This book argues that sometimes we have reasons to overcome repression and that these reasons are unlike any other reasons for action typically recognized by philosophers.

The expression “repressed memory” was introduced over 100 years ago as a theoretical term purportedly referring to an unobservable psychological entity postulated by Freud’s seduction theory. That theory, however, and its hypothesized cognitive architecture, have been thoroughly debunked—yet the term “repressed memory” seems to remain. In this paper I offer a philosophical evaluation of the meaning of this theoretical term as well as an argument to question its scientific status by comparing it to other cases of theoretical terms that have (...) either survived scientific change—such as “atom” or “gene”—or that have perished, such as “black bile”. Ultimately, I argue that “repressed memory” is more like “black bile” than “atom” or “gene” and, thus, recommend its demotion from our scientific vocabulary. (shrink)

The origins of Axel Honneth's theory of recognition lie in his earlier project to correct the conceptual confusions and empirical shortcomings of historical materialism for the purpose of an adequate post-Habermasian critical social theory. Honneth proposed to accomplish this project, most strikingly, by reconnecting critical social theory with one of its repressed philosophical sources, namely anthropological materialism. In its mature shape, however, recognition theory operates on a narrow concept of interaction, which seems to lose sight of the material mediations with (...) which intersubjective relations are imbricated. The paper argues that a circumspect return to this twofold materialist heritage could substantively correct and enrich contemporary critical theory. The paper provides an illustration of this with the paradigmatic example of work. (shrink)

The notion of repression as active forgetfulness already found in Nietzsche and systematised by Freud and his successors is employed in a distinctive manner by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception. By showing how we appropriate our environment towards outcomes and respond to other people, he contends, we can unearth hidden modes of operative intentionality. Two such modes are the motor intentional projection of action and the anonymous intercorporeality that includes touching and being touched. Each of these is an aspect (...) of a past that was never a present. Merleau-Ponty does have something to say about pasts that were once present and that linger on in human life. Yet he shows little interest in the unconsciousness of psychoanalysis for its own sake. Psychoanalytic accounts of repression are assimilated into his theory of the body itself, serving merely as means for illustrating the latter. I suggest that this move follows on a conception of an integrated existent whose past acquisitions are remarkably enabling and untroubling. (shrink)

Erdelyi's dialectical repression theory attempts to reconcile what appear to be incompatible perspectives in the contentious area of memory for trauma. He partially succeeds and makes a strong case that repression is “an empirical fact,” but makes a weaker case that distortions and omissions are due to the same mechanism and that recovered memories are necessarily unreliable. Available data do not suggest that the return of the repressed is any less accurate than the return of the non-repressed.

Pleiotropically acting eukaryotic corepressors such as retinoblastoma and SIN3 have been found to physically interact with many widely expressed “housekeeping” genes. Evidence suggests that their roles at these loci are not to provide binary on/off switches, as is observed at many highly cell‐type specific genes, but rather to serve as governors, directly modulating expression within certain bounds, while not shutting down gene expression. This sort of regulation is challenging to study, as the differential expression levels can be small. We hypothesize (...) that depending on context, corepressors mediate “soft repression,” attenuating expression in a less dramatic but physiologically appropriate manner. Emerging data indicate that such regulation is a pervasive characteristic of most eukaryotic systems, and may reflect the mechanistic differences between repressor action at promoter and enhancer locations. Soft repression may represent an essential component of the cybernetic systems underlying metabolic adaptations, enabling modest but critical adjustments on a continual basis. (shrink)

It is shown that the facts of behavior which Freud sought to encompass by his distinction of Primary and Secondary Process can be formulated in terms of Skinner's system of behavior. This is illustrated by considering the 'primary process' behavior in dreaming, some of whose characteristics according to Freud are: it is illogical and random; visual images predominate in primary process thinking; it is highly charged with affect compared to 'secondary process' thinking; it shows 'condensation' — the fusing together of (...) two or more images into a single image. It is shown that all of these properties can be derived from Skinner's account of behavior. It is then pointed out that both Freud and Skinner have pointed to similar controlling variables of behavior, utilized mainly similar processes, and drawn many of the same distinctions. Implications for contemporary criticisms of Skinner's account of 'thinking' are pointed out. The above is preceded by a preliminary argument that since both Freud and Skinner performed functional analyses of behavior, it should be possible to compare the two accounts if the 'superfluous' middle term — the intrapsychic apparatus — in Freud's account is ignored. It is pointed out that in extrapolating his system to human behavior, Skinner has described in terms of his own system some of the characteristically 'Freudian' facts of behavior, and his formulations on the phenomena of 'repression' are summarized. The Skinnerian formulation of the primary and secondary process distinction is then presented in support of the argument that other facts of behavior which have not been discussed by Skinner can nevertheless be represented within his system of behavior. (shrink)

