Il est fréquent de rencontrer, dans une grande partie des réflexions intellectuelles actuelles la formulation d’une nécessaire « modernisation » des institutions démocratiques. La démocratie irait « d'une crise à l'autre » (Gauchet, 2007), chacun s'accordant sur le constat et y allant de son petit remède. Quel lien entre ces propositions théoriques et les actuels bouleversements de la vie politique? Quelles conséquences sur l'organisation institutionnelle des « expériences politiques » classiques que sont la démocratie représentative et la lutte pour l'organisation (...) indépendante?Le contenu doctrinal de ces thèses sur un « renouvellement » de la démocratie emprunte parfois aux philosophies corporatistes qui lui sont étrangères, en premier lieu la doctrine sociale de l'Église. Plus que des vœux, ces thèses accompagnent idéologiquement des bouleversements politiques réels. Le concept de subsidiarité par exemple qui constitue le principe central de la doctrine sociale de l'Église est la colonne vertébrale des institutions de l'Union Européenne depuis 1992 et trouve sa place dans la Constitution française depuis 2008. Simple recours terminologique, filiation philosophique ou véritable objectif politique? L'article se propose de revenir sur l'histoire de la question démocratique ainsi que sur les conceptions politiques et sociales guidant ses artisans, et enfin d'interroger les arguments actuels de leur remise en cause. (shrink)

La référence au Fichte du Discours à la nation allemande est présente dans la double genèse de la social-démocratie allemande, chez Marx-Engels, et chez Lassalle. Cet article revient d’abord sur un débat trop peu connu sur la consubstantialité entre idéalisme fichtéen, unification et renforcement de l’Allemagne impériale, et social-démocratie. Celle-ci, plutôt louée par Jaurès dès 1891, est critiquée par Andler pour qui l’Allemagne, en 1918 comme après, demeure un Reich (et non une république) où la révolution, qu’elle soit bourgeoise (...) ou prolétarienne, est impossible. On examine ensuite la différence, chez Engels puis chez Kautsky, entre leur appréciation du nationalisme tchèque (perçu comme opposition à la domination austro-germanique) et celle du nationalisme polonais (confronté à la Russie), pour mettre en question qu’y soit en jeu « le seul intérêt de la révolution » (Engels), sans égard à celui des puissances « centrales » de 1914. On suit enfin les traces du débat Andler-Jaurès dans un clivage récurrent parmi les socialistes français sur la question allemande et européenne : Guerre d’Espagne, Munich, Collaboration et Résistance, CED, Traité de Maastricht et Constitution européenne. En 1989-1990, la « chute du Mur » et l’unification allemande résultent d’une poussée nationaliste qui, jointe à la dislocation du système soviétique, s’est particulièrement répercutée sur une Yougoslavie détruite sous l’effet d’une politique européenne d’inspiration largement allemande. (shrink)

Georges Labica offre, comme il le dit lui-même, à tous ceux qui refusent le " nouvel ordre mondial actuel " et luttent pour le changer radicalement, ce bilan d'une œuvre, à la fois théorique et militante, longuement mûrie. Qu'il s'agisse des mots, des concepts ou des choses, étroitement imbriqués, la pensée critique, dont Marx demeure la référence obligée, ne saurait rien laisser en l'état de ce qui constitue notre présent. La leçon en est limpide. Démocratie et révolution apparaissent plus (...) que jamais comme indissociables. La démocratie pour la révolution, la révolution pour la démocratie : il n'est pas d'autre programme dans la lutte des classes antilibérale et anti-impérialiste, où la violence dominante, parvenue à des formes extrêmes, appelle la violence révolutionnaire des dominés, comme sa seule réplique adéquate. (shrink)

En 1974 Jacques Rancière examinait la leçon de marxisme donné par le philosophe Louis Althusser à un collègue anglais et en faisait l'occasion d'un bilan sur l'althussérisme lui-même. Althusser avait imposé dans les années 1960 l'idée d'un retour à la vraie pensée de Marx, en phase avec les formes nouvelles de la pensée structuraliste (ethnologie de Lévi-Strauss, psychanalyse lacanienne, archéologie du savoir de Foucault) mais aussi avec les nouveaux espoirs révolutionnaires qui secouaient la planète à l'heure des luttes de décolonisation (...) et de la révolution culturelle chinoise. Or les événements de 1968 avaient montré le total décalage de ce marxisme renouvelé par rapport aux aspirations portées par les mouvements de la jeunesse et aux formes prises par la mobilisation populaire. La pensée du renouveau théorique et politique s'était transformée en pensée de l'ordre. Mais aussi, dans le contexte de l'après-68, cette pensée de l'ordre ne pouvait trouver son efficacité qu'en s'exprimant dans le langage de la subversion. La Leçon d'Althusser s'attachait à dégager les conditions de ce renversement en examinant le coeur politique de la philosophie althussérienne, l'opposition de la science et de l'idéologie, à la lumière de l'histoire récente mais aussi à celle de la tradition ouvrière et révolutionnaire. Ce texte devenu introuvable est aujourd'hui réédité avec une préface de l'auteur qui en souligne l'actualité : le destin de cette pensée de la subversion devenue une justification de l'ordre existant n'est que le premier épisode d'un mouvement politique et intellectuel bien plus vaste. Des années 1970 jusqu'à notre présent nous avons été témoins d'une vaste contre-révolution politique et intellectuelle dirigée contre tous les acquis des mouvements populaires d'un siècle et contre toute idée d'émancipation. Or cette contre-révolution a continuellement recyclé à son profit tous les thèmes de la pensée marxiste et critique d'hier. La Leçon d'Althusser mettait en lumière le mécanisme fondamental de ce processus et anticipait en ce sens le travail poursuivi par Jacques Rancière jusque dans des livres récents comme La Haine de la démocratie et Le Spectateur émancipé. Ce travail est donc propre à aider à la compréhension du présent et à la reformulation d'une pensée de l'émancipation. (shrink)

