While there is extensive literature on both the expansion of human rights and solidarity movements, and on micro-solidarity and violent actions, here I ask what is the relationship between human rights, micro-solidarity and social action? Based on a case study of structured, face-to-face dialogue group encounters in the Israeli/Palestinian context, I draw on Randall Collins’s interaction ritual chain theory to demonstrate why emotional energy and the ritualization of historical narratives have very limited potential to translate into human (...) rights-based moral actions. Instead, I suggest, these encounters produce micro-solidarity that ascribes additional weight to ethnic categories, serving to polarize and homogenize groups along ethnic lines. (shrink)

The success of any cosmopolitan political project depends on the development of forms of transnational solidarity that go beyond particularist commitments of kin, community, or nation. In this paper, I analyze how transnational solidarity can be generated around basic human rights. Rather than presupposing strong conceptions of a common humanity or a pre-existing sentiment of universal benevolence, I propose that the global discourse on human rights itself – an ongoing, dynamic, and dialogical process carried out within global public (...) spheres – be considered a form of or at least as a developing source for transnational solidarity. Together with the politics of human rights promoted by NGOs within global public spheres, this global discourse can contribute to constructing transnational solidarity around human rights. But a human right to basic subsistence, and commitment to fulfilling the correlative duties to the global poor, must be central to the cross-cultural dialogue on human rights for their to be adequate transnational solidarity around a global human rights regime. I frame my central argument through an engagement with Jürgen Habermas's revision of the Kantian cosmopolitan project. (shrink)

The privacy concerns discussed in the 1990s in relation to the New Genetics failed to anticipate the relevant issues for individuals, families, geneticists and society. Consumers, for example, can now buy their personal genetic information and share it online. The challenges facing genetic privacy have evolved as new biotechnologies have developed, and personal privacy is increasingly challenged by the irrepressible flow of electronic data between the personal and public spheres and by surveillance for terrorism and security risks. This book considers (...) the right to know and the right not to know about your own and others’ genomes. It discusses new privacy concerns and developments in ethical thinking, with the greater emphasis on solidarity and equity. The multidisciplinary approach covers current topics such as biobanks and forensic databases, DIY testing, group rights and accountability, the food we eat and the role of the press and the new digital media. (shrink)

Globally, one in eight people lacks access to potable water; more people die from unsafe drinking water than from all forms of violence, including war. A substantial body of research documents that the privatization of water – led by global financial institutions working in collusion with governments and corporations – does not lead to more people gaining access to safe water. In fact, the opposite is true: privatization leads to both higher cost and lower quality water. For the past century, (...) the dominant focus of transnational organizing has been “from the West to the rest,” and the frequent attention to movements in the global North has led to the neglect of transnational linkages between movements. Drawing on fieldwork conducted on three right to water movements that span three continents, this paper examines effortsto reclaim the water commons,and how struggles have been driven by grassroots movements demanding that democracy, transparency, and the human right to water are prioritized over corporate profit. As feminist scholars have pointed out, the “standpoint” offered by marginalized actors offers important insights into the operation of systems of power and the strategies of survival and resistance that less powerful actors adopt in order to survive and thrive. This paper explores how transnational movements around water and other basic rights engage with and learn from each other. (shrink)

Is the Right to the City (RTTC) still a useful framework for a transformative urban politics? Given recent scholarly criticism of its real-world applications and appropriations, in this paper, we argue that the transformative promise in the RTTC lies beyond its role as a framework for oppositional struggle, and in its normative ends. Building upon Henri Lefebvre's original writing on the subject, we develop a “radical-cooperative” conception of the RTTC. Such a view, which is grounded in the lived experiences (...) of the current city, envisions an urban society in which inhabitants can pursue their material and social needs through self-governed cooperation across social difference. Growing and diversifying spaces and sectors of urban life that are decoupled from global capitalism are, we argue, necessary to create space for this inclusionary politics. While grassroots action is essential to this process, so is multi-scalar support from the state. (shrink)