This volume seeks to explain how American society, which had been capable of noble aspirations such as those in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution, was capable of adopting one of the most widely deplored statutes of our history, the Sedition Act of 1798. It examines how the political ideals of the American Revolution were undermined by the adoption of repressive doctrines of the English monarchial system - the criminalization of criticism against the king, the Parliament, the judiciary, and (...) Christianity. Freedom of speech was dramatically confined, and this law remained unchallenged until well into the twentieth century. This book will be of keen interest to all concerned with the early Republic, freedom of speech, and evolution of American constitutional jurisprudence. Because it addresses the much-criticized Sedition Act of 1798, one of the most dramatic illustrations of this repressive jurisprudence, the book will also be of interest to Americans concerned about preserving free speech in wartime. (shrink)

A major weakness in Erdelyi's account concerns the claim that repression can become conscious. A relational account of cognition demonstrates that if repression is successful, then the repressive act cannot become known. Additionally, “resistance” further distinguishes “repression” from “suppression.” Rather than blurring the distinction between these processes, it is possible to recognise a series of defences. Suggestions are provided for alternative research avenues.

Fredric Jameson's exacting essay, "The Symbolic Interference; or, Kenneth Burke and Ideological Analysis" Critical Inquiry 4 [Spring 1978]: 507-23) moves me to comment. I shall apply one of my charges of my title to him, he applies the other to me. The matter is further complicated by the fact that there is a distance at which they are hard to tell apart. For any expression of something implies a repression of something else, and any statement that goes only so (...) far is analyzable as serving to forestall a statement that goes farther. And I can't go as far as I think if I share with Jameson what I take to be his over-investment in the term "ideology." . . . the line between the implicit and the explicit being so wavering, there are many cases where the distinctions between conscious and unconscious become correspondingly blurred. But the kind of methodological repression that is implicit in Jameson's hermeneutic model can be wasteful beyond necessity. For it encourages him to be so precociously prompt in his "rereading" of a text that he doesn't allow his readers to read a single sentence of it. He doesn't tell them what Sinn, in its own terms, my text has on the subject of "ideology," "mystification," and the "unconscious." Instead, he cuts corners and settles for a report of the Bedeutung that it has for him. In this case the procedure is particularly wasteful because Jameson is highly intelligent, and if it weren't for the bad leads of his models he's the last man in the world who would have to be so bluntly inaccurate as he is on this occasion. I believe that he could put me through quite a trying ordeal if he could have but kept on the subject and pursued me accordingly. Kenneth Burke's previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are "Dancing with Tears in My Eyes" , "Post-Poesque Derivation of a Terministic Cluster" , " Motion/ Action" , and a hermeneutic fantasy, "A Critical Load . . ." . He would like us to mention that William Willeford, the interlocutor of a section in " Motion/ Action," is a professor of English at the University of Washington. (shrink)

This paper explores Sigmund Freud's concept of repression in the existential strife exhibited by two main characters, Makar Alexyevitch and Varvara Alexyevna, in Fyodor Dostoevsky's "Poor People." To demonstrate this, I psychoanalyze of how they handle their repressed desires, emphasizing the necessity of Freud's main rule for this method: Openness. Dostoevsky's "Poor People" presents an existential crisis handled through openness and mishandled when an individual represses one's desires. In delving into Dostoevsky's first novel, I demonstrate a link between the (...) existential and psychological, wherein individuals strive to overcome themselves. Surprisingly, this link has a common influence between Dostoevsky and Freud: Immanuel Kant. I briefly discuss this shared similarity to show the basic idea of an "existential middle" derived from a Freudian psychoanalysis of Dostoevsky's "Poor People.". (shrink)

