One of the most tangled problems of philosophical thought is the “sublime” character of logic. By logic’s “sublimity” I mean to refer both to its ontologically privileged and to its ontologically unclarified or obscure status. Logic’s ontological privilege stems from the fact that logic and its methods have always overtly or covertly determined ontological inquiry. It is certainly arguable that Aristotle’s invention of logic and his invention of metaphysics are so related that formal structures (...) deriving from the former are translated into ontological structures of the latter. Given the patent and potent Aristotelian influence, medieval logic and ontology are similarly intertwined. In the modern period, the strong determinative connection between logic and ontology in Leibniz, Spinoza, and Kant is indisputable. In the twentieth century, an influential world-hypothesis such as that proposed by the early Wittgenstein in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus is a shining example of an ontology based on the “peculiar depth” of logic. A more recent and perhaps even more shining example is the ontology of “possible worlds” based on the work of Kripke in Naming and Necessity. Given this rather incestuous relationship between logic and ontology—we might call it the “history of the sublimity of logic”—the need for an ontological clarification of logic is imperative. (shrink)

This article explores the relationship between ignorance, authority and nationalism in neoliberal thought and practice to argue that, far from signalling its end, the recent global rise of the right-wing demagogue is firmly rooted in neoliberalism. Part one mobilises the aesthetic concept of the sublime to explore the central place of, and relationship between, ignorance and authority. Part two argues that neoliberalism has its own form of nationalism which is underpinned by a social Darwinist logic. It is here (...) that we find the basis for the intersection between neoliberalism and the forms of vitriolic and xenophobic nationalism which have helped propel the global ascendency of the neoliberal demagogue. The concluding section argues that, in the context of growing inequality and insecurity, the demagogue mystifies social relations, projecting blame for the failings of the system on those constructed as "enemies of the people" in the interests of maintaining the status quo. (shrink)

La noción de populismo no es unívoca e incluso se superpone con la de política, así como para Schmitt se superponían las ideas de democracia y política.A su vez, el populismo "contra la detracción que de él suele practicarse" se ubica en el espacio de lo sublime; como lo que supera al sujeto desde f..

In recent years, the claim of the unrepresentability of the Shoah has stirred vivid debates, especially following the strong positions taken by the French filmmaker Claude Lanzmann and author of Shoah (1986). This claim of unrepresentability, it can be shown, draws part of its attraction from the fact that it oscillates undecidedly between a claim of logical impossibility (“the Shoah can’t be represented”) and a normative demand (“the Shoah shouldn’t be represented”). This essay analyzes the argumentative structure of the advocates (...) of the unrepresentability and shows why the often made connection to Kant is flawed. Although his Critique of the Power of Judgment affirms indeed that the prohibition of representation is the “perhaps most sublime passage in the Jewish Law”, turning the prohibition of representation into a supposedly Kantian claim does not hold grounds. The essay reconstructs the political framework of the debate, situates the Kantian passage in its precise philosophical context and then successively assesses the main arguments put forward by Jean-Luc Nancy, Jacques Rancière and Georges Didi-Huberman in their critique of Lanzmann’s categorical imperative. While showing why the rhetoric of the “unrepresentable” bear troubling structural analogies to what they want to fight (i.e. the politics of erasure, which always also include the erasure of the traces of erasure), a certain notion of the “unrepresentable” is rescued nevertheless at the end of the essay. Representation, so it is argued by returning to a Kantian distinction, is not a matter of Kanon, but a matter of Organon, which then puts the debate about the Sublime (which took place between Lyotard and Rancière in the 90’s) into a new perspective. (shrink)

Kant argues in the Critique of Judgment (CJ) that there are two distinct modes of the sublime. This essay will concentrate on the mathematical mode. It is helpful to begin an examination of the mathematical sublime by elucidating the difference between logical estimation and aesthetic estimation; it is aesthetic estimation under strain, so Kant argues, that instigates the moment of the sublime. Logical estimation forms the cognitive basis of scientific calculations. He argues that scientific enquiry only requires (...) an understanding of the logical relationship of numbers and so does not require an aesthetic experience of those numbers. (shrink)

Over the past decade, radical questioning of the grounds of Western epistemology has revealed that some antinomies of the aesthetic experience can be viewed as a general, yet necessarily open, model for human understanding. This book is a rigorous _explication de texte_ of a central text for this thesis, Kant's Analytic of the Sublime.