Although the right to health is universal, many nations that honor it fail to do so in the case of non-citizen immigrants. In this essay, we argue that the reasons typically given for not extending the right to health to immigrants are without merit and that there are good reasons for nations to protect, respect and fulfill the health right of all immigrants. Contrary to the standard view, we argue that health can be understood as a global (...) public good. Two important points follow: because health is non-excludable and non-rivalrous, it is in the health interests of nations to respect, protect and fulfill immigrants’ right to health. Furthermore, meeting the health needs of immigrants is an important way for receiving nations to meet the duties that may be generated by the benefits they incur as a result of health’s global public good dimension, thus ensuring that receiving nations are not free riders. We then argue that because citizens and immigrants dwell together, nations have duties of solidarity to immigrants with respect to health. Using the insights of social psychology, we show that solidarity among diverse people is both a reasonable expectation and a morally desirable one. (shrink)

In this short paper I will discuss the ambiguous and, even, controversial term ‘right to die’ in the context of the euthanasia debate and, in particular, in the case of passive euthanasia. First I will present the major objections towards the moral legitimacy of a right to die, most of which I also endorse myself; then I will investigate whether the right to die could acquire adequate moral justification in the case of passive euthanasia. In the light (...) of the Kantian tradition I will argue that since rights are understood as based upon duties, the right to die should also presuppose a corresponding duty, which to me could be either an imperfect, solidarity-related duty, or an autonomy-related one, at least as far as the unwanted prolongation of life is concerned. I will conclude with the view that the right to die could actually be considered a legitimate one in the case of passive euthanasia, when the application of life-supporting techniques is against the wishes and the best interests of the patient. (shrink)

The recent and ongoing refugee crisis in Europe highlights conflicting attitudes about the rights of migrants and refugees to health care in transition and destination countries. Some European and Scandinavian states, such as Germany and Sweden, have welcomed large numbers of migrants, while others, such as the U.K., have been significantly less open. In part, this is because of reluctance by certain national governments to incur what are seen as the high costs of delivering aid and care to migrants. In (...) response to these assumptions, some theorists have argued that the appropriate way to view the health needs of migrants is not in terms of rights, but in terms of the interests of destination and transition countries—and have argued that providing care to migrants and refugees will generate benefits for their host countries. However, self‐interest alone is less effective at motivating the provision of care for health deprivations that do not pose a threat to third parties, or to migrants and refugees in poor or distant countries. In this paper, I argue that while self‐interest is unlikely in itself to motivate the provision of all necessary health care to all migrants and refugees, and may risk stigmatizing already vulnerable persons, it can provide the foundation upon which such motivations can be built. My goal is therefore to show how and why a more just approach to the provision of health care to migrants can and should be derived from narrower, self‐interested commitments to preserving citizen health. (shrink)

Avia Pasternak’s account of permissible political rioting includes a constraint that insists only oppressed citizens, and not privileged citizens, are permitted to riot when rioting is justified. This discussion note argues that Pasternak’s account, with which I largely agree, should be expanded to admit the permissibility of privileged citizens rioting alongside and in solidarity with oppressed citizens. The permissibility of privileged citizens participating in riots when rioting is justified is grounded in the notions that it is sometimes necessary, in (...) accordance with Pasternak’s necessity condition, and that it will oftentimes substantially improve the chances of successfully achieving the just aims the rioting seeks to achieve, in accordance with Pasternak’s success condition. Allowing for this improves Pasternak’s already strong account of permissible political rioting on its own terms. (shrink)

I argue that the right to solidarity may be understood as the negative right not to be hindered by social vulnerabilities in the exercise of citizen rights. I define social vulnerabilities as those vulnerabilities that result from structures of society. As a negative right, the right to solidarity shifts attention away from what is necessary for basic flourishing, and toward what is social structures that hinder full participation in other civic or political obligations and (...) rights. (shrink)