Hearing the news from South America at the turn of the millennium can be like traveling in time: here are the trials of Pinochet, the searches for "the disappeared" in Argentina, the investigation of the death of former president Goulart in Brazil, the Peace Commission in Uruguay, the Archive of Terror in Paraguay, a Truth Commission in Peru. As societies struggle to come to terms with the past and with the vexing questions posed by ineradicable memories, this wise book offers (...) guidance. Combining a concrete sense of present urgency and a theoretical understanding of social, political, and historical realities, State Repression and the Labors of Memory fashions tools for thinking about and analyzing the presences, silences, and meanings of the past. With unflappable good judgment and fairness, Elizabeth Jelin clarifies the often muddled debates about the nature of memory, the politics of struggles over memories of historical injustice, the relation of historiography to memory, the issue of truth in testimony and traumatic remembrance, the role of women in Latin American attempts to cope with the legacies of military dictatorships, and problems of second-generation memory and its transmission and appropriation. Jelin's work engages European and North American theory in its exploration of the various ways in which conflicts over memory shape individual and collective identities, as well as social and political cleavages. In doing so, her book exposes the enduring consequences of repression for social processes in Latin America, and at the same time enriches our general understanding of the fundamentally conflicted and contingent nature of memory. A timely exploration of the nature ofmemory and its political uses. (shrink)

The mechanisms used to establish embryonic polarity are still largely unknown. A recent paper(1) describes the expression pattern of the gene glp‐1, which is required for induction events during development of the nematode Caenorhabditis elegans. Although glp‐1 RNA is found throughout the early embryo, Glp‐1 protein is only expressed in anterior cells. This negative translational regulation in posterior cells is shown to be mediated through sequences in the glp‐1 3′ untranslated region (3′UTR). Thus in nematodes, as in Drosophila, translational (...) class='Hi'>repression is one mechanism used to establish the embryonic anterior‐posterior axis. (shrink)

Erdelyi grants emotional and cognitive qualities that can modulate consciousness and probably overlap with what is typically attributed to Such a broad appellation of repression explains virtually all behavior and lacks specificity. Repression and attention elucidate behavior in different clinical, cognitive, and cultural contexts. Refining these influences, we identify a few lacunae in Erdelyi's account.

The feuding factions of the memory wars, that is, those concerned with the validity of recovered memories versus those concerned with false memories, are unified by Erdelyi's theory of repression. Evidence shows suppression, inhibition, and retrieval blocking can have profound yet reversible effects on a memory's accessibility, and deserve as prominent a role in the recovered memory debate as evidence of false memories. Erdelyi's theory shows that both inhibitory and elaborative processes cooperate to keep unwanted memories out of consciousness.

By conflating Freudian repression with thought suppression and memory reconstruction, Erdelyi defines repression so broadly that the concept loses its meaning. Worse, perhaps, he fails to provide any evidence that repression actually happens, and ignores evidence that it does not.

How should insecure leaders deal with labor rights in the face of an economic downturn? Economic theory suggests that suppressing labor rights boosts the economy and that economic growth also dampens violent political opposition. As a result, the suppression of labor rights should contribute to more job security for leaders. However, some other scholars maintain that more repression actually increases the probability of opposition. As a result, the policy implication of this argument is that leaders would be better off (...) if they choose to improve the protection of labor rights. Our simple formal model demonstrates that the second argument is more likely to be the case. The probit analysis of 146 countries from 1984 to 2004 bears out this prediction. We also find that this relationship is stronger in non-democracies than in democracies. Our study appears to provide some support to Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s statement that policies that are good for political survival may not necessarily be good for the economy. (shrink)

Repression has become an empirical fact that is at once obvious and problematic. Fragmented clinical and laboratory traditions and disputed terminology have resulted in a Babel of misunderstandings in which false distinctions are imposed (e.g., between repression and suppression) and necessary distinctions not drawn (e.g., between the mechanism and the use to which it is put, defense being just one). “Repression” was introduced by Herbart to designate the (nondefensive) inhibition of ideas by other ideas in their struggle (...) for consciousness. Freud adapted repression to the defensive inhibition of “unbearable” mental contents. Substantial experimental literatures on attentional biases, thought avoidance, interference, and intentional forgetting exist, the oldest prototype being the work of Ebbinghaus, who showed that intentional avoidance of memories results in their progressive forgetting over time. It has now become clear, as clinicians had claimed, that the inaccessible materials are often available and emerge indirectly (e.g., procedurally, implicitly). It is also now established that the Ebbinghaus retention function can be partly reversed, with resulting increases of conscious memory over time (hypermnesia). Freud's clinical experience revealed early on that exclusion from consciousness was effected not just by simple repression (inhibition) but also by a variety of distorting techniques, some deployed to degrade latent contents (denial), all eventually subsumed under the rubric of defense mechanisms (“repression in the widest sense”). Freudian and Bartlettian distortions are essentially the same, even in name, except for motive (cognitive vs. emotional), and experimentally induced false memories and other “memory illusions” are laboratory analogs of self-induced distortions. Key Words: avoidance; Bartlett; defense; denial; distortion; Ebbinghaus; false-memories; Freud; inhibition; repression; suppression. (shrink)