Depuis le début du XXe siècle, se sont succédé en Iran quatre générations d’intellectuels. La première a vu officiellement le jour sous la Révolution constitutionnelle, et se réclamait d’un pluralisme politique entretenant des relations ambiguës avec l’islam. La seconde, sous Réza Shah, dans les années 1930 et 1940, se réclamait du nationalisme ou du marxisme, l’islam étant marginal dans leur horizon intellectuel. La troisième génération, à partir des années 1960, revient à l’islam et y puise les ressources pour lutter (...) contre l’autocratie du chah et l’impérialisme occidental. L’islamo-marxisme en est la conséquence pour la grande majorité d’entre eux. Enfin, après la Révolution islamique s’ouvre, dans les années 1990, une nouvelle période où les intellectuels « religieux » présentent une version pluraliste de l’islam qui remet en cause la théocratie islamique au nom d’un islam spirituel ou qui laisse le champ politique à la société. Cette nouvelle version de l’islam remet en cause le gouvernement du Jurisconsulte Islamique sur lequel est fondée la République Islamique d’Iran. L’opposition intellectuelle au pouvoir se décline désormais pour la première fois de manière explicite à partir d’une vision qui entend concilier islam et démocratie.Since the early 20th century, four generations of intellectuals have followed each other in Iran. The first was officially born in the wake of the Constitutional Revolution. It was based on a political pluralism maintaining ambiguous relations with Islam. The second, under the rule of Reza Shah, in the 1930s and 1940s, combines nationalism and marxism, Islam being of marginal interest at the time. The third generation, after the 1960s, reverts to Islam, in which it finds the intellectual weapons against the despotism of the monarch and Western imperialism. As a result, a combination of Islam and marxism defines their intellectual horizon. Eventually, after the Islamic Revolution, in the 1990s, a new period sets in, in which the « religious intellectuals » work out a pluralist version of Islam that questions Islamic theocracy in the name of a spiritual Islam or a religion that does not impose its views on the political arena. This new version of islam puts into question the Government of the Islamic Jurist upon which the Islamic Republic in Iran is based. From now on, the intellectual opposition to the government expresses itself from a perspective that intends to reconcile Islam and democracy. (shrink)

De la fin du XVIIIe siècle à 1830, l’Amérique hispanique est entrée dans l’ère des révolutions atlantiques. Sur les côtes du Venezuela, dans les années 1790, les échos des révolutions de France, de Saint-Domingue et d’autres îles des Antilles ont contribué à la floraison de révoltes et de conspirations aux mots d’ordre nouveaux. Les demandes de liberté des esclaves et d’égalité des métis s’inscrivaient désormais dans un nouvel horizon d’attente révolutionnaire. Cependant, la monarchie hispanique était toujours capable de mobiliser des (...) troupes pour défendre l’ordre établi. À partir de 1806, le Vénézuélien Francisco de Miranda, ancien général de la Révolution française, tenta de coordonner, d’abord sans succès, les efforts des premiers indépendantistes. La première indépendance fut proclamée à Caracas en 1811 dans un contexte de dislocation de la monarchie hispanique, à la suite de l’invasion des troupes napoléoniennes et des conflits entre péninsulaires et hispano-américains. Les patriotes proclamèrent l’égalité civile en mettant fin aux catégories socio-raciales d’Ancien Régime, mais maintinrent l’esclavage. Ce n’est que progressivement qu’ils incorporèrent des esclaves aux armées en échange de la liberté. Malgré ces libérations par les armes, l’alliance avec Haïti et les tentatives de Simón Bolívar, l’indépendance ne coïncida pas avec l’abolition de l’esclavage, qui fut finalement proclamée au Venezuela en 1854. (shrink)

Starting from an implicit quotation from Machiavelli’s Discourses on the Ten Books of Titus Livy contained in the Tractatus politicus, we would like to show that the Spinozian idea of democracy is aporetic, because the strategies that Spinoza suggests for the establishment of a democratic regime contrast with his ontology of conservation. Thus, we believe that the absence of the part on democracy in the Tractatus politicus represents an opportunity to rethink politics as the art of understanding and managing social (...) conflicts rather than neutralizing them. In this sense, democracy for Spinoza is the manifestation of the natural conflictuality of society, a request for equality between men that leads to the permanent questioning of private rights and property, as well as of every institutionalized State form. (shrink)

Branden Fitelson and Alan Hájek have suggested that it is finally time for a “revolution” in which we jettison Kolmogorov’s axiomatization of probability, and move to an alternative like Popper’s. According to these authors, not only did Kolmogorov fail to give an adequate analysis of conditional probability, he also failed to give an adequate account of another central notion in probability theory: probabilistic independence. This paper defends Kolmogorov, with a focus on this independence charge. I show that Kolmogorov’s sophisticated theory (...) of conditional distributions, advocated by authors such as Kenny Easwaran but often overlooked by philosophers, has the resources to define the notion of independence Fitelson and Hájek seek. I then argue that Kolmogorov’s original definition of independence, once suitably reinterpreted as capturing a slight logical weakening of this notion, is not so problematic after all. Indeed, rather than discarding Kolmogorov’s definition, we should make room for two distinct notions of probabilistic independence, one stronger and one weaker, which play different theoretical roles. (shrink)