Within the last decade those familiar with environmental ethics have witnessed a resurgence of environmental virtue ethics. According to Louke van Wensveen, ecological virtue language is “rapidly growing” and “represents a distinct moral discourse with an internal unity and logic”—what she calls “an integral discourse.” Does the modern Catholic rights tradition have anything to contribute to this ethical discourse? Grounded historically in neo-Thomistic natural law and virtue ethics, Catholic social teaching originated as a response to late ninteenth- and early twentieth-century (...) social and economic crises. Out of this application emerged the virtue of solidarity. However, an analysis of recent discourse in environmental virtue ethics shows that the treatment of solidarity as an environmental virtue is rather thin in the literature. Nevertheless, with the development of solidarity and the expanding notion of the common good, inclusive of the planetary commons, in recent Catholic documents, solidarity is “translatable” into the realm of ecological virtue ethics. As an environmental virtue, solidarity should be interpreted as “biophilic solidarity” grounded in the genetic homology of evolutionary speciation, and defined as the consistent habit of character expressed in the recognition of our fundamental interrelatedness with the human and nonhuman. As a virtue biophilic solidarity takes explicit shape in determined active engagement to create, promote, and restore the universal common good of creation. In relation to the human-centered Catholic rights tradition, the status of nature is examined drawing on an axiological analysis of nature indicating that the natural world holds a spectrum of values including utilitarian and intrinsic value. The concluding reflection points to the shortfall of environmental virtue ethics without an accompanying social ethic in the interest of an ecological vision for a sustainable society. (shrink)

Critics of exclusionary borders might be tempted to appeal for more hospitality, but this essay argues that such an approach is misguided and develops an alternative framework called solidarity borders. The ongoing legacies of imperialism, the functioning of global capitalism, and insights from democratic theory show that we need to problematize two key presuppositions of hospitality: a clear distinction between hosts and guests, and the exclusive right of the former to impose conditions. Moreover, Jacques Derrida provides limited guidance (...) as to how to enact necessarily conditional hospitality in the most just manner. By contrast, Iris Marion Young’s social connection model highlights the shared responsibility that actors bear to reduce structural injustice. Drawing out the implications of Young’s work for migration and borders, I argue that solidarity borders would build upon, expand, and modify the existing refugee regime. (shrink)

Recent work has stressed the importance of the concept of solidarity to bioethics and social philosophy generally. But can and should it feature in documents such as the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights as anything more than a vague notion with multiple possible interpretations? Although noting the tension between universality and particularity that such documents have to deal with, and also noting that solidarity has a political content, the paper explores the suggestion that solidarity should (...) feature more centrally in international regulations. The paper concludes with the view that when solidarity is seen aright, the UDBHR is an implicitly solidaristic document. (shrink)

This article argues that aspects of the animal rights view can be constructively modulated through a communitarian approach and come to promote animal welfare through the social contexts of expanded caring communities. The Nordic welfare state is presented as a conceivable caring community within which animals could be viewed and treated appropriately as co-citizens with solidarity based rights and duties.

현대 가톨릭교회의 평화 사상과 국제사회의 ‘평화권’ 운동은 모 두 ‘보편적 인권’에 기반하는 평화체제’를 강조한다. 가톨릭 평화사 상과 국제사회의 평화운동이 같은 노선 위에서 변화를 가져올 수 있었던 배경은 제2차 세계대전 이후의 사회변화에 있다. 전쟁의 참 상, 빈곤의 고통, 국가 간 갈등을 발생시키는 구조적 폭력의 문제 들은 인권의 문제를 직시하게 만들었다. ‘평화권’에 대한 구상은 더 는 물리적 폭력이 없는 소극적 평화에 만족하지 않고, 경제 사회 문화적인 구조적 폭력을 없애는 적극적 평화개념에 이르렀다. 평 화 만들기를 위한 제안들은 ‘평화롭게 살 권리’와 ‘연대권’으로 개 념화되고 (...) 있다. 이 권리들은 ‘전쟁을 거부할 권리’, ‘군사외교안보 정책을 민주적으로 통제할 권리’, ‘발전과 환경에 대한 권리’ 등을 포괄하며, 평화권이 개인과 집단의 권리이며 의무라는 점을 확인 한다. 난민을 포함한 이주민의 문제도 국가 간 불평등을 제거해야 하는 평화의 문제에 속한다. ‘평화권’ 개념은 가톨릭의 평화사상과 공통된 지향을 가질 뿐 아 니라, 아래로부터 요구되는 평화운동으로 이해할 수 있다. 한국사 회에서 ‘평화권’은 특별히 1919년 ‘거리의 평화운동’을 계승한다는 역사적 의의도 지닌다. 여전히 냉전시대를 살고 있는 비동시적 상 황에서, 한국사회는 ‘평화권’에 기초한 새로운 평화주의 원리를 발 전시켜야 할 과제를 지닌다. 그 원리는 한국사회의 민주주의를 발 전시키고, 한반도의 문제를 안정적이고 지속적으로 풀어 나가는 방안이어야 하며, ‘동아시아 평화 공동체’를 만들어 나가는 동력이 되어야 한다. (shrink)