The coordinated expression of the Hox gene family encoding transcription factors is critical for proper embryonic development and patterning. Major efforts have thus been dedicated to understanding mechanisms controlling Hox expression. In addition to the temporal and spatial sequential activation of Hox genes, proper embryonic development requires that Hox genes get differentially silenced in a cell‐type specific manner as development proceeds. Factors contributing to Hox silencing include the polycomb repressive complexes (PRCs), which control gene expression through epigenetic modifications. This review (...) focuses on PRC‐dependent regulation of the Hox genes and is aimed at integrating the growing complexity of PRC functional properties in the context of Hox regulation. In particular, mechanisms underlying PRC binding dynamics as well as a series of studies that have revealed the impact of PRC on the 3D organization of the genome is discussed, which has a significant role on Hox regulation during development. (shrink)

Originally published in 1983. The nineteenth century was a time of great economic, social and political change. As Europe modernized, previously ignorant and apathetic elements in the population began to demand political freedoms. There was pressure also for a freer press, for the rights of assembly and association. The apprehension of the existing elites manifested itself in an intensification of often brutal form of political repression. The first part of this book summarizes on a pan-European basis, the major techniques (...) of repression such as the denial of popular franchise and press censorship. This is followed by a chronological survey of these techniques from 1815 – 1914 in each European country. The book analyzes the long and short-term importance of these events for European historical development in the 19 th and 20 th centuries. (shrink)

This is the first book-length philosophical study of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology and Freud’s theory of the unconscious. The book investigates the possibility for Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology to clarify Freud’s concept of the unconscious with a focus on the theory of repression as its centre. Repression is the unconscious activity of pushing something away from consciousness, while making sure that it remains active as something foreign within us. How this is possible is the main problem addressed in the work. (...) Unlike previous literature (including Ricœur, Merleau-Ponty and Derrida) this book makes full use of the resources of genetic phenomenology and passivity in the attempt to clarify the Freudian unconscious. The central argument developed is that the structure of the lebendige Gegenwart as the core of Husserl’s theory of passivity consists of preliminary forms of bodily kinaesthesia, feelings and drives in a constantly ongoing process where repression occurs as a necessary part of all constitution. The clarification of Freudian repression thus takes place by showing how it presupposes a broad conception of consciousness such as that presented by Husserl’s genetic phenomenology. By arguing that “repression” is central to any philosophical account of subjectivity, this book takes on the most distinct challenge to philosophy posed by Freud. (shrink)

In the article by M. Karpitsky "Repressions against Non-Moscow Orthodox Christians in the Donbass" on concrete facts it is shown how the persecution of separatists and with what motivation are found in the Donbass territory by the faithful of Protestant communities, the Churches of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Greek Catholic Church and the Roman Catholic Church. It is talked about how they manage to survive in constant persecution and torture.

Repression is one of the most haunting concepts in psychology. Something shocking happens, and the mind pushes it into some inaccessible corner of the unconscious. Later, the memory may emerge into consciousness. Repression is one of the foundation stones on which the structure of psychoanalysis rests. Recently there has been a rise in reported memories of childhood sexual abuse that were allegedly repressed for many years. With recent changes in legislation, people with recently unearthed memories are suing alleged (...) perpetrators for events that happened 20, 30, even 40 or more years earlier. These new developments give rise to a number of questions: (a) How common is it for memories of child abuse to be repressed? (b) How are jurors and judges likely to react to these repressed memory claims? (c) When the memories surface, what are they like? and (d) How authentic are the memories? (shrink)