Research teams have used extra-uterine systems to support premature fetal lambs and to bring them to maturation in a way not previously possible. The researchers have called attention to possible implications of these systems for sustaining premature human fetuses in a similar way. Some commentators have pointed out that perfecting these systems for human fetuses might alter a standard expectation in abortion practices: that the termination of a pregnancy also entails the death of the fetus. With Biobags, it might be (...) possible, some argue, that no woman has the right to expect that outcome if the technology is able to sustain fetal life _after_ an abortion. In order to protect the expectation that the termination of a pregnancy always entails the death of the fetus, Elizabeth Romanis has argued that fetuses sustained in Biobags have a status different than otherwise ‘born’ children. In support of that view, she argues that these ‘gestatelings’ are incapable of independent life. This argument involves a misunderstanding of the gestational support involved, as well as a misapprehension of neonatology practice. Here, we argue that any human fetus sustained in a Biobag would be as ‘independent’ as any other premature infant, and just as ‘born’. Neonatologists would seem to have certain presumptive moral responsibilities toward any human fetus gestating in a Biobag. It remains a separate question whether the perfection and widespread application of Biobags for premature human beings would or should alter the expectation that ending a pregnancy also entails fetal death. (shrink)

Juliette Roussin | : Cet article a pour objet d’interroger la tendance actuelle des démocraties à s’entourer d’institutions indépendantes au fort degré de compétence en vue de limiter et de corriger les défaillances éventuelles des corps démocratiques élus et représentatifs. La légitimité démocratique de ces institutions contre-majoritaires leur viendrait, selon certains théoriciens de la démocratie, de ce qu’elles offrent la possibilité de contester les décisions collectives lorsque celles-ci sont mauvaises ou injustes, contribuant ainsi à l’amélioration globale des performances du régime (...) démocratique. À partir notamment d’une lecture des travaux de Philip Pettit sur la démocratie contestataire et d’une réflexion sur l’approche épistémique défendue par David Estlund, nous questionnons au contraire le caractère démocratique de ces formes institutionnelles de contestation et montrons que, tant qu’elles ne font pas l’objet d’un contrôle démocratique plus étroit, elles peuvent être interprétées comme des modes de contestation de la démocratie plutôt que comme des instruments de son amélioration. | : This paper investigates a current tendency among democracies to appeal to highly competent independent institutions in order to constrain and amend the potential deficiencies of elected and representative democratic bodies. According to some democratic theorists, these counter-majoritarian institutions enjoy democratic legitimacy because they allow the contestation of ill-devised or unjust collective decisions, and hence contribute to the global improvement of democratic results. Based on a reading of Philip Pettit’s work on contestatory democracy and of David Estlund’s epistemic approach, the paper questions the democratic nature of these institutional forms of contestation and shows that, as long as they are not subjected to tighter democratic control, these institutions can be interpreted as ways of contesting democracy rather than as implements for its improvement. (shrink)

Egyptians had many reasons to overthrow the government of Hosni Mubarak, and to challenge the legitimacy of the interim military government. Strikingly, among the leading reasons for the uprising and for continued protest are reasons grounded in criminal justice. Reflection on this dimension of the Egyptian uprising invites a broader examination of the relationship between criminal justice and political legitimacy. While criminal justice is neither necessary nor sufficient for political legitimacy, criminal injustice substantially undermines political legitimacy and can provide independent (...) reasons for revolution. A state may compromise its legitimacy by committing criminal acts, by perverting or subverting the criminal process, and by failing to discharge its duty to punish serious wrongdoing—a duty that then falls to individuals to discharge either directly (through vigilantism) or indirectly (through revolution). Contrary to the views of many leading criminal law theorists, the duty to punish serious wrongdoing applies to individuals and not only to states. The relevance of political legitimacy to criminal justice is more complicated. Individuals are morally obligated to follow the morally justified laws of an illegitimate state, but are not morally obligated to follow the morally unjustified laws of a legitimate state. Nor may any state punish in the absence of moral wrongdoing and moral fault. However, illegitimate states may be incapable of justly holding individuals accountable to the state, to the community, or to victims through criminal trials. This incapacity provides an additional reason to overthrow illegitimate states and replace them with legitimate states capable of justly administering a just criminal law. (shrink)

Le concept de volonté générale de Rousseau est présenté par l`auteur comme le fondement catégoriel de la compréhension moderne de la démocratie, et sa transposition d`un contexte naturel légal dans un contexte social, ainsi que la légitimation de la vie sociale et politique est prise comme une ligne de partage qui scinde l`histoire de la démocratie en deux époques. Dans la première partie de l`article l`auteur se base sur les explications de Hérode, Platon et Aristote pour reconstruire l`histoire ancienne du (...) concept de démocratie. Il passe ensuite aux changements essentiels dans la conception et le rôle réel de la démocratie qui se sont manifestés au siècle de la Révolution française, il distingue la volonté générale de la volonté commune pour établir la dimension morale de la démocratie, et sous cet aspect il se concentre sur la philosophie politique de Rousseau. En conclusion il se penche sur la partitocratie qui n`est qu`une forme d`aberration de la démocratie tout en se limitant au type transitoire de la partitocratie systématique qui apparaît dans le cadre du phénomène historique du postcommunisme. Dans ce contexte, à la théorie dominante de la transition l`auteur oppose la théorie du chaos postcommuniste qui est envisagée comme une approche théorique alternative de l`explication des événements postcommunistes. (shrink)