In this article, I contend that a concept of hope in terms of process theology can better deal with Miguel De La Torre's criticisms of theology of hope than Jurgen Moltmann's rightly famous treatment of this topic.

Contemporary human rights norms originated in the West and are in some tension with the cultural practices of developing nations. The distinctive African charter of rights stresses peoples' rights, questioning the liberal focus on the rights of individuals. Yet with regard to economic rights, Africa and the West face a similar human rights challenge, though for different reasons. The zero-sum politics generated by extreme want guarantee that African people will not escape oppression, poverty, and violence through multiparty politics and free (...) markets alone. Effective commitment to economic rights is needed. This commitment will challenge both existing patterns of power in Africa and the presuppositions of liberal understandings of rights in the West. Only a new consensus in Africa and the West on an inclusive understanding of rights -both civil/political and social/ economic / cultural -holds hope for the betterment of African societies. (shrink)

Effective Altruism is a popular social movement that encourages individuals to donate to organizations that effectively address humanity’s most severe poverty. However, because Effective Altruists are committed to doing the most good in the most effective ways, they often argue that it is wrong to help those nearest to you. In this paper, I target a major subset of Effective Altruists who consider it a moral obligation to do the most good possible. Call these Obligation-Oriented Effective Altruists (OOEAs), and their (...) movement Obligation-Oriented Effective Altruism (OOEA). I argue that insofar as this variety of OOEA seems to commit us to refrain from helping the people right in front of us, there is something intuitively wrong about it. In response, I introduce an alternative model that embraces partiality: Mutual Aid. Mutual Aid is a network of community members, usually from the same geographical region, who share a commitment to offer, receive, and exchange material goods, wealth, and social support. I recommend Mutual Aid as a liberatory model, which—through empathy, solidarity, and care—mobilizes community building and provides a catalyst for community advocacy. As such, we should resist the claims of OOEAs that partially distributing our funds to people or causes we care about is morally wrong or even less than ideal. We do not have a moral obligation to use our funds “effectively;” rather, we have a broader obligation to address human suffering, and Mutual Aid is one moral alternative for discharging this duty. (shrink)

For several years the authors have been working in Detroit with grassroots coalitions resisting Emergency Management. In this essay, we focus on how community groups in Detroit and Flint advanced common struggles for clean, safe, affordable water as a human right, particularly during the period of 2014 to 2016. We explore how, through a series of direct interventions – including public meetings and international gatherings, independent journalism and social media, community-based research projects, and citizen-led policy initiatives – these groups (...) contributed to challenging neoliberal governance, to undermining the legitimacy of state officials and their policies, and to shifting public consciousness around the human right to water. (shrink)

The paper argues that the liberal approach to social rights is contradictory and provides an alternative account that draws on solidarism, a strand of nineteenth-century French Republican thought. Solidarism links together a normative theory of social obligation and a descriptive account of social value, debt and unearned increment. The theory of social property provides a distinctive foundation for social rights.

