This paper presents a rationale for doing philosophy with children. It suggests a rationale that differs from more usual arguments supporting philosophy with children—for such reasons as that it will enhance problem solving-skills or will help pupils' thinking to be more logical. These worthy objectives are not denied but only considered somewhat subordinate to the rationale proposed. This is presented in three steps. In the first step the issue of whether philosophy should be done with children is considered in the (...) context of claims that children may be too young to do philosophy or too inexperienced in the ways of academic discipline to be able to discern proper philosophy. These objections are weighty enough, especially in view of general teacher reluctance to engage with philosophy itself in any form. In the second part, I invoke the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid as a method of philosophy particularly significant for, and appropriate to, philosophy for children. Finally, I show how these aspects arising out of my understanding of Reid's philosophy can help resolve at least some of the misgivings people have about doing philosophy with children. It is hoped that these discussions will illuminate the question of how it may be appropriate for children to do philosophy in classrooms today. (shrink)

This paper presents a rationale for doing philosophy with children. It suggests a rationale that differs from more usual arguments supporting philosophy with children—for such reasons as that it will enhance problem solving-skills or will help pupils’ thinking to be more logical. These worthy objectives are not denied but only considered somewhat subordinate to the rationale proposed. This is presented in three steps. In the first step the issue of whether philosophy should be done with children is considered in the (...) context of claims that children may be too young to do philosophy or too inexperienced in the ways of academic discipline to be able to discern proper philosophy. These objections are weighty enough, especially in view of general teacher reluctance to engage with philosophy itself in any form. In the second part, I invoke the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid as a method of philosophy particularly significant for, and appropriate to, philosophy for children. Finally, I show how these aspects arising out of my understanding of Reid’s philosophy can help resolve at least some of the misgivings people have about doing philosophy with children. It is hoped that these discussions will illuminate the question of how it may be appropriate for children to do philosophy in classrooms today. (shrink)

When Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr squared up to each other a few years ago on the issue of the role of philosophical theory in educational practice, it became clear that theory itself had become a troubled term. The very fact that Wilfred Carr could argue for the end of educational theory recalls Paul Feyerabend's fiery argument for the end of theory in natural science and simply deepened the attack that had already appeared in Carr and Kemmis's book, Becoming Critical (...) (1986). In response, Hirst insisted that theory, and particularly the philosophical theory of education, should be defined as a discrete area of study in itself, governed and structured by the axioms of logic. In this way, he argued, the philosophy of education would be no different from philosophy in general (at least in its analytic formulation). Carr, on the other hand, preferred to consider educational theory as a flexible event that took its shape from the landscape explored, and hence precisely not the kind of study that Hirst supported, but one based in action research and reflective practitioner experience. This debate is as yet unresolved. In this piece I begin by making several remarks about the current context for raising the question Hirst and Carr address, and I go on to consider other possible understandings of theoria in a Greek sense before developing this idea through a reading of Aristotle. I eventually conclude that each of the protagonists in the debate has taken a step too far. (shrink)

When Paul Hirst and Wilfred Carr squared up to each other a few years ago on the issue of the role of philosophical theory in educational practice, it became clear that theory itself had become a troubled term. The very fact that Wilfred Carr could argue for the end of educational theory recalls Paul Feyerabend’s fiery argument for the end of theory in natural science and simply deepened the attack that had already appeared in Carr and Kemmis’s book, Becoming Critical (...) (1986). In response, Hirst insisted that theory, and particularly the philosophical theory of education, should be defined as a discrete area of study in itself, governed and structured by the axioms of logic. In this way, he argued, the philosophy of education would be no different from philosophy in general (at least in its analytic formulation). Carr, on the other hand, preferred to consider educational theory as a flexible event that took its shape from the landscape explored, and hence precisely not the kind of study that Hirst supported, but one based in action research and reflective practitioner experience. This debate is as yet unresolved. In this piece I begin by making several remarks about the current context for raising the question Hirst and Carr address, and I go on to consider other possible understandings of theoria in a Greek sense before developing this idea through a reading of Aristotle. I eventually conclude that each of the protagonists in the debate has taken a step too far. (shrink)