Quelles sont les implications de la philosophie de Condorcet pour les théories épistémiques de la démocratie? Ces dernières réduisent souvent l’argument épistémique de Condorcet en faveur de la démocratie au théorème du jury. Or le philosophe montre que c’est seulement quand elle devient le vecteur de l’indépendance politique, économique et intellectuelle des citoyens que ses vertus épistémiques se font jour. En se concentrant sur les procédures de décision susceptibles de favoriser de bons résultats politiques, les approches contemporaines ne proposent qu’une (...) analyse partielle des embarras démocratiques, et se privent de bases pour un argument épistémique plausible en faveur de la démocratie. (shrink)

Les failles dans la théorie de la démocratie libérale ont été toujours localisées dans au moins deux sphères importantes : celle de la procédure et celle des résultatst. En ce qui concerne la première, le problème réside dans le fait que l’on tâche que «la volonté du peuple» – ou du moins celle du peuple pertinent, des électeurs éligibles – s’exprime à travers des mécanismes signifiants et pratiques. Suivant le consenus partagé jusqu’à récemment par la plupart des théoriciens orthodoxes de (...) la démocratie libérale, les élections à des cops représentatifs et les votes ultérieurs des gagnants de ces élections constituent de tels mécanismes. Or, on constate à tout bout de champ que différentes instances des pouvoirs élus agissent à l’encontre de l’opinion des groupements de personnes qui les ont élus. La théorie de la démocratie libérale dit que, tant que l’on respecte les procédures appropriées permettant l’expression majoritaire de la volonté du peuple quant à ceux qui le représenteront, les représentants sont légitimés à voter contre la volonté apparente du peuple. Or, c’est une pure condradiction pratique. En ce qui concerne la question des résultats, la théorie récente de la démocratie libérale s’est creusé là une fosse encore plus profonde en abandonnant le concept de bien commun, auquel souscrivaient du moins quelques-uns des théoriciens plus traditionnels. La théorie de la démocratie libérale a finalement renoncé à toute fonction critique à l’égard des résultats. Par contre, elle est obligée de ratifier tout résultat, quelque déplorable ou même tragique qu’il puisse être, tant qu’il soit le produit de l’ensemble habilité des procédures et des institutions admises. Or, la nouvelle orientation théorique devra s’attaquer à tous les éléments qui sont absents dans l’approche rawlsienne et dans les écrits de la plupart des disciples libéraux de Rawls : pouvoir, violence, domination, idéologie, décision, interprétation, expression politique, révolution, histoire, économie, biopolitique. On a désespérément besoin de nouveaux modèles opour la philosophie sociale et politique! (shrink)

Democracy purged of all its Disadvantages. « Encoded at the level of its lexicology and logical constructedness, the republican discourse of the enlightenment and revolution is marked by two conceptualizations which contradict and mutually exclude each other. Contemporary observers of the revolution or those close to its events speak about an opposition between an order of egotism and an order of equality, between a principle of utility and a principle of ascetism, between an ethics based on personal interest and an (...) ethics based on the national interest, between a kind of individualism and a kind of socialism, etc. Because it has excluded physiocratic thinking from its domain, the traditional historio-graphy of political ideas has obstructed an unbiased view to the context which engenders conceptualizations of an alternative Republicanism vis-a-vis that of Rousseau, while at the same time utilizing Rousseaus formulas ». (shrink)

Résumé — Le rapport de Simone Weil au marxisme est paradoxal en ce qu’il dévoile une fidélité à Marx par-delà les ruptures et les renonciations à la théorie marxiste. Au premier abord, les liens de Weil au marxisme semblent discontinus puisque après avoir adopté certaines idées révolutionnaires pendant ses premières années d’activité politique, elle critique Marx dès les années 1930, et finit apparemment par l’abandonner dans la dernière partie de sa vie. Ce constat, cependant, loin de révéler la disparition lente (...) et inexorable des concepts de Marx, semble plutôt démontrer leur persistance et leurs métamorphoses dans la philosophie de Weil. Nous voudrions ainsi suggérer que sa critique de la révolution elle-même, ainsi que le " christianisme " développé à la suite de son année d’usine, constituent sa façon singulière d’être marxiste dans le moment même où celui-ci semble avoir perdu pour elle toute utilité.— S. Weil’s relationship to Marxism is paradoxical because it unveils a loyalty to Marx in spite of ruptures and renunciations of the Marxist theory. S. Weil’s ties to Marxism seem discontinuous because after having adopted certain revolutionary ideas during her first years of political activism she criticizes Marx in the 30’s and ends up seemingly abandoning him in the last part of her life. This path, however, far from revealing the slow and inexorable disappearance of Marx’s concepts, rather, demonstrates the persistence and metamorphoses in S. Weil’s philosophy. We suggest then, that a criticism of the revolution followed by a kind of Christianity developed in the wake of a year spent in the factory, constitute S. Weil’s own special manner of being Marxist, even though Marxism seems to have become useless to her. (shrink)