This paper examines the ways that feminists have built on and transformed Mary Wollstonecraft’s Enlightenment idea that women’s rights are human rights. It argues that Wollstonecraft’s marginal attention to the issue of sexual violence reflects the mind-body dualism of her era where reason divorced from the body established our dignity as persons. Today’s feminists reject this dualism. They have adopted and retooled Wollstonecraft’s idea that women’s rights are human rights to (1) create solidarity among women of different places, races, (...) classes, religions etc., (2) break the silence surrounding the experience and meaning of rape, and (3) create grassroots, national and international forums that expose the fact that sexual violence is one of the crucial anchors of patriarchy. Wollstonecraft believed that human rights were guaranteed by reason and God. We find that these rights are embodied and fragile. They depend on us to make them real. Addressing this responsibility, the paper ends with a question: Are we up to the task? (shrink)

Whereas in the 1970s early bioethicists believed that bioethics is an arena for the application of philosophical theories of utilitarianism, deontology, and natural law thinking, contemporary policy-oriented bioethicists seem rather to be keen on framing ethical issues through political ideologies. Bioethicists today are often labeled “liberal” or “communitarian,” referring to their different understandings of the relationship between the individual and society. Liberal individualism, with its conceptual base of autonomy, dignity, and privacy, enjoyed a long period of dominance in bioethics, but (...) it has increasingly come under attack from ideologies promoting a more salient role for concepts of solidarity, community, and public interest. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal CommunityPaul HendricksonThe University of South Carolina. Hauke Brunkhorst. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005. Pp. xxv + 262. $42.50, hardcover.Public appeals to solidarity have been pervasive throughout the storied history of political dissent and democratic politics. From the French Revolution and the European revolutions of 1848 to decolonization, Polish Solidarność, and the antiglobalization movement, solidarity has been invoked as (...) a means of reinventing citizenship, rights, and community. Yet political theorists have not generally accorded the concept of solidarity a degree of attention comparable to that afforded other core political concepts, such as freedom, equality, and deliberation. In Solidarity, Hauke Brunkhorst seeks to remedy this neglect, arguing that the concept of solidarity should be deemed fundamental to democratic theory and practice: "In modern societies, solidarity coincides with the concept of democracy" (xxiii). Brunkhorst presents this thesis as a corrective to current theory, but he also develops it—in the spirit of much Frankfurt School theorizing—as a Zeitdiagnose, as a timely diagnosis, regarding the threats globalization poses to democratic self-governance: "Power, law, and money are globalized [today] at the expense of democratic solidarity" (7).Solidarity, as Brunkhorst understands it, is a thoroughly modern concept. The "ideas of 1789"—in particular, the fraternité of the French Revolution—provided the historical foundation for an egalitarian and democratic model of solidarity. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the concept of solidarity [End Page 343] gradually replaced that of fraternity in the wake of industrialization. Drawing on Marx, Brunkhorst argues that what promoted working-class solidarity was "not the local sympathy of communal relations or the friendly affection... of a tightly structured polis," but rather the railway, the steamship, and the telegraph (60). Brunkhorst's historiography is woven into a broad social-theoretic framework. Following Durkheim, he reasons that the modern division of labor is not founded on the mechanical solidarity of Gemeinschaft, on a shared sense of affinity, ritual, and communal belonging, but on the organic solidarity of Gesellschaft, on the integration of an individualized, pluralist, and functionally differentiated society.To readers acquainted with contemporary German appropriations of the sociological tradition, many of Brunkhorst's conceptual moves will seem familiar. But his unique fusion of social-theoretic and historical argumentation yields a fascinating and novel characterization of solidarity. For Brunkhorst, solidarity is not a form of sentiment or emotional bond; it is not premised on compassion for "tormentable bodies" (Brecht) or on a "flexible feeling of sympathy" (Rorty); rather, "it is nothing but the democratic realization of individual freedom" (3). This normative model of solidarity is guided by the regulative ideal of a political association without domination; it envisages a polity in which the individual is neither servant nor master to her compatriots. As modes of governance become increasingly globalized, democratic forms of solidarity must reach beyond the rights traditions of particular nation-states to include a "human-rights patriotism."Brunkhorst traces this ideal back to Greco-Roman antiquity and the Judeo-Christian tradition. Drawing principally on the writings of Greek and Roman philosophers, he argues that civic friendship (philia) provided a space for mutual freedom, emancipated individuals from the bonds of kinship, generalized friendship into a form of patriotism (philia politike), and realized the universal essence of man as a political being. But this civic-republican model remained profoundly elitist, excluding the many on the basis of gender, class, and citizenship status. More suggestive and original is Brunkhorst's treatment of Jewish and Christian thought. The intersection between rhetoric and philosophy is central to his interpretation of the Exodus story and covenant theology as a form of collective countermemory and as a prophetic practice of critique. Through his reading of the Jotham fable and other biblical narratives, he argues that the Jewish prophets and the Christian New Testament avowed "the equal proximity of all humans to God" and contributed to a "prophetic project of egalitarian solidarity" (33, 36). [End Page 344]Brunkhorst's historical reconstructions culminate in the French Revolution. On his view, the otherworldly universalism of the Judeo-Christian tradition was secularized and institutionalized in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789) and the first French... (shrink)

