in Wells and the capturing of the “general intellect”, this paper maps the contemporary prospects of the “world brain” against the backdrop of the worldweariness of the present. (shrink)

We have transited far from an ancient culture of hunters to the world of today when our conditions as human beings are changing. We recognize that our biological-cultural co-evolution has privileged reason. Even if it takes a tiny part of our mind; first memory and then reason have become protagonists in our relation with the landscape. It also means that pain control became a social custom for developing morality: this is the central thesis of this essay. This conclusion derives from (...) our experimental research on the symbolic image of the world, that was guided mainly by Jung’s psychology and by Aristotle’s Poetics and Ethics. (shrink)

Transhumanists, like other elites in modernity, place great value on human creativity, and advances in human enhancement and AI form the basis of their propos- als for boosting it. However, there are problems with this perspective, due to the unique ways in which humans have evolved, procreated and socialized. I first describe how creativity is related to past evolution and developmental aspects in children, stressing pretend play and the ambivalent character of creativity. Then, I outline proposals for enhancing creativity, be (...) it in embodied humans on the way to a superior species, in AI- related beings (virtual reality, robotics), or even in any degree of mixture in human- machine interaction. In the final section, I describe intrinsic limits to these proposals, such as the absence of a good understanding of human psychology by the proponents of enhancement; the lack of interest in the subjective side of creativity (for one’s own sake); delayed maturation and the ambivalence of pretend play in childhood; and the contrariness typical of new human generations. As for the enhancement of creativity, it is argued that creativity in its social context may be the victim of its own past success. On the other hand, an asymmetry between virtual beings and children is described— the latter can behave in a nasty way, it is part of their growth and creativity, whereas the former are not supposed to cause any harm to human beings. In sum, despite impressive progress in several scientific and technological interventions in creativity, philosophical questions emerge that place many constraints on transhumanist dreams of endless creativity. (shrink)

By “essentially embodied Kantian selves,” I mean necessarily and completely embodied rational conscious, self-conscious, sensible (i.e., sense-perceiving, imagining, and emoting), volitional or willing, discursive (i.e., conceptualizing, judging, and inferring) animals, or persons, innately possessing dignity, and fully capable not only of free agency, but also of a priori knowledge of analytic and synthetic a priori truths alike, with egocentric centering in manifestly real orientable space and time. The basic theory of essentially embodied Kantian selves was spelled out by Kant over (...) the course of slightly less than two decades, between 1768 and 1787, but above all, it flows from an empirical realist and metaphysical reading of the “Refutation of Idealism” that Kant inserted into the Postulates of Empirical Thought section in the 1787 edition of the first Critique. In my opinion, all rational but also “human, all-too-human” creatures like us are, synthetic a priori necessarily, essentially embodied Kantian selves. Let’s call that the essentially embodied Kantian selves thesis, or for short, EEKST. If EEKST is true, then it’s synthetic a priori impossible for the selves of creatures like us to exist independently of our own living organismic animal bodies or beyond the deaths of those bodies, whether temporarily or permanently, by any means whatsoever. Indeed, the very ideas of disembodied selves, their survival after death, and of human immortality, while minimally logically consistent, are in fact conceptually empty and incoherent, even over and above the synthetic a priori impossibility of such things, since the term “myself” indexically picks out an essentially embodied Kantian self, all of whose core features require grounding in a particular living organismic animal body. According to the recent and contemporary movement of transhumanism, the selves of creatures like us can not only exist independently of our bodies, as functional systems of representational content that are inherently able to be implemented or realized in digital-mechanical technology and uploadable to servers, but also to survive accidental or natural human death in server-limbo, then be downloaded into technologically enhanced partially mechanical humanoid bodies or even into wholly artificially-created completely mechanical non-humanoid bodies, survive in these new implementations or realizations for an indefinitely long time, repeat that process, and possibly even become immortal. Transhumanism is in fact metaphysically equivalent to Swedenborgianism, which Kant so effectively criticizes and wittily derides in his 1766 book, Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics. Moreover, and more importantly, if EEKST is true, then, just like Swedenborgianism, transhumanism is not only conceptually empty and incoherent, but also synthetic a priori impossible. And what’s more, it’s also existentially and morally reprehensible. In short, then, the belief in transhuman selves is nothing but a reprehensible noumenal fantasy or Hirngespinst. (shrink)

A Manifesto On the Freedom Of Form The Newly Titled and Expanded Second Edition of The Apartheid of Sex.