This chapter focuses on a 1914 photograph by Stefano Bricarelli that can be considered a visual representation of the concerns of landscape. It explores the concept of the sublime in terms of the interplay between distance, immediacy, and representation. Before considering the concept of sublimity, the question regarding entry into the scene must first be addressed. The possibility that landscape may only exist because of such an entry plays a vital role in any analysis of the photographic image. This (...) possibility also allows a conception of human presence that is not mere construction but a form of production. While there may be a process in which a form of presence comes into consideration, what is present brings with it a transformational quality. The logic of addition also suggests that human presence creates an original form of distancing. (shrink)

This article explores the critical limitations of the now decades-long shift toward digital culture in the material and cultural constitution of biotechnology. It does this by telling the story of three contemporary efforts to reimagine the logic of life on the logic of the digital and the struggles attendant to building the infrastructures needed to actualize that re-imagination and make it profitable. In tracing these stories, it lifts out how biotechnologists, once caught in the spell of the digital (...) sublime, are having to confront the ways in which dreams of a data-driven and automated biology, far from eliciting an exalted future of health, wealth, and security, are simply reinforcing at the level of the organism a world already boxed in by algorithmic modes of reason and governed by imperatives of optimization. In the midst of these binds, this article points to a pathos which is beginning to stir at the bench as blue-collar technologists seek to activate an older feel for craftwork, and how this pathos signals a familiar but vital reciprocity between the maker and the made. It concludes that, in the end, breakdowns in the digital sublime make space for a more interesting biotechnical proposition, one in which the living thing being crafted has to be accommodated rather than rendered algorithmic: the cellular targets of biotechnical intervention must be coerced, cajoled, and enticed into playing along with our biotechnical imaginations. To act differently proves to be the real source of our trouble. The stories in this article draw on fieldwork conducted by the author through multiple experiments in collaborative anthropology. These experiments began in connection to a then-emerging brand of biotechnology called synthetic biology, were carried forward in view of a “post-engineering” approach to systems biology, and are currently (as of the writing of this essay) being conducted among biologists and technologists working to build “digital infrastructures” for the life sciences (i.e., digital tools for assembling, mediating, and synthesizing post-genomic biology). (shrink)

Philosophical aesthetics have seen an amazing revival over the past decade, as a radical questioning of the very grounds of Western epistemology has revealed that descriptions of what used to be seen as specific to aesthetic experience can instead be viewed as a general model for human cognition. In this revival, no text in the classical corpus of Western philosophy has been more frequently discussed and debated than the dense, complex paragraphs inserted into Kant's Critique of Judgment as sections 23-29: (...) the Analytic of the Sublime. This book is a rigorous explication de texte, a close reading of these sections. The Analytic of the Sublime, he points out, tries to argue that human thought is always constituted through a similar incompatibility between different intellectual and affective faculties. These lessons thus try to isolate the analysis of a differend of feeling in Kant's text, which is also the analysis of a feeling of differend, and to connect this feeling with the transport that leads all thought (critical thought included) to its limits. (shrink)

Kant’s account of the sublime makes frequent appeals to infinity, appeals which have been extensively criticised by commentators such as Budd and Crowther. This paper examines the costs and benefits of reconstructing the account in finitist terms. On the one hand, drawing on a detailed comparison of the first and third Critiques, I argue that the underlying logic of Kant’s position is essentially finitist. I defend the approach against longstanding objections, as well as addressing recent infinitist work by (...) Moore and Smith. On the other hand, however, I argue that finitism faces distinctive problems of its own: whilst the resultant theory is a coherent and interesting one, it is unclear in what sense it remains an analysis of the sublime. I illustrate the worry by juxtaposing the finitist reading with analytical cubism. -/- . (shrink)

