In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Affectivity and Personality: Mediated by the SocialMartin Heinze (bio)Keywordsaffectivity, sociality, personalism, psychiatric anthropologyBy emphasizing the concept of the person, Rosfort and Stanghellini are to be congratulated for overcoming a reductive concept self driven by the limits of neurobiological research. In this commentary, I emphasize some points about the context of these thoughts concerning the dialectic of nature and freedom and the social realm in which the connections of affectivity (...) and personhood are situated.As discussed in philosophical anthropology, the concept “person” involves both the human capacity for freedom and the legal status given to an individual in society. Nevertheless, even in its most intensive understanding as personality and lived freedom, human existence cannot be separated from its being natural (including being emotional). Moreover, being natural is the condition sine qua non for a free conduct of life. The dialectic of freedom and naturality is addressed by Rosfort and Stanghellini as “ontologic ambiguity” or, to use an older phrase, the structure of “homo duplex”. The aspect of passivity in human existence in which we are determined by our physiology, our environment, and our biography becomes visible. On the other hand, we also see the active dimension of personhood: the possibility to put ourselves into question, to relate to ourselves, to undergo change, and to invent ourselves anew. In the Plessnerian sense, the “ec-centric” nature of the human condition enables us to become active in this way. Plessner supplanted the dialectic between passivity and activity with his notion of Leidenschaft—passion. In the German word Leiden we find the double meaning of suffering and being passionate. Humans are bound to act between the spheres of nature and free will. They suffer from being in the world and can also be passionate by acting in this reality. Leidenschaft thematizes both passivity and activity as well as their unity. Human beings are passive through being dependent on their circumstances. They are passionate, however, when they reflect on these conditions or attempt to come to terms with them. From the dialectical understanding, a unique structure emerges as mutually conditioned, both active and passive. The “passionate man” (a term that Plessner uses to define humanity) synthesizes his being dependent on others with his own freedom to create himself. Passion can be understood as an enhancement of sensuality and spirituality in the context of the conditio humana: “Human reflectivity does not stop in front of sensuality but rather enhances it or weakens it—and both directions can be dangerous for sensuality.” (Plessner 1976, 167, author's translation). [End Page 273]With Kierkegaard, we have to express this even more intensively: a human being is not only shaped by the dialectic of freedom and nature, but—through living—is himself this dialectic. Thus, human personality and human freedom cannot be disconnected from the dimension of passivity that lies at the very heart of freedom. In Jacob Böhme's words, the human situation is that of Naturfreiheit—being free by and through its very own nature. It is neither apart from nature (naturlos) nor is its freedom abstract.The fundamental characteristics of human personality, as described by Rosfort and Stanghellini, are activity, responsibility, freedom, will, reflexivity, and self-distance, but also corporality. In the conduct of life, the realm where this is all realizes is the realm of human relationships to other human beings, that is, a shared world only out of which a successful self-relation can develop. In this sense, the authors quote Grøn: “The normative dimension thus pertains to the self that one already is in relating to others, to a world in between, and to oneself.” Grøn refers to Kierkegaard's attempt—but now with regard to psychopathology—to overcome the duality of human nature by transforming the concept of the self to that of the person. For psychiatric anthropology, there is no way to circumvent this. Thus, psychiatric theories that concern human being inevitably involve a personalistic perspective.Ferdinand Tönnies was the first to use the concept of person to describe social realities. In his classical study from 1887, “Community and Society” (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft), he contributed to philosophical personalism. Insofar as the person seeks... (shrink)