Humans have always imagined better futures. From the desire to overcome death to the aspiration to dominion over the world, imaginations of the technological future reveal the commitments, values, and norms of those who construct them. Today, the human future is thrown into question by emerging technologies that promise radical control over human life and elicit corollary imaginations of human perfectibility. This interdisciplinary volume assembles scholars of science and technology studies, sociology, philosophy, theology, ethics, and history to examine imaginations of (...) technological progress that promises to transcend the constraints of human body and being. Attending in particular to transhumanist and posthumanist visions, the volume breaks new ground by exploring their utopian and eschatological dimensions and situating them within a broader context of ideas, institutions, and practices of innovation. The volume invites specialists and general readers to explore the stakes of contemporary imaginations of technological innovation as a source of progress, a force of social and historical transformation, and as the defining essence of human life. Contents Technological Imaginations.- Ethics and Politics of Envisioned Futures.- The Transhumanist Imagination in Context. Target Groups Scholars and students in science and technology studies, philosophy, utopian studies, science and religion The Editors Hava Tirosh-Samuelson is Irving and Miriam Lowe Professor of Modern Judaism and Director of the Center of Jewish Studies at Arizona State University in Tempe, Arizona. J. Benjamin Hurlbut is Assistant Professor of Bioscience Ethics in the School of Life Sciences at Arizona State University. (shrink)

Nietzschean Meditations takes its inspiration from the version of Nietzsche that was popular before the Second World War, which stressed the 'Zarathustrian' elements of his thought as the harbinger of a new sort of being - the Ubermensch. The book updates the image of this creature to present a version of 'transhumanism' that breaks with the more precautionary and pessimistic approaches of humanity's future in contemporary 'posthumanist' thought. Fuller follows Nietzsche in discussing deeply and frankly the challenging issues that aspiring (...) transhumanists face. They include their philosophical and especially theological roots, the implications of transhumanism for matters of life and death, and whether any traces of classical humanity will remain in the 'transhuman' being. (shrink)

Human augmentation is discussed in three axes: the technological means, the ability being augmented, and the social systems that will be affected. The technological augmentations considered range from exocortical information and communication systems, to pharmaceuticals, tissue and genetic engineering, and prosthetic limbs and organs, to eventually nanomedical robotics, brain-computer interfaces and cognitive prostheses. These technologies are mapped onto the capabilities which we are in the process of enabling and augmenting, which include extending longevity and physical, sensory and cognitive abilities, and (...) enabling control over emotions, moral behavior, and spiritual experience. The impacts of augmentation on the family, education, economy, politics and religion are considered individually, but their aggregate effects will be non-linear and drive complex adaptations in the living machine that is our co-evolved techno-social civilization. (shrink)

Tras una descripción de las características de nuestra actual cultura tecnocientífica y con ejemplos de su influencia en nuestra sociedad, se pone de manifiesto una tendencia en la educación superior que consiste en eliminar la reflexión acerca de quiénes somos y cómo vivimos en la sociedad. El futuro del conocimiento se orienta hacia una “hipertrofia” tecnológica produciendo una “atrofia” antropológica por dejar de lado “el saber sapiencial” de las Humanidades, sobre todo de la Filosofía, que ayuda a comprender mejor el (...) “todo” y no quedar anclados en “partes” desencajadas. Esto aumentaría las posibilidades de descubrir estrategias adecuadas para corregir muchos de los problemas que estamos viviendo en nuestra era tecnocientífica. (shrink)

At the centre of Kant’s “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” lies a tantalising relation, the reciprocal semblance between nature and art, upon which the entire text pivots. With this thought, Kant suggests a critically licensed blurring of some of the defining presuppositions of critical philosophy and reconfigures the ancient problematic of mimesis. This paper will offer a sketch of how some of Kant’s key successors attempt to extend his project of ‘transcendental critique’ in the field of aesthetics by exposing and challenging (...) the residual pre-critical assumptions underpinning such a conception of the relation between nature and art. The possibility thereby arises of liberating critique from the restraints of the Kantian ‘as if’ without relapsing into a pre-critical naivety. In this respect the important notion of ‘auto-poiesis’, the indigenous artistic creativity of nature, will be considered in its phenomenological and materialist guises. (shrink)