In their recent work, L. Graham and J.-M. Kantor discuss a remarkable connection between diverging conceptions of the mathematical infinite in Russia and France at the beginning of the twentieth century and the religious convictions of their respective authors. They expand much more on the Russian side of the cultural equation they propose; I do believe, however, that the French (or rather ‘West European’) side is more complex than it seems, and that digging deeper into it is worthwhile. In this (...) paper I shall therefore broaden the path laid out in Graham and Kantor’s work, by connecting two different strands of research concerning the origin of what I loosely call ‘formal’ ideas: firstly, the rich but complex relation between logic and rhetoric throughout European cultural history, and secondly, the impact of religious convictions on the formation of certain mathematical and scientific ideas during Renaissance and Early Modernity, especially but not exclusively in France. (shrink)

Both for Kant and for Nietzsche, aesthetics must not be considered as a systematic science based merely on logical premises but rather as a set of intuitively attained artistic ideas that constitute or reconstitute the sensible perceptions and supersensible representations into a new whole. Kantian and Nietzschean aesthetics are both aiming to see beyond the forms of objects to provide explanations for the nobility and sublimity of human art and life. We can safely say that Kant and Nietzsche used the (...) dualities of the beautiful/sublime and Apollonian/Dionysian to advocate their general philosophical worldview, and that the initial formation (in Observations and The Birth of Tragedy) and final dissolution (in the Critique of Judgment and Zarathustra and other later works) of these dualities are determined by the gradually established telos of their philosophical endeavor. Therefore, by observing the evolution of these so-called dualities, Kaplama gathers important clues as to how Kant’s and Nietzsche’s aesthetics transformed into different ways to affirm human art and life. On the one hand, Kaplama argues, the Dionysian came to be the heart and soul of Nietzschean aesthetics and ethics, and the Apollonian (or the formal drive of individuation) was reduced into a mere aesthetic criterion. On the other, Kant treats the sublime (which is originally an idea-producing feeling and/or judgment) as a mere appendix to his Critique of Judgment and aesthetic theory teleologically reducing it into its possible moral consequences. This is why Schopenhauer calls the sublime “by far the most excellent thing in the Critique of Judgment” which touches on the real problem of aesthetics very closely but does not provide a real solution for it. Kant’s forced teleological move is to make his theory of aesthetic judgment stand as a ‘reaffirmation’ of the earlier ethical justification he believed to have accomplished in the first two Critiques and the Groundwork where he defends an affirmation of human life through a teleological morality centered on the principle of free-will. In contrast, Nietzsche’s aesthetics (particularly the Dionysian) guides his ethics and metaphysics again through defining an ideal human nature without which ethos would be static and meaningless, lacking the ability to move and change and represent the tragic pathos of human life. (shrink)

Show more ▾ There are various dichotomies in Kant’s philosophy: sensibility vs. rationality, nature vs. freedom, cognition vs. morality, noumenon vs. phenomenon, among others. There are also different ways of mediating these dichotomies, which is the systematic undertaking of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. One of the most important concepts in this work is the sublime, which exemplifies the connections between the different dichotomies; this fact means the concept’s construction is full of tension. On the one hand, (...) as a pure reflection of aesthetic judgment the sublime must be without interest or purpose, but on the other hand it is “based on the concept of reason” (KU AA:292). On the one hand, the sublime “represents merely the subjective play of the powers of the mind (imagination and reason) as harmonious” (KU AA5:258), but on the other hand, reason “exercises dominion over sensibility” and the imagination is “purposively determined in accordance with a law” of reason (KU AA5:268f). Taking into account these problems concerning the essential definition the sublime, this paper will first illustrate how the sublime embodies the a priori principle of aesthetic judgment through contrasting the judgment of the sublime with the judgment of taste in order to establish a basic logical frame for the judgment of the sublime. Second, this paper redefines the boundary between the mathematically and dynamically sublime in order to reveal both the coexistence of contemplation and movement within the sublime and the unrevealed function of reason and imagination. Finally, contrasting the sublime with moral feeling, this paper elaborates the turning-structure (from sensibility to rationality and from object-intuition to idea-exhibition) of the sublime. (shrink)