This paper provides the theoretical analysis of forms of solidarity in academia and its relationship to academic integrity. This analysis is inspired by the Guidelines for an Institutional Code of Ethics in Higher Education drawn up by the International Association of Universities and the Magna Charta Observatory. These Guidelines refer to the principle of solidarity in the context of international cooperation between higher education institutions. However, the author of this paper believes that this principle might also be used (...) in a broader academic context, in particular, in the field of academic ethics and academic integrity. Therefore, this paper aims at revealing the relevance of solidarity in academia and argues that the principle of solidarity can be considered as one of fundamental principles of academic ethics and should be reflected in the structure and provisions of the codes of academic ethics. For this purpose the author explores the philosophical and sociological approaches towards solidarity and defines the concept of academic solidarity, discusses the conceptual connection between academic solidarity, ethics and integrity and illustrates the impact of solidarity on the development of academic integrity. This analysis allows the author of the paper to recommend embedding the principle of solidarity in the codes of academic ethics of higher education institutions as well as extending the scope of its application by linking the rights and responsibilities of different groups within the academic community in a way that best expresses their unity, shared responsibility, mutual support in meeting the standards of social ethos. (shrink)

Three recently published reports show to what extent democracy is losing ground in a global context increasingly characterized by authoritarianism and populism. The argument this articles proposes is that the deplorable state of democracies around the world is due to the neglect of substantial characteristics and sources of democracy, which are above all trust and solidarity. Democracy has three different, but interrelated sources that are built upon each other according to a lexical order. A democracy is first based upon (...) political rights, there is in an inherent liberal component to democracy. Second, a democracy requires trust among citizens and individuals that only some form of common identity is going to produce. Third, democracy is based upon strong forms of equality that are brought about by solidarity. The article comes to following conclusions: First, as the experience of Islamophobia and racism in Europe and authoritarianism in the Arab world shows, the concepts of illiberal democracy or majoritarianism currently promoted by strongmen around the globe do not stand for proper democratic political systems. Second, in our plural societies, neither thick nationalism nor strong multiculturalism does support the development of the democratic spirit. Third, Republicanism in Rousseau’s tradition is right that inequalities are the main cause undermining full democracies. A democracy requires the solidarity of the welfare state. (shrink)

In today’s digital societies, it has become very difficult for people to exercise meaningful control over what and how data is collected and used. McCoy and colleagues (2023) seek to address this p...