Prominent Ukrainian historian Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky (1919–1984) repeatedly addressed the topic of the Ukrainian revolution of 1917 – the 1920s, especially considering its intellectual origins and implications in the context of the history of Ukrainian social and political thought. Analysis of his works shows the manner in which the Ukrainian revolution as an event structures the history of Ukrainian social and political thought in both senses of the term “history”: as history itself and as its historiography. Based on this analysis, the (...) article considers changes in the meaning of the revolution for modern Ukrainians, as well as the credibility – in the context of these changes – of the classifications of the historiography of Ukrainian social and political thought, which rest on the key meaning of the revolution for modern Ukrainian history. The article also supports the conclusion that the rejection of the evolutionary model which I. Lysiak-Rudnytsky most directly addressed will help to outline a well-balanced and reliable history of Ukrainian social and political thought without excessive historicism. (shrink)

There is a need to bring about a revolution in the philosophy of science, interpreted to be both the academic discipline, and the official view of the aims and methods of science upheld by the scientific community. At present both are dominated by the view that in science theories are chosen on the basis of empirical considerations alone, nothing being permanently accepted as a part of scientific knowledge independently of evidence. Biasing choice of theory in the direction of simplicity, unity (...) or explanatory power does not permanently commit science to the thesis that nature is simple or unified. This current ‘paradigm’ is, I argue, untenable. We need a new paradigm, which acknowledges that science makes a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions concerning the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, theories being chosen partly on the basis of compatibility with these assumptions. Eleven arguments are given for favouring this new ‘paradigm’ over the current one. (shrink)

Du communisme au libéralisme : c’est de cette façon que le parcours intellectuel de Claude Lefort est généralement décrit. Malheureusement, les choses ne sont pas si simples. En effet, l’entier travail lefortien, des rangs du parti trotskiste à la réflexion sur le totalitarisme et la démocratie, comporte aussi une discussion continue avec l’œuvre de Marx. Un débat intensif avec le père du communisme, avec bien sûr des contrastes durs, guidé par l’influence de la phénoménologie de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Celle-ci conduit Lefort (...) à rejeter toutes les possibilités de connaissance objective comme les idées de fondation et de totalité. Ainsi, à travers son débat avec Marx, Lefort parvient à abandonner le marxisme, à mettre en question les catégories principales de la modernité, vers une nouvelle conception de démocratie et des droits de l’homme. L’article propose de suivre le chemin lefortien du point de vue de sa confrontation avec Marx, par trois points clés. Le premier point est la dimension symbolique, rejetée par Marx qui pense la représentation comme produit de la structure productive. Le deuxième point est l’interprétation de modernité que Lefort décrit comme autonomie et désincorporation. Enfin, les droits de l’homme, point décisif du travail lefortien en polémique contre l’analyse marxienne dans les pages de La question juive. Nous espérons faire ressortir la relation compliquée avec Marx et l’originalité de la pensée lefortienne. (shrink)

The article analyzes the events that took place in Ukraine on the verge of 2013–2014. This events are called Dignity Revolution. The authors argue that this revolution was the unifying factor of Ukrainian churches and religious organizations, a kind of manifestation of Christian ecumenism and interreligious understanding that jointly opposed the criminal power, for freedom and independence of Ukraine, for the dignity of every Ukrainian.

I am writing on moral knowledge in Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding. There are two basic parts. In the first part, I articulate and attack a predominant interpretation of the Essay . This interpretation attributes to Locke the view that he did not write in the Essay anything that would be inconsistent with his early views in the Questions Concerning the Laws of Nature that there exists a single, ultimate, moral standard, i.e., the Law of Nature. For example, John Colman, (...) in his book John Locke's Moral Philosophy , argues that even though Locke explains in the Essay that we arbitrarily create our moral notions, they are still objective since they are bound together with the Law of Nature. Colman explains that the features of human nature relevant to the derivation of the Law of Nature are universally shared needs and concerns . I argue that this presupposes a view of Locke which assumes that there are essences of species independent of our beliefs about them. However, I attempt to show from the text of the Essay that this view cannot be supported. ;In the second part, I argue that the text of the Essay supports two alternative theses. The first is that given the kind of metaphysical world-view presupposed by the corpuscular method of science employed within the Essay, coupled with Locke's commitment to the possibility of moral knowledge, he was left with only one option with reference to ethics, viz., to make moral goodness or evil a mind-dependent relation between a rule and an action, instead of a property of an action or person which exists independently of our moral beliefs. This view is logically inconsistent with the existence of the Law of Nature. The second is that Locke has a semantical view of moral claims which is consistent with his relational view of moral goodness, viz., the primary function of moral judgments is to recommend behavior for ourselves and others. I described. However, Locke explains in the Essay that the opposite takes place with respect to our moral notions: events and persons must conform to the moral notion. ;On the account that I offer, Locke's views on moral epistemology are much closer to David Hume's than many have supposed, and correspondingly, anticipate the more skeptical views of moral epistemology in the twentieth century. (shrink)

While the image of the slave as the antithesis of the freeman is central to republican freedom, it is striking to note that slaves themselves have not contributed to how this condition is understood. The result is a one-sided conception of both freedom and slavery, which leaves republicanism unable to provide an equal and robust protection for historically outcast people. I draw on the work of Frederick Douglass – long overlooked as a significant contributor to republican theory – to show (...) one way why this is so. Focusing the American Revolution, the subsequent republican government established new political institutions to maintain the collective interests of the whole population. The political revolution was held in place by processes of public reason that reflected the values and ideas of the people that had rebelled. The black population, however, had not been part of this revolution. After emancipation, black Americans were required to accept terms of citizenship that had already been defined, leaving them socially dominated, subject to the prejudices and biases within the prevailing ideas of public discourse. Douglass argued that republican freedom under law is always dependent on a more fundamental revolution, that he calls a ‘radical revolution in thought’, in which the entire system of social norms and practices are reworked together by members of all constituent social groups – women and men, black and white, rich and poor – so that it reflects a genuinely collaborative achievement. Only then can we begin the republican project of contestatory freedom as independence or non-domination that today’s republicans take for granted. (shrink)