With this issue we initiate the policy of expanding the scope of Tulane Studies in Philosophy to include, in addition to the work of members of the department, contributions from philosophers who have earned advanced degrees from Tulane and who are now teaching in other colleges and universities. The Editor THE LOGIC OF OUR LANGUAGE ROBERT L. ARRINGTON Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus that "logic is not a body of doctrine, but a mirror-image of the world. " 1 (...) In line with his suggestion that a proposition is a 'picture', Wittgenstein argued that propositions 'show' the logical structure of the real. He was insistent, however, that "the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one. " 2 As a result of this we can misunderstand the structure of fact. Philosophical problems arise just when "the logic of our language is mis understood. " 3 It is common knowledge that much of this view of logic was rejected by Wittgenstein himself in the Philosophical Investi gations. There we are told that language has no ideal or sublime 4 logic which mirrors the structure of the extra-linguistic world. Consequently, inferences from the structure of language to the structure of that extra-linguistic world are invalid. Reality can be 'cut up' in any of a number of ways by language. Wittgenstein adopted a view of philosophy which would render that discipline a non-explanatory, non-critical study of the multiple ways in which language can be used. (shrink)

Cet article propose une relecture du traité du Pseudo-Longin, le Peri Hupsous (Du Sublime), pour mettre en évidence l’un de ses enjeux philosophiques dont l’intérêt apparaît particulièrement actuel. Au cours de sa conceptualisation du sublime, l’auteur antique produit certes une définition du grand-dire mais il questionne surtout la puissance des œuvres, et ce de façon immanente, avant toute réception subjective. Or cette pensée de la puissance esthétique est solidaire d’une conception de l’art qui récuse tout dualisme de la (...) forme pour saisir l’œuvre en tant qu’unité paradoxale et intimement cohérente. Notre hypothèse tient en l’idée qu’à travers cette adéquation de la puissance à la logique même de la poièsis, le Pseudo-Longin ne nous donne à lire rien de moins qu’une première formulation de ce que nous appellerions dans un vocabulaire contemporain la performativité de l’art. Ce sont les conditions d’une telle performativité, étendue du discours à l’esthétique en général, que cet article tente de repérer tout au long du traité. (shrink)

Abstract:This essay is an extension of Bogdan's article, "The Shiver-Shimmer Factor: Musical Spirituality, Emotion, and Education" in Philosophy of Music Education Review, which elaborates "shiver" and "shimmer" as two kinds of emotional response to music, with "shiver" defined as a sensate surface aesthetic, considered subordinate to "shimmer," a meditational state aspiring to the condition of musical spirituality. "Incarnating the Shiver-Shimmer Factor" reverses the relationship between "shiver" and "shimmer" by regarding "shiver" as logically prior to "shimmer." Within this context, the roles (...) of both performer and listener are re-imagined through the tradition of Longinian and Romanticist aesthetics, wherein "shiver" is re-conceptualized as grounding musical spirituality, not as instrumental to it. Here the added dimension of what the performer brings to the musical experience is seen as key to creating the possibility of performers and listeners/audience as coequal participants in musical experience within a dialogical sublime based on an ethics of embodied listening. (shrink)

Driverless automobility presents a “technological sublime” encompassing both promises and perils. The light side of the emerging transportation future lies, for instance, in the newly gained freedom from driving. The dark side of this sublime includes ethical challenges and potential harm resulting from the required socio-technical transformations of mobility. This article explores contemporary visions for the self-driving car future through the lens of the sublime and some of its theoretical variations, such as the natural, technological, electrical, and (...) digital sublime. Nissan’s IDS Concept preview clip and the Chevrolet FNR trailer serve as examples for this analysis, which aims to demythologize the visual rhetoric of the depicted awe-inspiring self-driving systems. The sublime’s inherent dialectic of inducing both pleasure and displeasure is removed in the corporate utopian visions in favor of an exalting partnership between human and machine. This strategy succeeds by setting the mobility future in the context of controlled parameters such as the trustworthy communicative vehicle, the vital and independent protagonists, and the harmless and unharmed environment. Recognizing such recurring strategies and identifying the controlled parameters which allow the sublime object to electrify, not terrify, is key for a sensible engagement with such imagined futures and their social, cultural, political, economic, environmental, and ethical implications. Such premediations of awe-inspiring technological formations and the underlying logics ask to be unpacked toward decision making that considers all potential facets of the sublime future. (shrink)