Peter Sloterdijk presented a reading of Heidegger's Letter on Humanism at a conference held at Elmau in 1999. Reinterpreting the meaning of humanism in the light of Heidegger's Letter, Sloterdijk focused his presentation on the need to redefine education as a form of genetic ‘taming’ and proposed what seemed to be support for positive eugenics. Although Sloterdijk claimed that he only wanted to open a debate on the issue, he could not have been surprised at the level of opposition this (...) suggestion aroused. In the weeks following, he blamed Habermas for raising this opposition and for refusing to engage with him openly. Although Luis Arenas has chronicled the aftermath of Sloterdijk's paper, it may be of interest to educators to examine how Heidegger's text is presented. What is this new humanism? If Heidegger's new humanism was based on a mystical attitude towards Being, so Sloterdijk's new humanism was to be based on the materialist principles of a biotechnological age. Unlike Heidegger who rejected technology as yet one further example of the forgetfulness of Being, Sloterdijk seems to embrace technology and the enhancement of the human body and mind as the next great step forward in educational theory. Could he possibly be right? Is education in these times a partner or an opponent of the technological enhancement of the human being? This article tries to identify Sloterdijk's disagreements with Heidegger on the question of the human. (shrink)

Maurice Blondel's articles from 1906 on the origin of philosophy opens with the idea of whether philosophy is be spontaneous or whether it requires specific training. Behind this question lies the more fundamental issue of the relative balance of science and life and where philosophy finds its more natural home.

This book explores the phenomenology of learning with particular focus on the 'closeness' or 'proximity' of the knowledge that impacts on learners, young and old. Studying the power of learning to transform human beings, this book offers an in-depth discussion of how different phenomenologists understand this 'proximate' power. It draws on ideas of encounter from Husserl, care from Heidegger, bodily learning from Merleau-Ponty, language from Foucault, and recognition from Honneth. The book examines how phenomenological insight can explain the character of (...) radical learning. The book will appeal to academics and post-graduate students in the fields of philosophy of education, educational psychology, teaching and learning. (shrink)

Maurice Blondel devised a logic of the moral life on the grounds that action itself respects its own law of contradiction. Thwarted by compulsions and often by habits, the actions we choose often do not reflect the principles we endorse and so we sometimes find our actions operating against what we actually want to achieve. To describe this possible imbalance Blondel outlines five rules which describe the vulnerability of human action until the individual actor must finally confront her own destiny.

The German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk seemed to agree with Heidegger’s critique of humanism when he delivered a Conference address at Elmau in 1999. He rejected, however, the way Heidegger used the metaphor of a shepherd to explain the proper essence of the human and developed a counter-position and a contrary understanding of shepherding that he considered truer to contemporary times. During his speech, Sloterdijk used some examples from Plato’s Statesman to support a distinction between good breeding and civility and thus (...) implied that humanistic education had to incorporate efforts to promote biomedical improvements in the human condition, effectively broadening the work of education centred traditionally on the “reading of good books.” Did Sloterdijk then commit himself to some kind of eugenic programme? He immediately denied this. Did his view amount to a logical progression from Heidegger’s position or was it a radical departure? To clarify this question, this paper first sketches out Heidegger’s argument as put forward in the Letter on Humanism, then notes Sloterdijk’s response to Heidegger’s analysis before finally attempting to identify some key differences between these writers on the issue. (shrink)

It is helpful to recall the postmodern flavour of Blondel's method as one reflects on the connection between science and consciousness. How is speed knowledge as generated by the speed of technological advancement reconciled with the relative slowness of human life? The question arising from contemporary experience is whether science has any intrinsic ethical dimension.