Herbert Marcuse’s essay Repressive Tolerance (RP) has been praised by the Left and vilified by the Right for its alleged promotion of censorship targeting reactionary opinions and actions. I argue that this interpretation of the text is mistaken. According to my alternative reading of the text, RP should be understood as an exercise in provocation and irony aimed at defending civil disobedience and dissent. Marcuse’s defense of dissent, however, appeals to a critique of pure tolerance that exposes the unavoidably partisan (...) practice of tolerance, which invariably favors the reigning undemocratic status quo. The choice whether to tolerate in a manner that discriminates in favor of opinions and actions that are likely to advance the democratic conditions essential to a more just and epistemically sound exercise of toleration or to discriminate in favor of those that hinder them ---a distinction, as Marcuse sees it, that corresponds to the distinction between the Left and the Right---is dictated by reason itself, whose exercise depends on toleration. Because toleration must discriminate in the absence of full reason, its fallible exercise in favor of reason and democracy must proceed cautiously, not by suppressing voices on the Right so much as selectively encouraging those on the Left. I conclude that because this equation of impartial reason with a partisan view of society is unavoidable regardless of one’s political sympathies accusing Marcuse of being elitist and hypocritical is itself hypocritical. (shrink)

The present article undertakes a psychological reading of The Child's Conception of the World as a cultural artifact in which genetic psychology's naturalistic and positivistic assumptions reflect an Enlightenment model of science, and Piaget figures as an agent of technological rationality. A phenomenological analysis of the text reveals how Piaget's research engages in an active repression of specific dimensions of childhood experience. Young children's 'adualistic' conceptions of thought, self and language are deemed 'confused', and thereby discounted, by virtue of (...) the fact such children do not 'correctly' dichotomize experience in accord with the cultural norm of mechanistic rationality. Piaget's numerous associations of the child's 'primitive' views and the (childish) thought of the pre-Socratics are briefly explored. (shrink)

From the perspective of modern dream research, Freud's hypotheses regarding repression and dreaming are difficult to evaluate. Several studies indicate that it is possible to study these topics empirically, but it needs a lot more empirical evidence, at least in the area of dream research, before arriving at a unified theory of repression.

We argue that repression is primarily an unconscious process and that the position of Erdelyi is not coherent with Freud's views on the matter. Repression of ideas is a process that takes place without the knowledge of the subject. In this respect, it is essentially different from suppression, where ideas are acted upon by a conscious will.

ConclusionAlthough the paper points to many critical issues in the repressed memory debate, it does not adequately portray its full complexity. Focusing attention on the simplistic question of whether repressed memories exist or not deflects attention from the more promising issue of how traumatic memories are encoded and managed. Initial research indicates that encoding and managing traumatic memories may involve cognitive processes that are specific to traumatic experiences. Whilst recognising that repressed memory reports should not be accepted as historically accurate (...) recollections, there is a need to push ahead with rigorous research that extends our understanding of how traumatised people perceive and recall their unwanted experiences. (shrink)

Erdelyi's two key tenets – that repression may be conscious (“suppression”) and that it is context-sensitive – resonate well with findings on unipolar depression. Drawing from this field, I argue that (1) “oppression,” namely, pressure from significant others to refrain from attending to certain mental contents, influences individuals' repression/suppression; and that, (2) individuals actively create the very contexts that facilitate their repression/suppression.

Psychologists have often been criticized for their reluctance to engage with history, so it is interesting to find that historical accounts play an important role in the recovered memory/false memory syndrome debate. Using techniques of rhetorical and discursive analysis, we examined accounts of the historical origins of repression and of battlefield trauma in popular texts. The flexible and selective nature of these accounts was highlighted, and was discussed in terms of the rhetorical practice of ontological gerrymandering. Also, the employment (...) of discursive practices similar to Gilbert and Mulkay's (1984) `empiricist' and `contingent' repertoires was noted. We also comment upon how different understandings of the nature of history (as linear, cyclical, or geographical) were rhetorically employed by participants, and suggest that historical contexts are constructed for rhetorical effect. (shrink)