This comprehensive survey is particularly valuable for the intelligence and originality with which it approaches aesthetic speculation. The author permits the original texts to serve as the basis of his study, and exhibits each of the major aesthetic systems of the period as an integral whole involving logical and psychological principles. Each of the writers chosen from the tradition is criticized in his own terms, without detracting from the originality of his contribution to the body of aesthetic theory. A few (...) of the lesser-known aestheticians of the 18th century here receive fuller discussion than has previously been available.--J. F. D. (shrink)

The paper deals with the problem of representation on the background of J. Rancière’s political philosophy, in which he rejects the concept of the unrepresentable. The resolution of the problem follows from the confronting of two conceptions of the unrepresentable: that of the esthetics of the sublime in Kant and Lyotard and of the politics of prohibition in Foucault on one hand and Rancière’s understanding of sharing the perceptible on the other hand. This discussion leads the author to the (...) problem of visuality conceived as a set of visual representations, which in a historically given period are legitimately visible. This definition of visuality returns the representation and the unrepresentable back into the political conception of image. (shrink)

The German painter Caspar David Friedrich’s The Monk by the Sea, a picture that has played an important role in accounts of the prehistory of twentieth-century abstract art, is significant among other reasons because it bravely refused painting’s narrative vocation and in so doing radicalized the optics characteristic of the contemporary aesthetics of the sublime. Friedrich’s contemporary, the novelist and dramatist Heinrich von Kleist, intuited precisely this in his scintillating comments on the painting at the time it appeared. Invoking (...) the shocking idea that looking at The Monk by the Sea is like seeing through eyes whose lids have been cut off, he recognized that Friedrich had transformed the canvas into the locus not so much of narration and signification as of sensation. This article leans on the terms devised by Gilles Deleuze to explain the paintings of Francis Bacon in order to explore the seminal shift in the relationship between spectator and composition that Friedrich’s canvas dramatizes with such compelling power. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminist Studies 47, no. 2. © 2021 by Feminist Studies, Inc. 419 Paul Amar Insurgent African Intimacies in Pandemic Times: Deimperial Queer Logics of China’s New Global Family inWolf Warrior 2 This essay offers a new paradigm of “deimperial queer analysis” that reveals the tension between the People’s Republic of China’s extractive expansionism in Africa and its claim to solidarity with Africans against white supremacy and Northern imperialism. China (...) has been labeled an “anti-imperial empire” that forcefully challenges previous Euro-American imperial legacies—all while it verges on reenacting them.1 A critical way it resolves this geopolitical tension is through the articulation of a mission for global China, and since 2017, the heroic filmic fictional figure of the “Wolf Warrior” anchors such an approach. The Wolf Warrior is a gorgeous, muscled, Chinese male rogue soldier in exile who adventures through the archipelago of the PRC’s shipping, mining, and medical projects across the Global South to battle white mercenaries, corrupt Asian businessmen, and local pirates—all while saving Africa from a ravaging pandemic. Extending a hugely popular film series, the release in 2017 of the blockbuster Wolf Warrior 2 (abbreviated below as Wolf 2) unleashed a worldwide social media frenzy as well as a revolution in diplomatic tone and protocol for China. In these ways, Wolf Warrior 2 came to mark the debut of the global PRC as a hegemonic structure 1. David Armitage, “The Anti-Imperial Empire?” Times Literary Supplement, no. 6018, August 3, 2018, https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/the-anti-imperialempire -american. 420 Paul Amar of feeling with an attendant popular cultural logic, launching a cast of military characters, humanitarian imaginaries, and gendered rebranding initiatives. These fused into a global cultural megaproject with the PRC presenting itself as a leader in responding to the COVID-19 pandemic in the Global South—a time the PRC has officially branded as its “Rejuvenation Era” of “Stepping Out into the World.” This essay shows how exactly this Wolf Warrior imagination has legitimized a new global regime, but I also reveal how, paradoxically, the Wolf Warrior regime has offered a distinct, more subversive worlding project. I argue here that the utopia immanent in this project can be revealed by interpretively turning this Wolf universe inside out through a deimperial queer analysis that honors and combines a Third World feminist lens and the “Asia as Method” approach with Danmei/BL and Slash queer-feminist fanfiction hacks. Danmei is a Chinese (originally mainly Tawainese) fanfiction genre that subverts mainstream heteronormative narratives by erotically aestheticizing and renarrating male-male intimacies within mainstream plotlines from feminist perspectives. BL (short for “boylove ”) is a similar Japanese fanfiction genre, and Slash is the term used in English for the queer/feminist hacking and excavation of sublimated and particularly utopian gender and sexuality plots from within seemingly conventional heteronormative or patriarchal popular-cultural texts. The everted or inside-out epistemology given expression here uses a set of non-phallogocentric lenses and decolonial feminist decoding practices. At stake is the urgency of not repeating the epistemic violence of conventional “anti-imperial” arguments, which tend to be heteronormative, statist, macho, and monolithic. Instead, the form of critique elaborated here brings questions of gender, race, and sexuality to the fore through a three-part approach. First, I identify the homoerotic register of the techno-infrastructural elements in the film. I generate close readings that detail the visual and genre codes of battle scenes, thug subjects, and piracy plots that forge a homoerotic model of rogue or “wolf” governmentality and that act as a metaphor for China’s techno -infrastructural rule. Second, this essay explores the gendered hauntings of supremacist humanism. I deploy a decolonial feminist lens to map the configuration of African women, female doctors, Maoist women insurgents, and feminized “flowerboys” as a rebel protectorate overseen by China’s phallic prerogative that is itself haunted by the specters of Euro-American humanist betrayal and white supremacy. Third, Paul Amar 421 I trace queer kinship utopias. I demonstrate that Wolf Warrior 2 rejuvenates a non-Western, queer, globalist kinship structure that triangulates Asian, white, and Black through adoption dramas and bromance bonds. Through these intimacies, an... (shrink)