Despite decades of research and thought on the meaning and identification of revolutions in science, there is no generally accepted definition for this concept. This paper presents 13 different characteristics that have been used by philosophers and historians of science to characterize revolutions in science, in general, and in chemistry, in particular. These 13 characteristics were clustered into six independent factors. Suggestions are provided as to the use of these characteristics and factors to evaluate historical events as to their possible (...) categorization as revolutions in chemistry. Challenges to the goal of creating a consensus definition of “revolutions in science” are also presented in this publication. (shrink)

This book offers the first historical treatment of Hegel's political ideas since the 1970s. It completely revises our understanding of his response to the French Revolution, the most dramatic and significant event of his age. A fresh account of his take on the Revolution itself provides a new perspective on his thought as a whole. It also illuminates Hegel's relevance to modern politics. Dominant strands of post-War thought have taken the form of a repudiation of Hegel. This reaction has largely (...) been based on dubious arguments and poor scholarship. The alternative analysis offered here contextualizes attempts to disparage Hegel as pursued by strands of critical theory associated with postmodernism. In the process, the book challenges recent onslaughts against so-called "Western" rationalism. It takes issue with the ambition to relativize all values and to represent knowledge as an effect of power. (shrink)

Research teams have used extra-uterine systems to support premature fetal lambs and to bring them to maturation in a way not previously possible. The researchers have called attention to possible implications of these systems for sustaining premature human fetuses in a similar way. Some commentators have pointed out that perfecting these systems for human fetuses might alter a standard expectation in abortion practices: that the termination of a pregnancy also entails the death of the fetus. With Biobags, it might be (...) possible, some argue, that no woman has the right to expect that outcome if the technology is able to sustain fetal lifeafteran abortion. In order to protect the expectation that the termination of a pregnancy always entails the death of the fetus, Elizabeth Romanis has argued that fetuses sustained in Biobags have a status different than otherwise ‘born’ children. In support of that view, she argues that these ‘gestatelings’ are incapable of independent life. This argument involves a misunderstanding of the gestational support involved, as well as a misapprehension of neonatology practice. Here, we argue that any human fetus sustained in a Biobag would be as ‘independent’ as any other premature infant, and just as ‘born’. Neonatologists would seem to have certain presumptive moral responsibilities toward any human fetus gestating in a Biobag. It remains a separate question whether the perfection and widespread application of Biobags for premature human beings would or should alter the expectation that ending a pregnancy also entails fetal death. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Just Revolution: A Christian Ethic of Political Resistance and Social Transformation by Anna Floerke ScheidRamon LuzarragaJust Revolution: A Christian Ethic of Political Resistance and Social Transformation Anna Floerke Scheid lanham, md: lexington books, 2015. 208 pp. $84.00Anna Floerke Scheid argues that the Christian just war and just peacemaking ethical traditions lack a comprehensive ethic for revolutionary nonviolent activity and warfare. She proposes to fill this lacuna through a (...) theological exploration of what constitutes a just revolution. While Scheid maintains a consistent [End Page 212] preference for nonviolent resistance against tyranny, she remains open to the possibility of revolutionary warfare.The author articulates four stages of a just revolution. The first stage is jus ante, nonviolent resistance against a tyrannical government. Here the opposition develops a democratic and revolutionary vision of society that respects human rights, models that vision within its organizations, and resists through nonviolent acts. Second is jus ad, the stage where a tyrannical government eliminates all avenues for negotiation and represses peaceful resistance. This forces the revolutionary opposition to consider armed resistance as a last resort. Here Scheid grapples with two limitations of traditional just war theory. The first reserves the authority to start a war with governments. She argues that the legitimacy for a just revolution comes from a revolutionary organization's ability to envision and model a just society. Because a tyrannical government's authority is illegitimate, a revolutionary movement's just vision and practices gain for it a de facto legitimate authority. This legitimacy is reinforced by a revolutionary movement's ultimate intention to effect reconciliation with their oppressors postwar. The second limitation is the reasonable hope of success. Scheid analyzes the history of this criterion and demonstrates how it supports defensive wars despite the uncertainty of success. Oppressed persons, as the subjects of their own hope of liberation, ought to decide what constitutes the probability for success in fighting tyranny. Throughout this stage, revolutionary warfare must be practiced in tandem with continuing nonviolent resistance.The third stage is jus in, the justice practiced during armed revolutionary resistance. Fighting is deemed necessary to force a tyrannical government to negotiations. Meanwhile, revolutionary military units would work to minimize violence and loss of life. The last stage is jus post, the reconciliation needed to prevent revolutionary warfare from spiraling into revenge. Here the exercise of restorative justice—where responsibility for past injustices is assumed by all sides and a just resolution developed for social reconciliation and the development of a new, democratic society that respects human rights—is all important. Throughout the book, Scheid uses the African National Congress's revolutionary struggle against the South African apartheid government as a successful example of her theory in practice.Scheid's well-argued proposal deserves careful consideration by ethicists. Students will profit from her excellent summary of just war theory, where she brilliantly recovers some of its forgotten features. On the other hand, her concluding chapter considering the Arab Spring's potential for just revolution would have been stronger if she extended beyond a comparison to South Africa to incorporate similar features found in other successful revolutions. The 1986 Philippine People Power Revolution, the 1989 collapse of Eastern European Communist regimes, and the 1974 Carnation Revolution in Portugal come to mind. Moreover, important for South Africa's success was the durability of the [End Page 213] political institutions the British left behind. These institutions provided the framework that handled the transition of power from the pro-apartheid National Party to the post-apartheid African National Congress government. This feature could have been brought to light, as many recognize this structure as contributive to the peaceful transition of power in other countries that won independence through revolution, from the United States in the eighteenth century to India and the Caribbean in the twentieth.Ramon LuzarragaBenedictine University at MesaCopyright © 2018 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Isaiah Berlin, English Liberalism and a Third Concept of Liberty. The concept of Jacobinism, while lacking any strong anchorage in the historiography of the French Revolution, nonetheless represents the central category in the Marxist analysis of the revolutionary phenomenon in general. The aim of the present article is to examine the concept of Jacobinism in its relation to a series of other categories : the individual, the universal, and sovereignty, categories prominent in recent historical debates. Our aim is therefore to (...) propose a typology of the concept, by way of a provisional three-way division of political liberalism : the constituent liberalism of moderate Jacobinism, the egalitariam liberalism of centrist Jacobinism, the civic liberalism of radical Jacobinism. Going beyond the historical existence of the Jacobins as a group, the aim of our analysis is to give the largest possible extensive definition to the concept of Jacobinism, in order to evaluate its organic dimension within the political tradition which has its source in the French revolution. (shrink)