Humans are morally deficient in a variety of ways. Some of these deficiencies threaten the continued existence of our species. For example, we appear to be incapable of responding to climate change in ways that are likely to prevent the consequent suffering. Some people are morally better than others, but we could all be better. The price of not becoming morally better is that when those events that threaten us occur, we will suffer from them. If we can prevent this (...) suffering from occurring, then we ought to do so. That we ought to make ourselves morally better in order to prevent very bad things from happening justifies, according to some, the development and administration of moral enhancement. I address in this paper the idea that moral enhancement could give rise to moral transhumans, or moral post-persons. Contrary to recent arguments that we shouldn’t engender moral post-persons, I argue that we should. Roughly, the reasons for this conclusion are that we can expect moral post-persons to resemble the morally best of us, our moral exemplars. Since moral exemplars promote their interests by promoting the interests of others (or they promote others’ interests at the expense of their own) we can expect moral post-persons to pursue our interests. Since we should also pursue our own interests, we should bring about moral post-persons. (shrink)

Transhumanisms, as cultural, philosophical, and ideological movements that permeate various areas of technical and scientific knowledge, have caused a rupture in Western philosophical praxis by asserting the possibility of genetic enhancement of the human being through biotechnoscientific procedures. However, the biophysical alterations advocated by transhumanists are not limited to the somatic and psychic realms; they encompass humanity as a whole, including moral aspects. In this sense, the aim of this article is to demonstrate the ethical and political impacts concerning human (...) moral enhancement, highlighting to what extent our freedom may be threatened by such practices. After all, is it possible to genetically enhance our morality? Should we enhance our dispositional moral traits through biotechnoscientific procedures? Faced with these questions, we will first analyze how human moral enhancement can interfere with our freedom as human beings, and then we will examine how human enhancement has become a moral urgency for transhumanists. (shrink)

Transhuman, or trans-human, is the concept of an intermediary form between human and posthuman. In other words, a transhuman is a being that resembles a human in most respects but who has powers and abilities beyond those of standard humans. These abilities might include improved intelligence, awareness, strength, or durability. Transhumans sometimes appear in science-fiction as cyborgs or genetically-enhanced humans. This book will look into the question "Can machines think?" followed by "Can humans extend their lifespan and keep (...) up with machines?" In other words, do we (humans) have to modify ourselves to be bionic humans, to co-exist and make the most of machines in future? (shrink)

In the debates concerning the ethics of human enhancement through biological or technological modifications, there have been several appeals to the concept of human dignity, both by those favouring such enhancement and by those opposing it. The result is the phenomenon of ‘dignity talk', where opposing sides both appeal to the concept of human dignity to ground their arguments resulting in a moral impasse. This article examines the use of the concept of human dignity in the enhancement debates and reveals (...) that the problem of dignity talk arises because proponents of various positions tend to ground human dignity in different features of the human individual. These features include species-membership, possession of a particular capacity, a sense of self-worth, and moral behaviour. The article proposes a solution to this problem by appealing to another feature of human beings, namely their being-in-relationship-over-time. Doing so enables us to understand dignity as a concept that affirms the worth of human individuals as complex, multidimensional wholes, rather than as isolated features. Consequently, the concept of human dignity can serve both a descriptive and a normative function in the enhancement debates. At a descriptive level, asking what advocates of a position mean when they refer to human dignity will reveal what aspects of being human they deem to be most valuable. The debate can then focus on these values. The normative function, although it cannot proscribe or prescribe all enhancement, approves only those enhancements that contribute to the flourishing of human individuals as multidimensional wholes. (shrink)

In this article we examine the changing relationship to risk as revealed by the covid-19 pandemic and the ways this has, and may in future, alter sacramental practice, considering the radical effects this could have on traditional Christian practice. We consider the cultural trends that may lie behind this developing approach to risk, examining this in the context of an emergent transhuman identity that is technologically moderated and seeks to overcome risks of human mortality.

The recent film District 9 raises several issues of significance to transhumanism. These issues include whether it is permissible to give a human being superhuman powers against his will, under what circumstances humans will be accepting of transhumans or posthumans, and what roles space colonization and extraterrestrial encounter may play in the future of humanity. Consideration of these issues deepens the viewing experience, and it can inform current decisions about transhumanism’s future as a cultural movement.