I read Stefan Collini’s What are Universities For? last week with very mixed feelings. In the past, I’ve much admired his polemical essays on the REF, “impact”, the Browne Report, etc. in the London Review of Books and elsewhere: they speak to my heart. If you don’t know those essays, you can get some of their flavour from his latest article in the Guardian yesterday. But I found the book a disappointment. Perhaps the trouble is that Collini is too decent, (...) too high-minded, has too unrealistically exalted a view about what actually happens in universities which is too coloured by attitudes appropriate to the traditional humanities. And he is optimistic to the point of fantasy if he thinks that people are so susceptible to “the romance of ideas and the power of beauty” that they will want, or can be brought to want, lots and lots of universities in order to promote the ideas (as if they would suppose that the task of “conserving, understanding, extending and handing on to subsequent generations the intellectual, scientific, and artistic heritage of mankind” was clearly ill-served when there were only forty universities in England, as opposed to a hundred and whatever). (shrink)

A common reaction to Hegel’s suggestion that we collapse Kant’s distinction between form and content is that, since such a move would also deprive us of any way of distinguishing the merely logical from the real possibility of our concepts, it is incoherent and ought to be rejected. It is true that these two distinctions are intimately related in Kant, such that if one goes, the other does as well. But it is less obvious that giving them up as Kant (...) conceives them is as incoherent a proposal as many of Hegel’s critics think. It has been the point of a recent account of Hegel’s idealism to demonstrate that his critique of Kant’s dichotomy between form and content or concept and intuition does not commit him to the view that human cognition is materially creative of its content in the manner of a God-like or intuitive intellect—does not, in other words, signify a return to a pre-Critical metaphysics. This is the interpretative stance I adopt here as well, in hope of giving defenders of Kant reasons for taking Hegel more seriously. (shrink)

The Editors express their gratitude and appreciation to the indi-viduals listed below who served as referees for Informal Logic for Volumes 31 (2011) and 32 (2012).