Trois mouvements sociaux caractérisent la société iranienne d’aujourd’hui. Le premier est le mouvement des étudiants, qui combine des revendications culturelles pour une société plus ouverte avec des demandes politiques pour une société plus libre, dans laquelle la participation active des citoyens à la scène politique devrait être reconnue. Le second mouvement est celui des femmes, par lequel des femmes d’âge moyen ainsi que la nouvelle génération expriment leur demande pour une société moins discriminatoire vis-à-vis des femmes. Le troisième mouvement est (...) celui des intellectuels, par lequel de nouvelles interprétations de l’islam mettent en question la nature théocratique du régime politique en vigueur. Contrairement aux mouvements des années 1970, qui débouchèrent sur la révolution islamique de 1979, les nouveaux mouvements sociaux en Iran ont une forte dimension démocratique. Ils sont « protodémocratiques » dans le sens où ils revendiquent l’ouverture du système politique au nom d’une nouvelle version de l’islam, moins holistique, plus individualiste, séparant le registre de la spiritualité religieuse de celui du politique.Three social movements characterize today’s Iranian society. The first is the students’ movement which combines cultural demands for a more open society with a political one, for a freer society in which the citizens’ participation to the political system should be recognized. The second is the womens’ movement, through which middle-aged women and the younger generation express their claim for a less gender-discriminating society. The third movement is the intellectuals’ movement, in which new interpretations of Islam put into question the theocratic nature of the political regime. Contrary to the movements of the 1970s that ended up in the Islamic Revolution of 1979, the new social movements in Iran have a strong democratic dimension. They are « protodemocratic » in the sense that they ask for the opening of the political system in the name of a new version of Islam, less holistic, more individualistic, separating the realm of religious spirituality from the arena of the politics. (shrink)

The vast majority of work on the ethics of war focuses on traditional wars between states. In this chapter, I aim to show that this is an oversight worth rectifying. My strategy will be largely comparative, assessing whether certain claims often defended in discussions of interstate wars stand up in the context of civil conflicts, and whether there are principled moral differences between the two types of case. Firstly, I argue that thinking about intrastate wars can help us make progress (...) on important theoretical debates in recent just war theory. Secondly, I consider whether certain kinds of civil wars are subject to a more demanding standard of just cause, compared to interstate wars of national-defence. Finally, I assess the extent to which having popular support is an independent requirement of permissible war, and whether this renders insurgencies harder to justify than wars fought by functioning states. (shrink)

The self-limiting revolutions of 1989 in Central Europe offer an alternative paradigm of revolutionary change that is reminiscent more of the American struggle for independence in 1776 than the Jacobin tendencies that grew out of the French Revolution of 1789. In order to understand the contradictory impulses of the revolutions of 1989—the desire for a radical renewal and the concern for preservation—this article takes as its point of departure the political thought of Hannah Arendt and Edmund Burke.

The Constitution of Independence is a contribution to the newly rejuvenated subject of comparative Commonwealth constitutional law, politics, and history. In Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, a series of fascinating developments have been under way for more than a decade, characterized by independent thinking, experimentation, and cross-Commonwealth borrowing of constitutional ideas. These include the final termination of constitutional ties with the United Kingdom Parliament and the emergence of controversial issues including variably entrenched or implied rights and freedoms; wide-ranging claims by (...) indigenous peoples; republicanism; and assertions of national, popular, and sectional sovereignty.This book explores the development of constitutional thinking in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand from early domination by Imperial ideas, through the adoption of the Statute of Westminster and the contemplation of severing Imperial connections, to irreversible acquisition of constitutional independence in the 1980s. This book focusses primarily on sovereignty and the legal system, concepts which are also central to contemporary constitutional theory in Europe and the United States. The book closes with an evaluation of recent varied and often contradictory accounts of the constitutional foundations of Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, which depict a wide range of scenarios: from constitutional continuity and respect for the rule of law, to popular sovereignty and disguised revolution. Oliver argues that explanations of constitutional independence are characterized by their reliance on independent, country-specific constitutional thinking that evolved over the last century. on. (shrink)