The emerging international biomedical law tends to recognise the right not to know one’s genetic status. However, the basis and conditions for the exercise of this right remain unclear in domestic laws. In addition to this, such a right has been criticised at the theoretical level as being in contradiction with patient’s autonomy, with doctors’ duty to inform patients, and with solidarity with family members. This happens especially when non-disclosure poses a risk of serious harm to (...) the patient’s relatives who, without that vital information, could be deprived of preventive or therapeutic measures. This paper argues, firstly, that individuals may have a legitimate interest in not knowing their genetic make up to avoid serious psychological consequences; secondly, that this interest, far from being contrary to autonomy, may constitute an enhancement of autonomy; thirdly, that the right not to know cannot be presumed, but must be “activated” by the individual’s explicit choice, and fourthly, that this is not an absolute right, in the sense that it may be restricted when disclosure to the patient is necessary in order to avoid a risk of serious harm to third persons. (shrink)

This article tries to analyze the meaning and relevance of the concept of solidarity as compared to the concept of justice. While ‘justice’ refers to rights and duties , the concept of solidarity refers to relations of personal commitment and recognition . The article wants to answer the question whether solidarity and liberal justice should be seen as mutually exclusive or whether both approaches should be regarded as complementary to each other. The paper starts with an analysis (...) of liberal theories of justice which are followed by an analysis of the descriptive and a moral understanding of the concept of solidarity. The importance of solidarity lies in its relational aspects, particularly its emphasis on cooperation and commonality. The paper argues that while solidarity is more fundamental than justice, both concepts are important for the arrangement of health care practices. The paper gives special attention to the concept of decent care, reflective solidarity and humanitarian solidarity which is seen as fundamental for all health care policies and care practices. (shrink)

Some healthcare systems are said to be grounded in solidarity because healthcare is funded as a form of mutual support. This article argues that health care systems that are grounded in solidarity have the right to penalise some users who are responsible for their poor health. This derives from the fact that solidary systems involve both rights and obligations and, in some cases, those who avoidably incur health burdens violate obligations of solidarity. Penalties warranted include direct (...) patient contribution to costs, and lower priority treatment, but not typically full exclusion from the healthcare system. We also note two important restrictions on this argument. First, failures of solidary obligations can only be assumed under conditions that are conducive to sufficiently autonomous choice, which occur when patients are given ‘Golden Opportunities’ to improve their health. Second, because poor health does not occur in a social vacuum, an insistence on solidarity as part of healthcare is legitimate only if all members of society are held to similar standards of solidarity. We cannot insist upon, and penalise failures of, solidarity only for those who are unwell, and who cannot afford to evade the terms of public health. (shrink)

The value of solidarity, which is exemplified in noble groups like the Civil Rights Movement along with more mundane teams, families and marriages, is distinctive in part because people are in solidarity over, for or with regard to something, such as common sympathies, interests, values, etc. I use this special feature of solidarity to resolve a longstanding puzzle about enacted social moral rules, which is, aren’t these things just heuristics, rules of thumb or means of coordination that (...) we ‘fetishize’ or ‘worship’ if we stubbornly insist on sticking to them when we can do more good by breaking them? I argue that when we are in a certain kind of solidarity with others, united by social moral rules that we have established among ourselves, the rules we have developed and maintain are a constitutive part of our solidary relationships with one another; and it is part of being in this sort of solidarity with our comrades that we are presumptively required to follow the social moral rules that join us together. Those in the Polish Revolution, for example, were bound by informally enforced rules about publicity, free speech and the use of violence, so following their own rules became a way of standing in a valuable sort of solidarity with one another. I explain why we can have non-instrumental reasons to follow the social moral rules that exist in our own society, improve our rules and even sometimes to break the otherwise good rules that help to unite us. (shrink)

According to David Miller, immigration is not a human right. Conversely, Kieran Oberman makes a case for immigration as a human right. We agree with the latter view, but we show that its starting point is mistaken. Indeed, both Miller and Oberman discuss the right to immigration within the liberal paradigm: it is a right or not depending on the correct balance between the interests of the citizens of a given national state and the interests of (...) the immigrants. Instead, we claim that public justification can underpin immigration as a human right. That said, the public justification of the right to immigration has several counterarguments to rebut. Before we deal with that issue, relying on Jürgen Habermas’s social theory, we examine the legal structures that could support the right to immigration in practice. To be sure, this does not provide the normative justification needed, instead it shows the framework that allows the institutional realization of this right. Then, through a combination of civic and cosmopolitan forms of solidarity, the article discusses the formation of a public sphere, which could provide the justification of the right to immigration. (shrink)