Even though it is relative to his motivational set, a reason to overcome repression is external in the sense that an agent cannot correctly deliberate about it. If he could correctly deliberate about it, he would already have overcome his repression and therefore would lose his reason to do so. Such cases stand as counterexamples to arguments about the existence of external reasons. For example, in their now famous debate, John McDowell concludes there are while Bernard Williams concludes (...) there are no external reasons for action. An external reason is a reason that motivates an agent simply because it is the right or reasonable thing to do. Williams, on the one hand, claims that an agent can only determine that a reason is right or reasonable by deliberating about it and all deliberation turns out to be internal. McDowell, on the other hand, claims that an agent can come to see that a reason is right or reasonable, not through deliberation, but merely through a conversion of normative perception. If one thinks, like McDowell, that some reasons can simply be perceived, then one is free to think, unlike McDowell, that the normativity of relative reasons can simply be perceived without deliberation. (shrink)

When Herbert Marcuse's essay entitled “Repressive tolerance” was published in the mid-1960s it was trenchantly criticised because it was anti-democratic and defied the academic canon of value neutrality. Yet his argument is attracting renewed interest in the 21st century, particularly when, post 9/11, the thresholds or limits of tolerance are being contested. This article argues that Marcuse's original essay was concerned to problematise the dominant social understandings of tolerance at the time, which were more about insisting that individual citizens tolerate (...) government policy than governments encourage debate and dissent. The article shows how Marcuse attempted to demonstrate the social production of knowledge about tolerance, and how he diagnosed the social function performed by “impartiality” and “relativism”, and by “neutrality” and “objectivity”, which contributed to tolerance being repressive. In the sense that he was concerned about what counted socially as tolerance, and how it was socially defended and justified, his article can helpfully be conceived as an exercise in social epistemology. (shrink)

_Neoliberalism and Academic Repression_ provides a theoretical examination of how the current higher education system is being shaped into a corporate-factory-industrial-complex. This timely collection challenges the neoliberal emphasis on valuation based on job readiness and outcome achievement.

Pierre Bourdieu's work on literature has frequently been criticized for its perceived failure to attend to the specificities of literary form. This article argues that, in fact, literary form plays an important role in Bourdieu's theorizations of literature, or rather, that form is called upon to play a range of different, potentially conflicting roles. Through close readings of both The Rules of Art and the 1975 essay ‘L'Invention de la vie d'artiste’, the article seeks to clarify the different roles Bourdieu (...) attributes to literary form, as that which both conceals and reveals ‘repressed’, ‘incorporated’ or ‘unconscious’ social realities. It will examine Bourdieu's contention that the literary work functions analogously to the Freudian dreamwork in this respect, and will question how appropriate or convincing that analogy proves to be. (shrink)

Freud attributed uncovered incest, initially, to real abuse dissociated from self-consciousness, and later, to wishes repressed from consciousness. Dissociation is preferred on theoretical and empirical grounds. Whereas dissociation emerges from double-aspect materialism, repression implicates Cartesian dualism. Several studies suggest that abnormal individuals dissociate trauma from self-conscious source-monitoring, thereby convincing themselves that the trauma is imaginary rather than real, and re-experience the trauma as an unbidden image.

This book focuses on the central party apparatus of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front branches established in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and Jordan in the 1970s, and the most influential and innovative of the DF women's organizations: the Palestinian Federation of Women's Action Committees in the occupied territories. Until now, no study of a Palestinian political organization has so thoroughly engaged with internal gender histories. In addition, no other work attempts to systematically compare branches (...) in different regional locations to explain those differences. Students of gender and Middle East studies, especially those with a specialty in Palestinian studies, will find this work to be of critical importance. This book will also be of great interest to those working on political protest movements and factional ties. (shrink)

The English edition of Moscovici's classic work on the social representation of psychoanalysis enables us to reflect on the historical origins of psychoanalytic ideas and of social representation theory itself. Moscovici claimed that science was both univocal and abstract and, in these respects, it differs from the social representations of commonsense. This paper explores these notions, especially in relation to Moscovici's claim that psychoanalytic theory is to be found in Freud's first formulations. It is suggested that some of the processes, (...) which Moscovici attributes to the passage of psychoanalytic ideas to commonsense, can be found occur in the early history of psychoanalysis. This can be seen in Freud's criticisms of the way Jung used the concept of “complex”. Moreover, psychoanalytic theory could never be univocal for it incorporated the voices of patients and their representations of the world. An examination of Studies on Hysteria reveals further multivocality as Freud uses both the “action” language of ordinary life and the reified, nominalized language of science. Examples are given in relation to the first formulations of the key psychoanalytic concept of “repression”. Some comparisons are made between Freud's first formulations of “repression” and Moscovici's first formulations of “social representation”. (shrink)