The Velvet Revolution of Armenia, which took place in 2018, was an important event in the history of Armenia and changed the government peacefully by means of large demonstrations, rallies and marches. This historic event was covered by Armenian news media. Our goal here was to do a Discourse-Historical Analysis of the Armenian Velvet Revolution as covered by two Armenian websites: armenpress.am-the governmental website and 168.am-the non-governmental website. In our analysis we identified how the lexicon related to the Armenian Velvet (...) Revolution was negotiated and legitimized by these media, and which discursive strategies were applied. We concluded that ‘Armenpress’ paid more attention to the government’s speeches, discussions, meetings and tried to impose the opinion of the government upon the people. In contrast, ‘168’ tried to present itself as an independent website with a neutral attitude toward the Velvet Revolution but, in reality, as we can conclude from the negative opinions about the Velvet Revolution in the coverage of ‘168’, it also represented the government’s interests. There was also a discursive struggle over the exact meaning of ‘revolution’ and the sense of ‘velvet’ in politics and the academic field that was to some extent introduced by these media. (shrink)

This article revisits an historic exchange between two black ex-communists, Harold Cruse and Harry Haywood, a debate that prefigured many of the central contradictions of the black-power era. Their exchange followed Cruse’s influential 1962 essay forStudies on the Left, ‘Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American’, which declared that the American Negro was a ‘subject of domestic colonialism’. Written against the prevailing liberal integrationist commitments of the civil-rights movement, his essay called for black economic and political independence, and inspired many of the (...) younger activists who would give birth to the black-power movement. In a series of essays for the Bay Area black radical journalSoulbook, Haywood criticised Cruse’s mishandling of class politics among blacks, and his retreat from anti-capitalism. This forgotten episode is important on its own terms, for what it says about the character and limitations of left-political thinking during the sixties, and equally for understanding and contesting those commonsensical notions of African-American public life in our times which too often remain rooted in the vanished social context and political realities of the twentieth-century racial ghetto. (shrink)

En tant qu’introduction à son sujet, l’ouvrage est cependant un modèle de clarté et de concision. L’auteur retrace d’abord l’histoire des idées libérales et démocratiques: il présente la querelle des anciens et des modernes au sujet de la liberté, évalue l’impact de la révolution des droits de l’homme et résume les contributions de Mill et de Tocqueville au débat. Dans les derniers chapitres du livre, Bobbio discute les rapports que le libéralisme et la démocratie ont établis avec l’utilitarisme, l’individualisme, (...) l’organicisme et le socialisme. Considéré comme un travail d’introduction, le seul point faible du livre est de ne pas être à jour. (shrink)

The discussion of the American Civil War as a bourgeois revolution, reopened by John Ashworth’s recent work, needs to be based on a more explicit conceptualisation of what the category does, and does not, involve. This essay offers one such conceptualisation. It then deals with two key issues raised by the process of bourgeois revolution in the United States: the relationship between the War of Independence and the Civil War, and whether the nature of the South made conflict unavoidable. It (...) then argues that the American Revolution is unique for two reasons: the non-feudal nature of Southern society and the fact that the Northern industrial bourgeoisie, unlike their European contemporaries, were still prepared to behave in a revolutionary way. (shrink)

Cet article, version abrégée de l’introduction au nouveau volume des œuvres complètes de Rosa Luxemburg en langue anglaise (regroupant ses écrits sur la révolution des années 1906 à 1909), traite de la manière dont son concept de démocratie socialiste s’applique à deux problèmes liés : 1) le rôle des organisations révolutionnaires dans la formation d’une conscience de classe ; et 2) la forme exacte de la transition au socialisme dans des pays où la classe ouvrière ne constitue qu’une minorité (...) de la population. En étudiant une partie de ses écrits en polonais, qui n’ont été traduits que récemment, nous montrons que Luxemburg a apporté une contribution intéressante et singulière aux débats sur la transition au socialisme, contribution que les précédents commentateurs ont eu tendance à ignorer. (shrink)

Russia’s gender revolution notoriously produced women’s economic empowerment without domestic equality. Although the Soviet state vastly expanded women’s employment, this had little impact on a starkly unequal gender division of domestic labor. Such “stalling” is common, but in Russia its extent and persistence presents a puzzle, requiring us to investigate linkages between macro-level factors and micro-level interactions regarding the gender division of domestic labor. We do this by focusing on gender ideology, an important variable explaining the gender division of domestic (...) labor that bridges the macro level of the gender order and the micro-interactional level. We use longitudinal qualitative data to examine continuity and change in young Russian women’s gender ideologies between 1999 and 2010. Based on an analysis of 115 in-depth interviews from 23 respondents, we identify traditional and egalitarian trajectories and the processes underlying them, showing how the male breadwinner schema and an ideology of women’s independence support traditionalism, while non-traditional breadwinning and interactional support from men facilitate egalitarianism. Our analysis enables us to explain the Soviet gender paradox and distinguish sources of change in the post-Soviet era. Our theoretical contribution is to situate gender ideology in a multilevel framework, the efficacy of which we demonstrate in our empirical analysis. (shrink)