Democracy has become disentangled from our ordinary lives. Mere cooperation or ethical consumption now often stands in for a robust concept of solidarity that structures the entirety of sociality and forms the basis of democratic culture. How did democracy become something that is done only at ballot boxes and what role can solidarity play in reviving it? In Solidarity in Conflict, Rochelle DuFord presents a theory of solidarity fit for developing democratic life and a complementary theory (...) of democracy that emerges from a society typified by solidarity. DuFord argues that solidarity is best understood as a set of relations, one agonistic and one antagonistic: the solidarity groups' internal organization and its interactions with the broader world. Such a picture of solidarity develops through careful consideration of the conflicts endemic to social relations and solidarity organizations. Examining men's rights groups, labor organizing's role in recognitional protections for LGBTQ members of society, and the debate over trans inclusion in feminist praxis, DuFord explores how conflict, in these contexts, becomes the locus of solidarity's democratic functions and thereby critiques democratic theorizing for having become either overly idealized or overly focused on building and maintaining stability. Working in the tradition of the Frankfurt School, DuFord makes a provocative case that the conflict generated by solidarity organizations can address a variety of forms of domination, oppression, and exploitation while building a democratic society. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a descriptive and normative analysis of the requirements for effective transnational solidarity between southern NGOs and their northern partners. Drawing on interviews conducted with staff members of Senegalese women’s rights NGOs and a private international development foundation, I contend that existing theories of feminist transnational solidarity cannot allow us to properly acknowledge the power asymmetries and obstacles to solidarity that these NGOs are facing. After assessing the divisions related to gender interests and (...) limited resources that characterize this NGO-ized development landscape, I develop a partial theory of transnational solidarity that would center power asymmetries in order to address practical and political obstacles to solidarity. I argue that an effective account of transnational solidarity must include a commitment to disrupting global hierarchies of power as well as to building practices of accountability and attentiveness to power structures. (shrink)

Solidarity has for a long time been referred to as the core value underpinning European health and welfare systems. But there has been debate in recent years about whether solidarity, with its alleged communitarian content, can be reconciled with the emphasis on individual freedom and personal autonomy. One may wonder whether there is still a place for solidarity, and whether the concept of justice should be embraced to analyse the moral issues regarding access to health care. In (...) this article, I will answer this question by analysing the normative foundations of the concept of justice, followed by a deeper examination of the concept of solidarity in continental philosophy. More specifically, I will compare the philosophical traditions rooted in Kant (with emphasis on autonomy and individual rights) to approaches rooted in Hegel (with emphasis on individual relations of recognition). In addition, I will present the work of Avishai Margalit on the decent society to criticize a predominantly liberal approach to access to health care. The importance of solidarity lies particularly in its emphasis on relational aspects and the role of recognition in care practices, which are usually ignored in liberal approaches to justice. However, the article will argue that solidarity is not an alternative to a rights-based concept of justice, but must be considered as a necessary complement to it. (shrink)

The principle of solidarity is one of the fundamental legal principles applied in the field of health care regulation. This article analyses EU and Lithuanian legal acts, judicial practice, the doctrine of law and foreign scientific resources in order to reveal the content of solidarity principle and to discuss its role in the legal regulation of health care both at EU and national levels. The article is divided into three parts. The first part of the paper examines the (...) correlation between the right to health established in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (the Charter) and the principle of solidarity as the fundamental value upon which the EU is ‘founded’ and which it seeks to ‘preserve and develop’, as the preamble to the Charter states. It is noticed that the principle of solidarity is one of the principles which characterize the European law on social protection. In the summary of the findings of the article, the author states that this principle can be considered as a tool to achieve a greater social cohesion within the EU Member States in defining and implementing all policies and activities in order to ensure a high level of human physical, mental and social health protection through, first of all, a reduction of health care inequalities. For that it is necessary to tackle the factors which determine health care inequalities among the EU Member States. (shrink)